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ABSTRACT AND NOTE ON CHRONOLOGY
The thesis falls into three periods, each having 
roughly two sections. In the first period (1899-1902) we 
shall consider (I) Curzon's problem with the Indian Army 
and (II) The problem of Kitchener's appointment to India*
The second period (1903-1905) will consider Curzon' 
relationship with Kitchener over the question of Indian 
military administration against the background of 
(III) India's relations with the Home Government* We shall 
treat (IV and V) the struggle between Curzon and Kitchener 
for control of Indian army administration, leading to the 
abolition of the Military Member of Council in May, 1905*
The third period takes into account (VI) Curzon1s 
resignation and (VII) attempts to estimate Kitchener's 
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During the period when Curzon was Viceroy (1899- 
1905) and Kitchener Commander-in~Ghief (1902-1909)? a number 
of developments affected British policy in India and had a 
significant bearing on Indian army administration, The Boer 
War was perhaps the most decisive, bringing with it an 
immense interest in the military security and the vulnerabil­
ity of the Empire* At the same time, the ineptitude of 
Curzonfs military advisers in India - lacking an effective 
Commander-in-Chief - revealed weaknesses in India's military 
establishment, was accentuated by disclosures involving
racial collisions between Indians and European soldiers* It 
was in order to reform these abuses (and in conjunction with 
his fear of a possible Russian invasion and for India's 
external security) that the Viceroy obtained, in 1902, the 
services of the most distinguished soldier-administrator of 
his day, Lord Kitchener* However, subsequent divergence 
between the Government of India and the Home Government over 
the best method of advancing British policy in India, 
particularly In Central Asia, produced great friction; this 
friction was exacerbated by Kitchener's insistence on the 
abolition of the Military Member of the Viceroy's Council, 
which led to Curzon's resignation in the summer of 1905*
The controversy between Curzon and Kitchener, and 
the bitter legacy which it left, form the major subject of 
this thesis. In 1952 Sir Harold Nicolson wrote:
"To the end of his life he [Curzon] remained 
convinced that the Cabinet, and especially 
his old friend Nr. St* John Brodrick, Secre­
tary of State for India, had treated him 
shamefully. After seven years as Viceroy he 
returned to England an angry and embittered 
man.tT^
That controversy is significant for what It reveals about 
the formation of events in matters connected with Indian 
administration*
Curzon died in March 1925* Lord Bonaldshay, his 
biographer, became engaged in a scholarly three-volume work 
- begun in 1926 and completed in 1928 - the second volume of 
which carefully and impartially covered the circumstances 
leading to Curzon1s resignation* Nevertheless the storm of 
controversy and ill-feeling amidst which Curzon resigned his 
Viceroyalty left posthumous recriminations* In I960 Peter 
Fleming alluded to the fact that in 1926, while Bonaldshay 
was writing Curzon*s biography, Brodrick (then Lord Midleton) 
”had reason to fear” its publication: "There was clearly a 
risk that this bombshell might burst...” to the detriment of 
Brodrick1 s reputation and that ”If the spotlight of public 
interest was going to be focussed again on Curzon*s Vice­
royalty, Brodrick had strong motives for deflecting it from 
the fatal wrangle with Kitchener on to the earlier disagree­
ments - more Imperial, more impersonal - over Tibet and
2
Afghanistan.”
1. Nicolson, H*, King George the Fifth: His Life and Beign, 
p.84, n.l.
2. Fleming, P., Bayonets to Lhasa, pp.292-3.
1In June 1926, Brodrick had indeed composed a secret 
pamphlet in which he stated his own version of the facts0 We 
may well ask what was Brodrick1 s purpose in creating ’’some 
semblance of a Blast-proof shelter” for himself in this way* 
His own testimony at the time gives us a clue, for it was 
his Belief ’’that temper and not policy governed Curzon1 s 
attitude” towards the Home Government during the last two 
years of Curzon rs Viceroyalty when Brodrick was Minister for 
India* Accordingly, he suggested to Balfour the compilation 
of a comprehensive memorandum which he proposed to publish 
in the event of any misrepresentation on the part of Curzon’s 
Biographer; he also proposed to supply the memorandum to 
Ronaldshay "telling him that we have no desire to make any 
publication unless the papers left By Curzon involve dis­
closures which are quite at variance with the facts as we 
2see them*”
A fortnight later he informed Balfour: "Ronaldshay 
is getting on with his narrative & is Beginning to ask me 
searching questions * * * Despite Brodrick*s imprecations, 
Ronaldshay attempted to deal with the events surrounding 
Curzon!s resignation in a fair-minded way* Morever It is now 
possible to examine Kitchener’s papers as well as those of 
the Cabinet and Defence Committee; With the publication in 
1958 of Sir Philip Magnus’ admirable biography of Kitchener,
1* Pleming, P*, Bayonets to Lhasa, pp*292-3*
2* Brodrick to Balfour', 4- June 1926, Balfour MSS 4-9721*
3* Ibid * / I
8we are in a position to view both sides of the picture.
Magnus was obliged to give the dispute with Curzon 
only a brief chapter, and as seen from Kitchener!s view­
point. Hitherto no comprehensive study has been made examin­
ing the circumstances surrounding these events. Contemporary 
writers like L. Mosley, K. Young and the late lord Beaver- 
brook all refer to Curzon^ dispute with Kitchener and 
emphasise, not the circumstances of his Viceroyalty, but the 
verdict passed on him by the Home Government and by history, 
therefore it seemed useful and desirable in the present 
study to examine in detail the issues raised by the problem 
of Indian army administration, which became the central 
theme in Curzon's struggle with the Commander-In-Chief, and 
in his subsequent resignation.
With the opening of the private papers of Lord 
Curzon, the Balfour and Brodrick (Lord Midleton) papers, as 
well as the recently available records of the Committee of 
Imperial Defence and Cabinet, much new light is thrown on 
affairs connected with Indian administration. In preparing 
this thesis many other private papers have been consulted, 
including the Kitchener, Ampthill, Asquith, Haldane, Minto 
and Morley MSB; in addition, the Journals and Letters of 
Viscount Esher and the biography of Kitchener by Sir Philip 
Magnus have proved exceptionally useful. The purchase by 
the British Museum of the Marker-Kitchener correspondence,
in conjunction with that of the Sydenham MBS, has made it 
possible to trace Kitchener’s secret contacts in his struggle 
with Curzon for control over army administration. Besides 
these, the offioial records of the Government of India and 
the India Office, Parliamentary Papers and debates, news­
papers and contemporary secondary sources have been consulted
CHAPTER I
CTIRZOH’B PROBLEM WITH THE INDIAN ARMY
(1) The Army and India.
It was not long after its incorporation that the 
East India Company of London Trading Merchants found it 
necessary to employ military forces to protect its possess­
ions and interests. These forces were of two kinds: armed 
native Indians called Sepoys who were usually enrolled in 
its factories, and a small body of European soldiers used 
for the purpose of defence. In the early days of the Company 
the three centres of trade, and thus Company control, were 
Madras, Bombay and Calcutta and the armies of these presi­
dencies developed independently as the Company expanded from 
its three bases. The Acts of 1773 1783 gave the Governor-
General overall control of its armies but they remained 
separate until well after the Mutiny in 1857* The most 
important problem connected with India was that of defence 
and it became an axiom of the Company’s policy that India 
was ruled by force of arms, The troops needed for that pur­
pose came from several sources; Royal regiments were origin­
ally used in emergencies in aid of the Company and later 
became permanently garrisoned in the country. Always by far 
the most efficient and reliable force, they came to be 
regarded with some jealousy by the Company’s civil and 
military officers who were naturally conscious of their 
inferior position. The Company’s armies consisted of both
Europeans and Indians, but by far the larger proportion of 
the army was composed of Sepoy regiments, officered by 
Europeans * At a time when the Gompany's territories were 
rapidly expanding these forces frequently cast up men with 
resource and ability, adding a valuable link between the 
civil service on the one hand and the military on the other; 
and introducing a much-needed element of flexibility* Often, 
however, these soldiers - who were paid regularly and lived 
in comparatively good conditions - attached too much import­
ance to their prestige and this created friction* With the 
passage of time both Royal and Company troops came to look 
upon !the natives' with some contempt and in that way a gulf 
sprang up between the army and the civilian population.
Ihe shock of the Mutiny left a deep and lasting 
impression upon military administration for it had demon­
strated clearly that Britain did not rule India by consent.
In 1859 the Peel Commission established principles of 
military policy which were to endure for more than half a 
century, greatly influencing matters connected with the 
defence of India. Although the Queen's proclamation of 1858 
declared non-discrimination regarding the employment of 
Indians in the service of the Crown as well as the principle 
of racial equality, nevertheless that principle was virtually 
disregarded. The British element in the Indian army was 
increased while the Indian diminished until a rough propor­
tion of one to two was reached. Instead of having a salutary
12
effect, the Queen's declaration led to a spirit of caution 
in British army administration* In every measure of policy 
affecting the Indian army the cardinal principle was the 
prevention of mistakes which in the past had led to catas­
trophe* For the moment two Indian Battalions were brigaded 
with one European, and no important station was without its 
European complement of troops. As before, Indian regiments 
continued to be officered by Europeans but it was natural 
that the result tended to forego the needs of the future by 
remedying the failures of the past. That ratio, in addition 
to the practice of keeping the whole of artillery and control
of all arsenals in European hands, engendered bitterness and
1
the feeling of racial discrimination among Indians. More­
over, during the post-Mutiny era as the tide of British moral 
superiority rose in India and grew, that attitude did 
nothing to relieve the bitterness from the emotional 
involvement of the past. Affront, uncertainty and the degra­
dation of fearing those whom the army had attempted to intim­
idate, gave rise to insecurity, the doctrine of race superi­
ority and often contempt on the part of British soldiers 
towards Indians. In this connection officials in India and 
London viewed with grave anxiety the problem of race hatred;
1* Singh, H.L., Problems and Policies of the British in 
India ±8Q5-98~v7T3‘8TTSS:---------------- ----- --
and in particular the Indian army,^ as we shall see, pre­
sented peculiar hazards to the maintenance of British 
prestige.
At the close of the Mutiny, the European army num­
bered some 40,000 men and gradually increased until, in 1905? 
there were 75?000 European troops with an additional 140,000 
Indian forces, to which were added 2,700 British officers 
attached to the latter and 1,000 staff officers. Further, 
there were 35?000 men in the Indian Reserve, 35,000 European 
and Eurasian Volunteers, and nearly 20,000 Imperial Service 
troops recruited from the Indian States. The annual cost of 
the army was borne entirely by Indian revenues and by 1905 
constituted an impressive figure* The total net military 
expenditure amounted to 25% or roughly 20 millions sterling 
out of a total revenue of 82 millions. This was considerable 
when compared with that of Great Britain who spent only 30
millions out of a revenue of 144 millions on her military
p
preparations* Along with its role of defending India's 
borders while maintaining internal law and order, the London 
Government looked upon the Indian army as an Imperial 
reserve, available in emergencies to enforce British policy
1. Technically the term 'Indian army* lacked legality. The 
official designation was the 'army of India', Whereas 
Indian forces were subject to the Indian Articles of War, 
British officers and soldiers serving with the Indian 
forces were subject to the Army Act. But the term 'Indian 
army1 was in current use and will be used in this thesis. 
See ibid., p*158.
2. Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 4th Series, vol.147 
(Speech by Brodrick, 21 June 1905) cols.1238-9*
in campaigns in Africa and in China., There were constant
protests against this practice of denuding India's garrisons
while indenting her revenues for Imperial campaigns elsewhere,
This created a potentially dangerous political situation
while providing much ammunition for later grievance on the
part of western educated Indians; and in time we find Gandhi
writing that India must possess "the power to refuse to send
a single soldier outside India for the purpose of enslaving
tthe surrounding or remote nationalities*"
Some attempt must he made to note the system of 
Indian military administration, as it had emerged towards 
the close of the 19th century* Since 1795 the position of 
the Commander-in-Chief was usually assured as a Member of 
Council, and at all events since that date, had been 
appointed to a seat on the Council. Up till 1861 the military 
as well as the civil affairs of India were not in the charge 
of any particular Member of the Council, but were dealt with 
by the Council as a whole. The appointment of a Military 
Member of Council appears to have first been proposed in the 
year 1833. In that year, on the expiry of the East India 
Company's Charter of 1813, a bill was introduced into 
Parliament depriving the Company of its commercial monopolies. 
and providing for the better government of the Company's 
territories in India* One of the points taken up in the Bill
-L* Yo'ufl.g India, 8 December 1920.
was the extension of the authority of the Governor-General 
over the three Presidencies, and the strengthening of his 
Gouncil by the addition of three Members, one of whom was to 
be a military officer* In 1?86 the Military Department was 
created, and formed the channel for the issue of the orders 
of the Supreme Government to the executive heads of the army. 
In the years following the Mutiny, the whole of Indian 
administration came under the control of one strong central 
government, As the three bases of British rule and their 
armies tended to diminish in importance, the separate armies 
and Commanders of Madras, Bombay and Calcutta were accord­
ingly abolished in 1893, to provide one unified system In
the face of the proximity of Russia to the frontiers of 
1India. These changes came into effect In April 1895*
The Army of India had but one head - the Governor- 
Gefieral in Council - and the Military Member of Council was 
the representative of the Governor-General in Council 
collectively. By law, every act done by the Military Member 
was an act of the Governor-General in Gouncil; similarly the 
Commander-in-Chief acted on the basis of authority delegated 
by the Viceroy. The Viceroy could at any time intervene, But
p
during Curzon's Viceroyalty, for purely administrative
1. Singh, op*cit., pp.158-9*
2, George Ifathaniel, first Marquess of Curzon of Kedleston
(1859-1925) Under-Secretary for India 1891-2; Viceroy of 
India 1898-1905; Lord President of the Council and Member 
of the War Council 1916-18; Foreign Secretary 1919-24,
reasons lie found it more convenient to intervene through, 
the Military Member; in that way the Viceroy could bring 
cases of abuse committed in the army within his immediate 
purview and control; and it was this control and interference 
that subsequently created friction.
Responsibility for military administration thus 
became divided between two officers, the Commander-in-Chief 
who was the first military adviser to the Viceroy and 
executive head of the Army, and the Military Member who 
(invariably) was a second and alternative adviser, As the 
various departments of administration in India were each in 
the charge of a member, both the Commander-in-Chief, and the 
Military Member were members of the Viceroy's Council (col­
lectively described as the Governor-General of India in 
Council) in whom was vested by the Crown (under the Charter 
Act of 18J3) 'The superintendence, direction, and control of 
the whole Civil and Military Government of all our territor­
ies and revenues in India* * It is important to understand 
that the many duties of the Commander-in-Chief were quite 
sufficient to occupy his time and energies, besides making 
frequent absences from the seat of Government inevitable.
The Military Member and his department were designed, to 
provide an expert check upon military expenditure, by far 
the largest single expense in the administration of British 
India and subsequently a major source of grievance to Indians, 
Political considerations also buttressed this division of
administrative responsibilities in military matters, as Lord 
Roberts emphasised in a debate in the House of Lords in 1905:
"I have no hesitation in saying that in my 
opinion it is essential to the security of 
India that the Viceroy should not be depen­
dent on the advice of a single soldier, how­
ever eminent and distinguished he may be.
Even if he were an Indian officer and his 
experience had been entirely Indian, as was 
the case with myself, I consider It would 
be advantageous for the Viceroy to have at 
his side a second adviser not directly con­
nected with the Army* But when the Commander- 
in-Chief is ... a complete stranger to India,
I consider it to be a positive danger to our 
hold over the country that he should be the 
only one to advise the Viceroy on military 
matters ... It is essential that the Viceroy 
should have on his Council an officer - he 
need not be a great soldier - intimately 
acquainted with India, especially with the 
Native Army, its feelings and its idiosyn­
crasies* "1
That system was based on the British soldier who 
was trained to be a universal policeman and in an emergency, 
was expected - as an armed man under severe discipline - to 
be capable of great initiative, independent action, a high 
sense of duty, morale, efficiency and a multitude of other 
worthy traditions. Above all he was an object lesson to, as 
well as a member of, the British community in India, suscep­
tible to whatever forces moved his superiors* His task was to
1. Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 1 August 1905, 4th Series, 
vol.150, colso1096-7® Roberts (1832-1914) was the greatest 
military authority on India of the day, and had Inspired 
Kitchener during their time together in the South African 
War* Roberts had served in India during the Viceroyalties 
of Canning, Elgin, Lawrence, Mayo, Northbrook, Lytton, 
Dufferin and Lansdowne, and had been Commander-in-Chief 
in India for seven years, 1885-93*
obey, and yet he was supposed to lead an exemplary life on 
the theory that peace depended upon the traditional mainten­
ance of a powerful navy which dominated all strategy while 
the army was merely maintained as a form of military police 
to garrison the Empire. Small wonder that in many cases and 
under peculiar circumstances the system failed.
The health and comfort of soldiers was always the
subject of concern to authorities in India, and one of her
foremost soldiers became renowned for his efforts to lighten
the burden of the average soldier, which Kipling's ballad
so well expressed:
Now they've made a bloomin' Lord 
Outer Bobs,
Which was but 'is fair reward - 
Weren't it, Bobs?
So 'e'll wear a coronet 
Where 'is 'elmet used to set;
But we know you won't forget - 
Will yer, Bobs?
Then 'ere's to Bobs Bahadur - little Bobs,
Bobs, Bobs,
Pocket-Wellington an 'arder - 
Rightin'1 Bobs, Bobs, Bobs!
This ain't no bloomin' ode,
But you've 'elped the soldier's load,
An' for benefits bestowed,
Bless yer, Bobs!1
In 1887 Roberts Introduced a scheme in India which aimed at 
providing the soldier with greater facilities for social 
intercourse amidst more comfortable surroundings. Instrumen­
tal in raising the moral standard of the army, he, and his
1. James, D., Lord, Roberts, pp.242-3.
successors, abolished the fixed price of beer at 4 annas a 
quart and scrutinised the canteen profits made by Government 
malt and liquor contractors. His assault on the brewers and 
their vested interests, collectively known as 'the Beerage', 
became legendary, for they had compelled the soldier to 
spend his money on local beer (which he disliked) while pre­
venting him from consuming English beer (which he preferred). 
Venereal disease presented a chronic problem gravely impair­
ing the efficiency of the army* In 1894-5 ratio of 
admissions to hospital fox* V.D. was 511*4 per 1,000 per 
annum, and 522.3 per 1,000 per annum, subsequently reduced
by Kitchener so that by 1907-8 the figures stood at 89*9 and
169*0 per 1,000. The number of assaults of soldiers on 
Indians in 1903 was 72, reduced in 1905 to 24.^ British 
officers took great pride in reforming these abuses and on 
one occasion, while visiting troops at a parade at Poona, 
Kitchener spoke rather severely on the subject of V.D. One 
of the officers asked a soldier "what he had understood me 
to say. The man replied 'His Lordship congratulated us on 
our efficiency in the field and our discretion in the 
boudoir1", and the Commander-in-Chief reported to the 
Viceroy "good was it not?"-^
1. Record of Lord Kitchener's Administration of the Army 
in India, 1902-1909* pp«241-6. Minto MSS 836.
2. Ibid.
3* Kitchener to Minto, 30 November 1906, Minto MSS 979*
Army life tended to be monotonous and insufferably 
dull. The regiment was the centre of cliquishness, inevitable 
in any ingrown and exclusive association which took pride in 
maintaining its prestige* Men were stationed for long 
periods of time in all parts of India, often where there 
were hardly any of their countrymen. Usually merchants or 
officials had little desire to associate with soldiers and 
seldom allowed their womenfolk to do so. The world of the 
soldier was therefore filled with long hours spent on 
parades, drills, inspections, on sentry duty; or on polishing 
belts, bayonets, cleaning guns, or marching, often with the 
temperature around 108 degrees* The routine life of the 
barrack-room had its effect and troops often became destruc­
tive and given to behaviour characterised by drunkenness, 
brawling, beer-swilling or brutal licentiousness. Banded 
together in compact units, soldiers were animated by a 
fierce antagonism of any official censure of their conduct 
and winked at abuses committed by their comrades, especially 
where these involved Indians. In 1904 the Viceroy reported 
that in 19 out of 20 cases involving clashes between Indians
and soldiers "the cause of the mischief is that the English
1soldiers are either after a woman or are drunk."
Because she was an island, England never accepted 
the Army with sufficient seriousness, regarding the Navy as
1. Curzon to Brodrick, 3 March 1904. Note: Unless otherwise 
indicated all references to Curzon are cited from the 
Curzon Papers at the India Office Library, Eur.MSS. F.lll. 
See Bibliography for their corresponding arrangement.
her first line of defence. The military profession there­
fore, more often than not, provided a 'proper occupation1 
for the sons of country gentlemen pleasantly supplementing 
a generous private income © The association of the gentry 
with the officer class reflected a considerable amount of 
tinconscious arrogance and contempt in the army (especially 
towards one's inferiors) and a military career was indeed 
preferable -to such alternative occupations (with their 
attendant loss of social prestige) as selling bonds or 
insurance, entering a good law firm or perhaps the pulpit*
In that way, the traditional view of the honour of the pro­
fession of arms died hard, with regrettable consequences. 
Successive cabinets tried to improve matters, most notably 
Cardwell during Gladstone's ministry of 1868-74. Neverthe­
less efforts at reform met with blistering opposition and 
the dead-hand of tradition, followed by public apathy. One 
of the more serious shortcomings of the British Army lay in 
the proliferation of factions and cliques among its officers 
and the disagreements of the military experts themselves on 
questions of strategy. Rivalry among the professional 
soldiers often stemmed from the past and the long and bitter 
struggle between Crown and Parliament for control of the 
army (as symbolised by the presence of the archaic 'German 
sausage', H.ReH* the Duke of Cambridge, Commander-in-Chief 
from 1856 to 1895 who died in 1904 at the age of 84), and 
in part from the administrative mismanagement and inefficiency
of ministers and statesmen who seldom agreed on matters 
related to the conduct of military operations. The resulting 
chaos was demonstrated hy the Crimean War, the Indian Mutiny 
and more particularly, the Boer War when a glaring spot­
light was cast on the shortcomings of the British Army.
Nowhere was there a greater divergence of military 
opinion than between what became known as the 'Wolseley 
Ring* and the 'Roberts Ring' which culminated in the fiasco 
of the siege of Ladysmith during the Boer War. Antagonism 
had sprung up from the Wolseley faction, who zealously 
denied promotion to men who had served with Roberts in India. 
Furthermore, disagreement and friction arose as to what part 
India should play in the event of hostilities between 
England and Russia. In 1888 Roberts maintained that 
Britain's greatest danger was her exposure to potential 
Russian aggression in Central Asia while Wolseley contended 
that meeting Russia, say in Afghanistan, would automatically 
forfeit Britain's enormous advantages of sea power.^
It took the shock and humiliation of defeat In three 
successive disasters in 1899 at Magersfontien, Stormberg and 
Colenso, followed by the blockade of three British garrisons 
in Ladysmith, Kimberley and Mafeking to bring home to the
1* See Greaves, R.L., Persia and the Defence of India 1884- 
1892 for a full analysis of Roberts1 views and their 
Impact on British policy during the 80*s and 90's, p*3#
See also two recent books, Symons, J., Buller's Campaign, 
pp.16-17? and Lehmann, Je, All Sir Garnet: 'A Life of 
Lord Wolseley 1853-1913? pp7E5T757293l ~
ff* rj
i v  v j
country the failure of British arms. As events in South 
Africa disclosed fatal defects in the methods of war organi­
zation, confidence in the professional ability of soldiers 
waned* Insufficient maps for example led to masses of troops 
persistently hurled against carefully prepared positions 
when, if properly reconnoitred, they might easily have been 
taken* Breakdown in supply and transport arrangements brought 
troops into traps where once isolated, they were ambushed,
while whole bodies of men remained out of touch from the
were
main army and/ forced to surrender from want of ammunition 
and support. When it is remembered that the British enjoyed 
a numerical superiority of four to one over the enemy, small 
wonder that prestige and reputations suffered, though Incom­
petent blunders were termed 1regrettable incidents1 in the 
official despatches home* In England, when intellectuals 
did focus upon military matters it was to the effect that 
war was too serious a matter to leave to soldiers and L*S. 
Amery voiced much of the outrage of the British press when 
he wrote:
"Regarded as an institution of society the 
British Army of 1899 was undoubtedly a 
success9 The numbers on its rolls were large, 
the uniform of the members through all the 
ranks of the military hierarchy most dis­
tinctive, their traditional ceremonies, known 
as inspections, parades, guards, elaborate 
and pleasing to the eye, the regulations to 
which they submitted infinitely complex* As 
a fighting machine it was largely a sham*"!
* f
1* Amery, L*S* (ed*) The Times History of the War in South 
Africa, II, p*40.
The ensuing loss of public confidence in the
capacity of soldiers and statesmen alike created a new mood
in the country, with the result that the Edwardian public,
1ever alert for a hero, exalted in force and violence* But 
the army sent to South Africa was the victim less of war 
than of the War Office and though subsequently the Govern­
ment sought to save itself by blaming its generals, in 1903
the Elgin Commission of Inquiry laid the responsibility for
2failure on the British Cabinet* Once again there were 
frantic efforts to overhaul the defective machinery, first 
by St* John Brodrick, then by H*0* Arnold~Forster and 
finally by R*B* Haldane# In the meantime confusion over 
Britainfs military affairs rapidly accelerated*
In the face of mounting criticism and public outcry, 
the Cabinet had, on 19 January 1900, replaced General Buller, 
a member of the * Wolseley Ring1, by Lord Roberts as Comman­
der-in-Chief of the forces in South Africa* The selection 
of Lord Kitchener^ was made to act as Roberts1 Chief of 
Staff* As we shall see, Kitchener alone emerged from the
1. See Terraine, J<>, Dougles Haig, The Educated Soldier, 
pp.13,15,24*
2# Esherj Letters and Journals, I, p#39^*
3* Horatio~T3erTJert Kitchener, 1st Earl Kitchener of Khartoum 
(1850-1916)# Served in Wolseleyfs expedition to relieve 
Gordon, 1884-5; Sirdar of the Egyptian army 1892; Victor 
of the battle of Omdurman in the reconquest of the Sudan, 
1898; Followed Roberts as Commander-in-Chief in South 
Africa, 1900-02; Commander-in-Chief in India, 1902-09, 
Field Marshall, 1909; Consul General in Egypt, 1911; 
Secretary of State for War 1914; drowned when the H.M.S* 
Hampshire sank off Orkneys en route to Russia, 1916#
Boer War with his reputation enhanced and his prestige 
intact* Eor most of Britain1s commanders Africa had once 
more proved her curse as the graveyard of military reputa­
tions: and as the Viceroy of India wrote "What a war of mis­
calculations this has beenl It has been marked by a positive
1hecatomb of reputations." By his choice and at the express 
wish of the Government of India, Kitchener was then sent to 
India to reform her archaic system of army administration. 
Tot owing to a peculiar set of circumstances, a fierce 
struggle developed between the Viceroy and the new Commander 
in-Chief over the best way of advancing the interests of the 
Empire, to whose service both were dedicated* This struggle 
was waged for control of Indian army administration* Once 
again the Cabinet intervened, this time less decisively 
whilst a bitter and protracted conflict ensued between what 
John Morley termed the ’Kitchenerites * and the f Curzonians *. 
During a period of increasing unrest and instability that 
quarrel helped to obscure more fundamental issues which were 
to emerge, affecting British rule in India for the next 
generation*
In March 1900 the Secretary of State for India, Lord 
George Erancis Hamilton illustrated the shortcomings of the 
army in his letters to the Viceroy and his forebodings
1* Bee Curzon to Hamilton, 10 January 1901
presaged events soon to occur in India* He characterised the
military profession as !,not sufficiently a serious service.
A good figure, a tight waistband ... and physical proficiency
are supposed to he sufficient equipment", "brainpower ... is
1laughed at or ridiculed by the average British officer." 
Hamilton was dismayed by the spectacle of Britain's system 
of army administration and more especially the rivalry 
between military factions: "the jealousy, the dislikes, the 
army cliques are quite indescribable,, They seem to ramify
p
in all directions," The Permanent Under Secretary of State 
for India, Sir Arthur G-odley, shared that attitude: "the 
general character of the army, its easy life, its expensive­
ness, Its devotion to amusements, its tendency to shield and 
overlook all shortcomings, will go on exactly as at present,
and the British officer will remain what he has always been,
5
an amateur, and generally a stupid amateur."^
lowards the close of the 19th century British states­
men began to realise that though the navy was the keystone 
of England!s power, it was the army which maintained the 
prestige of British rule. Lord Salisbury, the aging Prime 
Minister, along with his nephew and successor, A.J.Balfour,
1* George Francis Hamilton (1845-1927) was formerly 1st Lord 
of the Admiralty (1885-6 : 1886-92) and Secretary of 
State for India 1895-1905* A tolerant and sympathetic 
Conservative he allowed Curzon generous rein during the 
period of their association*
2. Ibid., 50 May 1900.
5* GocIXey to Curzon, 22 November 1900. Godley (later Lord
Kilbracken, 1847-1932) served as Permanent Under Secretary 
at the India Office from 1885 to 1909#
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recognised the seriousness of the blow which British prestige 
had suffered at the hands of a few thousand ill-trained 
farmers during the Boer War* He became acutely concerned 
about the problem of racialism* fearing that prestige in 
British arms might be so impaired that sedition and revolt 
would break out in India in the event of her becoming 
involved in hostilities* In a remarkable letter to H*S* 
Northcote, then Governor of Bombay, he opened his mind on 
several aspects of that situation:
"... It interests me to find that you are 
struck with the 1 damned nigger1 element in 
the British society of Bombay* It is bad 
enough in official and military circles here*.
I look upon it as not only offensive and un­
worthy but as representing what is now, and 
will be in a highly magnified proportion, a 
serious political danger* But I preach in the 
wilderness* It belongs to that phase of 
British temper which in the last few months 
has led detachment after detachment of 
British troops into the most obvious ambus­
cades - mere arrogance * * * Compare our 
treatment of the native races with that of 
Russia* We have in vain tried here - with 
the Queen to back us - to obtain some por­
tion of military honours and grades for the 
native princes* It is not conceivable that 
they should bear for two more generations 
this ostentatious mark of contempt: that 
those of their race are not allowed to fill 
any high command* It is the fashion in which 
lurkey treats her Christian subjects* But we 
in India are a good deal less numerous than 
the lurks: and the Indian populations are 
infinitely more numerous than the Rajahs.
It is painful to see the dominant race 
deliberately going over into the Abyss*”
Salisbury went on to emphasise the tactical disadvantages
which would ensue when and if Russia should apply the
leverage of her Central Asian rail-roads in Afghanistan:
"There is another Indian policy or rather 
Indian neglect which greatly afflicts me 
and on which I have preached in vain both 
to Lansdowne and Curzon, I mean the want ofn 
the military railway from Quetta to Seistan 
• *. I acknowledge that Curzon is exonerated 
by the terrible financial problems he has 
had to meet. But our delay in making this 
railway may cause us great embarrassment.
It means that when Russia advances we shall 
have to fight her on the Indian frontier.
The strain of doing so will be enormous: 
our defence will be a frontal attack on a 
mountain barrier, which is not held by our­
selves. Occasionally the defence will fail 
for a time - and a spasm of sedition will 
start from one end of India to the other.
On the other hand, if you had a railhead at 
Seistan - connected with Quetta - or better 
still with the sea - Russia could not 
advance Eastward without masking your force 
at Seistan: an enormous effort. I am not so 
bent on this because I believe Russia has 
any definite view of conquering India. But 
when her Siberian railway is ready, she 
will want to be mistress of the greater 
part of China: and if Afghanistan is unpro­
tected she can force us to give way In 
China by advancing upon India* She won*t 
try to conquer it* It will be enough for 
her if she can shatter our Government and 
reduce India to anarchy. These things will 
not concern me - but my successors of I 
know not what degree. But nevertheless the 
forecast is not pleasant.*."2
Though that problem and the fears which it created 
were largely insolubley there remained for the Cabinet one
1. Seistan was the eastern-most province of Persia and was 
contiguous to India« The Government of India under 
Curzon were obsessed by the fear of Russian Influence and 
penetration in Seistan. See Nicolson, H., Lord Carnock, 
p.240. —
2. Salisbury to Northcote, 8 June 1900$ Grenville, J.A.S., 
Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy: the Close of the 
Nineteenth Century, pp.295-6■ Grenville provides ause­
ful’ background of the role of India in British foreign 
policy during the period 1895-1902.
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alternative; the discovery of some effective instrument for
Moreover,
the restoration of prestige in British arms*/*Aemphasis on 
the rightness of Britain's Imperial responsibilities grew 
and so too did the doctrines of paternalism, trusteeship and 
benevolent despotism* Curzon's Yiceroyalty marked the flood 
tide of Imperial rule in India, but the doctrines which he 
espoused turned out to be false ones - he found himself 
stumbling on the very ground where he thought himself most 
firmly footed. Furthermore the Cabinet was coming round to 
view with undisguised approval rule by the strong arm and 
here again they saw in Kitchener the most effective instru­
ment to achieve that aim.
In India in the meantime Ourzon considered himself 
a supreme bureaucrat served by his departments, with the 
civil service on his right hand and the army on his left.
As Viceroy he believed he could exercise a salutary influence 
throughout British Government in India*
Curzon1s brand of Imperialism rested on the hypothe­
sis that were it not for the British Raj India would lapse 
into chaos: "I am an Imperialist heart and soul"#he told the 
Liberal John Morley in 1900, He professed that in the long 
run the Imperial ideal "made for good government, righteous­
ness and freedom; I do not see how any Englishman, contrast­
ing India as it is now with what it was, and would certainly 
have been, under any other conditions than British rule, 
can fail to see that we came and have stayed here under no
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blind or Gapricious impulse "but .. ♦ for the lasting benefit 
of millions of the human race,"
Regarding it as his personal duty to see that 
British Government in India rested securely on a moral "basis, 
Gurzon set about righting abuse as well as carrying forward 
an exhaustive programme of reform. Determined to make his 
administration efficient as well as memorable, Curzon was 
the new type of public engineer who devoted his vigorous 
ability to the operation of an administrative machinery 
capable of reacting sensitively to the needs of the Indian 
people. In constructing his edifice, Curzon so designed 
matters as to be able to get to the bottom of every case, to 
the heart of every detail, to the root of every defect* 
Curzon1s intellectual temper had been sharpened at Balliol 
College, Oxford where he had learned to judge issues strictly 
on their merit, with a ruthless detachment from all emotion. 
Bo conscious of detail was he that In any dispute he was apt 
to emphasise a small point as a great one and few Viceroys 
were lea*st loved as Curzon. Nevertheless dislike of Curzon 
was accompanied by respect and the heat which he generated 
must not obscure the light which resulted. His chief 
business was to set up his machine and get it to work 
effectively as soon as possible, regardless of the resent­
ment of change it brought to a Civil Service enmeshed in
1. Curzon to Morley, 17 June 1900.
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comfortable routine and few of his changes did not turn out 
to be improvements. As he himself said, the Viceroy 
"must be very courageous ••* all around are great problems 
to be taken up, which have been shirked for years, almost 
for generations, because they are more likely to ruin than 
to make reputations."^ Nowhere was the Viceroy's energetic 
activity more resented than in cases of abuses committed by 
European soldiers in the Indian army.
Hitherto few historians have cared to dwell on 
Curzon1s crusade for social justice in India* Yet no consid­
eration of his Viceroyalty would be complete which failed to 
take into account his strong sense of moral duty to ensure 
integrity and fair play in Indian administration* Curzon 
embarked on. a campaign to end collisions between soldiers
and Indians and to prevent the racial estrangement which he
2knew they involved. Like Bipon before him he became unpopu­
lar with his own community and the target for much abuse. 
Undeterred he risked unpopularity in order to vindicate 
British rule from the charge of iniquity and went out of his 
way to investigate collisions between the races* This brought 
resentment and in that way Curzon opened a potential feud 
with the Indian army,
1, Curzon to Morley, 17 June 1900.
2* Lord Bipon (1827-1909) was Viceroy of India from 1880 to 
1884. In 1883 he had attempted in the Ilbert Bill to 
enable Indian judges to try Europeans and thus remove 
juridical disqualifications based on race in India, His 
action aroused much ill-feeling and was vigorously 
opposed by the European community and the bill had to be 
withdrawn* .
(2) "His Excellencyfs Attitude Towards Bin"
W.HIIBI EJ>H, I »lW 1 ^rftW<>)^ a*nil»l(MillMW*WiMg»UnC.II— I—Mill 1— WT —
Realising the harm caused 'by the potent factor of 
racialism in the Indian army Curzon embarked on a series of 
close investigations culminating in the discovery of an 
ugly disclosure, greatly prejudicing his mind against India’s 
system of military justice as well as the civilian adminis­
tration when it concerned the conduct of European soldiers 
towards Indians, Early in 1899 soldiers of the West Kent 
Regiment stationed at Rangoon had assaulted and raped a 
Burmese woman, A trial had been held at which conflicting 
evidence tended only to shield the culprits* They were 
acquitted and for a time the affair was hushed up. When 
the Viceroy accidentally heard of the matter his resolute 
sense of moral righteousness was deeply stirred and he 
became particularly irritated when he discovered "the extra­
ordinary apathy displayed by the local military authorities" 
in seeing justice done. Two principle issues were involved; 
military discipline and civilian administration of justice.
On 28 June Gurzon informed Hamilton that he intended to 
inflict severe punishment on the guilty parties, "... so 
important do I feel It for the sake of the reputation, both 
of the Army, and of British justice, that we should get to 
the bottom of this case," On 5 July, after closer examination 
he described what had occurred to the Secretary of State:
1. Gurzon to Hamilton, 14 June 1899*
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nThe woman was lying naked and covered with, 
filth, and one of the male witnesses testi­
fied his "belief that as many as 4-0 men had 
had connection with her."l
Curzon!s own moral code was outraged and contributed 
to the personal feeling with which he now pursued the case. 
No consideration of personal abuse, risk of unpopularity, 
or public disapproval would deter him. It is worthwhile, 
therefore, to ascertain how Gurzon visualised the problem of 
race hatred in India; for no aspect of that question was 
allowed to escape his eye as he indefatigably pursued the 
civil and military authorities who had thus so lamentably 
failed to discharge their moral obligations to British 
justice.
Accordingly, the West Kent regiment was banished 
for two years to Aden and the culprits dismissed while one 
General was relieved from his command. The civilian authori­
ties were severely censured for their part in what Gurzon
2
termed a gross miscarriage of justice. Finally, he issued 
an official statement, an Order in Council, in which he 
placed on public record the repugnance with which the Gov­
ernment of India viewed the negligence and apathy displayed 
by the responsible authorities. That action was tantamount 
to a declaration of war on the Indian army and inevitably 
there were strong reactions. Kis vigorous and
forthright measures were lauded In the English press both in
1* Curzon to Hamilton, 5 July 1899.
2. Ibid., 25 January 1900.
India and in England and tlie Indian National Congress passed
a resolution expressing gratitude lor his determination "to
uphold the interests of order and justice" by the subsequent
1issue of regulations on the conduct of soldiers*
Nevertheless the peremptory manner in which he served 
notice to the European community in India of his resolute 
desire for social justice might well have been more benefi­
cial had it been less calculated to put up the backs of the
tf|"*
Indian army and the Civil service. The resentment Curzonfs 
methods aroused was expressed in an anonymous article in 
(The Contemporary Review in August 1900. In particular the 
severity of the sentence was singled out for criticism:
"the banishment of the whole regiment to Aden, the compulsory 
retirement of its colonel and sergeant-major, the resignation 
of Its adjutant and the summary discharge of the offenders 
from the army" constituted "a disproportionate retribution." 
In addition, the Order-in-Council became the target of 
abuse: "The spectator stands amazed at the apparent lack of 
sense of proportion implied In this official order", for In 
the Viceroy's belligerent action was revealed "the unmistak-
p
able imprint of His Excellency's attitude towards Sin."
The 'Rangoon Outrage1, as the case became known,
3opened a fatal breach between Curzon and the army. In
1. Report of the Indian National Congress 1900, Resolution 
VII, p.70.
2. Contemporary Review, August 1900, !A Progressive Viceroy1 
by 1 Civilis
3. See Curzon to Hamilton, 16 May 1900, for his hostility 
to the army.
addition Curzon found that his efforts to prevent racial 
feeling produced a reaction against him among the European 
community as it gradually became known throughout the country 
that the Viceroy disapproved of European attitudes towards 
Indians, and their tacit approval of abuses and evasion of 
justice. Curzon told Hamilton:
"I grieve to say that, since I came to India,
I have not found a single man among *the 
better class1, to whose feelings you think 
that we might safely appeal, who either share 
my views, or could be relied upon to back 
them, at the cost of clamour or unpopularity.
They all admit privately that the occurrence 
of these incidents is regrettable, and that 
any failure of justice is shocking* But they 
think the collisions Inevitable and normal; 
they, almost to a man, contend that the blame 
rests with the Natives (which I certainly In 
my experience, have not found to be the case); 
and as for the judicial scandals - well, they 
shrug their shoulders and smile,"1
Curzon1s disposition moreover to approach the problems of
public administration from a personal point of view has been
2
examined by Harold Ni col son, but it is important to note 
that while Curzon received much credit for his popular 
reforms, correspondingly he also received the odium for any­
thing done that was unpopular. Curzon then has been criticised 
for having created his own personal problems with the Indian 
army. That judgement is not entirely fair to him, as we 
shall see.
In the summer following the Rangoon Outrage a number
1. Curzon to Hamilton, 25 September 1900,
2. See Nicolson, H., Curzon: The Last Phase 1919-1925? P*38.
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of incidents further exasperated the Viceroy; he detailed 
his increasing anxiety and mounting indignation in his
letters home, particularly over the cynical conduct of army
administration in India. On 13 June he wrote:
"... Pour British soldiers went out shooting - 
as usual without passes, without an inter­
preter, and in ignorance or in violation of 
the rules - shot, as usual, a peacock, had 
the usual row with the villagers, in the 
course of which their guns went off, as 
usual by accident, and as usual killed two
natives. ... these soldiers ... were, as
usual acquitted and released.1
Curzon*s indignation then grew warm:
1 these cases eat into my very soul* That 
such gross outrages should occur in the 
first place in a country under British rule; 
and then that everybody, commanding officers, 
officials, juries, departments, should con­
spire to screen the guilty, is, in my judge­
ment, a black and permanent blot upon the 
British name,1
Vehemently he condemned this travesty of justice which he 
feared would create a standing sore and thus materially 
weaken the bonds of rule in India, In the last resort he 
would use intimidation:
"My object is to purge away the stain; and 
if in five years I can terrify the British 
Army in India into conduct more becoming 
Christians and gentlemen, (and it will only 
be done by making them afraid), I shall have 
rendered a lasting service to British rule 
in this country.
Curzon once told Brands Younghusband that one of 
his main objects in India was the lessening of the gulf
1. Curzon to Hamilton, 13 Tune 1900.
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1between Indians and Englishmen, As an Imperialist Curzon 
hoped to strengthen the roots of British rule by removing 
just such abuses by setting an example of justice and fair 
play in granting necessary administrative reforms, thereby 
making British rule popular with the Indian people*
Yet his campaign against racial estrangement became 
more unpopular with his own countrymen as he continued to
exercise his authority against the pleasures and pastimes 
of the soldier in India* In September 1900 Curzon appointed 
a special committee to revise the shooting pass regulations 
and his actions met with discouragement and latent antagon­
ism. A spate of incidents now occurred. At Dinapore, one of 
the Munsters stabbed a washerman. At Port William a soldier 
shot an Indian tailor, confessed, and then pleaded insanity 
and was remitted to jail. Curzon blamed their officers for
2the actions of the "poor, clumsy, stupid, tactless Tommy..*" 
and determined to push ahead his unpopular crusade. "I 
worry all these cases to the last gasp: and I usually 
succeed in finding somewhere some almost criminal evasion 
of responsibility, or conspiracy to screen" he informed 
Hamilton, "I mean to hunt down the guilty parties*" With 
remorseless scrutiny Curzon soon became a kind of inspector 
general of the conduct of the Indian army. Characteristically
1. See The Nineteenth Century, May 1925* !Lord Curzon, A 
Personal Recollection* by Younghusband.
2. Curzon to Hamilton, 17 September 1900*
5* Ibid*, 25 September 1900.
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a year later, lie was able to pinpoint exactly what his 
experience with soldiers had taught him: "if I were asked 
to sum up in a single observation the most remarkable dis­
covery that I have made since I came to India, I should
i
unhesitatingly reply, the Frailty of Man*1 As the Viceroy 
increasingly uncovered lapses in the conduct of his military 
colleagues, his alarm grew* In an attempt to dramatise "the 
startling slackness of system that prevails in Military
p
Administration in this country" he continued to bombard 
the India Office with acid references* But he had reached 
the point where he understood the true nature of the problem 
of the army, race. "The fact is there is no justice in this 
country in cases where Europeans and Natives are concerned, 
and the fault lies not in our institutions, but in the 
racial spirit that is deeper than any institution."^
On one occasion he stumbled upon the fact that 
soldiers were still being flogged in India. He closely 
questioned the authorities on the point:
"Oh noI there was no truth in it* Then I 
pushed the Military Department further*
Yes, soldiers were still flogged, but only 
in prisons, which was analogous to the 
English practice. Still not satisfied I 
sent for a full statement of the exact prac­
tice, (a) in England, (b) in Indian military 
prisons; and this is what I found* Corporal 
punishment was for many years inflicted on 
military prisoners belonging to the British
1* Curzon to Hamilton, 25 September 1901.
2. Ibid., 28 February 1901•
5* Curzon to Godley, 15 August 1900.
Army -under the Prisons Acts of 1865 and 1877*
But in 1898 these Acts were amended; and the 
number of offences for which flogging was 
permitted was reduced to two; (1) mutiny or 
incitement thereto; (2) gross personal vio­
lence to an officer or servant of the prison,"
Gurzon was aghast to discover the fact that for three years
illegal flogging had been countenanced by the military
authorities simply because they were in total ignorance of
the change of law. He commented: "Good Lord, the things that
1the soldiers do in this country nearly turn my hair grey*" 
Quezon1 s desire to secure sound principles in his 
administration and dispense justice with an even hand, often 
blinded him in his appreciation of the true temper of the 
community to which he was temporarily attached. Sections of 
that community were deeply entrenched and hotly resented any 
tampering with their prerogatives* They took great care to 
preserve old and indolent traditions, such as regimental 
honour and the prestige of custom - they looked upon the 
office of Viceroy as purely ornamental, that he sould perhaps 
have passable brains, a firm seat on a horse and good behav­
iour, Above all he should be profoundly impressed with the 
idea of the inadequacy of his own qualifications and there­
fore rely on the good sense of his subordinates, who knew 
the ropes as well as the prevailing social etiquette and 
that sufficient administration resided in the fact that 
maximum superintendence lay in the minimum of interference.
1. Curzon to Hamilton, 16 October 1901*
They therefore invariably blamed Curzon personally for pro­
voking the insolence of the natives and found his attitude 
towards themselves, insufferable.
At the same time Curzon took great care to find a 
genuine basis from which to improve outstanding grievances 
in order to promote better racial feeling. He spent an 
infinite amount of labour in removing obstacles in the path 
of the army, For example he recognised that a great source 
of friction between European soldiers and Indians concerned 
assaults made upon punkah coolies. He intervened and in­
stalled electrically operated punkahs in Government barracks 
a benefit of no small importance during India1s hot weather* 
Any brief survey of Ourzonfs early Budget speeches reveals 
the valuable time he devoted to reviewing reduction of use­
less military expenditure, a constant source of grievance 
to the Indian National Congress: "I venture to say that no 
sterner critic, and no more uncompromising foe of extrava­
gance, or of levity in military expenditure, has ever 
entered the offices of the Government of India than myself#" 
In addition he asserted:
"My greatest ambition is to have a peaceful 
time in India, and to devote all my energies 
to the work of administrative and material 
development, in which there are so many p 
reforms that cry aloud to be undertaken#"
1* Curzon1s Budget Speech, 28 March 1900, quoted in Raleigh, 
I*, ed# Lord Curzon in India, Speeches 1898-1905, p.463* 
A complete se^~"oT Curzon1 s speeches was published in 
four volumes in Calcutta, 1900-1906#
2* Ibid#
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Moreover, Gurzon was concerned not to provoke friction with 
the Congress when the Indian Government despatched contin­
gents to South Africa and China, Anxious to reduce financial 
costs he told Hamilton:
,!I am inclined to doubt the wisdom of too 
frequently or regularly indenting upon the 
military resources of India for service in 
other parts of the Empire, even at the 
expense of the Imperial Exchequer; since it 
undoubtedly does place a formidable weapon 
in the hands of the Congress party, and of 
those who argue that India is already bled 
to an unnecessary extent for the maintenance 
of her military forces,"^
Curzon also sought to provide a military outlet for 
the aspirations of Indians of noble or gentlemanly birth and 
was convinced that it was unwise "to slam the door of a 
military career in the face of those whose pride or birth 
or surrounding prevents them from embracing a civil profess­
ion, whose interests lie naturally on the side of the 
British Government, but whose sympathies are in danger of
being alienated, and their energies dulled by the absence
2
of any field for their natural ambitions o" He accordingly 
put forward a scheme for the creation of an Imperial Cadet 
Corps to be recruited from members of the Indian aristocracy. 
When either these forces or for that matter any other of 
India!s representatives came under criticism, Curzon rushed
1, Curzon to Hamilton, 20 June 1900* It is perhaps worth 
recalling that one of the primary grievances in the 
revolt of the American colonies concerned the burden of 
defence costs.
2. Curzon's Memorandum of Commissions for Indians, 4- June 
1900, enc. Curzon to Hamilton, n.d, July 1900.
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to their defence using an astonishing array of facts and 
statistics warmly defending their conduct and services while 
invariably demonstrating the humanitarian tasks to which 
they were subject, such as helping to alleviate plague and 
famine conditions throughout India*^ Zealously interested in 
the smallest details down to the private morality of indivi­
dual officers and soldiers, Curzon spent a ludicrous amount 
of time in such projects as the selection of the Indian 
orderlies who were to attend the Coronation of King Edward 
VII and in seeing that they would not disgrace their uniform 
and thus India by 1 contracting relations with English women 
of the housemaid class1' who might be attracted and enamoured
of their "physique, and with a sort of idea that the warrior
2is also an oriental prince*"
Thus engaged in one of the most sustained efforts 
ever made in reforming India's archaic system of administra­
tion, Curzon often lacked discretion in judgement, the knack 
of getting along with other people; and above all, the 
ability to delegate responsibility„ He confessed to Lansdowne, 
the Foreign Secretary:
"I am handicapped in being surrounded by what 
I suppose is the weakest body of men that 
ever administered the Indian Empire* Quite 
apart from my own disposition, this throws 
a terrible lot of work on to my shoulders: 
and I am in truth the member for every de­
partment as well as my own."^
1* See Curzon to Major-General Sir John Hills, 24 July 1901.
2. Curzon to Hamilton, 15 November 1901,
5. Curzon to Lansdowne, 16 March 1902*
In 1902, Curzon became aware of a fatal collision between 
British soldiers and an Indian cook which damaged irreparably 
his relations with the Indian army.
(3) The 9th Lancer's Case
On 9 April 1902 members of a crack British regiment, 
the 9th Lancers, had arrived at Sialkot where they had a 
general carouse with a good deal of drinking* That evening 
Atu, an Indian who had been engaged to cook for the regiment, 
was brutally beaten outside the barracks by two soldiers, and 
was found the next morning lying on the ground some distance 
away in a badly bruised condition* He was carried to hospital, 
where, on 17 April he died from the effects of his injuries* 
Meanwhile, on 9 June, a trooper of the 9th Lancers kicked an 
Indian punkha-coolie and the latter died of a ruptured 
spleen* The trooper was tried In a civil court and merely 
fined* Curzon thought the whole affair profoundly discredit­
able, especially when he learned that the Commander of the 
9th Lancers had attempted to hush up the scandal and two 
months had lapsed before it reached his ears* He issued a 
public communiques to the press stating:
"The 9th Lancers lie under the stigma of 
concealing a criminal assault leading to the 
death of a defenceless Native, committed by 
a man or men of the regiment. In the opinion 
of the Government of India it is considered 
impossible to pass over the conduct of a 
regiment which lies under the stigma of 
concealing in its ranks one or more criminals, 
and such disciplinary action will be taken
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as will 'bring home to the men of the 9th 
Lancers that the Government of India are 
determined that brutal assaults by our 
soldiers on defenceless Natives must be put 
down with a strong hand*"l
Gurzon, extremely indignant, vented his inner feelings to
Godley:
nI have let them [the Indian military authori­
ties] know that I do not mean to have another 
Rangoon Outrage case; that the matter must 
be sifted to the bottom; and that the regi­
ment, no matter whether it is a crack British 
regiment or not, shall be punished. I will 
not have these things go on while I am in 
India* Though I stand almost alone, I persist 
in saying that it is scandalous and wicked: 
and the conduct of all the officers, from 
the highest downwards, who conspire to hush 
the matter up, and who say - ‘Don't for 
Heaven's sake, wash our dirty linen in public'
- is to my mind scarcely less scandalous and 
wicked than that of the actual culprits*
These things give me sleepless nights and 
days of misery* But I will not desist from 
my duty."
Significantly he asserted:
"These soldiers, with their violence and 
their lust, are pulling the fabric of our 
dominion down about our ears • and I for one 
will not sacrifice what I regard as the 
most solemn obligation imposed upon the 
British race to the license of even the 
finest regiment of the British Army."2
With the concurrence of his Government and Sir 
Power Palmer, the acting Commander-in-Ohief, Gurzon decided 
on the idea of collective punishment for the regiment* 
Accordingly, the leave of all officers was cancelled for a
1* Communique to press (by State Telegram), 20 November 1902, 
Curzon NSS* Eur. P*111/401.
2* Curzon to Godley, 18 June 1902.
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year and drastic regimental drills and duties for the sol­
diers were imposed* Curzon informed the public and the press 
of his action and like the West ICent Regiment, the 9th 
Lancers became publicly humiliated* In England, the 9th 
Lancers was regarded as a particularly gallant and heroic 
body of men. The idea of collective punishments was anathema 
to Parliament and the press and Curzon1 s action seriously 
damaged his reputation, Hamilton informed him: "Representa­
tions have been made to the King from certain quarters that 
you interfered with the Military, and inflicted punishments 
upon soldiers on your own initiative"; although the King was 
against bringing forward a censure proposal in Parliament on
ethical grounds, he did protest at the infliction of collec-
1tive punishments. The general impression which CurzonTs 
action created raised this question: "Why does the Viceroy, 
who is a civilian, interfere in questions of military
discipline? Can he not trust the military authorities to
2perform the duties allotted to them?"
Curzon1s hostility was merely reinforced by the 
response which he had provoked. He recorded his deepening 
despair in an observation to G-odley:
1. Hamilton to Curzon, 20 November 1902,
2. Ibid. Six years later, at a time of political -unrest, 
Morley told Minto that he could not "but honour Curzon 
for his famous affair with the 9th Lancers ... If we are 
not strong enough to prevent Murder, then our ph.arj.saic 
glorification of the stern justice Gf the British^'Raj
is nonsense," •
Morley to Minto, 26”August 1908, Morley MBS 573/5 *
TIHere in India we have * * * the pick of our 
British officers0 Nany are keen soldiers and 
still more are charming and agreeable men*
But their intelligence, their methods, and 
to some extent their standards of conduct,
are such as to fill me sometimes with dismay:
and the higher they get, the stupider and
narrower as a rule do they become*”1
The willingness of military authorities to condone collisions
between the races apalled him and when one of Lord Ampthill's
A.D.C.s kicked a coolie and he died, "Of course he had a big
liver or a big spleen: and equally of course, the kick was
represented as a !push with the foot1 - the phrase is now an
2
Indian classic*"
In his insistence on social justice, Curzon, who 
was extremely sensitive, felt himself the victim of ill- 
usage and resented his unpopularity with the Indian army; 
in that way his feelings became hardened and he became in­
creasingly vindictive in his sentiments concerning military 
administration in Indiae (Though his personality was flawed 
by many defects and though his methods often lacked a sense 
of proportion, his struggle to deal with the problem of 
racialism in India, with which he became personally identi­
fied, can be regarded as exemplifying his devotion to an 
unsparing sense of duty* These were high virtues, but his 
zeal in championing Indians stirred unappreciative public 
servants to comment that they "had their time wasted, as 
they saw it, in sending urgent telegrams announcing that
1* Curzon to Godley, 22 October 1902*
2* Curzon to Hamilton, 5 November 1902.
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1Private Blank had kicked cook Bamaswamy on the leg", and 
had Gurzon Been able to subordinate to such virtues the ego­
istic impulses of his own impatient temperament, his efforts 
today might be venerated as noble. Yet Curzon was unable to 
achieve that subordination and British officers felt they 
were "constantly exposed to provocative insult from the scum
p
of the bazaars." In 1904 Ampthill reported to Godley that:
"The soldiers say that they are now Cheeked1 
by even the lowest class of Natives in an 
intolerable way, and as they no longer dare 
to use or to threaten a good thrashing they 
are quite helpless. It is said that when a 
European raises his stick to chastise an 
insolent Native the latter frequently 
threatens to * tell the Lord Sahib*J When 
Sir Michael Hicks-Beach was in India the 
thing which struck him most was the growing 
’cheek* of the Native, and if this is appar­
ent to the casual globe-trotter it is pretty 
certain that the change of attitude is a 
considerable one»"3
Curzon*s attitude, in the case of one distinguished 
officer, General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, produced unfortun­
ate consequences. He found Curzon*s campaign so objectionable 
that he threatened to tender his resignation. He recorded 
the deep-seated feeling of grievance which had permeated the 
army, though he asserted that Curzon was probably unaware of 
the harm his attitude was causing, for a "masterful, self- 
centred man with no one to say him *Nay* would not pause to 
reflect that any attitude of his could be open to criticism,
1. Maconochie, E., Life in the Indian Civil Service, p.116*
2. Ibid. —  —
3. ISphill to GocLley, 27 July 1904, Ampthill MSS. 233/57.
or that cutting and disparaging remarks and minutes from the 
head of a great Government cannot he answered, hut do all 
the more harm on that account, for the iron enters far deeper 
into the soul of the people reflected on when no reply is
i
p o s s i b l e P o r  his vigorous efforts to enquire into cases 
of collisions between Indians and soldiers, Curzon became 
detested by the army, and his action in the !Rangoon Outrage1 
and in the 9th Lancers case opened a fatal breach when 
Curzon discovered their officers had attempted to hush up the 
misconduct of their men. An observer of this spectacle in­
formed Campbell Bannerman: ”.** it is an old story, the
2
readiness of the military in India to hate the Civil Power,”
Having done all he could by direct intervention to 
prevent further racial estrangement, the Viceroy now took 
steps which would enable him to direct and control super­
visory authority over the affairs of Indian army administra­
tion and thereafter friction and confusion rapidly spread* 
Porce of circumstances had deprived the Viceroy of an 
effective agent to oversee the details of military affairs, 
for General Sir W.S.A* Lockhart, the Commander-in-Chief 
(1898-1900) fell ill and died on 18 March 1900, In his place 
Curzon appointed a provisional officer, General Sir A*P, 
Palmer to act until such time as he could secure the
1. Smith-Dorrien, Ii*, Memories of Porty-eight Years Service, 
po307*
2* See G*l, MacKenzie to Campbell-Bannerman, 4 July 1905* 
Campbell-Bannerman MSS 41238*
services of General Viscount Kitchener of Khartoum as the 
new Coinmander-in-Chief for India* (The prolongation of the 
war in South Africa however, frustrated Gurzon1 s designs, 
and he was thus forced to rely upon the competent hut aging 
Military Member, Maj.-General Sir E*H.H, Oollen (1896-1901) 
for the advice and direction he and his Council desired. 
Collen soon retired, in April 1901 and it fell to the new 
Military Member, Maj.-General Sir E.R. Elies to provide 
Curzon with the instrument he needed in the supervision of 
army administration, Elies was extremely able and soon won 
Curzonfs confidence, while Palmer, the acting Commander-in- 
Chief was largely ineffective. Elies acquired an accretion 
of power and authority from Curzon which in time tended to 
encroach upon the preserve of the subjects dealt with by 
the Commander-In-Chief, In these circumstances, as we shall 
see, difficulties arose and friction sprang up between two 
departments, that of the Military Department under Elies as 
Military Member, and Army Headquarters under Palmer, the 
Coinmander-in-Chief, Further, as Elies reflected the 
Viceroy’s views in matters of policy and economy, Curzon 
unwittingly created an awkward situation for himself as 
events subsequiently showed, for Elies conducted military 
affairs along lines of strict scrutiny end economy, as 
Curzon preferred to manage things himself until such time 
as Kitchener’s services should be available. In effect, 
Elies and the Military Department were utilized by Curzon
as an instrument to examine and investigate army affairs 
generally.
The legitimate function of the Military Department 
was purely administrative} viz* control over the various 
departments of transport and supply, ordnance, remounts, 
clothing, medical stores, military works and finance and 
above all, the preparation of the Military Budget* The 
function of the Commander-in-Chief was as executive head of 
the army; he was charged with its organisation and training, 
mobilisation and direction in the event of war, and with 
promotions. His office was known as Army Headquarters* This 
executive - administrative arrangement was simply a way of 
doing business and the working of the system really depended 
upon the personality of the men holding the two offices*
Gurzon*s use of the Military Department as his 
instrument for investigating army affairs, naturally brought 
resentment between the Military Department and Army Head­
quarters * The system was really devised to serve two main 
purposes; as a check upon expenditure and as an independent 
military authority to advise the Viceroy on military affairs 
when the Commander-in-Chief happened to be an officer with 
little Indian experience, thus ensuring continuity of 
administration. Significantly, during Curzon’s tenure the 
duties of the Military Member and the activities of the 
Military Department became the targets for criticism which 
might otherwise have been directed towards the Viceroy.
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By 1902 the Senior Staff Officer at Army Headquarters in 
India, Smith-Dorrien, resolved to warn Kitchener of that 
situation* His opinion reflected the contemporary military 
thinking of many high-ranking British officers, and is there­
fore important* He was particularly annoyed at Curzon’s con­
descending attitude towards the Army as an inferior profes­
sion, his low opinion of the intellect of its officers, and
his view of the rank and file as a rowdy and licentious body
1
prone to drunkenness and the bullying of Indians* Smith-
Dorrien singled out the Military Department as the intoler-
2
able instrument obstructing the efficiency of the army*
U Q,
After threatening resignation, received permission from 
Palmer to explain these conditions to Kitchener personally, 
and to cite a number of cases illustrating the interference 
and opposition of the Military Department* "I reached London 
in August and sought out Lord Kitchener. I shall never forget 
that masterful man’s face as I read and explained to him case 
after case* He fairly gasped out, ’Is that the sort of thing 
I have got to compete with?’" • William Birdwood, who became 
Kitchener’s Adjutant-General in South Africa also records 
hearing Palmer’s detailed grievances in his experience with
ZL
the Military Department of the Government of India*
1* Smith-Dorrien, op0citt>, p*307«
2* Ibid., p„298.
5# Ibid*, p 0 314-0
4* BircTwood, Lord, Khaki and Gown, p<*137*
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In these circumstances Curzon1 s desire to put an end 
to the feud "between himself and the Army was reinforced. 
Accordingly he sought in the appointment of Kitchener, a 
possible bridge between his civil and his military admini­
stration, his strongest and his weakest sides, By the end 
of the summer of 1902, he fully recognised his failure to 
reform either India*s intractable military machinery, or 
the problem of racialism. He felt that Kitchener alone would 
be able to provide the initiative and necessary collaboration 
in handling the difficult problem of relations between the 
races, rendered so intolerable as a result of the antagonism 
of soldiers. Whilst not specifically admitting his personal 
failure, Curzon privately acknowledged that, 1 a great deal 
will depend on Kitchener, Hitherto I have not met one 
soldier in India who is on my side, Ihe majority of them 
openly denounce me, and unblushingly proclaim the law of 
licence, I do not suppose that any Viceroy has ever had to 
bear the brunt of such a campaign of malice and slander ,•• 
as I have done at the hands of the army and its officers
ever since the Rangoon affair .*. the majority of them look
1upon me as anathema,” He confided in Hamilton his 
intention to secure Kitchener !s services and that he would 
inform the new Commander-in-Chief, on arrival, of the state 
of Indian army affairs and his views on them:
1. Curzon to Godley, 50 July 1902.
"As soon as I meet Kitchener, I shall have 
a very frank interchange of opinion with 
him,, • The way in which I have "been made 
the scapegoat of the sins and blunders of 
the Army in India is a crying scandal. I 
have borne it without a word: though at 
any moment I have had it in my power by 
simply stating the facts to hold up the 
Army and its officers to public opprobrium. 
But their honour has been dearer to me than 
it has been to themselves; and for nearly 
four years I have borne a weight of calumny 
and misrepresentation such as no one - not 
in the inner life out here - can imagine, 
and which, if the facts were at any time 
made public, would redound to the lasting 
disgrace of the military service,"1
1, Curzon to Hamilton, 13 November 1902,
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CHAPTER II 
WANTED : A COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
(1) The Problem of Kitchener’s Appointment
As Curzon!s anxieties with the problem on Indian
army administration increased, fresh difficulties presented
themselves. The problem of Kitchener’s appointment arose
from the une:xpected prolongation of the South African war.
Together these circumstances caused friction and constant
irritation while making demands on the Viceroy!s patience,
and the situation was rendered especially complex resulting
from the absence of an effective Commander-in-Chief, Curzon
was aware that Kitchener greatly desired to come to India*
In December 1898, Kitchener wrote to congratulate the
Viceroy-designate on his Indian appointment and concluded
his letter with a significant message: "I enclose a photo
for Lady Curzon, to remind her of the man who means to take
1her down to dinner some day in India,*’ At that time both 
Curzon and Kitchener were held high in public esteem and 
The Times singled out the future Viceroy and the victor of
Omdurman as ’’the most remarkable and conspicuous figures in
2public life,” But Curzon had to establish precedence for 
Kitchener’s claims in India, He did so by deciding the 
question of Collen’s successor with the appointment of Elies 
and by filling the vacancy caused by the death of Lockhart
1, Kitchener to Curzon, 16 December 1898. Metcalfe MSS.
2. The Times, 15 November 1898*
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with Palmer, who was to act provisionally. In that way he 
left open a vacancy for Kitchener and above all for the 
competent authority which he so needed. Kitchener, for his 
part, pressed on his own appointment, somewhat rashly, from 
London# In August 1899 he had casually dropped in at the 
India Office and informed an astonished private secretary 
that he wished to be regarded as a candidate for the 
Military Membership and would be glad to know what chance 
he stood of being appointed# Godley informed Gurzon:
"His appearance at this office was most 
unexpected and, I should suppose, very 
characteristic: he came in, like Pick, Tom, 
or Harry, and asked to see Onslow. Onslow 
had gone abroad; so his Private Secretary 
came forward to ask if he could be of use*
Kitchener then said very openly that he 
had come as a candidate for the Military 
Membership of Council, and wanted to find 
out ’whether he had any chance1* The 
Private Secretary rather taken aback, 
urged him to see me (I was in my room); 
but he would not, saying that as he did not 
know me personally he did not like to 
trouble me about a vacancy still so distant; 
and so he departed
But it was not in that capacity that Curzon desired
Kitchener’s services.
Curzon wrote to Hamilton:
as regards Kitchener, while I have a 
personal regard for him and an admiration 
for his inflexibility of purpose, and 
while I should like to see him in India, *.*
I feel that it is not as Military Member 
that he would help us most, or render best
1# Godley to Curzon, 18 August 1899•
service to the Indian Army. In the first 
place, Lockhart and he would find it ex­
tremely difficult to get on; and I doubt 
if the former would stay* Keform is prodig­
iously needed in our military administration; 
but it will only be successfully applied by 
an experienced intelligence cooperating with 
a conciliatory hand* Kitchener is the man 
to drive through a campaign with relentless 
energy® You have only to go to Lord Cromer 
or to the Foreign Office to ascertain what 
is the effect that he produces, when let 
loose in administration,, Moreover, if my 
views in this respect be exaggerated or mis­
taken, it yet remains, I think, indisputable 
that it is more important to us to get a 
first-rate financier in succession to 
lawkins [Finance Member 1899-1900] now, than 
a first-rate organizer of victory in success­
ion to Collen [Military Member] later on *,* 
we must decide by the exigencies of the ,
present moment, not of a future contingency*"
He confided to Godley his apprehensions as to the possible 
consequences of Kitchener in India;
"I am already somewhat of a disturbing element 
in the placid economy of Indian administration.
The appearance of another and even more ^
seismic factor might produce unforeseen results."
Curzon needed above all a subordinate who was a competent
administrator,
"There would seem [he wrote in October 1899] 
to be some mysterious law that makes it 
impossible for soldiers to be decent admin­
istrators*,. I imagine that, either for 
government or for administration, some 
previous training in the principles by which 
both are regulated is required, and that 
this is why you cannot take even the most 
capable soldier from his tent and expect of 
him even moderate abilities in Office,"3
1. Curzon to Hamilton, 6 September 1899*
2. Curzon to Godley, 6 September 1899*
3. Curzon to Hamilton, 4 October 1899.
Curzon demonstrated, in good-humoured terms his predicament;
"I hear that a novel and local storm is 
slowly brewing in the arcana of the military 
bureaux: themselves* The Commander-in-Chief 
is said to be evolving a scheme for the 
abolition of the Military Department; and 
meanwhile I hear that the Military Member, 
all unconscious of his impending doom, is 
elaborating a counter-scheme for the 
extinction of the Commander-in-Chief. It 
looks as if I, who am a consistent though 
amicable antagonist of both, would ultimately 
have to step in to save them from mutual 
destruction at each other's hands ,"1
Hamilton wisely suggested caution before plunging
into the appointment of a new Commander-in-Chief for India:
"The change from Collen to Kitchener would 
be startling, and produce startling conse­
quences. If there is a chance of a vacant 
Command a year or two hence ... we could 
test his qualifications for the Commander- 
in-Chief; but he is too much of a bull to 
turn into such a china shop as India without 
previous training and civilizing;"
he foresaw the heat that might be generated when reform was
undertaken,
"Soldiers, when they become officials, are 
red tapists of the deepest dye; yet a 
soldier, distinguished by active service 
alone, rarely submits to the tiresome 
routine and drudgery which military reforms 
require before they can be launched with 
effect. From what you &&& say I gather you 
think the military system is very costly, 
and also ineffective. Financial reform in 
military matters rarely associates itself 
with improved efficiency, and I think you 
will have to consider which of the two 
defects you would wish to remedy first, In 
an autocratically governed country there 
is no weight behind military reforms except
1* Curzon to Hamilton, 27 September 1899*
58
the force of character of the reformed, and 
the army, like all other professions, 
opposes desperately reforms which affect 
its comfort or power<>"1
Opposition came from other quarters, notably the 
Grown, for Queen Victoria took a lively interest in military 
appointments being careful to overlook no possibility of 
preferment and promotion for members of her own family* In 
particular she had attempted to exercise her prerogative in 
the selection of the Duke of Connaught to command the troops 
in South Africa, but he was passed over in favour of Roberts, 
much to her dismay* Lord Salisbury informed Lansdowne that 
therefore the Queen was much annoyed at the thought that 
Kitchener, in going to India, would thereby be placed over 
the heads of many more senior generals who had much more 
experience:
’Her Majesty takes a very strong line against 
Kitchener for India and swears nothing shall 
Induce her to consent to it, because she 
thinks his manners are too ferocious. This 
is her 'riposte' to my objection to Connaught 
excluding Roberts, for she knows I value 
Kitchener*
But Curzon, following Lockhart's death informed the Queen:
"It is now above all things essential that 
a strong man in the prime of life should 
be appointed to succeed: since the Viceroy 
would not be doing his duty did he not 
confess to Your Majesty that there is 
grave need for reform in many branches of
1* Hamilton to Curzon, 28 September 1899*
2. Salisbury to Lansdowne, 28 September 19005 Newton, 
Lord Lansdowne, p0175*
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the military service in India. The machine 
has hecone clogged with tradition and 
routine, and calls for urgent overhauling, 
if we are ever to defend the Indian front­
iers with assured success."-**
Hamilton confirmed, that as a result of Kitchener’s force
un-
or character he was "very/popular; his manner is most un­
gracious, and he is very inconsiderate in his treatment of
his subordinates11, and that in consequence it would require
2a very "strong Military Member to hold him."
Curzon was thinking about that very problem and when
Collen retired in 1901 he commended the services of Sir 
Edmund Elies who was competent as well as being extremely
popular. In his recommendation he characterised Elies as "a
man of dignity of manner, and quietness of bearing ... loyal 
and agreeable ... he would work well with Palmer ... and 
would be . a useful and steadying check upon Kitchener.""^
Curzon then, saw in Elies a temporary way out of the diffi­
culties he had encountered with the Indian army. He had in 
despair written that he wished to be relieved of having to 
be the final arbiter on every military question:
"It is not my place. I ought to be able to 
trust my colleagues ... it is not my 
business* I ought not to be a sort of 
Civilian Commander-in-Chief, I am ready to 
drop it tomorrow, provided I can get men
whom I can trust. But I can honestly say
that while the soldiers may have hated it, 
the result so far has been nothing but 
good. I have saved the Government of India
1. Curzon to Queen Victoria, 22 March 1900+
2. Hamilton to Curzon, 5 April 1900.
3. Curzon to Hamilton, 14 February 1901.
lakhs of rupees, and score of absurd and 
doctrinaire experiments* But it breaks me, 
in the midst of all my work, to have to 
pronounce upon plans of forts, making of 
roads, location of troops, discipline of 
regiments, construction of defences, and 
all the thousand and one details of military 
administration* M-*-
While Curzon chaffed with anxiety caused him by the conduct 
of army administration in India, Kitchener was having diffi­
culties of his own in rounding up the Boers in a series of 
great drives, and it will be well to examine his background 
and his desire for appointment to the Indian command.
(2) Kitchener!s Background and Desire for the Indian 
Command.
Horatio Herbert Kitchener was born in 1850, the 
third child of Lieutenant-Colone 1 H.H. Kitchener, a proud 
and fearless man who was as well an eccentric martinet, 
running his home as if it were part of an army along lines 
of strict discipline * Detesting blankets, his father accord­
ingly slept under layers of newspapers sewn together which 
may well have contributed to the rapid deterioration of his
p
wifefs lungs and she died when Kitchener was 14* Disliking 
school, Kitchener was shy, independent and sensitive. At an 
early age he resolved upon a career in the army, entering 
the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich in 1868 where he
1. Curzon to Hamilton, 27 June 1900.
2. Magnus, P., Kitchener: Portrait of an Imperialist, 
pp. 1-12, here aft ercTtedas Magnus, Kitchener^
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impressed Tais superiors with, his dedication to hard work,
X
force of character, and exceptional good looks. He left 
the School of Military Engineering in 1873 and devoted his 
energies to the Palestine Survey and the Cyprus Survey from 
1872-82. Egypt then provided a chance for promotion as wellV
as an outlet for Kitchener rs consuming ambition and when, in 
1882 a mutiny occurred in the Egyptian army, he secured 
provisional employment in the formation of a new Egyptian 
army, becoming a Major in that army and a Captain in the 
British army in 1883* By 1884 Britain became seriously 
involved in the conquest of Egypt with Gordon1 s eixpedition 
to Khartoum* Gordon's influence on Kitchener, a fellow 
sapper, was great and it gave him the opportunity to utilise 
his knowledge of Arabic and his experience in the desert to 
thus enhance his reputation. Becoming Gordon's channel of 
communication with the tribes and his chief source of 
intelligence, when the failure of Gordon's rescue and the 
subsequent fall of Khartoum occurred, Kitchener became an 
important figure and for his gallant and intrepid efforts 
he was famous at the age of 34. He proceeded to the Sudan 
as Governor of Suakim from 1886-8; was on the Sudan frontier 
in 1889, aild Adjutant-General of the Egyptian army from 1888-' 
92. In 1892 he became Sirdar in Egypt and commanded the 
Dongola Expeditionary Borce in 1896, after which he was
1. Esher, Lord, The Iragedy of Lord Kitchener, p.10.
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promoted Governor-General of the Sudan in 1899* In 1898 he 
won fame and the thanks of Parliament in command of the 
Khartoum Expedition avenging Gordon's death, Following the 
outbreak and initial disasters of the Boer War, he was sent 
to South Africa as Chief of Staff under Lord Roberts, and 
became Commander-in-Chief of the Forces from 1900-2.
Long years of isolation and solitude had their 
effect on Kitchener's character. To most people he seemed 
shy, aloof, or distant - the outcome of a slow process of 
environment under the influence of the desert. To Churchill 
he seemed stern and unpitying; a man who treated all men as
i
machines, but who never spared himself. Lord Edward Cecil
characterised him as cynical and inclined to "disbelieve
that any action sprang from motives other than those of self- 
2interest", while Ian Hamilton described him as secretive, 
a law unto himself; being all-powerful he hated ready-made 
institutions and smashed organisations. Though difficult 
to work with, Kitchener had worked hard during the early 
years of his career, being handicapped in youth by what Dr. 
Johnson described as, 'the most contemptible of all stations, 
that of a soldier in time of peace 1, Steady application and 
preparation coupled with patience and thoroughness paid rich 
dividends, and his concentration on making desert railways
1. Churchill, W.S., The River^War, II, p,377*
2. Cecil, Lord Edward,' TheLeTsure of an Egyptian Official,
pp«187-8.
3. Hamilton, Ian, The Commander, pp.98-131*
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in Egypt and bis systematic precision in constructing block­
houses in South Africa demonstrated his success. Kitchener's 
instinct for boldness and pluck, so unusual in an engineer, 
resulted in his calm assurance that, having decided to take 
great risks, he would never hesitate or falter. His reputa­
tion for the conquest of the Sudan was secure, and he was 
the first General since the Duke of Wellington to restore 
lustre to British arms and to catch and hold the imagination 
of the man in the street. His Gool instincts and his pride 
in his ability to see things in a truer light from a dis­
tance, often misled his colleagues, overburdened with 
official responsibilities and traditional viewpoints* Lloyd 
George found him obscure and difficult to understand; he 
likened him to a "great revolving lighthouse, Sometimes the 
beam of his mind would shoot out and uncover the heart of
reality - then the shutter would turn and for weeks there
2would be nothing but a blank darkness." Lord Beaverbrook
observed that as he refused to reveal himself, the press was
compelled constantly to talk about him, if only in sheer
annoyance at his silence, with the result that he was the
*5best advertised man in the Empire. But Kitchener realised 
that distance was in his favour and when he was asked to 
take up War Office reform in England he explained his refusal
1* !lhe Kitchener Legend', The Limes Literary Supplement,
31 October 1958.
2. Beaverbrook, Lord, Politicians and the War, I, pp.177-8.
3o Ibid., p.181*
by asserting:
"Why? Because I should fail! I think I know 
what I can do as well as my limitations* I 
can I Believe impress to a certain extent 
my personality on men working under me, I
am vain enough to think that I can lead 1
them, hut I have no silver tongue to persuade,*,"
Detesting tradition and the water-tight compartments of
convention, he informed his confidante Lady Salisbury of his
views on the Government of India which he regarded as "very
curious «»* and in some points seems to resemble the Khalifa
p
in Omdurman." But Milner described Kitchener!s unorthodox
methods in his struggle with that Government by asserting:
"I do not think he has ever distinguished 
between fighting, shall we say, the Mahdi, ,
and fighting his own colleagues and countrymen.
Kitchener !s background and experience had taught him the 
value of camouflage and Introduced an element of furtiveness 
in his character, for he always feared some premature dis­
covery: "The tendency to hide his objective" wrote St. John 
Brodrick, afterwards Lord Midleton, "never left him in
later life* He rarely gave anyone his whole mind, lest he
4-should spoil a good hand," His independence of mind as well 
as action, made him extremely impatient of checks and he 
utterly despised routine and red tape:
"He was a difficult man to convince that he 
was wrong; that a project of his was
1. Esher, Lord, Journals and Letters, II, p#98. Hereafter 
cited as Esher, Journal's! ~
2. Kitchener to Lady’ Salisbury, 21 May 1903, Balfour MSS 
4-9757 -
3# Milner to Ourzon, 9 November 1905* P A I ’I
4-. Midleton, Records and Reactions 1856-1939*
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impossible Tae would never admit... If a 
subordinate were incapable of executing 
bis directions, ratlier tban abandon them 
be was inclined to carry tbem out himself#
Thus it came about that be bore sometimes 
a heavier burden of work than any one man 
could carry. He had no skill in argument, 
and had no respect for it: it seemed to 
him beside the point. Like other men of 
action, but in a special degree, his con­
clusions were instinctive, and the import­
ant thing in his eyes was that a decision 
should be right, not that it could be 
defended.
To most soldiers of Kitchener's day, an appointment
to an Indian command meant employment in a warm sunny post,
very well paid, with an opportunity of seeing active service
in the intermittent frontier wars, and they ,finvariably
tumbled over one another in their frantic efforts to have
2themselves seconded for: service." India presented problems 
which greatly interested Kitchener, with vast opportunities 
to carry out an integrated plan of military reorganisation, 
railroad construction and the chance, not possible in Great 
Britain, of carrying through root and branch reform on a 
grand scale* He perceived in India and in the Indian command, 
the large numbers of troops at his disposal and the respon­
sibilities of their training and preparation for war, that 
he would have a larger voice in settling lines of military 
policy than would be the case in England where the War
1# See Arthur, G., Life of Lord Kitchener, I, p.xiii* The 
preface was written by""tlie ’4th Marquis of Salisbury 
(1861-1947)9 and the three volume work published in 1920.
2. Magnus, Kitchener, p.32.
Office would dictate these policies officially, through the
hands of the Secretary of State as it emanated from the
Cabinet. In India Kitchener knew he would he in a powerful
position as executive head of the army and the first
military adviser to the Viceroy, and have access to him at
all times relatively unhindered as extraordinary member of
the Viceroy's Council, ranking second only to the Viceroy
himself while having precedence over the Lieutenant-
Governors. In these circumstances Kitchener felt India
offered much scope both for his ambition and his profound
sense of duty; his aim was to preserve the peace and security
of the Empire and maintain unbroken confidence in Britain's
power and mission. Above all, as an Imperialist, Kitchener
"believed in the reality of the white man's burden." He
conceived it to be his duty to embark on a programme of
military reform and, having achieved exceptional eminence
in the sphere of his previous activities, he -undertook what
he felt was a national mandate in putting his plans into
immediate effect. This duty he placed before all else: "He
felt he was defrauding the Almighty if he did not carry out 
2his task", and he looked forward to preparing Indian 
defences, with something of a 'free hand1, for the storms 
which he predicted lay ahead for the British Empire.
1. Magnus, Kitchener, p*24
2. Cecil, ppoci'-fcV, p.184-#
Significantly, he regarded India as the key factor of
1Imperial strategy.
In the period prior to Kitchener*s arrival in India 
(1898-1902)*the Indian army and its administration was in a 
state of transition. As we have seen the position of the 
Commander-in-Chief had only recently heen -unified by the
abolition of the Presidency commands and the new powers of
2the Commander-in-Chief were not always clearly defined.
In having the whole of Indiafs military establishment -unified 
under one head, the organisation and distribution of the 
army were still based on obsolete lines* Concepts which 
dominated military policy immediately after the Mutiny were 
only just being abandoned and India (s network of railroads 
had not been properly utilised for purposes of supply and 
transport. In such a state of flux, the question of re­
arranging internal garrisons to adjust to external dangers 
was largely ignored, while troop disbursements lay scattered 
about the country in isolated cantonments and detachments, 
often used for plague and famine work, rarely drilled either 
with their regiments or with battalions. Plans for mobilisa­
tion were sketchy and though the army was able to wage war 
with distinction against frontier tribes, its organisation 
was hardly prepared to resist the advance of a modern 
European foe.
1, Arthur, op,cit», II, p*116*
2. Bee especially Singh, op.cit», Chap*111.
3* Eraser, L., India Under Curzon and After, pp.398-9*
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Kitchener 'visualised an integrated system of Imperial 
defence and constantly asked his staff to explain to him how 
the Indian army was supposed to function properly:
"I found him completely puzzled hy the many 
and varied blocks1 into which the Indian 
Army was divided. He had visualized an Indian 
Army organized on much the same lines as the 
Egyptian Army; and when I spoke to him, say, 
of the 1st Bengal Infantry - the 1st Madras - 
1st Bombay - 1st Hyderabad - 1st Sikhs - or 
the 1st Punjabis, and explained to him the 
differences between them, he turned to me 
and said: *1 see. You really have no Indian 
Army with esprit de corps as such. You have 
a large number of small armies - some very 
small - all jealous of one another, and 
each probably thinking itself superior to 
the rest. I want to see a real Indian Army.
This can never be the case while your Army 
is divided into water-tight compartments1•"
The presence of Russia on the outskirts of India greatly
added to the urgency of reform in Indian army administration
and imposed a tremendous financial strain upon her revenue.
One of the most attractive features of Kitchener*s early
career was his passion for cheese-paring economy; there can
be tafc little doubt that Curzon saw in Kitchener what Cromer
detected in the Sudan, namely: "one extremely rare quality
* o, he was convinced that military efficiency and military
2economy were not necessarily opposing forcesPoliticians 
in London as well as Curzon in India greatly valued that 
asset and were eager to obtain his services for that reason 
quite apart from his proven reputation as a fighting soldier.
1. Birdwood, Lord, Khaki and Gown, p*141. 
2* Ronaldshay, Life of CrornerT" 242.
For his part Kitchener was anxious to end the war in South 
Africa so that he would he free for India and he "regarded 
the Indian command with a feeling akin to the enthusiasm 
with which Lord Cxirzon had entered upon the Viceroyalty."
In the meantime other men were interested in securing 
the services of the foremost soldier in the Empire and this 
involved the traditional conflict of interests between rival 
departments of the British Government, notably the India and 
War Offices. But the Cabinet, after some delay resolved this 
conflict9
(3) Cabinet Delays - The Conflict of Interests Between 
India and the War Office
Following the Khaki election of October 1900, St.
John Brodrick (1856-194-2) succeeded Lord Lansdowne (1845-
1932) as Secretary for War. In congratulating Brodrick on
that appointment Kitchener telegraphed: "Best congratulations*
2
Am anxious to get to India. Can you help?" Brodrick was
extremely reluctant to part with the one effective instrument
for military reform in England and indicated the pressing
need of the Cabinet:
"There is a very strong feeling, not only in 
the Cabinet, but outside of it, that your 
presence at the War Office, as soon as you 
can be spared from South Africa, would give
1. Fraser, op.cit., pA398.
2. Kitchener to Brodri ck, Telegram, 3 November. 1900, 
Kitchener MSS 30/57/22.
much confidence .*. The occasion is almost 
unique. The chance of reorganizing the Army 
is not likely to recur in your lifetime, or 
mine, under similar conditions. You have 
the most recent and extended experience of 
any General in our service, or indeed in the 
world, of campaigns, since you have been at 
the centre both of the Egyptian and the 
South African expeditions. If you go to 
India, we should scarcely be able to avail 
ourselves of your experience at all... If 
it influences you at all, I may say I have 
not taken the War Office with a view to 
half-measures„.. You may not perhaps always 
have a Secretary of State who feels as 
strongly as I do the necessities of the case,"
Kitchener was well aware of the gross defects of the
War Office, so glaringly exposed in the Boer War. But he
recognised his own limitations in working in harness with
party politicians and would-be reformers and was extremely
reluctant to compromise his outstanding reputation as a
fighting soldier by becoming harnessed to a machine whose
defects he conceived to be Incorrigible. He wrote; "I could
o
do no good there, and would sooner sweep a crossing." 
Brodrick at that time was generally supported by the Gabinet 
and in particular Lord Roberts and he repeatedly reminded 
Kitchener that he had little experience of India; "Are you 
sure", he asked, "that the Indian command is as good an
z
avenue to other high military positions as the War Office?"^ 
Kitchener remained adamant and was determined to avoid coh--;- 
tact with the War Office at all costs:
1. Brodrick to Kitchener, 9 November 1900, Kitchener MSS
30/57/22,
2. See Magnus, Kitchener, p.174,
3. Brodrick to Kitchener, 15 December 1900, Kitchener MSS 
30/57/22.
"I fully recognize that my lack of experience 
of India renders it difficult to place me at 
the head of military affairs there. Still ... 
it would he an excellent thing for the Indian 
Army to have some one in command who was not 
used to Indian routine, and could look at 
military matters from a larger standpoint 
than that of India alone. Also it is not un­
likely that before long serious trouble may 
occur In India, which is really our heel of 
Achilles, and I had therefore hoped to have 
the opportunity of gaining sufficient e:xper- 
ience to be of use if war broke out... I 
feel sure that I am not the man for the War 
Office, that I should be of little use, and 
that I should be a certain failure. This is 
my personal conviction.
Thereafter the Cabinet vacillated over the issue of sending 
Kitchener to India, causing Curzon infinite anxiety in India 
and Kitchener some perturbation lest his ambition to get 
there be frustrated by the Cabinet.
The unexpected prolongation of hostilities jeopard­
ised Kitchener’s chances and he despairingly wrote: tfI hear 
Palmer, the acting C.-in-C., is to get India, so I shall
have to look out for civil work, which I rather prefer. The
2
army is quite terrible, and I am afraid, incurable,1 H.O* 
Arnold-Porster (1855-1909) who later succeeded Brodrick as 
Secretary for War, recorded Kitchener’s attitude A* the War 
Office in a letter to his wife from Johannesburg dated 4* 
November 1900:
"I lunched with Lord Kitchener ... He was very 
friendly, and talked freely with me about
1. Kitchener to Brodrick, 13 December 1900, Kitchener MSS 
30/57/22.
2. Magnuss Kitchener, p.175*
Army matters generally« He, like most other 
soldiers, takes the lowest view of our W.O. 
organization, and spoke to me of the horror 
with which he first discovered the kind of 
machine he was expected to work with in 
South Africa, coming to it as he did after  ^
such a long experience of the Egyptian Army..*”
Curzon too became increasingly critical of his military
advisers in India and wrote:
"The fact is - you must have gathered it 
from my letters throughout the year - that 
our Generals here are a very inferior body 
of men* You may judge of their intelligence 
by that displayed by their seniors and 
superiors now serving in South Africa: and 
I shudder to think of what might happen to 
the Indian Army if it were engaged with a 
European foe*”
In fact he was crippled by the Incapacity of his military 
colleagues whom he described as "almost useless.. • The 
junior officers of the Department are occupied in writing 
monumental notes and circulating files; and things are 
generally very much at sixes and sevens. If I had the same 
trouble with the other Departments, or even with any of 
them, that I have with the Military Department, I could not 
conduct the Government of India for a month." He bitterly 
continued: i
"«. 0 the whole system is utterly vicious*
These soldiers play into each others1 hands: 
they connive at each others' irregularities: 
and there is neither check, nor supervision, 
nor responsibility, nor control. God forbid 
that we should ever have a war with such men 
at the head of affairs. I can see no hope 
until we clear them all off and get fresh
1. ArnoId-Eorster, M., H.O. Arnold-Forster, A Memoir, p.* 162.
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brains to advise, and more virile energies 
to act ... We want new blood .,. we want a 
Kitchener to pull things together •.. When 
in your letters you confess your incurable 
distrust of military men in high places at 
home^ believe me that it cannot be greater 
than that which less than 14- months have 
inspired in me of the great panjandrums out 
here,"
What so annoyed Curzon was that the delay in settling 
the appointment of Kitchener to India was costing Indian 
taxpayers large sums in futile armaments * By accident in the 
spring of 1900 Curzon had visited a fortified pass at Kohat, 
which he described as Mfantastic and superfluous , . I find 
that all these wonderful forts, with steel shutters, and 
machicoulis galleries, and impregnable keeps, which the 
military engineers are always thrusting upon me, are ridi-
p
culed by all the local population,” In addition, India’s
/
revenues were being indented in order to supply troops for (
\
the_war in South Africa where there were almost 10,000 men
from British regiments and as well some 13,000 more scattered
about the outposts of Empire in Ceylon, Singapore, Mauritius
and in China during the Boxer Rebellion, Curzon viewed that
denudation with alarm as it constituted 1 a very serious
3subtraction from our Indian garrison*1 Curzon found himself 
between two fires in confronting the subject of army admin­
istration e On the one hand were Indian nationalists who
1, Curzon to Hamilton, 15 February 1900.
2. Ibid*, 23 April 1900.
3* Ibid., 18 July 1900,
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assumed that military expenditure was excessive and a waste 
of money, while on the other were the demands of professional 
British soldiers hent on improving military efficiency. He 
faced his critics defending his position in his 1900 Budget 
Debate when he attested:
"The first result of the Transvaal war will,
I believe, be an increase to the budget of 
every military nation in the world••. are 
we to stint the annual expenditure that may 
be required to protect the vast Empire of 
India, as large as the whole of Europe with­
out Russia, against the infinitely more 
formidable dangers by which it may one day 
be threatened? ... as head of that Govern­
ment, I know my responsibilities, and, if 
my colleagues and I are convinced that the 
military protection of India against the 
perils by which she may be menaced absolutely 
require that this or that expenditure should 
be incurred, we shall not flinch from under­
taking it."l
Curzon was tireless in his efforts to prepare India against 
danger and felt justification in providing one million 
sterling to rearm the entire Indian army with the latest 
weapons while establishing factories to turn out India's own 
war materials:
"I am not in the least disturbed by the 
argument that all this military expendit­
ure is a waste, and that the money had much 
better be spent upon projects of economic 
development. I would gladly spend the whole 
of our revenues in the latter way, but I 
say frankly that I dare not. The Army is 
required to make India safe; and it cannot 
be said that India is safe. In the event 
of an invasion or a campaign, those very 
theorists who are so fond of the phrase
1. Budget Speech, 28 March 1900$ Raleigh, op.cit., pp.463-4.
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*bloated expenditure*, and who denounce any 
attempt to make the Army more efficient that 
costs money, would he the first to rim round 
and take shelter under the armaments whose 
expansion they had resisted.
moreover
Curzon’s subsequent policy was/greatly affected by two major
developments in Asia, first by the expansion of Russian
railways against the frontiers of Afghanistan and second,
by the impact of Japanese victories over Russia in the
Ear East. "The lesson of the Russo-Japanese War** he asserted
1905 ,fis surely the most supreme vindication of preparation
for war” and having ample surplus available for military
expenditure Cur son awaited the man to put them to effect and
thus secure the Indian people ’’from the future horrors of war”
by steadily preparing India’s defences. "Until universal
peace reigns, which will not be in our day, the best custo-
2dian of his own house will still be the strong man armed."
With Lockhart’s death in 1900 the matter of a
Commander~in*-Chief became urgent for India and the Cabinet
decided to leave the queation of kitchener’s appointment
open, to be decided when the situation in South Africa
became more clear* The Home Government in fact, were having
great difficulties of their own with an agrng Prime Minister 
who K
/waited on events while often "immuring himself at Hatfield",
his country home* In these circumstances Hamilton informed
1. Budget Speech, 27 March 1901; Raleigh, op. cit., p.4-67*
2. Ibid., 29 March 1905? pp.472-3.
3. (Jrenville, op.cit., p.308.
Curzon that there was little he could do to expedite matters
and that the Cabinet was 1 collectively a most effete organi- 
1zation,1 incapable of pressing home decisions* In one sense 
their absorption with the war left Curzon in India relatively 
free to dictate his own policy, but in the sphere of India*s 
external relations as we shall see, the Cabinet subsequently 
became very much interested in the control of Indian affairs* 
In the meantime Ministers were loth to part with the one 
instrument, Kitchener, which they conceived could effectively 
produce reform. Nevertheless in the face of Kitchener's 
absolute refusal to comply they weakened and accordingly, on 
9 March 1901 Brodrick telegraphed:
"I have arranged with India Office that 
Palmer's appointment should be confirmed for 
one year only from now. I earnestly trust, 
on conclusion of war, you will give us your 
assistance here until India is vacant. Above 
arrangement is made in your interest . "2
In India in the meantime, Palmer, having pointed out the
unfairness of an indefinite appointment, was confirmed
temporarily in the post until November 1902*
However, even though as early as August 1900 the
Cabinet attempted to resolve the dilemma of a new Commander-
in-Chief for India,
"After having duly settled that Kitchener was 
to be the next Gommander-in-Chief in India, 
the Cabinet at a subsequent meeting decided
1. Hamilton to Curzon, 12 September 1900.
2* Brodrick to Kitchener, Telegram, 9 March 1901; Kitchener 
MSS 50/57/22.
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to annul that decision, and leave the whole 
question in abeyance*.* I am afraid this 
hanging up of the highest military appoint­
ment in India will inconvenience you, hut 
much as I should like to settle the matter, 
the general feeling of the Cabinet is too 
strong the other way.I,J-
Curzon was much distraught over the indecision of the Cabinet
and wrote:
"What very funny people the Cabinet are. I 
had received your intimation of the selec­
tion of Kitchener, I had settled contentedly
down to the prospect of working with him as
a colleague, I had written to him (but 
fortunately had not despatched) my congratu­
latory letter - and now comes your further 
letter saying that the Government have 
cancelled their previous decision, and that 
the whole question is again in s u s p e n s e . " 2
In actual fact the Cabinet faced strong press and Parliamen­
tary agitation against what were termed Kitchener!s brutal 
methods in herding women and children into concentration 
camps, but Kitchener, impenitent, characterized this agita­
tion as a specious and defeatist propaganda. Nevertheless, 
he was compared by Lloyd-George to Herod whose methods also
"tried to crush a little race by killing its young sons and
daughters."^ In these circumstances the Cabinet, ever mindful 
of the lesson of the Mutiny, were alive to the danger of 
sending Kitchener to India and Hamilton wrote:
"I look with some apprehension upon his 
appointment, as I fear the effect of his 
rough unsympathetic manner, and strong
1* Hamilton to Curzon, 2 August 1900*
2. Curzon to Hamilton, 22 August 1900.
3, Magnus, Kitchener, p.180.
economic hand upon the Native Army, You will 
have carefully to watch him...1
Kitchener justified his actions hy objecting that in war
victory could only be achieved by firmness and force and
resolved the issues by threatening to retire in November
p
1901 and the Oabinet reluctantly dropped the matter, as 
Kitchener*s reputation commanded the greatest measure of 
public confidence. But the Viceroy would have done well to 
heed that warning.
/
As Curzon!s term of office was to expire in March 1995? 
he was concerned to obtain Kitchener*s services well before 
that time in order to work with the Commander-in-Chief in 
reforming Indian army administration. That object became 
instrumental in Curzon *s desire to extend his Viceroyalty by 
an additional period of two years. In the meantime he re­
peatedly pressed Kitchener's claims from India, constantly 
reminding the Home Government of his difficulties. In March 
1901 Curzon forwarded to Kitchener two letters he had writ­
ten, one previously on 21 August 1900, the other dated 31 
March 1901. In the latter he explained that as March 1903 
would find him in the fifth and last year of his administra­
tion time was running out in which reform could be initiated 
in co-operation with Kitchener. In his original letter Curzon 
explained his great interest in all military questions, 
particularly in frontier affairs and the problem of India's
1. Hamilton to Curzon, 27 July 1900.
2. See Lee, S., Life of Edward VII, II, pp.81-2.
external relations, which, he managed exclusively® Consider­
ing himself something of an expert on questions of frontier 
policy he informed Kitchener:
"I hope not to give you much scope for mili­
tary activity there (though with so ticklish 
a problem one never dares prophesy); but the 
main guarantee for peace is a close and 
cordial cooperation between the Civil and 
Military authorities."
The Viceroy indicated where Kitchener's help was most needed:
"I see absurd and uncontrolled expenditure,
I observe a lack of method and system. 1 
detect slackness and jobbery. And in some 
respects I lament a want of fibre and tone.
Upon all these matters I shall have many 
opportunities of speaking to you, and of 
suggesting abundant openings for your 
industry and force ♦"
He concluded that letter by proffering his hearty sup­
port to the prospective Commander-in-Chief, assuring him that 
he would be able to overcome the traditional jealousy between 
the Indian and the Home services which every selection for 
the supreme command was liable to revive, and he took credit 
as well for pressing'Kitchener *s appointment:
"I know well, from our conversation before I 
left England, how greatly set your heart 
has been upon Indian service; and I can say 
that, as the results show, I have not myself 
been backward in assisting you to realize 
your ambition.111
In Curzon's second letter he took especial care to 
note the anxiety which military administration was causing:
1. Curzon to Kitchener, 21 August 1900, enc. in same to
same, 31 March 1901.
”<,*» the tendency of which I see much* hut 
say nothing, is that of the military auth­
orities if: anything unpopular is done to 
which they have themselves consented or 
which may even have emanated from them in 
the first place, to shrug their shoulders 
and shift the hurden on to those of the 
masterful Viceroy«> I have been very unlucky, 
for I have had during over two years no 
Oommander-in-Ohief as poor Lockhart was dying 
all through my first year and lost all 
personality and vigour* Sir Power Palmer 
has only "been acting and has therefore lacked 
power and influence* The co-operation of the 
Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief, is the 
only preventative of the evils that I have 
already described, and I can honestly say 
that I shall look forward with keen antici- 
pation with bright hopes to your appearance*”
What Curzon wanted was a subordinate authority who would be
able to bridge the gulf between himself and the Indian army*
Kitchener wrote to thank the Viceroy for his help
and assured him of his cordial support:
”•.• I did not write to you before, as I 
wished to leave you an absolutely free hand 
in dealing with the question of my appoint­
ment* I cannot thank you sufficiently for 
the action you have taken. Considerable 
pressure was brought upon me to go to the 
War Office, and, had the Indian appointment 
been postponed to 1903? I doubt very much 
whether I should have been able to take it.
You may be quite sure when I come to India 
I will serve you loyally and do my utmost 
for the Indian Army* I have no fear regard­
ing the personal feelings of officers, 
which, owing to my want of experience of 
India, I can well understand* I am not so 
black as I am painted, and I feel sure that 
personal contact will do away with the 
doubts that may exist in the minds of any 
officers who are really working at their
1. Curzon to Kitchener, 31 March 1901.
profession and are keen soldiers at heart; 
such officers will soon find out that to me 
they are the salt of the earth.”
But the idea of Kitchener as Commander-in-Chief in India 
was not popular in the Indian army and it was feared that
he would create more problems than he solved* Curzon men­
tioned this fact to the Secretary of State;
"The news will be received here with weeping 
and gnashing of teeth* The Indian soldiers 
generally will alternate ... between rage 
and alarm, and a good many of the harmless
expletives that, I have no doubt, are now
vented upon me, will be transferred to 
another quarter* "2
Pour months later he wrote:
”The possible appointment of Kitchener Is 
exciting the liveliest dread In the Army in 
India. I have had a letter from Sir P.
Palmer, who implores me, if I cannot prevent 
it, at least to ensure that, before Kitchener 
assumes the Chief Command, he shall have been 
tried in a Provisional Command. He calls him 
•Kitchener of Chaos1; and predicts general 
disaster*”3
In the meantime Brodrick at the War Office brought 
pressure to bear on the Viceroy, in an effort to prevent 
Kitchener from going to India* Brodrick was extremely sensi­
tive to criticism regarding the failure of the War Office in 
the conduct of the operations during the campaign in South 
Africa; he needed an effective instrument to carry out his 
projected reforms and he warned Curzon against Kitchener;
1* Kitchener to Curzon, 8 May 1901*
2. Curzon to Hamilton, 15 August 1900*
3. Ibid., 13 December 1900*
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"There has been a good deal of Cabinet decas- 
sion this week about the new C.-in-C* I
am told you are now for Kitchener, If this 
be so, I should have sent you copies of some 
of Cromer*s recent letters which would throw 
light on his eligibility for India. I can 
only say that there is no precedent »•* for 
appointing a C.-in-C* quite unversed in 
India, and there are special dangers in K's 
case *
But six months later, following the CabinetTs decision in
principle to send Kitchener to India when the war in South
Africa was finished, Brodrick reversed his ground and wrote:
".. ♦ I tore my vitals out for you about 
Kitchener, It will probably go far to 
wrecking my period of office «., it would 
be everything to have K, to appeal to *. #
I have literally no one to depend on in 
reorganization,.,rT,
But with the Cabinet*s decision Brodrick had weakened and
he explained to Curzon: "I think the Empire is a whole &
your need is greater than mine. So I gave in and told the
Cabinet the reason. I had meant to make him Chief of the 
2Staff." In his memoirs, Brodrick asserted that he had in 
fact taken his and Curzon*s rival claims to Kitchener!s 
services, with the tacit approval of the Prime Minister,
Lord Salisbury, to Lansdowne and Roberts and that they had 
unhesitatingly decided that Kitchener must go to India:
"The appointment lay with the War Office, and although
1, Brodrick to Curzon, 2 August 1900: This letter is no 
longer to be found in the Curzon Mss (Eur, E.111/10) at 
the India Office Library. Consequently we are forced to 
rely on Mosley, L,, Curzon: The End of an Epoch, p.98*
2, Brodrick to Curzon, 22 March 1901, Curzon MSS Eur,
P.111/10*
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Curzon did not know it, I had, on strong public grounds, 
done all in my power to prevent Kitchener going till Curzon 
had left India,n Brodrick*s testimony is somewhat flawed 
with defects as his subsequent actions reveal.*^
Brodrick*s personal fortunes had suffered when, in 
August 1901, his wife died. In January 1903 he remarried, 
this time to a warm admirer of Kitchener, Madeleine Stanley, 
Throughout the duration of the Boer War Brodrick had regu­
larly corresponded with Kitchener in South Africa and with 
Curzon in India, That bond of friendship, in the case of 
Kitchener became reinforced by marriage whereas in the case 
of Curzon increasingly produced estrangement, as we shall
p
examine in the next chapter. In spite of these personal 
misfortunes, in the face of Curzon*s consistent demand for 
Kitchener in India, Brodrick acceded, perhaps viewing with 
interest that two such men with so strong temperamental 
characteristics should be brought together in India# Curzon 
knew Kitchener more by reputation as the soldier who had 
avenged Gordon, slain the Mahdi and restored a measure of 
prestige upon British arms in South Africa; Brodrick Under­
stood the operational tactician whose rough and ready methods,
1# Midleton, Records and Reactions 1856-1939* pp,201-2, For 
different interpretations on Brodrick1s“position regard­
ing Kitchener*s appointment, see especially Fleming, P,, 
Bayonets to Lhasa, p,290 and the less balanced account 
in Mosley, Isupra,
2, See Brodrick to Kitchener, 19 December 1902; Kitchener 
MSS 30/57/22,
power of "brute force as well as expediency) privately 
earned Kitchener a reputation as an autocrat though it 
inspired confidence in his official superiors in the 
Cabinet*'1*
At the same time while the Cabinet deliberated) the 
presence of Russia on the outskirts of India seriously 
added to the problem of the defence of India and Curzon*s 
dilemma was not mitigated by assistance from his military 
advisers* In February 1901 he commented bitterly:
"Last week we had our opening field-day upon 
the military estimates* I can only say that 
I look forward to these discussions with 
horror and back upon them with mingled 
annoyance and regret* No proportion, no 
system, no thought out plan of military 
reform *.* a lot of petty, rubbishy propo­
sals * * * If we go on with the present system 
of what the Military Department here calls 
*Army Reform* we are gust paving the way to 
as big a smash someday as the heart of the 
bitterest enemy of England could desire*"2
(4) Russian Railway Expansion and the Defence of India 
While Great Britain was distracted by the Boer War, 
Russia had taken the opportunity to bring renewed pressure 
to bear against India by the construction and development 
of a network of railways in Central Asia* One of the main 
problems underlying British policy in Europe was the diffi­
culty of interpreting the motives of Russia in Asia* The
1* Midleton, op*cit«, pp*216-7*
2* Curzon to Hamilton, 21 February 1901.
threat of a Russian invasion of India had a long-standing 
history and now Witte, the ambitious finance minister, was 
building between Orenburg and Tashkent a connecting line
1linking the Fersian-Afghan frontier with European Russia.
The rapid extension of that system posed a formidable threat
p
to the security of India and greatly alarmed the Viceroy* 
Increasingly it became evident to those responsible for 
Britain!s Imperial defence and European diplomatic posture, 
that the strategic advantages conferred by England's sea 
power were now diminished by the expansion of Russian 
railroads in Asia*
During the winter of 1899~1900 the whole question of 
the Defence of India was reopened by the India Office* It 
wasjdecided that in the event of hostilities by a Russian 
attack upon Afghanistan, at least 30,000 British troops 
would be sent to India at once, with an additional 70,000, 
should prolonged hostilities require that number. By 
December 1902, an India Office Committee reported that "the 
military position of Russia grows stronger every day and the 
completion of the Orenburg-Tashkent railway in or about 1905 
will add immensely to the danger to which India may be
Zl
exposed*" That situation produced great anxiety in India.
1* Monger, 0*, The End of Isolation, p*4.
2. Ronaldshay, Curzon, II, p/lOl' "ff.
3. Despatch No.51 23 February 1900, Curzon UBS F.111/414.
4. Monger, op * cit *, p.4*
Though the distances to he traversed between Russia and 
India were vast and the intervening country desolate, India*s 
long land frontier left her exposed and in a position where 
Russia could apply leverage in an area totally removed from 
British naval superiority, a classic reversal of strategy in 
Russia!s favour. The British in India now faced an extremely 
difficult problem - the dilemma of having to meet an aggres­
sor along her frontiers whilst maintaining her internal 
control, always with the possibility of rebellion from 
within India.
Because Curzon had long kept up a lively interest
in Russian policy in Central Asia he considered himself an
expert on Asian affairs there. He published his views in his
first important work, Russia in Central Asia in 1889» which
established his reputation, and in which he described the
sum and substance of Russia*s policy, as "to keep England
2quiet in Europe by keeping her employed in Asia. " With the 
possibility of a Russian advance Curzon as Viceroy carefully 
reviewed British policy with the intelligence reports he 
received from officials along India*s frontiers and in Europe, 
and he was determined to be prepared to face any eventuality.
British policy towards a Russian invasion may be 
roughly summarised in the following five principles: (1) 
Indian forces could not alone deal with Russia and must
1* See Greaves, R.L., Persia and the Defence of India 1884—
1892, p.3. ----------- -------------- ------
2. Curzon, G.N., Russia in Central Asia in 1889, p.321*
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depend as we have seen upon reinforcements from home* (2) 
Ultimate decisions concerning Russian policy in Asia rested 
with the Foreign Office and not the Government of India*
(3) The incident most likely to cause a rupture between 
England and Russia would he violation by Russia of Afghan 
territory* (4) Should war break out the main theatre of 
operations would be somewhere in Central Asia; simultaneously 
measures against Russia would be taken in the Baltic, the 
Black Sea, and in the Far East* (5) In the event of hostili­
ties, England1 s aim would not only be decisive military
victories, but also the financial exhaustion of Russia, thus
1forcing a favourable peace. Ourzon was at great pains to 
revise that policy in order, among other considerations, to 
prevent increasing financial strain which war would inevita­
bly place upon Indian revenues* He assumed that the defence
burden would be borne largely, if not wholly, by the Imperial 
2exchequer, and in consequence his views clashed with those 
entertained by the Home Government*
The problems of Indian defence involved not only the 
north-west frontier, but also the integrity of Afghanistan, 
Persia and Tibet. Russian activities in Central Asia led 
Curzon to an increasing interest in these territories 
as potential buffer states* But agreement on this subject
1. See Greaves, op*cit*, p*40.
2. Despatch Ho• 85, 13 June 1901, Curzon MSS Eur. F. 111/414.
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was difficult "between the Government of India, the India 
Office and the British Cabinet under the auspices of the 
Defence Committee* Though we are not concerned with Britain1 s 
diplomatic policy in Europe, suffice it to say that the wide 
divergence of opinion which arose between London and Cal­
cutta regarding the best way to advance the interests of a 
mighty Empire, became acute. As the problems of India*s 
external affairs gained in importance, they increased the 
complexity of reconciling India!s policy with that of 
Cabinet strategy* Moreover the age-old conflict between 
civilian control and military strategy once again produced 
friction, only partly resolved by the decisions of the 
Defence Committee. Though direct negotiation in Europe
ultimately culminated with the Anglo-Russian Convention in
2
1907> the intervening years were rife with tension.
The unexpected failure of British arms in South
Africa exploded like a bomb amidst the smooth surface of
contemporary political affairs in England. For that reason
Salisbury had deferred his resignation until July 1902 to
avoid incurring the risk of giving a false impression to the
therefore
Boers as to the harmony of English counsels* Salisbury/found 
comfort in the fact that there were new and younger men 
capable of managing the administration of Imperial affairs:
1* See Charteris, J*, Field-Marshal Earl Haig,[19293»P*30.
2* Greaves, op.cit., p.43V"
1 It is fortunate for us that the satraps of the Empire were
never more conspicuous for intelligence and force than they
1are now - yourself, Cromer, Milner, Kitchener*" The shock
of the Boer War did little however to help British prestige
in India; and was felt all over the Empire as a howl of glee
arose at the humiliation of the British by a few thousand
untrained farmers, whose habit of taking away the trousers
of their prisoners only added to the more comic aspects of
2
that prestige. As conflicts between soldiers and statesmen 
now became primarily administrative ones, they were embit­
tered by personal animus even more than by disagreement 
about the best method of achieving success. In these circum­
stances Curzon once again became exceedingly impatient with 
the administration of the Indian Army, and as rumours of 
Russia's intention to take advantage of England*s difficul­
ties spread, Curzon determined to set his house in order and 
overhaul the Indian military machine, illustrating in 1900 
one of the problems which delay of Kitchener !s appointment 
was causing him:
"We are once again going to have that most 
distressing of experiences, a full field 
day in Council, in which all his [the 
Military Member's] fresh military proposals, 
some of them individually excellent, but 
collectively impossible from the point of 
view either of expediency or finance, will 
have to be threshed out by a body of civi­
lians who will be told at each turn that 
if they do not give this or that they will
1* Salisbury to Curzon, 9 August 1902*
2, Eor the impact of the Boer War on the British Army, see 
Terraine, J*, Douglas Haig, The Educated Soldier, p*24.
be responsible for the future discomfiture 
of British arms0I?1
The successive postponement of KitchenerTs appointment,
(although having heen decided on in principle by the Cabinet
in March 1901), left Curzon in a somewhat exposed position
and he was forced to place control of military administration
in the hands of Elies, to the extent that, according to
Magnus, he took ’’the ambitious military member under his 
2wing*1 In that way he had hoped to provide some kind of stop 
gap for the problem of India*s military security*
Indian external defence involved vast logistical 
dimensions for her strategic boundaries covered in theory an 
area extending from the waters of the Cape of Good Hope on 
the West to the Straits of Magellan on the East* Her long 
land frontier stretching from Tibet and Chinese Turkestan 
in the East to Afghanistan and Persia in the West, was, of 
course, partially insulated by the geography of the highest 
mountain barrier in the world* The intervening terrain, 
characterised by mountains and deserts, made any Invasion 
logistically difficult. Only along the Horth-West frontier 
was India really vulnerable, and there Persia and Afghanistan 
separated the Russian Empire, and British India* neverthe­
less the Great European powers, Russia, Prance and Germany 
were becoming increasingly interested in Asia* The fact that
1* Curzon to Hamilton, 1 Pebruary 1900*
2. Magnus, Kitchener, pc201*
91
India!s huge land frontiers touched Turkey, many parts of 
the Arabian peninsula, Russia on the Pamirs, Ghina along the 
entire border of Turkestan and Yunnan, and Prance on the 
Upper Mekong, prompted Curzon to observe: "in Asia a great 
deal is still in flux and solution, and there must, and 
there ... will be, great changes*"^ In 1885 the Russians had 
succeeded in pushing their frontiers southwards until they 
were coterminous with Persia and Afghanistan; the Penjdeh 
crisis in which the Russians suddenly attacked the Afghans, 
marked the beginning of a large increase of military expen­
diture in India, and demonstrated to Britain that the last 
safeguards between India and Russia x^ ere now threatened# 
These circumstances combined to produce a tremendous expan­
sion of the military budget of the Indian Government; in 
1893 the value of the rupee fell, and increased financ||||? ' 
embarrassment, forcing the reduction of military estimates 
at a time when a series of frontier wars coupled with the 
famine of 1896, necessitated the greatest financial string­
ency. Consequently by 1900 Curzon feared that the burden of
defence would ruin Indian finance and so reduce the Govern-
2ment to chaos.
The Home Government too was extremely anxious; by 
1903 Roberts reported to the Committee of Imperial Defence:
1# Summary of Curzon1 s Administration in the Military Dept#, 
1906, Curzon MSS, II1/4-14, p#91*
2. Ibid., p.5*
"... as regards Russia, there is undoubted 
evidence that she has designs upon Afghani­
stan and India. Twice during the last cen­
tury we were dragged into war with Afghani­
stan in consequence of the presence of 
Russian Emissaries at Cabul ... Russian 
possessions in Central Asia have now been 
brought into direct railway communication 
with St. Petersburg via the Caspian. Russiafs 
frontier is absolutely coterminous with 
that of Afghanistan along its whole length ..♦ 
it is only reasonable to conclude •.* she 
will take advantage of some plausible pretext 
to repudiate her existing engagements, and 
continue her policy of aggression and absorp­
tion... To sum up, I would urge that Russia 
be informed, on the earliest possible oppor­
tunity, that any interference with Afghan 
affairs or any other violation of the Afghan 
frontier would lead to a declaration of war 
by England."!
In the meantime Balfour the new Prime Minister, informed
his Foreign Secretary, Lansdowne:
"The fundamental principle which should 
govern us in discussing a forward policy 
is quite simple: until Russia moves we 
remain still; as soon as Russia moves in 
the north we move in the south.
The application of that principle, particularly in the
Persian Gulf, was not so simple, but it reveals to what
extent Great Britain was prepared to go in the event of
further Russian encroachment against the buffer states
surrounding India.
1. Memorandum, 24 March 1903, by Roberts on Military Defence 
of India, Cabinet records of the Committee of Imperial 
Defence, 6/1/8D Paper 8D (Papers on the Defence of India, 
P.R.O,: This collection contains over 50 papers dealing 
with related issues on the defence of India from 1901- 
1904. See'List of Papers of the Committee of Imperial 
Defence to 19141, HMSO 1964, pp.1-18.
2. Ibid., Paper 3SD, Balfour to Lansdowne, 6 September 1902*
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Curzon however was not prepared to stand idly hy 
while Russia gradually consolidated her position in Central 
Asia# He was convinced that Britain could win the great 
struggle with Russia in Asia and vigorously rejected what 
appeared to him to he the spineless attitude of the Home 
Government# Having little use for a !huffer policy1, he 
advocated a more militant forward policy in Afghanistan, 
Persia and Tibet, and preached that Britain must he ready to 
defend India hy restoring the dominating influence of British 
prestige in those territories vital to her interest#^ Broadly 
speaking, Curzonfs external policies were characterised hy 
his tendency to gain hy force what could not he achieved hy 
negotiation, and that policy brought him into direct conflict 
with the Cabinet* Brodrick reminded him that the South 
African War was making serious drains on Britain's military 
forces and that the times were particularly unfavourable to 
a forward policy:
f1You may say that inaction spells future 
trouble; hut, if you were here, I doubt if 
you would give Prance, Germany and Russia 
a chance of coming together on anything; #.*
Don't resent my saying this; I.am, as you 
know, of the forward school and am oppressed 
hy the sometimes needless inertia; hut your 
views, which are well known, rather perturb 
Arthur [Balfour] and others who are as keen p 
as yourself, because times are so difficult.1'
These differences came to a head, as we shall see, 
over the defence of Asia, and Curzon felt the Home Government
1# Grenville, op*cit*, pp.292 & 298*
2* Brodrick to Curzon, 8 August 1901, Curzon MSS 111/10.
(See also Ronaldshay, Curzon, II, p#207)*
were inept in handling affairs there# Furthermore, Kitchen­
er's appointment was greatly to complicate the question of 
Indian defence which Ourzon so hoped it would resolve* 
"Kitchener's foundations had been laid deep in public 
opinion, and he did not intend to be any* man's tool* He 
intended to do his duty* in the autocratic way which had 
answered in the Sudan and South Africa*"^ Fundamental 
differences between India and the Home Government over 
foreign and defence policies were to be strikingly illustra­
ted when they became related to the problem of military 
administration in India, and it will be convenient to examine 
these in Chapter III.
In the meantime Curzon's crusade against racialism 
and social Injustice in the army and his concern for the 
administrative arrangements of India's external as well as 
internal policies, epitomised both the strength and the weak­
ness of his Viceroyalty. In his position of relative isola­
tion, no one was better placed than he to analyse such prob­
lems, hitherto notably mismanaged. He was able therefore to 
relieve the worst of the abuses by forthright action prior 
to Kitchener's arrival. But his successes were purchased at 
considerable cost and although by 1902 he could write that 
he had assured India's internal security through improved
1. Magnus, Kitchener, p.196.
communications and the permeation of the "pacifying influence
of the civil administration", "Provision for external defence
1alone remained Tins at is factory e 1
Peace was made with the Boers on 31 Hay 1902, and 
Kitchener sailed from Cape Town for England in June. After 
receiving the honours that were showered upon him, he 
took up the question of his future which had occupied his 
mind for so long, with members of the Imperial Cabinet.
He discussed the date on which he would assume the Indian 
command with Roberts, the Commander-in-Chief, and with 
officials at the India Office. Godley, the Permanent Under­
secretary had expected a "silent man of action", and was 
accordingly dismayed when Kitchener "talked incessantly for 
about 55 minutes". Godley was greatly impressed:
"He had not sat down for three minutes before 
I felt that I perfectly understood what I 
had heard of his strength and his influence; 
and one appreciated from the first his extra­
ordinary gift of complete want of self- 
consciousness - the mind fixed on the object, 
and absolutely regardless of you or of itself, 
or of the effect that it may be producing on 
you."
Kitchener was at some pains to secure for himself a much- 
needed holiday:
"In talking to me he made a great point to 
not taking his work up until the end of 
November. He said he had been not only in 
command of armies, but virtually at war,
1* Summary of Curzon *s * Administration in the Military 
Department*, p#15# Curzon MSS 111/414.
for seven years without intermission, and 
that he must have a spell of rest ."I
The Viceroy however was extremely anxious that
Kitchener should arrive in India as soon as possible, pointed
out that the preparations for the great forthcoming Delhi
Durbar imposed some hardship and inconvenience on Palmer,
the provisional Commander-in-Chief, who was thus forced to
arrange for the details for the entire military part of the
programme, involving some 30,000 to 40,000 troops. Moreover,
he urgently needed Kitchener's services by the middle of
October if he was to take command eX -the~g K > - f o r *
2"men whom he has never seen in a country he does not know, 
and predicted that in the meantime his own relations with 
the Indian army would make his position at Delhi "most 
difficult and trying" • How would Kitchener handle that 
situation? Curzon was not sanguine:
"... for with the army of 40,000 soldiers 
there, the society will be almost exclusively 
military; there will be 1,200 officers alone, 
all of them probably cursing me in their 
cups: and I doubt not that I shall receive 
many a curt answer and sullen glance. No 
doubt too they will get a hold of the Duke 
of Connaught, who will send home woeful 
messages to the King. This is the price that 
a man has to pay in this country who dares to 
stand up against the crimes of his fellow 
countrymen or to hold the scales with even 
hand..."5
But the Home Government were determined that Kitchener must
1. Godley to Curzon, 18 July 1902.
2. Curzon to Godley, 23 July 1902.
3* Curzon to Hamilton, 27 November 1902.
have a holiday and Hamilton telegraphed (16 July 1902) that 
Kitchener would reach Bombay on 28 November.
While in England Kitchener paid a series of visits
to prominent members of the ruling class. In July of 1902
Lord Salisbury retired from the Premiership and A.J. Balfour,
a warm admirer of Kitchener, succeeded his uncle as Prime
Minister* Kitchener took the precaution of making Lady 
1Cranborne his secret contact with the leadership of
Balfourfs new government. Her husband was first cousin to
Balfour, and succeeded as Lord Salisbury in August, 1903*
Kitchener had "enjoyed a long friendship with the Cecil
family, and its influence was considerable. Its members acted
always from a sense of disinterested duty and from motives
2
of the highest patriotism." Arrangements were made for 
Hubert Hamilton, Kitchener’s military secretary to send 
documents which Kitchener felt would be of interest to his 
friends, and thereby keep them independently informed of’ 
events in India.^ Whatever the motives, the existence of 
this secret channel of communication was to become a major 
source of erosion, undermining confidence in the relations 
between India and the Home Government and culminating in the 
steady deterioration of personal as well as official friend­
ship between Curzon and the India Office.
1. Lady Cicely Alice Gore (1867-1955); (1887) Viscount 
Cranborne (4tli Marquis of Salsibury).
2. Magnus, Kitchener, p.197*
3. Ibid.
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Balfour’s Government was not strong, but be managed 
to push through three important measures of reform in the 
field of education, defence and foreign policy. With the 
appointment of Kitchener to India, two of these reforms, in 
imperial defence and foreign policy, were to seriously 
affect the policy of the Government of India and the Vice­
royalty of Curzon. Moreover, just as the war in South Africa 
had overshadowed all other events and allowed policy in 
India to run along fairly autonomous lines, after 1902 under 
Balfour’s initiative, the question of Imperial strategy took 
on new importance with the result of increasing the power of 
the Prime Minister over Britain’s foreign and defence affairs.x 
It was Balfour’s intention to utilise Kitchener’s talents to 
help co-ordinate Imperial policy.
Kitchener left England en route for India on 17 
October 1902, and landed in Egypt to inspect the Asswan Dam 
and visit the Sudan where he opened Gordon College at 
Khartoum on 8 November* In Cairo, he discussed his future 
plans for the reorganisation of the Indian army with Lord 
Cromer. Dubious of Kitchener’s expectations before he had 
the opportunity for a thorough investigation of the conditions 
on the spot, Cromer suggested that Kitchener go to India with 
only an open mind and not a plan of campaign, and that he 
should form his opinions only after long and patient
1. See Young, K., Arthur James Balfour, pp.199-200, and 
Monger, op.cit., pp.95-4» “
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examination of the obstacles in the path of Indian reform.
Brodrick wrote:
"Unfortunately, Kitchener sowed the seeds of 
discord on his way out to India by telling 
Lord Cromer that he intended to abolish the 
Military Member of Council..,",1
and Lord George Hamilton, (in his memoirs), mentioned that
a few days before Kitchener left England to take up his new
duties, he had called upon him at Deal Castle:
"In conversation he said quite casually,
!what are the functions and status of the 
Military Member of Council in India? * I 
described them as shortly as I could and he 
then said, *1 ought to be Military Member.1 
I did not attach much importance to this 
remark but the news reached me that almost 
immediately upon his arrival in India he 
fell foul of General Elies, who was then 
Military Member."^
The stage was now set for the first act of a Homeric combat •
It was four years since Kitchener had first enter­
tained the idea of his appointment to India with Curzon, (in 
1898), and by 1902 he was convinced that it was now time 
for thorough reform of the Indian army. Kitchener arrived in 
India "with a fixed obsession that a Russian invasion was 
being prepared", and "landed, accordingly, with an urgent 
sense of mission, and with the firm resolve to take drastic 
and immediate steps to prepare the Indian Army to meet the 
Russian threat."^ Supported by his friends in England,
1. Midleton, op.cit., p.202.
2. Hamilton, (CF., Parliamentary Reminiscences and Reflections, 
1886-19055 pp.3 0 5 ^
3. Magnus, Kitchener, p.196.
Kitchener believed that he possessed something of a national 
mandate for reorganising the defences of India, and that 
nothing and no one would be allowed to stand in his way. At 
his first meeting with Curzon, Kitchener rather disingen­
uously asked whether in fact, it would be easier for him to 
accomplish his mission if he had come to India as the
i
Military Member instead of as the Commander-In-Chief* But 
to this problem the Viceroy for the moment turned a deaf 
ear, being at the time preoccupied by the growing 
estrangement not only with Russia but with the Imperial 
Cabinet over India’s external affairs.
1. Magnus, Kitchener, pp*201-2.
101
CHAPITER III
INDIA’S RELATIONS WITH THE HOME GOVERNMENT
(1) Brodrick’s Unpopularity as Minister for War
throughout the duration of the war in South Africa, 
Cursor, absent from the seat of control of the Imperial 
Cabinet, carried on the task of administrative reform in 
India relatively unhindered*, Because Ministers in London were 
almost exclusively absorbed in the conduct and prosecution 
of military operations there, circumstances tended to 
limit the sphere of their intervention in Indian affairs*
But in the aftermath of the Boer War, which left a deep and 
lasting impression upon members of the Gabinet, the attitude 
of ministers towards India became radically altered. British 
statesmen might be blind in their own choice of a policy for 
India but they were more than aware of their own disinclina­
tions. In effect, being uncertain as to what course should 
be pursued and adopted in India, they realised quite clearly 
those directions which they did not want to follow. It was 
this negative quality, increasingly grasped and proclaimed 
by the Cabinet in order to avoid fresh entanglements abroad, 
which so exasperated Curzon. Conflict arose when Curzon 
embarked upon a course of independent action, often in 
defiance of ministers collectively responsible for Imperial 
policy in London. And as India!s external policy more and 
more threatened to encroach upon the C&binet’s conduct of
Imperial affairs* the ensuing confusion spread very rapidly. 
Moreover, the source of much of the friction and grievance 
between the Government of India and that in Whitehall con­
cerned the issue of finance.
One incident in the summer of 1902 serves to illus­
trate this difficulty: Curzon had become concerned over the 
burden of the cost of the Indian representatives at the 
Coronation of King Edward VII held in London, and subsequent­
ly, the question of a remission of taxation for the Indian 
people at a Durbar in India that winter* The Viceroy refused 
to assent to the provision of funds from Indian revenues to 
defray the costs of India’s guests on the tacit assumption 
that to demand payment from India was a travesty of the 
elementary laws of hospitality. When, however, in August 
1902, Curzon suggested the announcement of a reduction of
l
taxation at the Coronation Durbar to be held in India, his 
proposal met with stiff opposition. He then appealed over 
the heads of ministers directly to the King, and that action 
was deeply resented by the Cabinet. Hamilton wrote:
"The two telegrams that you sent to the King 
were transmitted by him to the Cabinet, and 
there read. They excited strong comment. It 
was alleged that it was the first time that 
any appeal had been made to the King to 
influence a Cabinet whilst it had under its 
consideration a question affecting the person 
who had so appealed. It was, moreover, felt 
and said that the question at issue was of
1. Curzon to Godley, 27 August 1902.
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the very class in which, an appeal to the 
Sovereign ought not to have Seen madefn^
Curzon then threatened resignation, and defended a 
position from which he declined to withdraw* He replied:
"Now I look forward with utter sickness of 
heart to another dispute with your Council*
In my view ~ and it is shared by all my 
Colleagues - they are as wrong in advising 
you as they have done « as they were over the 
Coronation expenses, Berar, the Police Com­
mission, and the various other matters in 
which they have shown themselves to be false 
judges of the Indian situation* I am 
accountable for this Durbar, its success or 
its failure*** By a happy accident the King 
can associate his Coronation with boons, 
long promised and urgently needed, to his 
people ,* * I would sooner not hold the 
Durbar at all than hold it under the con­
ditions which you desire to prescribe for 
me; .** I say, therefore, with the utmost 
respect, but with emphasis, that I cannot 
accept the position which you desire to 
assign me; and I urge you once again to 
accept my advice (which has not so far, on 
a single important occasion, led you astray) 
in preference to that of the counsellors who 
have been wrong before, and are now wrong 
again*,T£^
Curzon then informed A.J* Balfour, the Prime 
Minister, of the great personal sacrifice he was making in 
order to perform his duties in India.
"If the Government are fixed in their views,
I feel disposed to say that it will be 
fairer upon me, and fairer upon yourselves, 
that you should get some one else to carry 
them out. Do not make me the instrument of 
this great failure * *, if a public servant
1. Hamilton to Curzon, 20 November 1902
2. Curzon to Hamilton, 13 November 1902
has lost the confidence of his masters, 
they have the right to recall him, and you 
can exercise that right in the present case."
But the Viceroy was informed by Brodrick that the Cabinet
were prepared to sack him if he persisted in pushing his
policy in the teeth of their hostility:
"I hate writing this - but I telegraphed 
because I feared you might think if you 
threatened resignation, the Cabinet might 
give way *. * but in this instance there 
has been unanimity of opinion in the India 
Office & Cabinet*.
Ihe Coronation Durbar episode became the subject of heated 
controversy between India and the Home Government and re­
vealed the growing divergence between the Viceroy and his 
colleagues in London. In particular it opened a breach with
Brodrick, and Curzon told his wife:
"Observe the amicable way in which he informs 
me that all the Cabinet, including himself 
(a humble participator), were quite prepared 
to throw me overboard ... I need not comment 
on it all *.. but what a light it throws upon 
human nature and upon friendship* "3
That rift in the personal relations between two former
friends added significantly to the difficulties which were
to beset the conduct of India1s affairs In other matters*
The gulf was noticeably widened partly as a result
Because
of other events following the Boer War*/BalfourTs Cabinet
1. Curzon to Balfour, 20 November 1902*
2* Brodrick to Curzon, 21 November 1902. Curzon MSS 
III/10.
3* Eonaldshay, Curzon,- II, p*244*
was not strong they hoped to win popularity by a reduc­
tion of expenditure, particularly in Army estimates, and this 
involved the use of Indian revenues to defray the costs of 
Imperial obligations. In that way Curzon1s friendship towards 
Brodrick, was subject to considerable strain. St* John Brod­
rick was industrious and conscientious as well as being 
profoundly determined to carry through at all costs what he 
conceived to be his duty - root and branch reform at the War 
Office. Nevertheless, if Brodrick was forceful he was also 
tactless and he became extremely unpopular in his own party 
as well as in the eyes of the country,^ for the mismanagement 
of the War Office. Lord George Hamilton informed Curzon of
these circumstances while conveying his personal observations
2reaffirming Brodrickfs unpopularity. In addition both 
Hamilton and Curzon were not happy with the way in which 
Indian interests were treated in the hands of the War Office, 
resulting from a traditional conflict of interests. At the 
time Hamilton wrote; "I dislike the idea of the military 
expenditure of India being run up by £800,000" to suit the 
needs of the War Office and he rejected the position that
1. See Dunlop, J.K., Ihe Development of the British Army 
1899-1914-, p. 152.
2* Hamxlton to Curzon, 13 February 1902: Hamilton as a 
former 1st Lord of the Admiralty was, as 
an expert naval administrator, critical of the
organisation of the War Office. His son had been involved 
in the seige of Ladysmith and had almost died, prejudicing 
his mind against the War Office.
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India and the War Office should he that of provider and user.
In their efforts to obtain more equitable terms for 
the India Office and the Government of India, both Hamilton 
and Curzon found as often as not they were not consulted 
until decisions regarding Indian revenues had been taken, 
and Curzon later, in 1909*
"It might surprise some of the more embittered 
critics of British rule in that country if 
they knew how bold a struggle had often been 
waged for the defence of the Indian tax-payer 
by its much-abused rulers
Though personally sympathetic to Brodrick, Hamilton explained 
that the War Mnister*s difficulties stemmed not only from 
his personal limitations but from defects in his administra­
tion and that:
"The British public are now on the rampage ,,* 
the press want some scapegoats ... therefore, 
the War Office is marked down in advance as 
their prey,"3
Moreover, Brodrick imperfectly understood the position of 
the Government of India regarding military expenditure:
"Brodrick has ... obtained the idea that you 
and I starve military expenditure in India, 
and that a huge increase is absolutely 
necessary to bring the equipment and.arma- 
ment of the Indian Army up to date,"^*
Hamilton assured Curzon that as far as he was concerned,
1, Hamilton to Curzon, 13 February 1902, See also Singh, 
op0cittt, who cites instances of the often arbitrary 
demands made on India by the War Office,pp,1975 208.
2. Curzon, G.W,, The Place of India in the Empire, p.22.
3* Hamilton to Curzon, 6> March 1902*
4. Ibid,, 19 December 1902.
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"the Indian Army is far more efficient and 
better equipped for mobilisation than it 
has ever been, and that, although there is 
no prospect of a reduction of expenditure, 
yet with the savings which we hope Kitchener 
may effect in the reduction of the Engin­
eers bill, we may be able to go on improving 
our army with comparatively little additional 
cost. But just now he has so many troubles 
inside his office, and the pressure on him 
for an increase of expenditure is so great, 
that I think his ordinary level-headedness 
is somewhat upset, and that he takes a very 
exaggerated view of what is really necessary 
to achieve military efficiency,"
In addition, Brodrick was often extremely tactless in his
personal relations with his colleagues:
"He somehow or other contrives to rub up all 
the officials with whom he has to deal, both 
civilian and military, inside as well as out­
side his Department, and he has undoubtedly 
committed a series of gauoheries which, 
though small in themselves, give his oppon­
ents an opportunity of holding him up to 
ridicule, and prejudicing the public mind 
against him, I am afraid the War Office 
internally is from an administrative point 
of view in a worse position than it has been 
for many years past,"l
Hamilton attributed Brodrick1s declining popularity to his
Increasing deafness which may well have unconsciously annoyed
his colleagues:
his deafness has greatly grown upon him, 
and that, combined with a certain tactless­
ness, prevents him from understanding the 
gist of personal conversations, and to this 
physical failing rather than anything else 
may be attributed the very unjust opinion 
which, I fear, almost universally prevails 
concerning him,"^
1, Hamilton to Ourzon, 28 January 1903,
2« Ibid,, 13 February 1903.
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On 27 February 1903 Hamilton once again took up that theme.
MI think his failing is that his power of 
logical exposition greatly exceeds his 
powers as a practical reformer or organiser.
He is so deaf that he does not hear other 
people!s opinions, and he is, in addition, 
very self-opinionated himself."
Brodrick1s career at the War Office was a regrettable failure
2and he was a liability as well to the Government; Hamilton 
moreover predicted a ministerial collapse upon Army estimates*
A good deal of the opposition attack in Parliament 
came from Winston Churchill, fresh from his adventures in 
South Africa, and the new Member for Oldham. His repeated 
remarks on the prodigious Army estimates which brought dis­
sension over Army reform, and neither increased efficiency 
nor reform, revealed the weakness of Balfourfs Parliamentary 
position and threatened to bring the Government down. As a 
strong advocate of the Admiralty1 s 'blue-water1 school 
Churchill bedevilled Balfour!s efforts to increase expendit­
ure on the army in preference to expanding the fleet in 
preparation for a European war. But both Hamilton and 
Curzon generally agreed that financially the policy of the
1. Hamilton to Curzon, 27 February 1903*
2. Ibid. In the bitterness of defeat Curzon two years later 
wrob'e of his treatment nby a man who has failed in every 
office that he has filled ... and who would never have 
had the chance of being a failure as Secretary of State 
for India if he had not already been a failure as Secre­
tary of State for War.1* Curzon to Ampthill, 23 July 1905•
3. See Johnson, P.A., Defence by Committee, p*42; and 
Dunlop, op.cit., ppel5?5 157-87
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Home Government sacrificed Indian interests and Hamilton 
wrote:
T,In order to justify the vast increase in 
expenditure, "both Brodrick and Balfour have 
made free use of Indian requirements and of 
the large reinforcements which India would 
require in the event of an assault upon our 
North-West frontier •"
Ihe Government in fact was under tremendous pressure for an 
increase in military efficiency, the natural reaction 
of the country to its colonial obligations; hut it was also 
partly due "to the ambition aroused in the military mind of 
being able to take some part in a big continental war." 
Nevertheless such evidence foreshadowed the discontent 
which was to lead to the Liberal landslide ahead, and 
Hamilton foreboded: our popularity is steadily on the
wane. People are tired of us", and sceptical of the Govern­
ment’s capacity to "manage the affairs of the Empire,
2
except by an expenditure which is ... steadily gaining."
Curzon was thus dismayed to learn that Balfour’s 
Government though under the threat of being turned out, 
(resulting from the unpopularity of the War Minister), was 
considering the prospect of utilising and providing funds 
for increased military expenditure by the use of Indian 
revenues, (The War Minister’s efforts to obtain this
1. Hamilton to Curzon, 13 March 1903.
2. Ibid.
3. See "Brodrick to Curzon, 16 September 1902. Curzon MSS 
111/10
additional finance and so prove himself worthy of his post 
in the eyes of his colleagues and countrymen, produced un­
fortunate consequences with the Government of India* As we
have shown Brodrick as well had "been disappointed in losing
1Kitchener's services for the War Office; and had openly 
asserted that if Curzon elected to resign over the Durbar
2episode, the Cabinet would accept the fact with equanamity* 
Now Brodrick's suggestion that Indian revenues be used to 
defray the costs of increased military expenditure in the 
Army estimates of the War Office, created a crisis of confi­
dence in his friendship with Brodrick which received a 
severe blow. Added to this came a private intimation that 
the Cabinet were thinking of Brodrick as a possible candidate 
to succeed Curzon as Viceroy. In these circumstances the 
Viceroy had just cause to fear a change of Government at 
home*
(2) The Extension of Curzon's Term of Office,
The question of an extension of the Viceroy's term 
of office now brought Curzon into conflict with the Home 
Government* Normally, his five years' period of office would 
have terminated in December 1903. For reasons which we shall 
examine, Curzon desired to extend his tenure by two years on 
the condition that he should be granted leave of absence
1* Midleton, op.cit., p.201; see also Brodrick to Curzon,
22 March 1901*
2* Supra, p,104-* Brodrick to Curzon, 21 November 1902;
and 27 January 1903* Curzon MSS 111/10*
3. See Dawkins to Curzon, 25 July 1902.
early in 1904* In discussing his reasons for a prolongation 
of his term with the Prime Minister, Curzon noted in addition 
to the necessity for continued co-operation with Kitchener 
for the prosecution of successful military reforms (1) his 
desire personally to conduct the forthcoming Royal tour 
(1905); (2) his duty to stay and complete the administrative 
reforms which he had initiated? and (3) his wish to maintain 
on a sure footing India’s delicate relations with Afghanistan:
*.• it would he an abnegation of public duty 
on my part to take my hand off the plough 
for a little while longer * *. I should be 
willing to stay on in India, if required, 
until the end of 1905? i*e., until I have 
been here for 7 years* Within that time I 
think that I could have completed my task, 
and laid the foundations secure *,,'L
But he was secretly anxious about Brodrick's ambitions in 
India*
At home the pressure in Parliament for fresh men to 
undertake the task of reform remained* When it was mentioned 
that the Liberal opposition (notably Rosebery) wanted to 
replace the unpopular Brodrick with Kitchener for Secretary
p
of State for War, Curzon wrote:
,f Our’Hercules from the Himalayas’, as Rosebery 
persists in calling Kitchener, greatly to the 
fury of the latter, has an opinion about the 
War Office and its chief, which it would be 
hardly wise to repeat on paper, and I can
1, Curzon to Balfour, 5 February 1903? no*7» 
2* See James, R.R., Rosebery, p*446*
assure you that the very last thing that he 
desires is to be recalled from the Himalayas 
and employed in any capacity in Pall Mall*1'1
Meanwhile Curzon supported his contention that Brodrick's 
appointment as Viceroy would not be well received in India.
He corroborated that view with extracts from Indian news­
papers which he sent Hamilton on 5 March. (The Secretary of 
State conceded that there were risks involved in the possi­
bility of sending out Brodrick and he therefore encouraged 
Curzon to remain, expressing his view that Brodrick
,!has ridden his horses to a standstill... I 
do not believe it would be politically safe 
to put him in a position of such unique 
authority as the Viceroy of India exercises, 
and where his discretion would be so ion- 
fettered. (Therefore, from every point of 
view, I consider it would be for the advan­
tage of India that you should stop on.11^
But Curzon was indignant when he heard ,Tfrom an authoritative
quarter in England .*. that the idea has been seriously
entertained of sending Brodrick out as my successor to India
next year because he is thought to have failed at home, and
of bringing me back to clear up the mess that he is supposed
to have left at the War Office ... No consideration in the
world would induce me to take part in the administration of
the War Office, I believe it to be utterly bad from top to
bottom ... if I were asked to undertake the task, my answer
would be No^ No, and a thousand times No. (There is no reason
1. Curzon to Hamilton, 19 February 1903 •
2* Hamilton to Curzon, 27 March 1903*
why one should sacrifice the whole of the hest of one!s life
for work which you get no gratitude, and are, on the contrary,
1overwhelmed with ignorant calumny and malignant scorn," The 
suggestion merely reinforced Curzonfs determination to remain 
in India and complete his work.
But the question of Curzon1s future was inextricably 
bound with that of the Governments, and further complicated 
by the King's dislike of the idea of a Viceroy taking a pro­
longed absence from India, while on holiday in England, 
before resuming his Viceroyalty* As a result of the Govern­
ment's vulnerability, Balfour could not guarantee Curzon any 
extension of office, and that fact created a charged atmos­
phere between the two Governments, Balfour reviewed 
that delicate situation In an undated letter to
Curzon in March, 1903* The Prime Minister maintained that 
though it would be of great advantage to Indian Administra-* 
tion that Curzon1 s work should be continued, "the future of 
the Government cannot be regarded as in all respects assured. 
We have been in office a very long time; we have carried 
much legislation; and we have been responsible for the con­
duct of a prolonged and very costly war*" A difficult 
Parliamentary situation had "been occasioned as much by 
matters personal to Bt. John [Brodrick] as by the merits or
1. Curzon to Hamilton, 12 March 1903*
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demerits of his military policy," Balfour pointed out that 
if Curzon were re-appointed and came home for a holiday, a 
ministerial collapse might completely frustrate his plans 
and, that as well "objection might be felt to your re­
appointment on the eve of a General Election which turned 
against us*"^ In a postscript Balfour took exception to some 
acid references to his Government which Ourzon had made:
"George Hamilton, by-the-way, has shown me a 
private letter of yours in which quite a 
surprising number of pungent adjectives are 
applied to the Asiatic policy of the Govern­
ment,** I suppose I could find some not less 
pungent method of describing the alternatives 
proposed for India,"
Ourzon was extremely pained by that letter and once again
hinted at resignation:
"I only offered, In what I conceived to be 
the public interest, to stay on, should the 
Government desire me to do so. Otherwise I 
would strongly prefer to consult my own 9 
health and interests by returning home,"
On the same day, Ourzon informed Hamilton:
"I have been somewhat pained at the tone of 
Balfour * s letter *,, I wish you clearly to 
understand that, except from the point of 
view of public duty, I have not the slight­
est desire to exceed my five years1 term, 
and His Majesty1 s Government may retire me 
whenever they please,"
The one condition to which the Viceroy attached the greatest
importance was a holiday in England, Accordingly he informed
1, Balfour to Curzon, n,d, March 1903,
2. Curzon to Balfour, 30 April 1903*
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Hamilton:
"It is not for me, after five years of the 
work that I have gone through, to ask the 
Government for a favour* I am much too proud 
to do so. It is for them, if they conceive 
my staying on here to he in the public inter­
est, to ask me to remain. The only other 
point at issue is that of my holiday. Every­
one tells me that I have nothing whatever to 
gain by remaining in India, and you know 
perfectly well that it is only a sense of 
duty that impels me to consider the step.
But whether I gain or lose in reputation by 
staying, there is one loss to which I do not 
want to submit as the consequence, and that 
is the permanent loss of my health.
Curzon had other and more personal 
reasons for desiring to remain in office. He had been pri­
vately warned moreover that Kitchener intended coming out to 
India with ambitions of his own and "that he has got a year 
with you which he will need to look round, and he wonft 
collide with you. After that, he will use the whole of his 
popularity and prestige to dominate the next Viceroy. Con*- 
sequently, it Is your successor he is already occupied with," 
That tip was not lost on the Viceroy, especially when he 
learned of a tactless remark which Brodrick. had inadvertently 
mentioned to Hamilton as to possible candidates succeeding 
him; Hamilton had never wholly trusted the appointment of 
Kitchener to India and reaffirmed that view when he intimated 
(on 5 June 1903) Kitchenerfs desire to mould men to suit his
1. Curzon to Hamilton, 28 May 1902.
2* Dawkins to Curzon, 25 July 1902, no*131*
own ideas* According to Hamilton, Kitchener had attempted
"to influence those in authority into believ­
ing that Eddie Stanley [17th Earl of Derby] or 
Oranborne [later 4th Marquis of Salisbury] 
would either of them be efficient Viceroys*
Brodrick told me this with great glee, as 
Kitchener was certain that he could manage 
either of them, and then added St* John 
[Brodrick], with his usual naivet§: *But he 
[Kitchener] does not think that of me1*"1
Hamilton then went on to make an extraordinary suggestion; 
he asked for Ourzon!s views on the possibility of Kitchener 
succeeding him as Viceroy, and pointed out further that "so 
long as you are there, you will not only be able to pull 
together, but be able to do some excellent work in combina­
tion, though I can quite understand he would like to have a
2
weaker man whom he could mould and influence as he chose*"
Without hesitation, Curzon replied that Kitchener would not
do as Viceroy of India*
"In the first place, his whole heart is in 
the Army, and he thinks and talks about 
nothing else. Ho man could now be both Vice­
roy and Commander-in-Chief* If he were Vice­
roy I should be extremely sorry for his 
Commander-in-Chief, who would be reduced to 
a cipher .** Moreover, Kitchener has not any 
.., grasp of administration* He rather prides 
himself on his financial capacities; but - 
in my view he confuses finance with arith­
metic, and thinks that the only thing in 
finance is to frame an estimate and to keep 
inside it *** Then he is no speaker*-*"3
But Hamilton was as well aware of these limitations as was
1. Hamilton to Curzon, 5 June 1903#
2m Ibid*
3. Curzon to Hamilton, 24 June 1903-
Curzon; he was as convinced as Curzon as to the unsuitability 
of Kitchener. But nonetheless, his question accurately re­
flected the current of thought of Cabinet members who 
regarded Kitchener highly. Hamilton, moreover, pointed out 
"... it must not be forgotten that it was mainly due to his 
manner and hasty changes that the serious mutiny at Omdurman 
originated."'1" In warning the Viceroy of the dangers ahead, he 
especially cautioned Curzon against converting a difficult
situation into one of deadlock by being involved in any
moreover
collision with Kitchener: he predicted/"constant friction 
and trouble" in the future with regard to Kitchener's pro­
ceedings? The seeds of distrust were effectively sown;
Curzon now regulated his conduct in the light of the informa­
tion he received and suspicion of Kitchener's ambitions 
remained Indelibly stamped on his mind* He was told that 
"Lord Salisbury is so impressed by Kitcheners determination 
to run the show that he says the best way out of it is for 
Kitchener himself to succeed youl"^ Anxious lest the insta­
bility of Balfour's Government adversely affect India and 
her interests, Curzon now felt just cause for alarm at 
the motives of Brodrick and Kitchener, particularly when
1. On 28 January 1900, a batallion of Sudanese men and 
officers seized the British officers1 quarters and guard 
room, and 300 rounds of ammunition per man as a result 
of the harsh rule of Kitchener. They were provoked by a 
reduction of their field allowance and the fear that 
they were shortly to be sent to their doom against the 
Boers„ Magnus, Kitchener, p. 153*
2. Hamilton to Curzon, 5 June 1903*
3. Dawkins to Curzon, 25 July 1902.
rumours of their candidacy to succeed him reached his ear*
He felt even less assured when notified in the spring of 
1903:
1 *.. a change of Government must seriously 
affect your plans for the future* I think 
you may safely rely, if you accept an ex­
tension of time, that the greater part of 
it will he spent under the direction of 
another Government *
Those developments added to Curzon*s consternation and he 
therefore
/resolved to remain in India hy obtaining his two years1 
extension of his normal term of office* That decision was to 
he an enduring one, profoundly affecting his career*
In the meantime, during the autumn of 1903  ^ Balfour!s 
Government became engaged in one of the most far-reaching
reviews of British foreign and defence policies ever under-
2taken* That review profoundly affected matters connected 
with Indian administration*
(3) The Committee of Imperial Defence and India.
Throughout the latter part of the 19th Century and 
particularly in the days following the outbreak of the Boer 
war, Britain was plagued by the fear of Russian aggression 
against India0 That threat, as we have seen, affected
1. Hamilton to Curzon, 19 June 1903*
2* Esher, National Strategy (1904); The Committee of 
Imperial’ defence (191277 Hankey, The Supreme Command
, I, pp *4-5-59; Nonger, G«, The End of 'Isolation, 
p.93 ff*; Young, Arthur James Balfour, pp,228-9; and 
Johnson, E,A., Defence by 6'ommlttee, "p*33«
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seriously the conduct of the Government of India* Conversely, 
the extent to which India!s external affairs affected the 
conduct of British foreign policy cannot he underrated.
Indian affairs were often moulded hy considerations which had 
little or nothing to do with Indian conditions or interests.
But Cabinet policy was greatly Influenced hy European power- 
politics and the broader problems of Imperial strategy*
These problems often produced much confusion between the Home 
Government and India* and in some cases friction. Their 
result, during Curzon*s Viceroyalty, was to strain the in 
some respects already strained relations between India and 
the Cabinet*
The expansion of Russia in Central Asia revolution­
ised Britain*s posture everywhere in the world. India repre­
sented Great Britain1s most vulnerable point - a sensitive 
nerve on which pressure could perhaps induce British Govern­
ments to alter hostile policies directed against Russia, and 
therefore of great use when applied on all those questions 
where mutual interests of Russia and Britain were in collisione' 
It was this leverage which Russia was thus able to apply 
against Britain in India that produced so profound an effect 
upon the thinking of statesmen in England and it was the need 
to resist^Ru^ which produced in turn so severe
a strain on Britain*s finances and manpower. That situation
1. Alder, G.J*, British India*s Northern Frontier 1865-1895» 
P*304.
triggered off a great desire on the part of the Home Govern­
ment to seek some means of providing a co-ordinating body to 
integrate the problems of imperial security and defence 
planning. A central authority was drastically called for in 
order to direct military and naval programmes, and it was 
this authority which was to have such an intimate bearing 
upon the problem of Indian army administration and the 
struggle between Kitchener and Ourzon over administrative 
control of army affairs.
Balfour!s ^judicial mind, sharpened by dialectics and
tempered by philosophical enquiry, was peculiarly fitted to
the task of sifting the often conflicting opinions of
military and naval experts. Accordingly, he exhibited a
strong interest in the absorbing problems of defence and
Imperial strategy resulting in the rapid growth and
development of the Committee of Imperial Defence which met
under Balfour for the first time on 18 December 1902*
Balfour was convinced of the absolute importance of his
achievement in undertaking to evolve the office of Prime
Minister as the supreme agent responsible for directing and
1co-ordinating the defence of the Empire. His study of the 
problems of defence convinced him that Central Asia was the 
sphere of most potential danger and that Russia was Britain1s
1. Monger, G., The End of Isolation, p.93 ff.
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most dangerous enemy.
The objects for which the O.I.D. was established 
were fourfold, (1) To ensure full discussion on matters 
connected with Imperial defence and falling within the pur­
view of more than one department of state, (2) To circulate 
questions affecting more than one department before the 
notice of all other related departments, thus establishing 
communication between mutual or conflicting interests* (3)
To bring about the settlement of questions in dispute 
between two or more departments of state, (4-) To bring naval 
and military experts into direct contact with ministers, who 
could then fully and freely question them, thus avoiding 
many of the misunderstandings arising from official minutes 
and memoranda. The C,I.D. was to be purely a consultative 
body having no executive powers or administrative functions* 
As an advisory body it could only make recommendations to 
the Gabinet. In reality it lent great weight and force to 
Cabinet decisions,
It followed that, in place of short-term improvisa­
tion and the spasmodic efforts which had so strikingly 
characterised the disasters of the Boer war and had produced 
so much wasteful expenditure, decisions henceforward would 
be based on consistent and reasoned principles* Ill-regulated
1, Monger, G*, The End of Isolation, p*97*
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policies of the pa&t were disregarded while new schemes and 
suggestions were considered on the basis of accurate infor­
mation and long-range planning. The creation and transforma­
tion of the C.I.D. as an instrument of British Foreign 
policy was of fundamental importance to India, Nowhere was 
the force of this body felt more strongly than in affairs 
connected with Indian army administration: "It will be 
necessary in future for the Government of this country" 
wrote Sir George Sydenham Clarke, secretary to the C.I.D.,
"to pay much more careful attention to these problems than 
in the past. It is not safe to permit the military questions 
of India to be settled in that country without much more 
full consideration than has, at some periods, been accorded
to them by the Home Government, which is responsible for the
1security and for the well-being of that country," (This shift 
in the emphasis of British foreign policy played an extremely 
significant role in the affairs of the Indian Government 
profoundly affecting relations between India and the Cabinet, 
In fact at the conclusion of Curzon^ tenure of office, 
questions involving military administration overshadowed all 
other Indian issues.
If Balfour exhibited a strong tendency in his attempts 
to discover the truth for himself, he was challenged by 
Curzon who considered himself an expert in matters connected
1, Note on the Imperial Defence Committee, Sir G* Clarke, 
n,d* (ca,1905)? Sydenham MSS 50836*
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with, the affairs of Central Asia. Balfour had Borrowed a 
leaf from Salisburyfs notebook. He echoed in particular the 
latter*s advice to Lytton when he warned that;
"You listen too much to the soldiers... You 
should never trust experts* If you believe 
the doctors, nothing is wholesome: if you 
believe the theologians, nothing is innocent: j.
If you believe the soldiers, nothing is safe."
Balfour was at pains to guarantee that Britain*s European 
diplomatic relations were not damaged by non-European issues. 
He was, significantly, determined not to venture on a course 
of foreign policy independent of public opinion in Britain, 
and in that way was most reluctant to countenance fresh 
involvement overseas. Nevertheless his reappraisal of British 
responsibilities and committments forced him to dictate his 
policies In the teeth of Curzon*s opposition from India. But 
this occurred in singularly unorthodox and interesting ways. 
Eor almost all these matters, as we shall see, were closely 
linked with immediate political events.
As Balfour preferred to reject the dictates of 
experts, his independence of mind led him to scrap the time- 
honoured policy of splendid isolation and in 1902 in con­
junction with Lansdowne he formed an alliance with lapan^for 
the security of the Ear East to face the potential threat of 
Russian pressure in Central Asia. Balfour clearly realised 
that Britain!s power was being overtaken by newer rivals who
1. See Adjler, op.cit*, p*509
challenged her supremacy0 He pondered and prepared* He
engineered the Anglo-Erench Entente in 1904* He recognised
the incipient German naval threat although it was not until
July of 1907 that he suggested the need for x^econsideration
of the plans to counter a German invasion of the British 
1
Isles. In formulating his ideas he, above all, was most 
reluctant to provide any provocation whatever to Russia any­
where in Central Asia amd it was here that friction between 
Curzon and the Home Government was generated* (Bee IV, 6).
While Balfour deliberated, Curzon acted, Curzon 
possessed outstanding executive ability particularly as an 
administrator* As a great savant on the problems of Central 
Asia Curzon was actively suspicious of the motives of the men 
behind the 0*1.D., He described Balfour as being "led by the 
nose by the Defence Committee, which I consider one of the 
most dangerous inventions of recent years* It assumes an auth­
ority unknown to the constitution: and it is dominated by a
2man. Sir George Clarke, whom I profoundly distrust*n But 
there was one more important aspect underlying these suspic­
ions: India, more often than not, paid for her own way in 
Imperial affairs. Lansdowne, the Eoreign Secretary, for 
example, was always ready to listen to Curzon1s advice on 
matters connected with Persia and British policy in
1* Young, opocitp, pp0228-9* Bee also Ld. Esher!s National 
Strategyo
2. Curzon to Lamington, Governor of Bombay, 24 July 1905.
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Persia was often contingent -upon finds from India revenues 
(as the only* possible source of income for supporting resis­
tance to commercial penetration on the part of Russia in the 
Persian Gulf). If India were to defray e^enses it was only 
right that she had some say in calling the tune of policy 
there, That held valid in other matters, matters more intric­
ate and complex such as in Tibet, Afghanistan, and India’s 
internal army organisation* It was in these spheres that 
Ourzon resented his views being ignored, or when registered, 
discarded* It was particularly in the last mentioned category, 
Indian army administration, that cause for grievance became 
accentuated when the suggestion was put forward by Brodrick 
that Indian revenues should be taxed to cover the expenses of 
a new scheme to defend India from South Africa,
One of the first questions which the Defence Com­
mittee attempted to answer was that of the manpower needed 
to throw back an invasion in India, As early as 12 December 
1901 Balfour had written Lansdowne:
"The weakest spot in the Empire is probably 
the Indian frontier. In a war with Russia 
our military resources would be strained to 
the utmost to protect It, and while the pro­
gress of events strengthens the position of 
Russia for aggressive purposes in this part 
of the world, no corresponding gain is poss­
ible on the side of defence. A quarrel with 
Russia anywhere, about anything, means the 
invasion of India and, If England were with­
out allies, I doubt whether it would be 
possible for the French to resist joining in 
the fray,"
1. Balfour to Lansdowne, 12 December 1901, Balfour MSS 49978.
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We have seen that the extension of Russian railways against
the Indian frontiers was a classic reversal of strategy for
Britain, cancelling out her naval superiority completely.
In these circumstances Balfour considered as his only hope 
that Kitchener would he ahle to meet that threat with enough 
men and material to hold India; indeed the defence of India 
necessitated a whole new policy. In a significant Memorandum 
in 1903, Balfour declared;
"the investigations we have undertaken on the 
subject of Imperial Defence seem to me to 
point unmistakably to the conclusion that 
the chief military problem which this coun­
try has to face is that of Indian, rather
than of Home, Defence,"!
The moment had arrived for the necessity of providing some
scheme for the men and expenditure needed to support the
maintenance of a standing expeditionary force held in reserve
2
for the defence of India.
(4-) The South African Garrison Scheme
The defence of India in 1903 became the "central
element" in Imperial defence. In the drastic necessity of
4*her requirements all other military problems were judged.
1. Memo by Balfour, 30 November 1903* C.I.D. Records, 6/1/34-D
2. See Godley to Minto, 30 March 1906, corroborating the 
fact that Balfour's policy from the autumn of 1903 
attempted to reconcile any conflict of interests in 
Imperial affairs. Minto MSS 1005*
3. Balfour to Hamilton, 11 September 1903, Balfour MSS 4-9978* 
4-, Memo by Esher, n.d. 1903> Balfour MSS 4-9718.
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Ministers were uneasy about the numbers of troops required 
for the security of India, particularly Sir John Fisher who 
felt Balfour was "stupefied by the Indian Frontier Bogey", 
and attributed this mainly to the evil influence of Brodrick. 
Brodrick had, in the summer of 1903, put forth a scheme for 
supplying the necessary troops for India in the event of a 
Bussian invasion# His proposal became the subject of an 
angry correspondence between the authorities in India and in 
Whitehall and lead to much personal friction between Brod­
rick and Curzon, permanently damaging their friendship*
There were two closely related problems. Ourzon 
considered that he could actively check Russian aggression 
along India's frontiers by a policy of direct negotiation, 
that is, in the buffer zones of Tibet and Afghanistan, 
kitchener, on the other hand, thought that it was essential 
to have emergency reinforcements, numbering upwards of
125?000 men, available in order to make India's frontiers 
2defensible* Brodrick, as War Minister was concerned to try 
and supply these men as cheaply as possible to meet Kitchen** 
er's demand* In attempting to do so he clashed head-on with 
Curzon.
Brodrick suggested that a British garrison (of 
12,500 men) should be stationed in South Africa reserved for
1* Marder, A.J*, ed. Fear God and Dread Fought, vol.I,
pp.320-19 323*
2* Telegram from Kitchener, 27‘ July 1904, C.I.D* Records, 
6/2/64D*.
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use in India, one third of the costs of which should "be 
"borne by India» At a later date he defended this position in 
a Commons Debate over the Indian Budget, 13 August 1903? hy 
asserting that it was the Government of India which imposed 
so great a strain on Britain!s finances and consequently 
kept Army Estimates so high* He further stated:
1 it would be more to our advantage that India 
should have a separate army • •• [and] relieve 
us [the War Office] from those fluctuating 
demands which we cannot control, but which 
the Indian Government make upon us . * * If 
the Indian Army is to be increased, and if 
you could draw a distinction between British 
policy and Indian policy, the increase is 
not due to trouble forced upon India by our 
Imperial position, but is due to the actual 
needs of India itself, and the policy pursued 
in her behalf by her rulers . *. it is not 
our difficulties in Europe which cause the 
increase of Indian armaments. It is the need 
of her own protection which make it necessary 
for India to make further demands on the War 
Office*
That speech, and Brodrick*s attitude generally, Curzon 
bitterly resented*
Curzon was extremely indignant at what he felt were 
disparaging remarks aimed at his Government:
ffIndia renders conspicuous services to Great 
Britain [he informed Hamilton] , without 
which for many Imperial purposes the latter 
would be absolutely crippled* When Brodrick 
is always trying to make out that an army 
of a certain size is to be kept up by the 
Home Government for the sake of India, he 
forgets to mention that the obligation is 
more than repaid by the many services on
1* Parliamentary Debates, 4th series, v*127» Commons, 
13 August 1903, Cols, 1 2 5 2 - 3 Speech by Brodrick*
behalf of the Empire which, that Army is 
called upon to render* Not a word is said 
on these occasions about South Africa, or 
China, or Somaliland, and the impression is 
left that Great Britain is a generous mother 
who Is being bled by a prodigal offspring*
That is not at all our view here, nor do I 
think it is consistent with the facts,"-1*
There were, in addition, other considerations which poisoned
the atmosphere between India and the Home Government evolving
from Brodrick*s proposal*
Again, the problem of reinforcements for India had 
been the subject of prolonged discussions between officials 
in London and in India for many years. In the main that 
question too boiled down to the issue of money. When the 
Government of India estimated that it would require 100,000 
men as reinforcements from Britain in the event of war with
p
Russia, Curzon pointed out that he was not trying to 
starve Indian military expenditure but was attempting to 
remove any additional increase to the amount which taxed 
Indian revenues* He told Hamilton in 1902: "We never laid 
down that our armaments in India, for which India pays, ought 
to be limited to the satisfaction of our internal needs; on 
the contrary we expressly admitted as an obligation devolving 
upon us, not merely the maintenance of internal order, but 
the defence of our border" as a legitimate charge upon Indian 
revenues. "Russia will not send a fleet into the English
1* Curzon to Hamilton, 2 September 1903.
2. Report of Committee on the Military Defence of India,
24 December 1901, C.I.D. Records, Cab.6/1, Paper 1.
Channel or attempt? an attack upon London; neither will 
Russia invade our Colonies or bombard our coaling stations; 
she will throw her whole force against the frontiers of 
India**." The essential point in this case however-was not 
the efficiency of Indian military organisation, hut India!s 
financial capacity to pay for any increase for Imperial 
purposes:
if you ask me whether I will go further,
I say emphatically No, and if this is a 
further case of an addition to our military 
charges being pressed upon us by the Govern­
ment at home, in the interests, as I maintain, 
not exclusively or mainly of India, but of 
the Empire, then during my time at least I 
do not think that it will be accepted*n3*
It is interesting to note that one of the primary reasons 
for Curzon*a reluctance to sanction additional military 
expenditure lay in his desire, as we shall see, to prevent 
the Congress from hurling the charge of 1 economic drain1 at 
the military policies of the British in India*
The Cabinet however, was prepared to accept Brod­
rick Js scheme and had all but adopted the proposal that
30,000 men should be sent to India at the outbreak of hostil-
2
ities with an additional 70,000 to be sent afterwards* But 
Curzon was unwilling to accept those figures nor did he feel 
that India should pay for their cost:
1. Curzon to Hamilton, 15 October 1902*
2. Hamilton to Curzon, 3 July 1903*
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”1 think •o * that the Government have not 
heen altogether **. fair to India, in the 
course they have adopted .. , I submit that 
the announcement of your intentions looked 
very much like an attempt to force our 
hands *. * You first make an announcement *.. 
and then you say that you are going to con­
sult us afterwards*n
He proceeded to denounce the recommendation on the grounds
that Brodrick had publicly announced the project in the
House of Commons before the Government of India had had the
opportunity of giving any opinion about it, Curzon concluded:
"This is the way ... that the Government of 
India is always treated about military 
affairs.,* We [are] only informed when the 
decision had already been arrived at...,,J"
What particularly annoyed Curzon was the idea that 
if a garrison was equipped and maintained by Indian funds in 
South Africa it would also be used as an Imperial reserve 
capable of being withdrawn elsewhere in the event of an 
emergency. In other words* Curzon argued, India was to ’sub­
sidise British Imperial interests not only in South Africa 
but anywhere else the Cabinet chose, This, he submitted, was 
not a fair burden to lay upon the shoulders of the already 
burdened taxpayer. Curzon cited an article which appeared in 
the Pioneer which asserted:
M*.. either the War Minister or his project 
must be abandoned... There are some luxuries 
for which it is possible to pay too high a 
price: Mr* Brodrick seems to be one of them."
1* Curzon to Hamilton, 3 July 1903.
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"It is not fear for India but for their own 
position that occasions this sudden anxiety 
to improve the military resources of the 
Dependency*
Though it was true that the Conservative Government hoped to 
win popularity hy reducing Army Estimates Brodrick saw in 
Indian revenues a possible way out of his difficulties. But 
Curzon was adamant. He cited not only press opinion in India, 
but asserted that Brodrick1s procedure was materially weak­
ening the prestige of Great Britain, and that his scheme was 
shaking "the moral bases of our dominion in India ... There 
is not a paper in the country ... that is not aflame with
anger at the way in which they think that India is about
2once more to be treated."
In rejecting the Governments defence policy as 
far as It involved Indian revenues, Curzon now clashed 
with the Cabinet. It was precisely for just this type of 
problem that Balfour had set up the Defence Committee and 
discussions as to the best method of meeting the requirements 
of Indian defence were given top priority. Hamilton took 
the precaution to warn Curzon in advance that he and Kit­
chener must make up their minds as to the exact number of 
troops necessary so that the Cabinet could get on with the 
business of supplying theme Unfortunately that issue turned
*1 Pi nuPPT* PA- rTwlv I Q O ^  n.
2! Curzon to Hamilton, 22 July 1903: H.L.Singh also cites 
the strong objection which Indians took towards the Home 
Governments attitude in regard to the payment of troops 
for Imperial purposes, indented from Indian revenues. 
QpoOit0, PPol97? 208.
on the principle of who should bear the full burden of the 
costs. Hamilton tactfully but obliquely suggested that the 
Defence Committee should handle this question. By way of 
introduction he pointed to the need for co-operation between 
the rival interests in the Empire:
"The Committee is an innovation, and will 
require to be worked into the existing 
practice and official Institutions of the 
Empire. His [i.e. Balfour’s] idea, in which 
I most thoroughly concur, is that this com­
mittee should be the means of obtaining the 
views not only of the highest military and 
naval experts in Great Britain, but also of 
those who are holding high positions in 
other parts of the Empire ... We are fortu­
nate in having two such high authorities 
as yourself and Kitchener simultaneously 
holding high positions in India; and it, 
therefore, would be very advantageous If 
you could draw up between you a joint 
report which you could both sign. Two con­
flicting or antagonistic Memoranda signed 
by two such high authorities would ... add 
greatly to its difficulties as an advisory 
Committee.111
But Hamilton's explanation did not touch upon the main point 
in contention; who was to pay for these troops?
Curzon in July had prepared to mount his own assault 
against the Home Governments proposals* He did so in several 
ways, including leakages to the Indian press about what was 
occurring. He enlisted Kitchener’s support by asking him to 
become associated with the Viceroy in an official protest 
against these measures. This had the effect of delaying the 
necessary figures. But these tactics also exacerbated
1* Hamilton to Curzon, 3 July 1903*
friction with the Home Government while tending to diminish 
confidence in Curzon1 s conduct of Indian administration. 
Specifically, he rejected the scheme on two points; the£*
cA’ A W - v^5,
transport^to India, and their availability in the event of 
an emergency. Curzon wrote:
"Brodrick **, talked lightly about guarantee­
ing us the possession of these men, but 
Kitchener says straight that if you are only 
going to keep 25*000 men in South Africa, 
there is not the remotest chance for the 
12,500, or even half that number, will be 
available for use when we have a war in 
Afghanistan.
A week later he wrote:
"Kitchener was himself the strongest opponent 
of your scheme ... He laughed at the idea ...
I submit that his views cannot be underrated 
or ignored. He has come here with the most 
consuming desire to place the defences of o
India upon a footing of the highest efficiency,"
But earlier in July Curzon was dismayed to learn that 
Brodrick had made a further statement in the House of Commons 
about the intentions of the Government, and that "India were 
going to be called upon to pay for a portion of the charge" 
of maintaining a garrison in South Africa* He considered 
that demand as an outright raid on Indian revenues; he 
strongly pressed against "the inequality of the arrangement 
under which you are almost every day drawing freely upon our 
troops for yoxir wars in every part of the Empire without
1. Curzon to Hamilton, 22 July 1903#
2. Ibid., 29 July 1903#
3. Tbld», 22 July 1903#
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paying us a penny in advance"; he warned the Home Government;
"It will he much better now *.. to recognise 
that a mistake has been made, and to recede 
from it In good time instead of persisting 
in what will be regarded as an unwise and 
despotic course*"
He was upset by "the persistency of the Home Government in 
attempting to undertake these proceedings without prior con­
sultation with the Government of India*" He described 
Kitchener1 s reaction to the announcement without prior 
consultation as "the most startling discovery he has made 
since he came to this country*" But Curzon did not know 
that Kitchener had secretly been tipped off by Brodrick as 
to the probable course of decisions made by the Defence
Committee, and that they would largely depend on Kitchenerfs
2
rather than Curzon*s views.
By mid-summer of 1903 > the atmosphere between the 
two Governments was sulphuric. Though Curzon perhaps 
grossly misjudged his colleagues in London and underestimated 
the determination and achievement of the Prime Minister, he 
was aware of the fact that he was becoming regarded as a 
dangerous factor hindering the smooth harmony between the 
two Governments and he therefore flippantly suggested to
1* Curzon to Hamilton, 29 July 1903.
2. Brodrick to Kitchener, 19 December 1902, Kitchener MSS 
30/57/22*
Hamilton that the Cabinet might select some more "safe and
sturdy pillar of the Empire who will mildly say !yesj!
i
to the Professors of Downing Street." These cutting remarks 
did not go unnoticed. Hamilton revealed the impact of 
Curzon!s attitude on the relations between India and the 
Home Government on 6 August 1903:
"The blunt refusal of your Government of the 
proposal to locate troops in South Africa has 
very much annoyed the Cabinet .. * Brodrick 
certainly ... has a legitimate cause of com­
plaint. It is quite true that he alluded in 
a tactless way to the correspondence which 
was passing between you and me, and he con­
trived to convey to the public that what he 
was asking India to do was to contribute to 
an object which ought to have been met by 
Imperial revenues, and Imperial revenues 
alone. But this clumsy method of dealing 
with a difficult question Is one peculiar 
to Brodrick. Since, however, your telegram 
(rejecting Brodrick1s scheme) has been pub­
lished, he has been the subject in a number 
of papers to a series of gross attacks, and 
just in proportion as he is abused, so are 
you eulogised. An incident such as this does 
disturb .,, the relations between the two 
Governments..."2
But eighteen months later Brodrick, now in the capacity of 
Secretary of State for India, was to repeat those bungling 
methods in an effort to reconcile Curzon and Kitchener over 
the question of Indian army administration; and the distaste 
which the storm over the South African Garrison Scheme left 
had its effect on the outcome of that issue.
1. Curzon to Hamilton, 29 July 1903*
2. Hamilton to Curzon, 6 August 1903*
Moreover, Curzon1 s peremptory dismissal of the War 
Minister’s scheme drew a sharp protest from Brodrick who 
proceeded to explain his position in an extremely signifi­
cant and revealing letter. Brodrick bitterly denied that he 
was responsible for the wide divergence of views over the 
matter. Sensitive about the leakage to the press condemning 
his conduct and criticising his actions, he used the weight 
of the Defence Committee to reveal to Curzon his authority 
in making the decision to supply troops to India from South 
Africa* He asked Curzon: ’In such a case is the Cabinet 
master or not?1 Brodrick had in fact been threatened with 
the resignation of the Colonial Secretary, Chamberlain, if 
the Colonies were not adequately supplied with troops, and 
now Curzon*s refusal to help pay for India’s share of the 
burden of defence added to his problems. That caused Brodrick 
to suffer "very heavily at the hands of the Indian press, 
and made the difficulty of harmonious working greater than 
ever." Brodrick continued:
"Briefly what is felt ,. „ is this - you are 
pressing for a most vigorous policy in Persia, 
Afghanistan & Tibet - your army even in normal 
circumstances has been pronounced inadequate 
by one Committee after another» We are the 
first Government who has not ignored these 
representations which strain our recruiting ... 
to the uttermost. Lord Salisbury said to me 
more than once 1Curzon always wants me to 
negotiate as if I had 500*000 men at my back, 
and I have not*"
"Honestly we though^ I especially, tlaat 
while teaching us the 'benefit of a vigorous 
policy, you would endeavour to teach India 
the necessity of adequately supporting it.
Instead we surely have a right to say you 
have done the reverse, & we feel it hardly 
fair that the oppressed India whose champion 
you are & whom you defend from exactions, 
knows nothing of the strong measures which 
you call upon us to adopt ... My position 
is very difficult. I have fought a heavy 
hattle this year to keep the troops necessary 
to maintain your drafts; I have written you 
confidentially well in advance; my adminis­
tration has received a severe blow just when 
it least wanted it, & all who are round me, 
political or military, are vexed with India!s 
attitude ..." ^
But as far as Curzon was concerned Brodrick*s argument was 
inescapably linked to his attitude over the ill-fated 
Coronation guests scheme and his proposal for garrisoning 
troops in South Africa to he subsidised by Indian revenues. 
Those proposals would have produced unnecessary hardship 
on the already overburdened Indian taxpayer and in 1909 
Curzon wrote:
"Cases of this have occurred .;, both in 
respect of military charges and of the 
entertainment in England of Indian guests, 
and the utmost vigilance is required on the 
part of those who are charged with the 
custody of India*s interests to see that 
they suffer no injury."^
Nevertheless, Brodrick1s protest gives us the key to
Balfour*s strategy: The Viceroy*s refusal to allow Indian
revenues to be indented confirmed the Cabinet view that
1. Brodrick to Curzon, 19 August 1903, Curzon MSS 111/10.
2. Curzon, The Place of India in the Empire, p.21.
India!s relations with the Home Government were growing 
intolerablee It was to face this problem that, in the autumn 
of 1903, Balfour directed attention in the ensuing Cabinet 
reshuffle in an effort to end, once and for all, fundamental 
differences between the two Governments.
(5) Brodrick Assumes the India Office
The autumn of 1903 marks an important turning point 
in the struggle between Curzon and Kitchener in India* During 
September-October the Cabinet broke up over the growing 
disagreement about tariff reform as Chamberlain resigned and 
launched his policy of Colonial preference,. His resignation 
was followed in September by Hamilton, who was a convinced 
free-trader# With Hamilton1s loss Curzon!s policy increas­
ingly became dependent on the diplomacy of the Home Govern­
ment, handled exclusively by the Cabinet as advised by the 
Defence Committee. On the day of his resignation (16 Septem­
ber) Hamilton offered the Viceroy the following advice:
"Try and suffer fools more gladly; they constitute the
1majority of mankind." For almost five years Hamilton had
been able to "facilitate the progress of the machine by
p
pouring in a little oil” and his departure, in addition to 
the retirement of W.R. Lawrence, Curzon*s private secretary
1. Hamilton to Curzon, 16 September 1903.
2, Curzon to Hamilton, 29 July 1903.
and valued friend, seriously affected Curzon's official 
relations, both, with the India Office and in the Government 
of India.1
In his' reconstruction Balfour gave special attention 
to the problem of bringing together the various departments 
of the government with the view to integrating Imperial 
problems, notably defence. Arnold-Eorster became the new War 
Secretary and significantly Brodrick was moved to a depart­
ment directly connected with Imperial affairs, the India 
Office. The Government in the meantime was living on borrowed 
time* There was scarcely a month from the beginning of 1903
until his resignation late in 1905 that Balfour's Cabinet
2did not threaten to dissolve* By 1903 however, the Prime 
Minister was able to achieve several important advances in 
addition to the Defence Committee in the field of defence 
planning with the War Office Reconstruction Committee under 
Lord Esher In November 1903 and the planning for the estab­
lishment of a permanent Secretariat with official minuting of 
Defence papers, set up on 4 May 1904.  ^Using these instru­
ments as an effective part of his governmental machinery, 
Balfour now turned to the task of consolidating the various 
ministries of the Empire in a final effort to reconcile their 
defence problems* Accordingly, he surrounded himself with the 
Exchequer, Eirst Lord of the Treasury, War, Admiralty,
I* See Lawrence, W.R., The India We Served, pp.221-52.
2. Young, K., Arthur James Saifour, p*209.
3. Ibid., p.224.
Colonies and India Office, and as he later told George 
Wyndham, "This Government must stand or fall together!" In 
that way Balfour hoped to he in a position to reconcile the
p
interests of India within the Imperial framework, Brodrick*s 
particular task was to get Curzon and Kitchener to work 
together in harmony, or so it would seem from what ensued.
In his memoirs Brodrick wrote: "I accepted the
India Office with no axe to grind" and had "hoped my personal
influence with Curzon, which he recognized by appeals on
important occasions earlier in life, might help to a better
understanding between him and the Cabinet,"’' Nevertheless
he Realised with dismay that Curzon .. ♦ looked upon the
Secretary of State as the Viceroy!s representative at the
Zl
Court of St. James*s" and asserted that "The two Govern­
ments were, in fact, running on lines which could only end 
in a collision" regarding the Viceroy's policy towards the 
Amir and in T i b e t A s  we shall see in Chapter VI, Brodrick 
had strong motives for focusing criticism upon Curzon*s 
policy in Central Asia in order to deflect It from his con­
flict with Kitchener, in which Brodrick plays a central 
role. It will therefore be essential to keep these points 
In mind as we examine the following correspondence between
1. Balfour to Wyndham, 31 January 1905? Balfour ffiS 49805*
2* See Hankey, The Supreme Command 1914-1918, I, pp.45-59*
3* Midleton, op.cit., p*2l0. '
4. Ibid., p.2ml 
5* Ibid*, p.198,
the Home Government and the Government of India over issues 
related to India's political and military security. Further­
more, during Brodrick*s tenure at the India Office two 
developments had very definite consequences for the Govern­
ment of India concerning the burden of defence. Traditionally, 
the use of Indian revenues was regarded as the price which 
the Government of India had to pay for its security; but by
the early 20th century while the Navy defended Great Britain
1
It was the Army that was needed to defend India. Moreover 
Curzon contended that Indian revenues should not be used to 
subsidise the War Office, and thus have her interests sacri­
ficed to the Mother Country; in contending for that principle 
the Viceroy introduced an important corollary to the princi­
ples of Imperial security. He laid great emphasis on Indian
p
public opinion in determining India's needs. Therefore when 
Brodrick entered office intent upon discharging the obliga­
tions of the Home Government in defending India's land fron­
tiers, he faced considerable financial opposition from India 
and we may assume that past War Office failures to provide 
enough troops in the early days of the Boer War^ may well 
have been in the back of his mind as he now turned to the 
task of meeting the requirements, in men and money, for 
Kitchener's reforms in India, The ensuing friction simply
1. See Maurice and Taya Zinkin, Britain and India : Requiem 
for Empire, p#33*
2* See Curzon to Godley, 27 January 1904,
3. Midleton, op.cit., pp.119-120,
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accelerated the deterioration of relations between the two 
GovernmentSc
On 29 .September 1903 Brodrick telegraphed to Curzon 
that he was to be the new Secretary of State for India. (It 
will be remembered that Brodrick had worked in harness with 
Kitchener in the South African War, and had been a close 
personal friend of Curzon) • In his telegram he pointed out 
that it was under Balfour Ts direction that he would now act 
to try and bring relations with India into closer harmony 
with the Home Government. His telegram stated:
"Owing to constitutional changes in the War 
Office the Prime Minister desires me to 
take the India Office. Judging from the 
past that I am likely to be in sympathy 
with you,- I trust this arrangement will 
commend itself to you. Apart from personal 
affection, no Member of the Cabinet more 
fully realises the greatness of your work 
in India and his own inexperience. Be sure 
of all possible support from me«”-*-
Brodrick took office on 10 October 1903, and reiterated that
Mno efforts on my part will be wanting to maintain the
cordial relations existing between my predecessors, yourself,
and your Government 0 My best exertions will be at your
2service.” Although both Balfour and Brodrick were sincere 
in their recognition of the need for agreement between the 
two Governments, a brief comment made by Curzon in a previous 
letter to Hamilton (23 September 1903) indicates his suspicion
1. Brodrick to Curzon, Telegram, 29 September 1903*
2. Ibid., 10 October 1903*
that Brodrick would attempt to retrieve his reputation, and 
redeem himself in the eyes of the public in his new capacity 
at the India Office:
"Brodrick .. , as you know, is one of my 
oldest and closest personal friends, and I 
think that we should find no difficulty in 
working together* At the same time loyalty 
to India would require him to surrender 
many points of view which he has acquired 
in the War Office, and I am afraid, in 
view of recent events (notably the demands 
made upon the Indian establishment in con­
nection with the South African Garrison 
Scheme), his appointment would be extremely 
unpopular in India itself* If he is trans­
ferred from the War Office, it will be 
because he is not thought to have succeeded 
there, and no Department is particularly 
overjoyed at receiving the failures of 
another*."1
During the interim between Hamilton and Brodrick, Sir Arthur 
Godley, the Permanent Head of the India Office, acted as 
Secretary of State. To him Curzon confided:
"I must honestly confess that I think there 
will have to be some change of clothes 
before he can be generally recognised as 
the whole-hearted champion of Indian inter­
ests, The War Office point of view is not 
the India Office point of view, and even if 
it is that, it is most certainly not the ? 
point of view of the Government of India."
Curzon took considerable care to explain to Brodrick 
the extent to which the interests of India could be sacrificed 
before trouble came. In his first semi-official communication
1. Curzon to Hamilton, 23 September 1903.
2. Curzon to Godley, 23 September 1903*
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to Brodrick (on 2 October 1903) he advanced his belief that 
the India Council and the Secretary of State should avoid 
"overruling the unanimous opinion of the Viceroy and his 
Colleagues on any purely Indian matter which did not present 
an Imperial aspect - in which case of course the Home Gov­
ernment must be supreme*" He attempted to explain how Indians
regarded the Viceroy and, more important, the Secretary of
State:
"India looks to her official representative 
to be her champion, and to fight her battles 
in the Cabinet. She expects him to be the 
Secretary of State for India in the strictest 
sense of the word*"
Curzon then adopted a minatory tone which could not have
been very flattering to Brodrick1s new position:
the number of things that can be done
at the expense of India (and that were done
in the old days) is diminishing year by 
year. The recent experience of the South 
African Garrison is a case in point* I do 
not hesitate to warn all public men at home 
that India will become more and not less 
claiment in the future .. * let me warn you, 
therefore, in advance of the cases where I 
think that the Home Government of your own 
advisors are going wrong.
Bor his part, Brodrick firmly expressed his own ideas 
as to the future relations of the two Governments and re­
turned to the charge that the defence of India was of the
1. Curzon to Brodrick, 2 October 1903- In this letter Curzon 
wrote that 1 the private correspondence between the Secre­
tary of State and the Viceroy is really the means by 
which the Government of India is carried on.1
utmost concern to the C.I.D. as well as of the Gabinet. He 
noted Curzon1s anxiety over the fact that he had become the 
new Secretary of State:
"I am not astonished at this, because you 
have never worked with me, and I have never 
felt that on the subjects which I understood, 
such as those connected with the Army, you 
felt the same regard for my views as I had 
for yours. "
Upon military issues Brodrick felt his authority would be 
supreme, especially when it came to handling Kitchener:
"This, as we go on, will, I hope, become 
apparent to you. I shall never differ from 
you if I can possibly help it, and I have 
perhaps an exaggerated view of the necessity 
of trusting the man on the spot. In proof 
of this I think I may point to the fact that 
with all the troubles and anxieties of the 
War, with a strong man working at very high 
pressure in South Africa so far removed 
from all our Parliamentary troubles, I never 
had a word of difference with Kitchener 
during 18 months' campaign."1
It was, however, on the Defence Committee that Brodrick laid
particular stress, exhorting Curzon to pay close attention
to its proposals and advice upon the pressing problems of
imperial strategy:
"As I am writing about the Defence Committee, 
do let me urge privately that you will give 
these decisions all the consideration you can.
It is, so far as I have seen, the best con­
ducted business body and the most represen­
tative of all parties, which has yet been 
established. The Members know infinitely 
more of their subject than the Members of 
the Cabinet do on most subjects brought be­
fore them* Ihe points are closely reasoned,
1. Brodrick to Curzon, 15 October 1905*
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and the members are in a position to take 
a thorough all-round view of Defence* The 
Prime Minister has given an immense amount 
of time and thought to it, and any summary 
dismissal of its conclusions would entail 
a good deal of friction, ,,-‘-
Not entirely happy with that view, Curzon asserted 
that as far as India was concerned, ”.., the Defence Committee 
is not a tribunal which, in my opinion, can be regarded as 
absolutely final, and that if we claim the liberty to dissent 
from its views, it is not from any contentious spirit, but 
because we think that information and knowledge of the facts 
are sometimes in our possession out here which are not 
equally available at home *,* the fact that the Defence 
Committee knows more than the Members of the Cabinet, does 
not necessarily imply that, on a particular range of subjects,
p
they know more than we*.*n Curzon*s attitude towards the 
Home Government reveals the divergence of opinion that had 
grown up between India and the Cabinet, and which Brodrick 
was attempting to alleviate. Earlier Curzon had written to 
Balfour (on 8 July 1905) and in thanking him for supplement­
ing his term of office, pointed out:
"I think it the duty of Ambassadors, Pro­
consuls, Governors, etc. to be a little 
ahead of the Governments whom they advise.
Hhe inclination of the latter Is always to 
go slow, sometimes unnecessarily slow. Ihe
1. Brodrick to Curzon, 15 October 1905*
2. Curzon to Brodrick, 4 November 1905; see also Curzon to 
Brodrick, 20 April 1905*
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way has to he shown to them, even if they 
decide perhaps quite rightly not to take 
it a . Some of the things that I have put 
forward and that you have rejected - eg*
Tibet - will of a surety come; and my only 
discredit will have been to be a little 
previous *
Brodrick nevertheless remained apprehensive lest 
Curzon1s policy attempt to lead British foreign policy, 
and thus create a difficult situation* Whereas the 
British Cabinet shared Curzon's anxiety and distrust of 
Bussian expansion and penetration in Asia, they were 
persuaded that Britain's imperial security could only be 
achieved by the avoidance of provoking Bussia, Bepeatedly 
it seemed as though Curzon advocated a policy of vigorous 
and immediate penetration in the buffer zones along the 
gldcis of the Indian frontier, (by placing a permanent 
British Besident at Lhasa in Tibet and by entreating the 
Amir of Afghanistan to make direct contact with the 
British Government in India through an agent in Kabul*)
Balfour's study of imperial strategy led him to 
believe otherwise and that the fullest co-operation of 
ministerial departments was needed, in view of the potential
1* Curzon to Balfour, 8 July 1903*
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threat of Russia. Clearly the Cabinet was collectively 
responsible for the safety of the Empire. Nevertheless, 
while pressing his proposals for imperial defence upon his 
subordinates, Balfour was most reluctant to introduce personal 
animosities into the arena of public affairs. Above all he 
desired to remain aloof from distasteful controversies es­
chewing friction caused by personal distress. "Arthur could
never bring himself to dip his hands into dirty oT troubled
1waters,*1 (wrote his niece, Hrs. Dugdale). Confident now 
that Brodrick would be in a position to facilitate agreement 
between the two Governments, Balfour proceeded to discuss 
the problem of Indian defence always keeping in view the 
Army Estimates to be debated in Parliament early in December 
1903. Once again this was to prove difficult. The last 
letter Balfour wrote while Hamilton was still in office 
reveals the significance of the role the Committee of 
Imperial Defence was to play in the affairs of Indian admin­
istration* Balfour asserted that the question of the number 
of reinforcements which India would require in the event of 
a war with Russia "is so -urgent that, although the Committee 
will not meet till November .,. this all-important informa­
tion should be at once supplied us *" Balf our attached a 
Memoranda^ dated 11 September, which clearly frames the need
1. Dugdale, B.E.C. Arthur James Balfour, I, p*393* The 
author, Balfour's nTecej explains the personal element 
in the relations between Balfour, Brodrick, Curzon and 
Kitchener, pp. 392-4-08.
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for agreement between the two Governments • In that document
he begged Hamilton to impress upon Curzon and Kitchener the
utmost necessity of forwarding the necessary information*
"The number of troops required by India is 
in my view the central element in the whole
problem on Imperial Defence so far as this
depends upon the Army; and it is quite 
impossible to form any rational estimate of 
the military needs of the country, or the 
burden which should be thrown on the tax­
payer in respect of Army Estimates, until 
we have in some authoritative shape the 1 
conclusions of the Indian Military Authorities *1
Brodriek took up that issue towards the end of
October:
"Nothing would please me better than to know 
that India had got enough troops at present, 
and was not likely to need more in an emergency";
he felt a? that Curzon was holding things up, and
stressed the urgency of the issue:
"This is an immediate question: the estimates 
will probably be discussed early in December, 
and I think we ought to have very full 
guidance from yourself and Kitchener on the 
points and numbers which the Defence Committee 
has sent y o u *  2 p shall be surprised if you 
find, on going into it, that you can dispense 
with a single man which the Defence Committee 
proposed* On the main point I imagine that 
Lord Kitchener practically agrees with Lord 
Roberts, namely, that the attempt to check 
Russia’s advance must be made on the Kandahar- 
Kabul line, and could not be confined to 
holding passes into India*"?
1. Balfour to Hamilton, 10 September 1905? enc. memo by 
Balfour, 11 September, Balfour MBS 4*9778*
2. C*I*D* Records 6/1/28D, 3 July 1903.
3* Brodrick to Curzon, 23 October 1903.
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But far from agreeing with, anyone, Kitchener wanted to see
for himself the conditions which existed along the entire
1northern frontier of India. His absence during the months
of August-November, coupled with the fact that Curzon was
occupied by a trip to the Persian Gulf inevitably caused
delay, and this gave great irritation and inconvenience to
the Home Government, who held Curzon personally responsible.
Indeed for his part, Curzon clearly regarded the issue as
inextricably bound up with Brodriek1s South African Garrison
Scheme, When Brodriek stated ,!I have not come to the India
2
Office to press any military views of my own”, Curzon 
questioned whether it was his intention that India pay the 
burden of the costs involved in the defence deliberations of 
the Committee, and now resented Brodriek^ attempts (or 
those of any other member of the Home Government) to encroach 
upon Indian revenues. Moreover, he had been particularly 
offended when Brodriek had found it necessary to authorise 
an additional pay to soldiers serving in Indian and Colonial 
garrisons; when the substance of the matter was conceded to 
the War Office after the issue had been submitted for arbi­
tration to the Lord Chief Justice of England; his award 
rendered India liable to charges amounting up to some 
£750,000 per year«^
1* Curzon to Brodriek, 21 October 1903*
2. Brodriek to Curzon, 15 October 1903#
3* Ronaldshay, Curzon, II, p<>287*
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Thus part; of the problem overshadowing the Govern­
ment of India was a hang-over from the past. In contending 
for the principle that the interests of India ought not to 
he sacrificed to the Mother Country, Curzon became champion 
of India!s cause, and his efforts to secure his ideal (that 
of Indian autonomy in financial matters) merely exacerbated 
friction between the two Governments. He stressed Indian 
public and press opinion which "has been growing all the 
while, is articulate, is daily becoming more powerful, 
cannot be ignored*" He sought to enlist the authority of 
Kitchener in support of his crusade to prevent the Home 
Government from dictating his policy. In particular he 
declined to co-operate on the particular question of Indian 
reinforcements, as he thought their payment was against the 
best interests of India, In so doing, he pitted his strength 
with dogged determination against formidable odds. While 
these discussions continued, Curzon demurred answering 
Brodriekfs urgent request for information by explaining that 
Kitchener wished to avoid committing himself prematurely.
"He wants, in the first place, to pursue the 
investigation which he is now conducting into 
the actual number of troops which may be 
available in India, and which he hopes, by a 
number of reforms, largely to increase; and, 
in the second place, he requires fuller 
information ,.. he declines to put his name 
to any report which, in the event of war 
hereafter, might be quoted against him, if 
it turned out to be based upon inadequate
1. Curzon to Godley, 27 January 1904-.
or unreliable data0 In this, I think he is 
entirely right.
In the meantime Curzon !s relations with Kitchener 
markedly declined and while the latter was visiting India1s 
borders, Curzon pointed out
"the fact Is that we have suffered in a good 
many ways by Kitchener’s prolonged absence 
from Head-quarters during the past year ...
I shall hope in future years to restrain him 
from wandering so freely and so far, but he 
has an intense dislike of office work, or 
sedentary life of any description, and is 
never so happy as when surrounded by a band 
of A.-D.-C.’s, he is scouring some remote 
or inaccessible part of the frontier."2
That situation however was but a symptom of the growing
estrangement between Curzon and the Home Government and
Brodriek wrote impatiently on 11 November explaining that
the Home Authorities had waited long enough:
"... your opinion *,* adds to the gravity of 
the considerations which must influence the 
Home Government in their estimate of the 
force, and in the meantime you have rejected 
the proposal of the late Secretary of State 
and his Council to contribute towards the 
maintenance of reinforcements in South Africa.
As this subject has now been nearly four years 
before the Indian Government, and the conclu­
sions of the Defence Committee will have been 
before your Government for seven months before 
the next estimates are introduced, the Prime 
Minister feels that we must have before us 
your opinion and Lord Kitchener’s before we 
decide what number of troops to ask Parliament 
to vote. January would, as you know, not 
enable us to frame estimates, nor can we 
adjourn the Defence Committee for two months
1. Curzon to Brodriek, 28 October 1903.
2. Ibid., 7 November 1903*
more on so vital a matter* I am sorry to 
press you, "but I hardly think that you 
realise how much importance is attached to 
the decision at home*"^
Curzon promptly replied stating:
"Kitchener declines to commit himself to any 
calculations without further examination ... p 
you are asking me for a physical impossibility*"
Curzon's Council had not, in fact, examined the issue because 
they were unalterably opposed to the principle involved; the 
problem was further complicated by the fact that information 
as to the extent of the Russian railway building programme 
was scanty* Curzon attempted to defend his position (15 Nov­
ember) :
"You said in your telegram that the subject 
had been nearly four years before the Indian 
Government , , . I cannot recollect that we 
have ever been asked to examine the problem 
of the Russian railways and their powers of 
transporting men to the frontier, or to 
devise a joint scheme for England and India, 
in opposition*"3
Nonetheless, Brodriek pressed for a decision and on 13 Nov­
ember emphatically reiterated his earlier warning:
"... the more consideration you can show to 
the decisions of the Defence Committee, the 
easier will working be between the Indian 
Government and the Home Government... I do 
not know what considerations have made you 
and Kitchener ask us to put off till January 
any decision as to the number of troops 
which it may be necessary to employ in 
Afghanistan; but I fear you do not realize 
the Irritation to which this decision will 
give rise*"
1. Brodriek to Curzon, Telegram, 11 November 1903# 
2* Curzon to Brodriek, Telegram, 12 November 1903•
3- Curzon to Brodriek, 15 November 1903*
"Of all the urgent questions which have 
been allowed to fall into arrear, the Prime 
Minister considers the defence of the Indian 
frontier the most urgent0 The Defence Com­
mittee took It up the moment it was estab­
lished* It sat continuously debating this 
subject for weeks together, carefully analy­
sing all previous decisions and recommenda­
tions, and all changes which could be made by 
railway or other variations of transport. It 
postponed the question of home defence, and 
indeed all other questions, except some of 
the most pressing ones in the near East, in 
order to accomplish Its work in time to get 
your opinion and Kitchener' s before the new 
estimates. Your reply, which was dated the 
3rd August,is regarded and I think legiti­
mately, as something of a put-off ... You 
will, therefore, realise that, when it comes 
to your asking us to propose fresh estimates 
on an assumption which, If it does not coin­
cide with your ultimate opinion, you would 
be the first to declare that the Government 
of India had not accepted, Is a very serious 
difficulty to lay upon us at a time when all 
eyes are upon the army estimates with the 
view to reduction, and when the maintenance 
of the number of men necessary to sustain 
us in Afghanistan is the main item which 
governs the estimates of the force to be 
sent abroad..
I am really reluctant to have had to 
write as much as this about this matter, 
but the strongest possible views were ex­
pressed about it in the Cabinet, and I have 
literally no defence to offer, seeing that 
the Committee reported nearly four years 
ago, and that you and Kitchener have had 
Balfour's Memorandum (dated 11 September 
1903) for three months in your hands."2
Curzon also received a warning from Godley (on 13 November)
that
1* See Cd.D. Records 6/1/30D, 3 August 1903; "Memorandum 
... on the Provisional Report of the Defence Committee 
on Indian Defence"*
2. Brodriek to Curzon, 13 November 1903*
"on two subjects - Defence of the Frontier 
and Coolie Labour for South Africa! - a 
pistol has been put to your head from this 
side. On the formed subject I sgather that 
we are to hear something in your private 
letter by this next mail; but that something 
will not be what His Majesty's Government 
want, viz., a statement of your view as to 
the number of men required . *. I trust that 
the decision, whatever it is, will be followed 
by prompt action, and^not by a wrangle between 
the two Governments."^
The requirements of India were the master key to 
Britain*s Imperial defence; but the fundamental obstacle to 
solving that problem lay in relating India's revenues to the 
burden of imperial defence costs and Brodriek wrote (on 20 
November):
I am unduly insistent in this matter, 
but It is part of a much larger subject, 
which, if I could only get you to see it in 
my light, would alter the whole working 
between this Government and yours about a 
great many questions."
1* Arising from the post-war shortage of amenable Kaffir 
labour to work the gold and diamond mines, the Transvaal 
mine-owners agitated for the importation of cheap Asiatic 
labour; the Home Government then suggested using Indian 
labour. This was implacably opposed by Curzon: "The name 
of South Africa stinks in the nostrils of India. The most 
bitter feeling exists over the treatment meted out to 
Indians in the Transvaal and Natal. Any attempt to ignore 
or to override this feeling would produce a commotion 
greater even than that over the South African garrison, 
while the recollection of the latter would tend to in­
flame it." Curzon to Brodriek, 15 November 1903. A year 
later the Government were denounced by the radical opposi­
tion over the issue of 'Chinese slavery' after their 
failure to import Indian labour for use in the mines. See 
Gollin, A.M., Proconsul in Politics (a biography of 
Milner), pp.55::75T
2. Godley to Curzon, 13 November 1903.
As Brodriek greatly feared creating a deadlock he ignored 
the principle of money, and repeatedly appealed for Curzonfs 
assistance.
"When I came here six weeks ago, I undertook 
to hack you as far as I possibly could* I 
have found myself beset with difficulties in 
that respect ... I hardly think you can real­
ise the friction caused by the tone of your 
reply, which was practically an intimation 
that, unless the view you took, that this 
was a favourable moment for turning the screw 
on the South African Government, an outcry 
would be produced in India which would have 
serious effects*"!
As Balfour*s Government had experienced the greatest 
difficulty over reducing the Army estimates after the war in 
South Africa, and were, as we have seen, now appealing to 
the country on the basis of lowering them, Brodriek naturally 
hoped to regain popularity by devising a scheme which would 
effectively curb a swingeing burden of defence costs in 
Britain, while maintaining an efficient army in accordance 
with Cabinet policy* Kitchener's viex^ s were of signal import­
ance in these deliberations and Brodriek, ever sensitive to 
the charge that he was the main atumbling block to reduction 
(see Brodriek to Curzon, 26 November 1903), was determined 
to co-operate with Kitchener; this however entailed 
negotiating via Curzon*
1. Brodriek to Curzon, 20 November 1903*
Moreover, as a reaction to opposition, the Government 
had, in fact, shifted its policies to face the increasingly 
heavy financial demands made on it at home; and the newly 
reconstructed Cabinet, highly critical of any further 
involvement requiring additional expenditure abroad, had on
their hands a costly reconstruction In South Africa, an
expedition in Somaliland, troubles in Morocco and Macedonia, 
in Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet, while at the same time at 
home, the tariff question and national defence were pressing 
for settlement. Britain was discovering it increasingly 
difficult to find, under the existing voluntary system, the 
number of reserves required for the Colonial and Indian 
garrisons, and the necessary funds for their upkeep. Because 
the Government had previously experienced sharp disagreement 
on the question of the charges to be imposed upon India 
in connection with the army, in that way the estrangement 
between Brodriek and Curzon had deepened. Believing that the 
Home Government w«fee largely Ignorant of Indian army affairs
Curzon felt that the divergence of attitudes between the two
Governments, were irreconcilable, evident in a letter he 
sent to Brodriek on 4- November 1903:
"... in respect of the Army, about which you 
know so much and I know so little, I have 
during the past five years, entirely because 
of my ignorance, as I think I told you in a 
former letter, refrained from uttering any 
opinions at all. The only army that I know
1. Brodriek to Curzon, 4- December 1903*
anything about, or am at all qualified to 
speak upon, is the Indian Army, and if my 
views upon that do not coincide with those 
of the War Office at home, it is because I 
think that the two parties approach the 
question from entirely different standpoints, 
and that a complete reconciliation of their 
attitudes is impossible*1'!
Once more Godley attempted to heal the deepening 
gulf between Curzon and Brodriek by explaining the circum­
stances as he saw them:
"... I have given you , *. very plain hints 
as to the position of affairs, about which 
I do not feel happy ... You have another 
and a different hand upon the reins ,.. and 
his relations with everyone in this office 
are,-so far, most cordial ... this by no 
means must be taken to imply that he is 
going to do what we want him to do in all 
matters* Nor is he at all more likely to 
be inclined to take his cue from India *.,
I am quite sure that you would be wrong if 
you were to count on his being either duc­
tile or malleable *1
Godley went on to point out quite frankly that the new
Cabinet were hostile to Curzon's policy; he urged Curzon to
"remove the impression, which certainly 
exists, that you are inclined, when there 
Is a difference of opinion, to carry your 
protest beyond the recognised official 
limits, to bring pressure to bear, to force 
the hand of the Government at home*"
He advised him to acquiesce in this case, and do "your best
to conceal all differences of opinion, and to carry out the
policy of the Government 'as if you liked it' ... If you
1. Curzon to Brodriek, 4 November 1903* See also 27 February
1905.
could do tlais, I am quite sure that it would not only make
things easier and pleasanter, hut would, in the long run,
1strengthen your hands and increase your influence."
Curzon wrote on 1 December that "... if the Home 
Government had wanted our views, it could have asked for 
them at any time during the past four years, hut it has not 
done so. Moreover, the entire situation has heen changed hy 
the construction of the Orenburg-1ashkent Railway," although 
hoth Brodriek and Godley warned Curzon that he was holding 
things up; the real reason for the delay stemmed from the 
fact that Kitchener had wired to Lord Roberts for his views 
and as Roberts was ill, received no reply. Curzon only
became aware of this shortly before he left for a trip to
the Persian Gulf, from where he wrote to Brodriek that
"... it now turns out that he [Kitchener] had 
written to Lord Roberts and was waiting for 
a reply from him. Believe me, therefore, 
that, if there is any idea at home that we 
are playing a game with the Defence Committee, 
it is an absolute marels nest*"
He added:
"You seem to think that I am unduly placing 
myself athwart the wishes of the Home Gov­
ernment. Of course if on any occasion I 
feel it my duty to stand up for the interests
of India, I am suspected of disloyalty (I
know of a Cabinet Minister who said that my 
refusal to accept the South African Scheme 
was !an act of gross disloyalty to the p 
Ministry1) - there will be no getting on”;
1. Godley to Curzon, 27 November 1903.
2. Curzon to Brodriek, 1 December 1903, included with letter 
dated 8 December 1903*
thereafter the atmosphere between the two Governments became 
increasingly charged with tension.
The next occasion for discussion of the topic 
occurred on 17 December when Ourzon informed Godley that he 
felt it was the India Council who misunderstood the position 
of the new Secretary of State, and that friction between the 
two Governments - especially in sanctioning his schemes - 
was the fault of that minister as opposed to the Viceroy:
it is more like an admonition addressed 
to a new Viceroy under an old Secretary of 
State than to the reverse conditions. For it 
is surely a contradiction of every law, both 
of reason and experience, than an old hand 
should require to be more sat upon than a
young one; or, to take a concrete case, that
a Viceroy who has just been extended, should 
be less trusted than a novice."
To the charge that he was at fault for applying pressure to
gain his own ends, he justified his position on the grounds
that he was personally responsible for the policies of the
Government to the Indian people,
"Whatever my faults, I have never tried to 
put anyone, least of all the Government at 
home, into a hole. On the contrary, as you 
know in the Indian Coronation guests case, 
and in the Delhi Durbar case, I never said 
a word here, though I might have been a 
popular hero here many times over. Of 
course if at any time that I do not fall in 
with all the Cabinet!s views, I am suspected 
of unworthy motives, there is no good going 
on, and no one would more gladly surrender
1. That attitude was to count heavily against him later, 
once the agitation over the partition of Bengal raised 
his relations with educated Indian public opinion in the 
summer and autumn of 1905«
the task than myself* But my first duty 
lies, in my judgement, to my constituents, 
and they are the people of India* I would 
sooner retire from my post than sacrifice 
their interests; and if I see anything un­
fair Being done or contemplated, I fear it 
is too much to ask me to stifle my protest*"
On 24 December Curzon indignantly pronounced on the
question of the number of reinforcements for India, and
said that even Kitchener was irritated "at the suspicions
that seem to prevail at home and for which he declines to
accept any responsibility •. • he said that he was so
uncertain of the reliability of his figures, and so confident
that if they turned out to be wrong, he might be leading the
Government of India into a serious quagmire, and might
expjose himself to well-deserved criticism at a later period
at home, that before proceeding any further he sent home his
figures to Lord Roberts with a request that they might be
compared in the War Office with the calculations that form
the basis of the conclusions of the Defence Committee at 
Phome,1
In the meantime Brodriek was disturbed at the way 
in which Curzon interpreted the needs of India in determining 
her policy, especially in the sphere of external affairs. 
Incensed at what he felt constituted an injustice to the 
Cabinet, namely Curzon!s allegation that they "would
 ..........  ■■■■■!— NI,| I.    I n I !■ ■*!>■— ■■■■! V , r    n >■■■^ *..11 I ■■■■■■. ■ ■■* ■ ■ ■ m m m.....   I I  l |  M U I|.I
1. Curzon to Godley, 17 December 1903.
2. Curzon to Brodriek, 24 December 1903.
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sacrifice almost a n y t h i n g " in Central Asia "in order to
1have a quiet time11, as Curzon suggested, he emphasised that 
it was Curzon who misunderstood the fundamental relationship 
of the Indian and Home Governments as manifest in the control 
of the Cabinet in the affairs of the Empire* He made his 
reasons abundantly clear on 11 December:
"You take so absolutely divergent a view from 
the Cabinet of the attitude of India *.* You 
constantly speak of the Indian Army having 
saved Natal, and write rather as if the Empire 
owed India a debt in consequence. You also 
think, because your foreign policy in India 
has not hitherto created any demand on the 
Empire for men or money, that therefore India 
owes no debt in return. But surely it must be 
realised that the whole question of the up­
keep of our Army is with the view to support­
ing Indian policy";
according to Brodriek it was Curzon who was responsible for
the policy for which the Home Government paid, and he asserted
that
"Ihis difficulty of feeding a great Indian 
force in time of peace, and of providing a 
still greater one in time of war, is what 
is embarrassing our finance, wrecking one 
Secretary of State after another and one 
Commander-in-Chief after another, and forms p 
an abiding factor of Parliamentary trouble."
Balfour at the time put the position of his Govern­
ment before the King, and explained the policy he was forced 
to pursue if he was to remain in office:
1* Brodriek to Curzon, 4 December 1903*
2* Ibid *, 11 December 1903*
"What are, in Hr, Balfour's opinion, the 
objects to be aimed at may be roughly sum­
marised as follows: we want an army which 
shall give us sufficient force for at least 
any immediate needs of Indian defence; and, 
in conjunction with the auxiliary forces, 
for Home defence, which shall be capable of 
expansion in times of national emergency - 
which shall if possible be less dependent 
on men in civil employment (i.e. the Reser­
vists) for filling up the ranks on mobilisa­
tion - and which shall throw a smaller 
burden on the taxpayer. This last is of 
particular importance, not merely because 
of the present conditions of our finances, 
but because the demands of the navy are so 
great and so inevitable that the total cost 
of imperial defence threatens to become 
prohibitive•"1
Indeed the Government's financial outlook was extremely 
black* Ihe fiscal question dominated all others in Parlia­
ment, and because of heavy expenditure, an unstable political 
situation In England affected Curzon !s plans for the future 
and Brodriek Informed the Viceroy on 17 December: "I expect 
there will be an election before or soon after you reach 
England*
In the third week of November, ill and fatigued, 
Curzon had departed for his trip to the Persian Gulf. While 
Curzon was absent, Balfour had undertaken to write directly 
to Kitchener expressing his gratitude that "we have got you, 
in this critical and in some respects transitional period" 
in dealing with the problems of Indian defence. Balfour 
carefully made the distinction that matters involving purely
1* Balfour to Edward VII, 14 December 1903, Balfour MSS 
49684*
2. Brodriek to Curzon, 17 December 1903.
Indian military organisation were Mquite outside the "broader 
problems with which at present the Committee of Imperial 
Defence is endeavouring to deal*" He was however perturbed 
"at the relations between India and this country *.. I see 
problems coming up for consideration which will certainly 
strain the already in some respects strained relations 
between the two Governments *
Curzon was by now*, grudging in the manner of his
treatment by the Home Government , and in his correspondence
he increasingly adoptl^a querulous tone, particularly after
he had been informed that India would be invited to pay some
£400,000 a year towards Brodriek1s proposed defence facili-
2ties in South Africa* Referring to that scheme he wrote:
"Here was a sudden and far-reaching proposal 
sprung upon me at a moment1 s notice ♦. * I 
was told that the Cabinet was to consider 
the matter within a week; and I was given 
3 days in which to commit the Government of 
India one way or the other. I was further 
not obscurely warned that if my views did 
not coincide with those of the Home Govern­
ment, 1 Great Britain would be forced to over­
ride the Indian Government .. • It seemed to 
me that the Cabinet at their next meeting 
were in danger of coming to a decision that 
would very likely lead to serious friction 
with the Government of India, if not to 
public agitation in this country ..* public 
opinion in India resents the idea of being 
thrown over by the Secretary of State*"3
1. Balfour to Kitchener, 3 December 1903? Balfour BSS 49726;
Curzon returned from the Gulf on 7 December 1903*
2* Ronaldshay, Curzon, II, p*287*
3# Curzon to BrodricE, 8 December 1903? included with letter 
dated 1 December 1903*
By January 1904, Curzon had been five years in India, 
and his relations with the Home Government had reached 
serious proportions. (In addition, the Viceroy’s health was 
in a state of collapse, the result of a riding accident in 
which a pony kicked him in the right leg, caused him acute 
pain and neuritis, and threatening his breakdown* Moreover, 
Lady Curzon, due to leave for England on 10 January 1904 
where she would await the birth of her third child, was 
suffering from acute sleeplessness.) The outstanding 
questions between the two Governments were in consequence 
postponed until the Viceroy arrived in England for a holiday 
in May 1904. Nevertheless confusion over India’s military 
affairs on the eve of Curzon*s departure was merely the 
prelude of graver conflicts which were to emerge between 
India and the Home Government in the struggle for control of 
Indian army administration. That question (Indian military 
administration) was gradually assuming a wider importance 
in Imperial affairs, and the Cabinet increasingly welcomed 
the talents of the Commander-in-Chief whose presence in 
India inspired rather more confidence in ministerial circles 
than did the Viceroy*
Before taking up the narrative of events during 
Curzon*s absence in England however, (which we shall do in 
Chapter IV(5), when dealing with Brodriek*s secret corres­
pondence with Kitchener), we must go back for a moment to 
the year 1902, at the time of Kitchener’s arrival in India 
and examine his relations with Curzon.
THE STRUGGLE OVER INDIAN ARMY ADMINISTRATION, Part I
(1) "My new and erratic Colleague..."
Kitchener had taken little trouble to learn anything 
about the administrative machine he was expected to reform 
following his arrival in November 1902. Having little know­
ledge and no taste for Parliamentary or constitutional 
methods of public administration, he set about to improvise 
his own techniques rather than study the existing set-up 
confronting him in India* After a life of comparative isola­
tion and individual responsibility, Kitchener was unused to 
acting in concert with others and it was therefore perhaps 
inevitable that he was disinclined or incapable of providing 
the much-needed link between the Government of India's civil 
and military arms - between the Viceroy and the Army* Having 
no use for the watertight compartments of tradition and 
making no attempt to assimilate the functions of collective
responsibility, he assailed the Government of India as
is
"narrow and conservative ... whatever is/right, and every-
1thing that is not Indian is wrong and to be avoided*" In 
that frame of mind and either unwilling or unable to provide 
the necessary link for Curzon, Kitchener rapidly began to 
create more problems than he solved. He knew his autocratic 
methods had answered well in the Sudan and in South Africa;
1* Kitchener to Lady Salisbury, 10 June 1903? Balfour MSS
49757♦
in consequence his friends in England felt sure that "nothing 
and no one” would he allowed " to stand in his way.""*"
Kitchener fs connection with the Cecil family who 
"were prominent in a ruling class which felt that it poss­
essed a direct personal responsibility for the safety of the 
Empire" was significant, for "many of those friends dis­
trusted the forward policy which the vigorous Viceroy was
2pursuing in Afghanistan and Tibet*" We have seen that during 
the conduct of the war in South Africa the Cabinet, pre­
occupied with the recurring difficulties and disasters, 
exercised but little control on the conduct of Indian affairs, 
and that such restraint from London as there was, was limited 
to the India Office. Following the Boer War, however, con­
fidence in Curzon waned as the suspicion grew that the 
Viceroy was becoming less heedful of advice from England.
In 1903 Balfour wrote to the King:
"The Cabinet are apprehensive that the Viceroy 
entertains schemes of territorial expansion, 
or at least of extending responsibilities 
which would be equally detrimental to Indian 
interests and to international relations of 
the Empire., "3
In these circumstances the Cabinet were rather more persuaded
1. Magnus, Kitchener, p.196.
2. Ibid., p7T97^— ~
3. Balfour to Edward VII, 6 November 19035 Balfour MBS 49684.
by the Commander-in-chief's talents than by those of the 
Viceroy? and it will therefore be necessary to examine the 
relations between Kitchener and Curzon before proceeding 
with the divergence of opinion which they raised*
Initially Kitchener entertained a cordial liking for 
the Viceroy. In his first letter to Lady Salisbury? however? 
he asserted that the system of Indian military administration 
was faulty.
"I had a long talk with Curzon with which he 
was pleased and I hope to improve matters 
in the Army in which he is most unpopular 
at present# It is not so much due to the 9th 
Lancers case as that the Army consider he 
has taken every opportunity of slighting 
them ... I believe Curzon means all right 
and things will now get right but by the 
system of having two military advisers the 
C.-in-C# and the Military Member of Council? 
the Viceroy has received on several occasions 
disloyal advice? for each of these Officials 
have only given the advice they think the 
Viceroy would like as they know that all 
their plans and projects would be upset at 
once if the Viceroy went over to the other 
side#"1
He characterised the system as 'most extraordinary1:
".*. I asked Curzon why he liked to keep up 
such a farce and his answer was ’if the 
C*-in-C. had anything to do with the 
machinery he would become too powerful, so 
to keep him down we take his power away and 
run another man as well; between the two 
the civil elements get control1 * He assured 
me that, though perhaps not logical? the 
system worked very well? and he was satisfied 
with the results, Lord Dufferin said just the
1. Kitchener to Lady Salisbury, 10 December 1902, Balfour
MSS 49757.
same when he was Viceroy. When one sees 
however the deplorable state of the organ­
ization of the Army, I am astonished at 
the satisfaction expressed * *« As to power,
I do not want more power outside the Army, 
but I do want power to do good in the Army; 
if I am incapable why appoint me; if I fail 
get rid of me; but why keep on a dead level 
of inefficiency or drift backwards because 
you won't trust the person you appoint to 
do good?"
In that letter Kitchener raised the issue of India's lack of
preparedness in the event of a Russian invasion, and he
intended to convince his correspondent of the urgency for
reform. He pointed out that though India had an Army on
paper amounting to some 250,000 men, only 60,000 could be
put into the field on short notice, and this he deemed
1unsatisfactory. Kitchener found himself unable to work a 
system in which he felt his initiative was stifled by 
India's administrative machinery* In November 1903 he 
informed Lady Salisbury:
"The system of putting the really important 
parts of the army under a separate adminis­
tration is simply monstrous, and full of the 
utmost danger in war time. I have an army 
without any means of feeding, mounting or 
supplying it* For this I have to trust to a 
totally distinct and separate Dept, of Govt., 
which Is, I firmly believe, very inefficient, 
and certainly knows nothing of the require­
ments of war* Mien war comes disaster must 
follow, and then I suppose the soldiers will 
be blamed*..
1. Kitchener to Lady Salisbury, 25 January 1903, Balfour 
MBS 49757.
2. Ibid., 11 November 1903, Balfour MSS 49757-
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When Curaon met Kitchener in India (1 December 1902) 
he was greatly impressed "by his honesty, directness, frank 
common sense, and combination of energy with power." Kitchen­
er informed him that he was nervous about his position and 
powers and that Elies, the Military Member was "too big for 
his boots." Kitchener then proceeded to explain his attitude 
towards the system of military administration in India 
expressing his regret that he had made a mistake in coming 
to India as Commander~in-Chief rather than as the Military 
Member. Kitchener believed that the sole adviser to the 
Viceroy on military affairs should be the man with the most 
knowledge and experience, namely himself. He desired partic­
ulars of the relative functions and powers of the Commander- 
in-Chief and Military Member and asked Curzon for his views 
and advice.
"I asked him to wait a little and see the 
system in practice, when I thought paper 
rules or situations would be found to yield 
to force of character and circumstances. I 
assured him that the power and influence of 
the Commander-in-Chief depended not upon the 
constitutional definition of his prerogatives, 
but upon his own personality; and I said 
that it was not likely that we should get in 
India the inestimable advantage of the presence 
and counsels of the first soldier of the day, 
and then commit the unpardonable error of not 
profiting by themo"-^
1* Curzon to Hamilton, 3 December 1902
Curzon was soon to learn that Kitchener entertained 
his own ideas and meant to see them carried out by root and 
branch reform of the whole administrative system. In his 
letters to the Secretary of State, he expressed his dismay 
at the manner in which the Commander-in-Chief pursued his 
ambitions:
"Kitchener , is proceeding in the most 
unconventional way. He seems to think that 
the Military Government of India Is to be 
conducted by concordat between him and me. 
Accordingly he comes and pours out to me 
all sorts of schemes to which he asks my 
consent* It is all so frank and honest and 
good-tempered that one cannot meet these 
advances with a rebuff* Here and there I 
head him off, or steer him into more ortho­
dox channels* But of-,course as yet he does 
not know the ropes."
Curzon found it necessary in fact to impose certain condi­
tions upon Kitchenerfs methods of procedure, creating fric­
tion when it became necessary for him to protect and later 
champion the Military Member, Elies, whose office was 
anathema to Kitchener.
Curzon suspected that Kitchener was conspiring
through Brodriek, to rid himself of Elies by kicking1 the
latter ’upstairs', promoting him to the post of Quarter-
Master-General in England.
"I found that Elies was reluctant to go - 
though evidently seriously afraid of rows 
with Kitchener - but that he could hardly
1. Curzon to Hamilton, 13 January 1903*
resist the bait of an office that would make 
him a Lieutenant-General at once, and lead 
to other things beyond. At the same time he 
[Elies] asked that ... he might be with us 
to keep-Kitchener straight in the opening 
heats."1
As Kitchener had little knowledge or experience of Indian 
affairs, Curzon regarded it as his own personal duty to 
intervene and retain the services of the more experienced 
Elies, who would be in an awkward position in having contin­
ually to stand up to Kitchener's more unreasonable proposals.
Curzon moreover was a good deal disquieted by what 
he had heard privately from England with reference to 
Kitchener's ambition either to succeed him as Viceroy, or 
pressure the Government into naming a candidate whom Kitch­
ener could manipulate. He was aware that Lord Salisbury, 
before he died, had been impressed by Kitchener's determina­
tion to dominate Imperial affairs, end of his suggestion 
that Kitchener should succeed him as Viceroy. Curzon had 
been informed by his former Finance Member, Sir Clinton 
Dawkins (1859-1905), that Kitchener was "going out to 
India with one idea only, that of running 'the whole 
show' ... that he has got a year with you which he 
will need to look around, and he won't collide with you. 
After that, he will use the whole of his popularity and 
prestige to dominate the next Viceroy. Consequently it is
1. Curzon to Hamilton, 13 January 1903
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1your successor he is already occupied with*" Dawkins men­
tioned Selborne and Brodriek as possible candidates for the 
Viceroyalty should Curzon retire, and reported that Kitchener 
was " advancing 1000 reasons in all quarters against them*
His candidates are Eddy Stanley (Lord Derby), lazy and sub­
ordinate to him in Africa, or Cranborne*" Although Kitchener 
was, in his opinion, "a great organiser in the sense that he 
can hold 100 threads in his hands and 1000 details in his 
head," he was "a great centraliser, and has very little 
appreciation of the proper organisation of a great administra­
tion* He will obliterate any distinction between the Comrnan- 
der-in-Chief and Military Member, and insist on doing the 
Military Member’s work himself*1 Curzon then had just cause 
for misgivings when he reconsidered the problem of his 
successor, as we have shown in Chapter III (2).
Shortly after Kitchener arrived in India he dis­
covered several irregularities in the functioning of the 
Military Department, in reference to the publication of 
general orders for the army* In one particular instance, he 
informed Lady Salisbury,
"luckily I was just in time and as I intimated 
to Curzon I should be inclined to resign if 
it was issued it naturally got hung up and 
now they are asking me my opinion on it*"^
1. Dawkins to Curzon, 25 July 1902.
2. Kitchener to Lady Salisbury, 12 February 1903, Balfour 
MSS 4-9757*
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By that act of calculated impetuosity Kitchener gained an 
important advantage over Curzon in India’s external relations* 
Curzon had previously informed Kitchener (on 21 August 19Q0) 
that he had "perhaps a greater excuse than some of his pre­
decessors for interesting himself in military questions: 
seeing that I know something of the frontier, ... and that I 
take its management exclusively into my own charge*" By 
threatening to resign over a matter cognate to the defence 
of India, Kitchener in that way wrung a crucial concession 
from Curzon in matters dealing with foreign affairs, and 
hence defence and he wrote:
"I think there need he no fear that the Indian 
Gov’t* will commit themselves to anything p
about defence without full discussion at home."
Kitchener hoped for two things in threatening to 
resign; first that military efficiency would be improved if 
the Home Government, acting through Balfour’s Committee of 
Imperial Defence, intervened to make him supreme in the 
military administration of India* Secondly, he hoped to 
bring about the appointment of a new Viceroy more amenable 
to his own schemes* In his confidential and highly secret 
correspondence with Lady Salisbury he continually harped 
upon the fact that he was unable to do anything while Curzon 
remained Viceroy. He was willing to wait for one year, but
1. Curzon to Kitchener, 21 August 1900*
2. Kitchener to Lady Salisbury, 3 April 1903? Balfour MSS 
4*9757.
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after that period ”1 shall then resign on a very similar 
proposition so if Curzon gets a years’ extension as everyone 
here seems to think probable you may see me again in London 
about this time next year, I am sure I could not stand the
i
position I am placed in for more than another year,” And
again, "Ihe Our20ns talk of being at home next March but
whether they are coming back again on reappointment or not
I cannot make out, I am afraid I shall never get this system
2of block in all Army matters altered during his tenure.”
When Kitchener learned in the summer of 1903 that 
Cur2on was to remain in India, he shifted the base of his 
attack, reverting to his original argument that
’’Under the present Military Dept, system it 
is almost impossible to get anything done 
and as the Viceroy supports that system I 
feel perfectly hopeless about the future 
Is it therefore waste of time to stop here? 
and can I afford to go on taking the res­
ponsibility for an effete service which when 
war comes must be shown up?”5
Curzon, he said, was extremely reluctant to quit India, and
when the announcement of his extension was made suggested:
,,C*-in-G.!s can be provided, I have no doubt, 
for the pay, who will shut their eyes tight 
and let things go on, but I cannot, and as 
the Viceroy likes the present system there 
is no doubt I ought to clear out, ”4-
1* Kitchener to Lady Salisbury, 21 May 1903# Balfour MSS
4-9757.
2* Ibid., 10 June 1903#
3. m ., 29 July 1903.
4. Xbid., 6 August 1903.
17?
Curzon was anxious to take into careful consideration 
Kitchener's point of view, which, he retailed in extremely 
long and vivid accounts which he sent to Hamilton. Neverthe­
less though capable of brilliant diagnosis and a superb 
grasp of Kitchener's attitude, Curzon was almost wholly 
unable to provide any cure in circumstances where the final 
verdict rested with the Ministers at Westminster and he 
reported:
"He has come out to India after holding a 
position of almost uncontrolled authority, 
first in the relatively petty sphere of 
Bgyp'fc? secondly in the larger sphere, though 
still incapable of being compared with India, 
or South Africa. In both cases his authority 
was supreme, because it was military authority 
exercised at a time of war. From these two 
enterprises he returns to England, crowned 
with a glory and prestige that have had no 
parallel for many years. He then comes out 
to India to occupy what he regards, and I 
think rightly, as the greatest post in the 
military service of the Empire. He knows 
nothing of India, or its peoples, or its 
army, or its conditions, or of the vast and 
complex system of administration which has 
here grown up. He thinks that, as in Egypt 
or in Africa, he has only to signify a wish 
in military matters for it to be carried out; 
he thinks he is at liberty to go anywhere and 
do anything that he pleases. He regards the 
Military Department as an insufferable and 
odious obstruction, which must be temporarily 
tolerated, but which is to be swept away as 
soon as he is firm upon his legs*"l
Curzon made it sufficiently clear that he was aware 
of Kitchener's desire that he should go, an attitude which 
naturally introduced an element of personal antagonism,
1* Curzon to Hamilton, 14 May 1903.
which Curzon was careful to avoid mentioning.
"I suspect that he is one of the keenest 
wishers for my retirement in December next, 
and that nothing would cause him greater 
disappointment (though unaccompanied by the 
smallest personal feelings against myself) 
than the news, that I am likely to be here 
for another year and a half, or two years *
He thinks that when I go, he will get rid 
of the Military Member, and with a new 
Viceroy, ignorant of India, and probably 
less strong-willed than himself, that he 
will be the ruler of the country in every­
thing but the name. "
Curzon mentioned Kitchener's threat of resignation should 
his desire to see a new Viceroy be unrealised, and opened 
his mind as to the tactics he would pursue in order to main­
tain a semblance of amicability.
"Now, you will agree with me that this situa­
tion is fraught with great difficulty. It 
can only be successfully handled during the 
remainder of the present year by the con­
tinuance of the cordial relations that 
fortunately prevail between us at the present 
time, and by the most open interchange of 
opinion upon all the subjects of difference 
that may crop up •"
Astute enough to realise that Kitchener's isolation 
from India's social world was a defect of his social back­
ground and a factor he would have to consider he commented:
"Kitchener is an extraordinarily lonely man; 
being unmarried, he has nobody in his house 
except young officers greatly his inferiors 
in age and standing; he takes no advice from 
anybody; he spends his whole day in thinking 
over his own subjects and formulating great 
and daring schemes; he will not go and talk 
them over with the Military Department, 
because he looks upon the latter as his 
sworn foe; he will not make friends with 
other Members of the Government, some of
whom he cordially despises and openly criti­
cises; he stands aloof and alone, a molten 
mass of devouring energy and burning ambi­
tions, without anybody to control or guide it 
in the right direction."
He was quite prepared to work in harmony with Kitchener in
assisting him in his more practical schemes for reform.
"Now the Viceroy, as long as he is the 
personal friend of this remarkable phenome­
non, is the only man who can supply the want; 
and therefore it is that, during the remain­
der of my time here, I shall endeavour, as 
far as possible, by the frankest intercourse 
and interchange of opinion, to avoid the 
dangers that otherwise lie ahead*"
Disturbed at the way Kitchener proceeded in ignor­
ance of the conditions of Indian service Curzon feared that 
his advisers would lead him astray. This uneasiness was 
confirmed by an incident over a proposal to send a military 
expedition to Tibet. Kitchener's Ad jut ant-General, Smith- 
Dorrien, recommended an absurdly large military force which, 
because of its size, would have encountered the greatest 
difficulty in crossing the terrain of the Tibetan frontier. 
Similarly, Kitchener subsequently "put forward certain pro­
posals subverting the time-honoured principle that our Eield 
Artillery in India shall remain in the hands of the British 
soldier. Ills proposal was adversely criticised, but with 
perfect courtesy, by Elies. The case then came to me, and I 
noted upon it also in the most civil terms, but strongly 
supporting Elies' view. Kitchener was wise enough to see 
that it would never do to take the case to Council, since he
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would get no support. He therefore at once withdrew it, and
told me that he had done so* (There is no feeling whatsoever
between us about it, but you may be sure that it will not 
make him more friendly towards the Military Department, who 
will thus have scored for the second time.” Curzon was 
anxious to smooth over the difficulties and keep any dissen­
sion well in check. Above all he wished to avoid an open 
clash with Kitchener, and in doing so he was content merely 
to chronicle the weekly proceedings of Kitchener in his 
letters to the Secretary of State.
’’Please keep all that I tell you about 
Kitchener private, because there are plenty
of people only too anxious to create dis­
sension between him and me, a wish which I 
intend to the best of my ability to disappoint.”
The following week (21 May 1903) Curzon continued
his account describing ’’the movements of my new and erratic
Colleague”, whose precipitate actions had exposed himself
to new humiliations at the hands of the Military Department*
Curzon then recorded Kitchener’s scheme for abolishing the
Military Department and thereby concentrating all military
authority, hoth executive ana administrative, in the hands
of the Commander-in-Chief. Aware for some time of the ideas
that were floating in Kitchener’s mind Curzon discovered that
Kitchener had gone so far as to have them published in an
2article in the February 1903 issue of the Fortnightly Review;
1. Curzon to Hamilton, 14 May 1903-
2. Fortnightly Review, ’Lord Kitchener and the Indian Army’, 
February 1903*
181
after that Curzon suggested that he had better wait until
he had acquired further experience before proceeding, and
1
Kitchener appeared to accept that advice*
For the next few months Kitchener spent the greater 
part of his time in touring along the frontier in an 
effort to acquire the much-needed experience. "From those 
expeditions he only returned to Simla ten days ago* Xou may 
judge of my surprise when I suddenly heard from my wife, to
whom the Oommander-in-Chief had let it out in conversation,
2that he had rewritten and expanded his Memorandum and 
launched it upon its official career.1 Once again Curzon 
urged him to withdraw his proposals in the certainty they 
would not be acceptable to the Council* In addition he was 
1 anxious to spare him the mortification of a third bad 
rebuff" from the Military Department. Curzon described these 
new proposals as "most startling and revolutionary"*
The principle for which Kitchener contended involved
the transfer of the Departments of Supply, (Transport,
Equipment, and Ordnance from the Military Department to
himself. (Thus he would be in the position to combine respon-
But
sibility with power ./Curzon raised several objections to 
these proposals which could hardly have excited Kitchener*s
1* Ourzon to Hamilton, 26 February 1903*
2* Memorandum in Kitchener MSB 30/57/28, later emerging on 
26 April 1904- as Administration of the Army in India1' 
in C.I.D. Records 6/2/56D. See infra, p. 194*; p.214-.
3* Curzon to Hamilton, 21 May 1903*
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satisfaction with the machinery of the Indian army* He in­
formed Hamilton that
t1 these drastic and revolutionary proposals 
are put forward by a Commander-in-Chief who 
has not yet been six months in India, who 
has spent the greater part of that time in 
touring along the frontier, who knows nothing 
whatever of the Departmental working of the 
machine, and who admits that, except on one 
or two trivial points, he has not himself 
personally experienced the evils or abuses 
against which his Memorandum, obviously 
written by somebody else, declaims.1
Curzon discussed the matter with the Commander-in-
Chief over dinner on 20 May. He told Kitchener that he felt
Elies had been within his rights in criticising and opposing
1his proposals "on every point”; he doubted whether Kitchener
could get any support from the Council and suggested he drop
the whole case. Writing to Hamilton the next day, he lamented
the fact that for want of judgement Kitchener "deliberately
and gratuitously runs his head in this way against a brick
wall, My life Is becoming a perfect burden to me with the
controversies that are being aroused on all sides, and with
the effort day after day to keep things going without an
o
explosion and to preserve the peace. rtt~'
Far from accepting CurzonTs suggestion that the case
1. Curzon to Hamilton, 21 May 1903.
2. Ibid,
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be dropped, Kitchener promptly sent in his resignation* He 
told Curzon the next day;
"your advocacy of the present system remaining 
as it is, is such a powerful factor in any 
attempted solution of the points raised, that 
it appears to me quite hopeless on my part to 
expect any success .
Accordingly he informed Curzon (25 Nay),
"I feel there is no course open to me but to 
resign my present command* I need not say I 
shall greatly regret to leave India, as I 
was in great hopes of being able to do some 
good in the Indian Army; but I am sure you 
will agree with me that where a point of 
fundamental difference is reached, no 
personal feelings should be allowed to 
interfere in coming to a decision on a 
question of principle*"2
In trying to reconcile Kitchener with Elies, in 
order to avoid a clash with himself, Curzon accidentally 
stumbled on the crime of Kitchener1 s discontent. He put to 
Kitchener the question at issue;
"What is at the bottom of it all - what do 
you object to? You admit that you have no 
case against the Military Department, from 
your own experience, and yet you want to 
destroy it; where does the grievance come in?"
Kitchener had at once replied that what he could not stand
was that his proposals should be criticised or rejected by
any subordinate authority. He explained to Curzon,
"You may be unable to understand it, for 
it is all a question of military feeling 
and military discipline. Civilians do not 
have the same sensitiveness, but as Commander-
1, Kitchener to Curzon, 21 Nay 1905 •
2, Ibid., 25 Nay 1903.
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in-Chief I cannot afford to have my opinions 
criticized, and possibly overturned, by Mili­
tary officers of lower rant: than myself. 
moreover
Curzon/considered Kitchener1 s objection to Elies 
unacceptable:
"Of course this is a claim to absolute dic­
tatorship in all military matters for the 
Commandor-in-Ohief, and it is drawing a 
razor across the throat of the Military 
Department and cutting it from ear to ear*
That is undoubtedly what Kitchener came out 
here to do; what he has had in his mind ever 
since; what he may desist from attempting 
for the present under pressure from me; but 
what he will bring up again either during 
my time or the moment that I have gone*1
That prophecy was honoured by events, so uncannily fore-
yet
cast; Curzon delighted in marshalling facts and/arranging 
evidence leading up to a particular situation, and was
strangely deficient when it came to acting in the circum-
2stances of the advice he had given.
Curzon hwoyoffls felt that the structure of India's 
military administrative machine was essentially sound and 
that the Military Department "performs very useful and 
necessary functions* I do not think that the presence of a 
Major-General at its head [EliesJ detracts in the smallest 
degree from the prestige, the authority, or the power of the 
Commander-in-Chief * I believe that the relations between the 
two, with a little good feeling and accommodation on both 
sides, can be maintained on a perfectly harmonious basis. I
1. See Curzon to Hamilton, 21 May 1905.
2* See Ronaldshay, Curzon,III, p.36b*
have seen them so maintained, and I have assisted in the
1task for four and a half years*" The position of the Com­
mander-in-Chief entirely depended he thought on that 
officer!s own personality: "no check placed upon him hy our 
constitution can prevent him* if he is a man of character 
and capacity, from becoming hy far the most prominent mili­
tary personage in the land." What was wanted in order for 
the system to function properly was harmony and a more chari­
table attitude on the part of Kitchener.
"If only he will observe a little discretion 
in his relations with the Military Department, 
he will find them eager to work for him 
instead of against him; for after all, to 
look at it from the lowest point of view, the 
ulterior promotion of all of them is in his 
hands."
Curson concluded:
"There is not the slightest necessity for him 
to expose himself to any rebuff or to receive 
any humiliation. If only he will take counsel 
in advance, and not rush madly at his fences, 
he will carry through the bulk of what he o
desires, and need not assuredly come to grief."
He did however, advance two suggestions which he
submitted for Kitchenerfs acceptance. The first was that,
before making any large proposals he should consult the
Military Department as to their own views. In that way "the
officers of the latter ... will only be too glad, to help,
and the schemes of the Commander-in-Chief, instead of being
1. Curzon to Hamilton, 21 May 1905-
2. Ibid.
put forward in their present inchoate and ignorant form, 
will he co-ordinated with Indian experience and fact.'1 
Curzon1s second suggestion related to the permanent record 
of the Commander-in-Chief's proposal; he was willing to 
allow Kitchener the right to withdraw his schemes for further 
discussion should they be vetoed, thus avoiding embarrassing 
Kitchener by having his mistakes printed in the Departmental 
files and circulated to the other Departments for information. 
That patronising note must surely have been distasteful to 
Kitchener, who now was being treated as an offending school­
boy, continually checked by higher authority. Curzon in 
fact, was not certain what the result of his suggestions 
would be, though he expressed his belief that these incidents 
revealed strong defects in Kitchener's character.
"I am sure I do not know Che wrote at the end 
of his letter on 21 May], whether he will 
accept these suggestions, or, even if he 
does, whether they will be helpful in keeping 
the peace. What troubles me about the whole 
matter is the incessant vexation and worry 
that I see are likely to be imposed upon my­
self in keeping things going in the future; 
but what shocks me much more is the disappoint­
ing light that is thrown by these incidents 
upon the personality of a man whom I have 
constantly seen described in the papers as a 
diplomatist and a statesman, but who seems to 
me, in so far as I have yet been brought into 
contact with him, to be strangely deficient 
in some, at ary rate, of the essential attri­
butes of both."
Curzon's attitude at this point must be further examined In
the light of a series of small but significant episodes which
had occurred earlier in the spring as a result of Kitchener!s
frontier tours.
(2) Frontier Imbroglio
Early in April 1905, Colonel Yate, the British 
officer in command of a frontier post at Chaman, had been 
arrested by Afghan soldiers while riding just inside the 
Afghan border. His captors confined him to Spin Baidak, a 
fortress some five miles from Chaman inside the Afghan 
frontier and refused his release until satisfaction had been 
obtained from the Indian Government. Simultaneously, another 
British officer had been fired upon by an Afghan sentinel 
while touring along the Indian side of the frontier. Curzon 
was extremely annoyed by that imbroglio which he considered 
an act of gross discourtesy on the part of the Amir's troops. 
Moreover he felt that the incident was a direct result of 
Kitchener's tours along the Indian frontier and he accord­
ingly wired Kitchener to desist from exacerbating further 
a potentially explosive situation.
Curzon informed Hamilton (15 April 1905):
"For 'pot-shot1 relations to prevail between 
Afghan sentinels and British officers on the 
frontier is an intolerable situation, and 
cannot be patched up by a mere apology. The 
curious and rather vexatious aspect of the 
whole case Is that these incidents are the 
direct consequence of Kitchener's vigorous 
dashes here, there,and everywhere along the 
frontier. With the admirable desire to make 
himself personally acquainted with the 
frontier that he is called upon to defend, he 
is scouring every mile of the border .., with 
a posse of generals and officers behind him. 
Everywhere a trail of excitement, rumours, 
and apprehension follows upon his track: and 
the Baluchistan people tell me that Tate's 
capture was without a doubt the Afghan reply 
to what the latter looked upon as the menace
1of Kitchener’s appearance upon the scene."
Curzon was particularly irritated as he had not been con­
sulted about the details of Kitchener’s proposed trip.
"He does not in the least understand the 
Indian ropes. As Commander-in-Chief he thinks 
that it is in his power to go anywhere at any 
time without reference to anybody. Beyond 
telling me that he was going to the frontier 
he never let me know to what particular 
places he was going; he never gave me a plan 
of his tour, as has hitherto been the invari­
able custom, and did not acquaint me with its 
duration. He issues no plan or programme to 
anybody, but disappears into space and is 
heard of one week at Nushki, another at Datta 
Khel. This morning I got a telegram from 
Parachinar at the top of the Kurrum Valley 
to say that he was just going to Peshawar.
His arrival there while the present ferment 
is going on would only tend to confirm the 
worst suspicions of the tribes, and might 
produce serious results."
The Viceroy then cabled Kitchener:
"there is great ferment on Khyber border, and 
arrival of Commander-in-Chief will be inter­
preted by tribes as meaning something serious.
They are already very much alarmed at our 
apparent activity all along the frontier, and^
I want very much to let things quieten down."
Kitchener replied immediately that he would cancel his visit
to Peshawar. Curzon foresaw that the sequence of small, but
irritating, explosions, would be followed by "a whirlpool
A
of excitement and suspicions." "A Commander-in-Chief, 
particularly of his prestige and name, cannot go scouring
1. Curzon to Hamilton, 13 April 1903.
2. Curzon to Kitchener, Telegram, 6 May 1903*
3. Kitchener to Curzon, Telegram, 6 May 1903.
A. Curzon to Hamilton, 7 May 1903*
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about our advanced frontier as if be were taking a galop 
on Salisbury Plain* A train of incidents follow upon bis 
progress for wbicb I am beld responsible, and wbiob may 
involve tbe Government of India in serious trouble In 
asking Kitchener to abstain from bis energetic examination 
of tbe frontier, Curzon boped to avoid further trouble with 
Afghanistan.
"I have not a doubt that tbe outrages committed 
by tbe Afghans at Smatzai and Shinpokh are 
their answer to Kitchener*s recent visit to 
that region, just as tbe incident of Colonel 
Yate was tbe local response to bis arrival at 
Chaman."
As to tbe conduct of tbe latter, be informed tbe Lt. Governor 
of Burma, Sir Hugh Barnes:
"That ass, Colonel A.C. Yate, involved us in a 
fine trouble with tbe Amir, by getting arrested 
at Cbaman."1
It bad been Curzonrs ardent desire by tbe removal 
of such small incidents to establish tbe rule of law and 
order for misrule and tyranny in tbe tribal districts of
p
tbe frontier. That policy was now threatened by Kitchener*s 
energetic activity. Curzon was determined, in an effort to 
pursue bis policy, to maintain or at least restore Afghan 
confidence in tbe Government of India. By such salutary 
restraint tbe Viceroy boped to frustrate Russian designs and 
counter-actions by avoiding direct interference in Afghan 
affairs.
1, Curzon to Barnes, 16 June 1903.
2. Davies, C.C., Tbe Problem of tbe North-West Rrontier 
1890-1908, pp.12-13. “
Curzon was 'becoming increasingly nervous about 
Kitchener’s presence in India and he informed Hamilton on 
7 Hay;
I foresee quite clearly, however, that 
when he comes hack I must have a very frank, 
though I hope friendly, talk with him about 
his movements in the future. ”
Because Kitchener had hitherto ’been in a position of
undisputed command and in circumstances such as those of
active warfarey where his voice was supreme, and where
military dominated political considerations, he expects to
find the same conditions revived here*” Kitchener had replied
to Curzon fs rebuff by informing him that he had obtained the
tacit approval of ministers in London before coming out to
India:
”1 was very much surprised last night to hear 
that you did not know that both Balfour and 
Brodrick told me before I started, that it 
was most essential that I should examine our 
positions on the frontier as soon as possible 
after my arrival in India, so as to be able 
to report upon them from a military point of 
view. When I was at Whittingehame discussing 
this matter with Balfour, I particularly asked 
him to write to you on the subject of my going 
round the frontier without delay, and it .never 
occurred to me that he had not done so*1’
Balfour indeed had made no reference to the matter in his
correspondence to Curzon* In these circumstances Curzon now
became anxious about Kitchener’s designs and we must
investigate their substance*
1* Kitchener to Curzon, 15 Hay 1905
Balfour, working through, the reconstructed Gommittee
of Imperial Defence, via Roberts, greatly desired that
Kitchener familiarise himself with the problems of the Indian
frontier. In that way the Cabinet sought to obtain indepen-
1dent information regarding India1s defence. Kitchener out­
lined his views in his private correspondence with Roberts -
including proposals for the reform of India!s system of army
2
administration - a purely internal issue at that time.
Roberts had informed the Secretary of State, Hamilton, of 
that correspondence and Hamilton had casually referred to 
that communication in his letters to Curzon. Curzon now took 
the opportunity to ensure that in future Kitchener should 
use only official channels in any correspondence involving 
the internal administration of India, and was careful to 
quote the official procedure governing private communications 
to Kitchener:
TtIn his letter which came by yesterdayfs mail 
Che informed Kitchener on 12 May,] the Secre­
tary of State mentioned that he had heard 
from members of the Imperial Defence Committee 
at home of ’schemes of wide reform and great 
alteration1 being put forward by you, as he 
assumed, in private letters to the War Office 
or the Commander-in-Chief, and he asked me to 
warn you that ’although communications between 
the two Commanders-in-Chief are always recognised, 
any changes of an important character in the 
organisation of the Indian Army must be referred 
through the Indian Government to the India 
Office here. Otherwise we shall have a double 
set of communications which will be the source
1* See Roberts’ letters to Kitchener, in Kitchener MSS 
30/57/28.
2. Ibid., Kitchener to Roberts, 30/57/29.
1of great embarrassment and personal friction’...”
This proved to "be the case* Kitchener admitted his 
offence with good grace, explaining to Lady Salisbury, of 
whose secret correspondence Gurzon was wholly unaware:
"I have just had a wigging from the S* of S. 
for writing home too much *,* You, Ld. R., 
and Ian Hamilton are the only people I have 
written to; as you know, I am not a great 
letter-writer. I enclose a copy of the wigging, 
and of my reply* It seems rather petty*.*"2
The result of Kitchener's frontier tours and the
misunderstanding over his correspondence with Roberts about
them created friction* Curzon made it clear "that in oases
where your ideas or proposals have not yet been submitted
to or received the consent of the Government of India”, the
Commander-in-Chief would in future speajt( solely for himself.^
But Curzon was a good deal troubled by the concatenation of
events which had so nearly precipitated the disaster he had
zl
anticipated as early as 1899* How a further incident
1* Curzon to Kitchener, 12 May 1903*
2* Kitchener to Lady Salisbury, 13 May 1903? Magnus,
Kitchener, p.206* The correspondence of the 5th Marquis 
of Salisbury and his wife (1867-1955) is not yet avail­
able. Some copies of Kitchener's letters to the Salisbury 
family are in the Balfour Papers at the British Museum. 
For the remaining letters Magnus may be relied upon.*
3. Curzon to Kitchener, 13 May 1903*
4. See Curzon to Godley, 6 September 1899* He had written to 
Godley: "I am already somewhat of a disturbing element 
in the placid economy of Indian administration. The 
appearance of another and even more seismic factor might 
produce unforeseen results.”
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seriously complicated the increasing divergence in the rela­
tions between Curzon and Kitchener, Reluctantly intervening 
in a dispute between Elies and Kitchener, Curzon was forced 
to come down strongly in favour of the former, thus prejudic­
ing Kitchener irreparably against the Military Member*
(3) The Clash with Elies
Elies had committed a minor usurpation of Kitchener fs 
powers by issuing a correction to an order while Kitchener 
was away on tour* Elies had rightly argued that one of the 
principal functions of the Military Department was to see 
that the orders of the Secretary of State or Government of 
India, as the case might be, were properly carried out. One 
of the instruments by which this was done was a 'G.G.O.1,
i.e. a Governor-Generalrs Order. These were invariably 
drafted at Army Headquarters by the Adjutant-General or his 
staff, and came down with the sanction of the Commander-in- 
Ohief to the Military Department for issue. The latter were 
responsible for seeing that the phraseology was in strict 
accordance with the standing orders, and for final publica­
tion. In practice, most of the orders were of a routine and 
purely administrative character. In this particular case, a 
draft G.G.O, had been drawn up in the usual way, and sent 
down to the Military Department for issue. Unfortunately it 
was carelessly e:xpressed and gave rise to some misapprehension
when received at the other end. News of that misunderstanding 
was telegraphed to Elies, and he assumed responsibility for 
correcting the mistake, without consultation and further 
delay. It was upon the trivial re-issue of this amendment 
that Kitchener declared war.
Kitchener sent in a long Memorandum, in which he
proposed the suppression of the Military Department on that
solitary charge. He then withdrew the Memorandum when Curzon
judged that Elies had acted entirely within his right.
Curzon thought the matter was at an end asserting:
"The whole thing was so utterly petty and 
childish that when I wrote to Kitchener 
urging the withdrawal of his big Memorandum,
I said I thought that the reference to this 
particular incident was of too insignificant
a character to find a place in an important
State paper.
Contrary to his hopes Kitchener returned to the charge: "he 
meant to have Elies1 blood at any cost" and threatened to 
resign. That threat "fairly took away my breath. If or I 
found myself in the ludtficfeus position of being apparently 
involved in a first-class row with him .. . over a matter in 
its origin of almost puerile insignificance, in no way con­
cerning me at all, and in so far as it touched a question of
principle, raising one in which all my sympathies are
strongly on the side of, and not against, Kitchener's con-
p
ception of his own authority."




For his efforts Curzon was now faced with a direct 
confrontation with Kitchener* He was not clear about what he 
should do* and advanced a number of reasons for Kitchener*s 
threatened action. He was certain of Kitchenerfs enthusiasm 
for his work, and of reform in the Indian Army. Others 
doubted that hypothesis and suggested Kitchener meant, "in 
any case, to shake off the dust of India, and that he is 
merely seeking for a plea that will enable him to retire 
without discredit.1' He insisted he had done all he could to 
help Kitchener:
"I have striven my hardest to steer him into 
the path where his vast opportunities really 
lie and to head him off from all the side­
tracks which are bestrewn with obstacles."
Asserting how he sought to avoid any unfriendliness and 
misunderstanding in his relations with Kitchener, he pointed 
out how patient and tolerant he was:
"I have in a few weeks spent more hours in 
listening to his torrential expositions than 
I have in the company of my two previous 
Commanders-in-Chief in four years; and I have 
allowed him to interfere in matters exclusively 
under my charge, such as Frontier Militia and 
the like, in a manner which I would never 
have tolerated from one of his predecessors."
Curzon demonstrated the stages by which Kitchener
reached the point of resignation in his letter to the
Secretary of State on 28 May.
"Kitchener is manifestly and intensely dis­
appointed with his position and surroundings
1* Curzon to Hamilton, 28 May 1903*
in India. He came from being tbe autocrat 
of South Africa and the darling of England 
to find himself here a greatly inferior 
force o Starting by thinking that he could 
do whatever he pleased, trample upon all 
opposition, destroy the Military Department, 
reconstitute the Army, overturn and recreate 
everything by a nod, he finds himself for 
the first time in his recent life the ser­
vant of a highly systematised Government 
whose functions and parts are strictly defined, 
and which cannot be swept aside as a tiresome 
obstruction."
The imbroglio on the Afghan frontier raised the whole princi­
ple of the necessity of maintaining good communications 
between the civil and military heads of Government: "He 
thought he could travel anywhere along the frontiers without 
telling anybody a word. He found himself warned that higher 
permission was required." Earlier Curzon had indeed objected 
to Kitchener's absence from the headquarters of the Govern­
ment* He feared that a dangerous precedent would be estab­
lished should the excuse of a stern tour of duty easily 
become a three-months holiday in some remote part of the 
frontier with a good deal of shooting thrown in. He asserted 
that "not even a Commander-in-Chief can dash off to the
1uttermost corners of the Empire as the humour seizes him."
Curzon then singled out Kitchener's proceedings in 
relation to the Military Department:
"He thought he could revolutionise the entire 
organization of the artillery in India liter­
ally by a stroke of the pen - a telegram to 
you and a telegraphic 'yes' from you in reply.
1* Curzon to Hamilton, 1 April 1903.
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He found that not a single one of his Col­
leagues agreed with him, and he had to with­
draw his schemes in face of their unanimous 
disapproval*”
Having robbed the Military Department of its prospective 
best men, Kitchener then attempted to emasculate its power 
by issuing an abortive Memorandum, which ”had to be with­
drawn within 12 hours of its issue in order to save its 
author from an even worse rebuff.” In his effort to punish 
Elies, Kitchener had next cited the case of the fatal 'G.G*0.T 
and found once again that he had missed fire* Yet now it 
became evident that Curzon was faced by that very collision 
which he most hoped to avoid ”... he has forced me by his 
clumsy tactics into the position of championing the Military 
Department (which I had never thought possible), and of 
everywhere putting the brake on to his plungings.
One source of Kitchener!s discontent was, Curzon was 
convinced, in dislike of his surroundings: ”He cannot under­
stand why the Viceroy should be splendidly housed and 
equipped while he is accommodated in what by comparison is a 
bungalow.” Moreover he felt Kitchener was annoyed generally 
by the Government of India: ”He frankly dislikes Anglo- 
Indian society ... He is bored with Simla. He abominates 
our files and departmental method of working* In fact, he is 
Just like a caged lion, stalking to and fro and dashing its • 
bruised and lacerated head against the bars.”
Curzon attempted to put himself in Kitchener's shoes
in order to comprehend his annoyance and motification:
"... at the bottom of all is the fact that, 
having been first and almost uncontrolled in 
his different spheres for the last four years, 
he is now not only second, but in the organisa­
tion of society and Government out here, a 
second who is scarcely in it ... It is a 
novel and painful experience for a man of 
imperious temper who is already over 50. He 
thought to be ruler of India straight away: 
and as he has said I-VJhen Curzon has gone,
and we have a weak Viceroy in his place, I
shall be dictator*T But meanwhile I have not 
gone, and there is a good chance of my staying; 
so where is the dictatorship for which he 
came out?"
He hinted that the denouement might come at any moment, and 
that the Home Government might have to choose between retain­
ing Kitchener*s services as Commander-in-Chief and the ex­
tension of his term of office as Viceroy, realising that
public opinion in England would side with Kitchener, ,fand
say he had been driven out by me, or by the bureaucracy, or 
by anything but the real cause." He asserted that "no effort 
on my part shall be wanting to prevent such a stupid disaster 
as the loss of Kitchener*s services,1 whatever the pretext 
Kitchener might use or however trumpery the issue on which 
he might elect to go. Curzon was anxious that the Home Gov­
ernment should understand that he was "regarding it from the 
point of view of the advantage of the Empire. If only we can 
tide over his first year, by the end of which he must to 
some extent have learned the ropes, all may yet be well."
Ilie essential feature of these proceedings was that
they left the Viceroy in an exposed position* Hitherto, in 
exclusively managing Indian administrative policies, Curzon 
sought in his subordinates a responsibility for carrying out 
his instructions. He needed colleagues capable of function­
ing smoothly within the framework of India's vast administra­
tive machine, thus introducing an element of flexibility*
But in Kitchener he found an authority equal to his own - 
that even challenged his direction of its affairs. Threaten­
ing resignation, Kitchener had now compelled the Viceroy to 
admit him into the heretofore exclusive management of these 
affairs. Bor his part* Kitchener loyally promised to work in 
harness with the administrative machinery and allow it, as 
it were, a year's grace, and "on that understanding they 
shook hands." The Viceroy confided he was willing to do 
anything to "escape these weekly fiascoes." Above all he 
wanted Kitchener to get on with his task of military reform 
while he pursued his own tasks:
"It is all, as you may imagine, intensely 
wearing and vexatious to me, and the absurdity 
of the thing lies in the fact that, whereas 
all my a priori sympathies are on his side, 
and I love"to smoothe away the obstacles 
from the strong man who means business ..."
Curzon now found himself in a direct collision with Kitchener.
"The only safeguard" he concluded in his long letter of 28
Nay to Hamilton, "... and the only possible preventive of
disaster, is that I should remain his friend* The moment
that we are estranged, or that public opinion begins to
1* Nagnus, Kitchener, p*208.
think seriously that we are quarrelling - the crash is
1certain to come,"
(4) The Calm before the Storm ... Kriegspiel.
The atmosphere thereafter calmed down considerably, 
but the difficulty was of a much more fundamental nature, 
India*s internal administration was based on the model of 
the Cabinet system at home in that the Military Member and 
the Commander-in-Chief corresponded roughly, in so far as 
their functions were concerned, with the Secretary of State 
for War and the Commander-In-Chief in England, The major 
relevant difference was that the Secretary of State for War 
was not a serving officer, junior in rank to the Commander- 
in-Chief as the Military Member necessarily was. In other 
important respects, however, the system differed from the 
home analogy, India’s system was designed so that Parliament 
as far as possible could maintain its financial control over 
Indian expenditure, especially military expenditure-.
But there was not any close resemblance between the 
principles which applied in Britain, governed as it was 
under democratic parliamentary institutions, and the condi­
tions that obtained in India, where the government remained 
bureaucratic, with such parliamentary checks as were found 
necessary by the India Office, Moreover, control of the Army
1, Curzon to Hamilton, 28 May 1903,
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in India was in fact vested in the hands of the Governor-
1General in Connell, Therefore it was essential, in order 
for that system to work, that Members of the Governor- 
General^ Council work together as a closely knit team. But 
Kitchener was far too proud and disdainful to discuss his 
various proposals informally with other members of the Indian 
Government, and least of all with the Viceroy and Military 
Member* Having found a modus operandi with Cur son, Kitchener 
was content warily to await the decision of the Home Govern­
ment and the confidential advice of its members before 
acting.
Kitchener1 s relations with the Military Member and 
his department in the meantime remained cool, and now Curzon 
feared, that Elies would abandon his post:
"... ever since, I have been expecting the 
resignation of Elies, which would have been 
an appropriate balance to that of Kitchener 
the week before. I must say I feel my posi­
tion most deeply ..*1 provide a Tom Tidier!s 
ground on which these two turkey-cocks fight 
out their weekly contests each clamouring to 
get me on his side, and threatening me with 
resignation if I take the other. Moreover 
it is all so unnecessary and so stupid* If 
only Kitchener would show a little grace and 
tact things would go better. As it is I am 
the focus of a perpetual turmoil which I 
have done nothing to provoke, and of which I 
am a mortified but helpless spectator. I am 
told too, that all sorts of fresh combats are 
ahead to which I look forward with an almost 
sickening apprehension^
1. Report of the Army in India Committee, 1919-1920, Cd.9^3,
p*7. ~ ~ "
2. Curzon to Hamilton,. 4 June 1905*
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Early in the summer of 1903? Kitchener suggested 
the creation of a number of batteries of Indian field artil­
lery? and thereby exposed his ignorance of one of India's 
great shibboleths* He subsequently proposed that a combatent 
force of some 6,000 troops, accompanied by 900 men and 3?000 
followers should be despatched in the event of a British 
mission to Tibet* It fell to the Military Department to point 
out the utter impracticability of that proposal in view of 
the high altitudes and geography of Tibet* In both cases, 
the importance of the Military Department was vindicated* 
Kitchener for the moment appreciated that he had met his 
match in Curzon, who was content to observe:
"During the past week the volcanic energies 
of 'snowdon1 have slumbered; only a thin 
cloud has hovered about the cone; and ..* 
the lava-streams have ceased to flow*"1
In the course of the next two months relations 
between Curzon and Kitchener improved considerably, and 
Kitchener was able to inform Lady Salisbury:
"The Curzons, both of them, have been very 
kind and nice to me* When you write to them 
you might say how much I appreciate it all*
He is really a first-rate Viceroy and we 
work together much better now - quite 
cordially In fact."^
Curzon, in factv was delighted in the marked change in
Kitchener's attitude and made a determined effort to work in
1. Curzon to Hamilton, 4 June 1903*
2* Kitchener to Lady Salisbury, 1 July 1903; Magnus, 
Kitchener, pp*208-9*
harmony with him:
"He [Kitchener] is out with me here in camp 
at this moment and not a cloud flecks the 
sky *. * Though he must surely have known 
that I pressed for his appointment to India 
and did everything to smooth his advent, he 
confesses to having started with the idea 
that I was opposed to him and was hent on 
wrecking his schemes* He now realizes his 
mistake and is aware that I am his best 
friend* The latter frame of mind is as sen­
sible as the earlier was unjust, and if it 
can be maintained I can see no reason why 
there should be any trouble in the future *"
In his first official letter to Brodrick who had 
succeeded Hamilton in October 1903 as Secretary of State, 
Ourzon felt able to report that Kitchener had exhibited a 
conduct more becoming his position:
"Kitchener you know. He commenced by trying 
to destroy the Military Department and to 
concentrate the administrative and financial, 
as well as the executive, work of the Indian 
army in his own hands. This I declined to 
allow, and he has now settled down to his 
work, In which he is introducing a great 
deal of timely zeal and efficiency*
It must be made clear that Curzon had no desire to 
thwart or hamper Kitchener in his task of placing the def­
ences of India upon a sound basis, and so utilise the exper 
ience he had gained In warfare during the course of his 
campaigning in South Africa* Upon a number of important 
questions Curzon and Kitchener were in close agreement, and 
Curzon attached supreme importance to Kitchener1s scheme of
1. Curzon to Hamilton, 9 July 1903*
2. Curzon to Brodrick, 2 October 1903.
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army redistribution and reorganisation. In addition tbe 
Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief were agreed on tbe need for a 
more articulate and definite military understanding witb the 
Amir of Afghanistan; on the necessity for the Nushki-Seistan 
railway; on the problem involving clashes between Indians 
and European soldiers; on the impracticability of garrisoning 
reserves for India in South Africa in the event of a war
against Russia; and finally on the desirability of institut­
ing a Staff College in India:
"Only last night I noted with approval on his 
scheme for establishing a Staff College in 
India ... Kitchener is, I think, quite righto 
The great desideratum of modern warfare is a 
trained and competent staff; you cannot get 
it except by a special and technical system of 
instruction; and it is much better that it
should be available in this country, where the
bulk of staff officers should go through it, 
than that a limited number only should be able 
at a considerable outlay to themselves to pro­
ceed to a not altogether suitable Institution 
at home•"f
For Kitchener however, that halcyon period ended 
when he learned that Curzon*s term of office was being 
extended and that the Home Government were permitting him 
to return to England for a holiday and rest.
Accordingly, Kitchener sent a copy of his Kriegspiel 
or plan of campaign for the defence of India in the event of
Russian aggression, suggesting to Lady Salisbury that she
2
pass it along to A.J. Balfour. Balfour, in fact, had
1* Gurzon to Hamilton, 9 September 1903.
2. Kitchener to Lady Salisbury, 6 August 1903, Balfour MSS
4-9757.
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communicated earlier with. Kitchener as we have seen, through 
Roberts and Roberts wrote: UI shall be very anxious to hear 
your views on the subject of !the Defence of India1,"'*'
Despite his promise to Curzon to allow a yearfs grace on the 
question of dual control, Kitchener prefaced his Kriegspiel 
with a sustained indictment of Indian military administra­
tion, which he characterised as the greatest obstacle in the 
path of military victory in an Anglo-Russian war. That attack 
drew a long and extremely anxious reply from the Prime 
Minister.
Balfour thanked Kitchener for his Kriegspiel and for 
the trouble he had taken in investigating the problem of 
Indian Military organisation* He suggested that: "The remedy 
is with the Indian Government", and therefore "quite outside 
the broader problems" of the Committee of Imperial Defence. 
Nevertheless Balfour was "profoundly perturbed" from the 
point of view of defence, "at the relations between India 
and this country. For many purposes we seem to be, not so 
much integral elements in one Empire, as allied States, one 
of which though no doubt more or less subordinate to the 
other has yet sufficient independence to make effective 
common action a great difficulty. 1 fear this will be more 
and more felt as common action becomes more and more necess­
ary, and I see problems coming up for consideration which
1. Roberts to Kitchener, 30 June 1903; Kitchener MSS 30/57/28,
will certainly strain the already in some respects strained 
relations between the two Governments.M
Balfour was careful to point out that deliberations 
in the arcana imperii, the Defence Committee and Cabinet, 
concluded that:
"Our Regular Army does not exist principally 
for the defence of Great Britain, but almost 
entirely for the defence of India."
The gravaman of Balfour !s view was that Indian defence
placed an intolerable financial strain upon the Mother
Country; "and I think the military relations of the two
Governments, especially in the matter of finance, may have
to be very carefully considered." As for the increasing gulf
between the Government of India and the views of the Home
Government, Balfour clearly reveals that underlying the
whole question was the burden of defence costs involved in
military administration:
"I know George Curzon thinks that we are 
always trying to rob him, and the Press and 
Public here are ever ready to take up the 
cry that this powerful and wealthy country 
is bleeding a poor and subordinate Dependency 
with cynical selfishness. My impression is 
that the wrongs are all the other way, - for 
India pays nothing for the Navy, without 
which Indian reinforcements could not be 
sent, and but little for an Army which exists 
chiefly on her behalf."
Balfour was willing to concede that India doubtless 
was "the brightest jewel1 in the Imperial crown, as well as 
being an excellent customer for British manufactures." But 
from a strictly military point of view, India was nothing
but a liability:
"Were India siiccessfully invaded the moral 
loss would be incalculable, the material 
loss would be important, - but the burden 
of British taxation would undergo a most 
notable diminution!"
The Prime Minister concluded his letter with a 
significant message to Kitchener;
"I have not touched on questions of Indian 
Army organization; but my own personal con­
viction is (at least as at present advised) 
that the existing division of attributes 
between the Coinmander-in-Chief and the 
Military Member of the Council is quite 
indefensible ... I cannot say how thankful 
I am that we have got you, in this critical 
and in some respects transitional period, 
as our military adviser and guide on the 
problems of Indian Defence.
Thus encouraged Kitchener made no further reference 
to the matter of the dual control of the army before the 
Viceroy sailed for England, being preoccupied with the 
results of his serious riding accident which occurred on 15 
November 1903. Thereafter however Kitchener began composing 
fresh schemes for the abolition of dual control. In the 
meantime the breach between India and the Home Government 
came to a head over the state of affairs of India in Tibet 
and Afghanistan* In the six months intervening between the 
appointment of Brodrick as Secretary of State for India 
(October 1903) and the time Curzon left Calcutta in April
1. Balfour to Kitchener, 3 December 1903, Balfour MSS 49726.
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1904-, relations between the two Governments steadily 
deteriorated•
Curzon illustrated his grievances and considered 
that the interests of India were being sacrificed by the 
Home Government:
"I think perhaps, that I have suffered ... 
for having felt it my duty strongly to 
oppose H,M.G. in some of their attempts to 
score off India - and for having, during 
the last six months, had a new Secretary of 
State, who launches upon me weekly the most 
extraordinary schemes and proposals * * * 
wholly divorced from Indian knowledge or 
experience, and then complains bitterly if 
I do not accept them, and even thinks I am 
disloyal to H.MoG. for not helping them 
over these stiles* His Council are delighted 
to have got a new man, who does not know 
anything of India, and they knock spots off 
us with the keenest satisfaction*"
He was dismayed that Brodrick, though his personal friend,
would not also champion his policy;
"I think he rather enjoys spreading the 
impression that I am a very difficult person 
to handle, and that It is a good thing for 
the Cabinet to sit upon me from time to time*1
Confident in his hope that his personal appearance in London
would dispel most of the anxiety between the Government of
India and the Home Government, Curzon jestingly predicted:
"All this will disappear when I get home, and 
meet these suspicious gentry at a table, I 
think I can soon blow away the atmospheric 
conditions that have transformed me into a 
sort of Spectre of the Brocken of exaggerated 
and inhuman proportions."1
1. Curzon to Clinton Dawkins, 9 March 1904-,
Before handing over charge of the Indian Government 
to Lord iimpthill, Quezon restated the policy and principles 
of his Government in a Budget speech (30 March) which was 
to become famous;
"India is like a fortress with the vast moat 
of the sea on two of her faces, and with 
mountains for her walls on the remainder,.
But beyond those walls extends a glacis of 
varying breadth and dimensions, We do not want 
to occupy it; but we also cannot afford to see 
it occupied by our foes. He would be a 
short-sighted commander who merely manned his 
ramparts in India and did not look out beyond; 
and the whole of our policy during the past 
five years has been directed towards maintain­
ing our predominant influence and to preventing 
the expansion of hostile agencies on this area 
which I have described."1
Bor his part Brodrick was fully convinced that 
Curzon*s arrival in London would help facilitate agreement 
over many of the issues outstanding between them: "I feel
sure that a great number of these questions could be settled
2orally without the slightest difficulty." Brodrick however, 
recorded the general fear among his Councillors and colleagues 
"lest they should be sledge-hammered on questions on which 
they feel acutely, and I cannot help thinking that, just as 
I personally have never been able to come to an arrangement 
with the Prime Minister when writing, although I can always 
do so in half an hour's conversation, the distance of many 
thousand miles and the different way things look when they 
are explained by letter, counts for much." Once again
1. Budget Speech, 30 March 1904, In Raleigh, op.cit., p.408.
2. Brodrick to Curzon, 19 Pebruary 1904.
Brodrick reiterated the significance of the Defence Committee
"Arthur Balfour is the first Prime Minister 
who had given any real consideration to 
national defence, and had India been attacked 
any time in the last thirty years, preparations 
would have been as vague as they were at the 
time of the Crimean War,"1
The problem of defending India was, he continued, "assuming 
very wide importance," and he emphasised the desirability of 
coming to some definite conclusions. In a subsequent tele­
gram, he indicated the anxiety of the Home Government over 
Indian military affairs generally:
"As soon as you arrive in England the Defence 
Committee desire to confer with you on all 
defence questions which have recently been 
discussed between us. Lord Kitchener's recent 
memorandum^ as to the carrying powers of the 
Russian Railway and the probable Russian 
forces in Afghanistan raises the most import­
ant questions. As by statute Lord Kitchener 
cannot join you in the deliberations here, 
could he nominate some officer in his confi­
dence, who has been working with him on this 
subject, who could be present with you and 
save much correspondence..."^
Curzon was markedly troubled about the number of 
problems he faced, particularly those related to Indian 
army administration and the dissension between Kitchener and 
Elies; he feared Ampthill would be placed In a difficult 
position should an open conflict arise. Some months before 
his departure, Curzon wrote to Brodrick:
1. Brodrick to Curzon, 18 March 1904, Midleton MSB 50075*
2. of* C.I.D. Records 6/1/36D, 20 January 1904.
3. Brodrick to Curzon, Telegram, 30 March 1904.
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"*.. I want you to know in strictest confidence 
that I have great difficulty in keeping the 
peace between K. and Elies. Ihe former most 
unreasonably and unjustly dislikes and des­
pises the latter ... He wants to break & 
destroy the Mily. Dept, and thinks I fancy 
that the best way to do it is to force Elies 
to resign*"1
Curzon was even more dismayed at the "flimsy and hypothet­
ical" character of the calculation of the Defence Committee, 
directly attributable to the delay of Roberts, a prominent
p
member of the C.I.D*
Confusion however between India and London regarding 
defence estimates was probably the result of Kitchener!s 
secret channels of communication with the Home Government. 
Lady Salisbury early in 1904-, sent to Kitchener marked 
*Very Private1, a letter written to her by her husband which 
in part explains the dilemma which such secret communications 
caused:
"A.J.B. is very much concerned about the 
situation in India, He is much hampered 
because the information K*sends is secret, 
and he therefore can't use it. He is doing 
his best to act through Roberts in order 
that the Govt*, of India may be approached, 
officially or semi-officially, and an 
opportunity afforded for that Govt, to give, 
officially or semi-officially, this informa­
tion which K# has given secretly to you.
A.J.B, earnestly hopes that K. will do his 
best to make the effort successful."5
1. Curzon to Brodrick, 14 January 1904, Midleton MSS 50075*
2. Ibid., 11 Eebruary 1904.
3. Lord Salisbury to Lady Salisbury, n.d. 1904$ Magnus, 
Kitchener, p.207*
In reply to Brodrick's request of 30 March Curzon 
telegraphed on 1 April that he had given Kitchener permis­
sion to depute Colonel Hubert Mullaly, who had worked with 
Kitchener on his schemes for reorganising the Indian army, 
as his agent at the meetings of the Committee of Imperial 
Defence. As yet unaware that Kitchener was in such intimate 
contact with members of the Home Government, Curzon was 
nonetheless upset about Kitchener's implacable hostility and 
contempt for the Military Department:
"The unauthorised procedure of my Commander- 
in-Chief, not only in this but in many other 
respects, is a source of great annoyance to 
me, and I have frequently conversed with him 
on the matter. He cannot resist however, 
having his little scores off the Military 
Department or some other traditional foe, 
and I am afraid he will go on committing ^
these irregularities to the end of the chapter."
Nevertheless, the Viceroy overtly reaffirmed his hearty
support in Kitchener's task of improving preparations for
the defence of India:
"... I have the warmest admiration for your 
single-hearted plans and ideas for the 
reform of the Indian Army and the strength­
ening of the defences of the country ... I 
should consider it a national asset to re­
tain you here. While I am at home you may 
rely upon me to do all that I can to push 
forward your schemes: and in the meantime I 
wish you all success at this end."^
Kitchener replied by strongly hinting at the views 
he was expressing in his letters to England. He uncompromis­
ingly asserted that, should war come, disaster must follow
1, Curzon to Brodrick, 14 April 1904, Midleton MSB 50070.
2, Curzon to Kitchener, 26 April 1904.
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■under India's existing system of divided responsibility:
"#,tl think I ought to tell you that in 
writing home privately I have not hidden my 
firm conviction that the system under which 
the Army in India is now administered is 
very faulty * Under it, as you know, I do not 
consider myself responsible for those essen­
tial Army services that are not under my 
control, and in case of a serious war I have 
the gravest doubts as regards our state of 
preparation and efficiency, I cannot help 
thinking, if no change is made in the present 
system, war with Russia must assuredly lead 
to disaster, and it will be too late when war 
is at our doors to obtain much advantage by 
altering the present system* "1
In London, Kitchenerrs Kriegspiel contained a hard 
thread of military and political logic and corresponded with 
some exactitude to the utterances he voiced in India* War 
between Russia and Japan had broken out in February 1904 and 
British policy had to be skilfully managed as the result of 
the Japanese Alliance of 1902, Kitchener had no scruples 
whatever in exploiting that situation to promote his objec­
tives with the Defence Committee and the production of that 
document triggered off strong emotions* This helps to explain 
the vindictive mood which the Viceroy adopted in response 
during the summer of 1904.. In addition that mood was related 
to a number of other issues concerning Britain's policy in 
Central Asia, For Curzon this was but the beginning of the 
storm which lay ahead.
1. Kitchener to Curzon, 27 April 1904.
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(5) Brodrick : "When the cat's away,. .1
Curzon sailed from India on 30 April 1904 landing 
in England in mid-Hay♦ While on holiday in London the Viceroy 
was invited to attend several meetings of the Defence Com­
mittee hy which it was hoped agreement he tween the two 
governments would he facilitated* On 15 dune 1904, to his 
intense surprise, Curzon discovered that a memorandum sent 
hy Kitchener had heen circulated hy Brodrick among the
members of the Committee, categorically condemning Indian
1army administration, Curzon challenged its production as 
ultra vires and strongly objected to the document on the 
grounds that rather than dealing with Indian defence, it 
proposed a variety of changes within the Indian government, 
notably on the position of the Military Member* Curzon, 
greatly disturbed by that incident, described his reaction 
in a letter to Ampthill:
"To my amazement (this is very confidential)
I found Kitchener's Memorandum proposing r"to 
abolish the Military Department - which I 
induced him to withdraw in India a year ago - 
among the agenda papers ,,. entered for 
early discuss ion I I at once wrote to Balfour 
protesting against the go-by being given to 
the Government of India in this way,,,",
Curzon claimed that the C,I.D,, as only an advisory Commit­
tee, had no place in the Constitution and foresaw
"that the Defence Committee, with its un­
defined powers and unscientific method of 
conducting business, may be a source of some
1* Supra, p. 181 f*n,2*
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anxiety to the Government of India* Indian 
affairs are freely discussed there by a body 
of men barely one of whom has ever been in 
India, among whom the sailors are very 
strong, and where the only representative of 
our interests is the Secretary of State who 
knows nothing about India at all*1,1
Balfour promptly withdrew the memorandum, but the incident
dramatised the fact that Kitchener was intriguing behind
his back*
Brodrick had indeed raised the whole question of 
Indian defence privately to Kitchener shortly after Curzon 
left India in April 1904* Though it was true that Brodrick 
was inexperienced in matters connected with Indian affairs, 
we have seen that he felt a special responsibility, entrusted 
to him by Balfour, for bringing such questions that presented 
an imperial aspect squarely before India and the Home Gov­
ernment* Brodrick now also addressed himself to a more 
thorough study of army reform in India than had been attempted 
at any time since the days following the Mutiny* He was con­
vinced that among India*s great requirements, leaving aside 
for the moment the question of army administration, was the 
creation of a force that could effectively serve to bolster 
the Indian army in the event of hostilities in Asia* Unfor­
tunately by maladroit handling he once again provoked Curzon 
over the use of Indian revenues (as in his South African 
garrison scheme) and his efforts caused more friction 
(cf. Ill, (4-6)) between the two Governments*
1. Curzon to Ampthill, 23 June 1904*
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Nevertheless lie was determined to clear the way of obstacles
in the path of the Cabinet, first by supplying Kitchener
with the necessary materials for reform in India and secondly
to halt what was considered to be Curzonls adventurous policy
in Tibet and Afghanistan. In discussing the first of these
problems Brodrick had warned Curzon that his Council at the
India Office were definite in their unanimous feeling in
being T1very much disinclined to overrule Lord Kitchener”
1when it came to supplying him with men and money* One of 
his first steps therefore was to communicate directly with 
Kitchener for advice as to how to proceed to set about 
supplying requirements for the security of India* Here again 
confusion resulted, for Curzon, not always informed of the 
details of these discussions, was in fact kept in the dark*
Significantly the former War Minister raised the
whole question of Indian defence with Kitchener, in camera,
during Curzon^ absence from India:
”1 have not written .., because I believe it 
is forbidden by practice for me to communicate 
with anyone except the Viceroy *.. But I want 
to break the rule for once on the principle 
that fwhen the cat!s away the mice will play1.”
Brodrick informed Kitchener that they had arrived at "a
point where it is absolutely essential that you and the Home
Government should understand each other.” He insisted that
Kitchener keep their correspondence secret, *and not to let
1* Brodrick to Curzon, 4 July 1904; Midleton MSS 50076.
it be known to others I have written..*", and explained his 
concern at the way in which Curzon*s financial stringency 
placed army reform in serious jeopardy, particularly in view 
of pressure of the Liberal opposition in Parliament for a 
reduction in the army estimates* In that letter, Brodrick 
reiterating his earlier advice to Curzon* told Kitchener:
"At present we have a Prime Minister who is 
convinced that the military plans for the 
defence of India are sound, and that the re­
inforcements they demand must be provided",
at a cost of some £30 million to the British taxpayer* The 
problem was to get Kitchener to provide the necessary figures, 
in men and money in order to establish the basis for the new 
army estimates.* Brodrick felt that the psychological moment 
had arrived to act: "I have had more experience of War Office 
administration than any man now in Parliament, and I am con­
vinced that you cannot reduce the military charge to 
£25*000,000" in order to meet the necessity of obtaining 
adequate reinforcements for India in the event of Eussian 
aggression* Brodrick summarised the predicament of the Gov­
ernment :
"if all this is .put off and quietly debated, 
another Government will be just as much 
forced as we are to meet the Indian demand 
reasonably* ..* Your main experience of Gov­
ernment in the last eighteen years has been 
of Conservative Governments possessing a 
strong majority in both Houses, annually 
increasing estimates, and much assisted in 
doing it by a rapidly growing revenue. The 
revenue is now halting, taxation is much 
higher, the political outlook, although for
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the moment more quiet, is uncertain, and the 
radical party, which comes in pledged to re­
trenchment, will have a very strong backing 
with a people satiated by the fresh territory 
we have acquired and the wars which we have^ 
carried through in the last fifteen years *"
Brodrick demonstrated to Kitchener why the Indian 
Commander-in-Chief was an asset to the Government:
"*.* confidence in military opinion has re­
ceived heavy blows in the last few years#
The continual attacks on the army by the 
Times and other parties *. have gone far 
to destroy the belief in the infallibility 
of any military chief* The 'disillusionment1 
of the public of successive military chiefs 
[notably Wolseley, Buller, Wood, and subse­
quently in Roberts] with the exception of 
yourself, will probably be accentuated*"
Brodrick reflected his bitter experience in office
during the Boer War* He predicted that the newly appointed
Esher Committee, in attempting to remodel and reconstruct
the British army, would largely fail and the reformers would
be "unable to make the new heaven and the new earth that is
expected* * *. the sharper the raaor the greater inducement
to use it#**" He was determined that, in his new capacity,
he and Kitchener would not be blamed for unpreparedness in
India should the Russians begin building railroads in
s.
Askhabad through to Seistan* Confident in Kitchener's presence 
in India, he explained that the deliberations of the Defence 
Committee pointed to taking diplomatic action in case the 
Russians attempted to consolidate their existing expansion
1* Brodrick to Kitchener, 29 April 1904, Kitchener MSB 
30/57/22.
by laying rails in Khorassan, thus threatening Persia* In 
that event, "we should occupy Ohabbar as a Tquid pro quo1*" 
In concluding, Brodrick emphasised that he would treat 
Kitchener !s views on British policy in Asia in the strictest 
confidence:
"I hope you will reply to this letter fully, 
although !sub rosaf* I shall keep our com­
munications entirely to myself, but they 
will be of the greatest use to me in our 
discussions this summer*"1
Brodrick, fresh from an inept tenure at the War 
Office, has been well described by a recent historian as:
"... one of those figures who recur throughout 
the history of British party-politics: a man 
who, although remarkable neither for his 
talents nor his principles, is tacitly, per­
haps even reluctantly, regarded as an indis­
pensable pillar of his party's fortunes and, 
when it is in power, is automatically given 
a portfolio*"^
Kitchener was concerned less about the position of 
the Government than about his own position in India. He 
agreed that chaos would result from an armed clash with 
Russia:
"There is no doubt if we had a big war on the 
frontier there would be a frightful crash and 
'show-up* out here* A system under which
1, Brodrick to Kitchener, 29 April 1904, Kitchener MSB 
30/57/22.
2* Pleming, P., Bayonets to Lhasa, p*92: Though Colonel 
Fleming's account ofrthe Tibetan Mission is partial to 
Younghusband, it accurately reveals the extent to which 
the Home Government attempted to undermine Curzon's Tibetan 
policy, and in doing so, enlisted the help of Kitchener.
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Transport, Supply, Remounts, Ordnance, are 
entirely divorced from the executive command 
of the Army, and placed under an independent 
authority, is one which must cause an entire 
re-organization as soon as war is declared - 
rather late to begin."
In his indictment of India!s cumbrous departmental system,
Kitchener credited Curzon with having at least tried to
improve and reform the Indian army:
".,. efficiency is about the last thing that 
appeals to anyone, except the Viceroy ... 
what has been done in the past is right, 
and nothing must on any account be altered 
by horrid innovators coming from benighted 
England - be they Viceroys or Co~in-Cf!s.
Curzon has done a great deal, but there is 
still so much to do.1
Kitchener deprecated the fact that the Military Department 
was out of touch with the needs of the troops who must de­
pend upon supplies in time of war:
"*.. what will be the good of having well- 
trained and organized troops if they have 
not got anmmnltion, guns, horses, & transport 
... these are our great wants, and during the 
breathing time we have before Russia can be 
prepared, these, and strategic railways on 
our frontiers, should be our main considerations * ”
In his letters to Brodrick before he left South 
Africa, Kitchener expressed his admiration of the great 
German manoeuvres of 1902, and had strongly recommended 
British army organisation along German lines, setting up a 
corps and divisional basis upon standard units roughly equal
1* Kitchener to Brodrick, 15 July 1904-; Kitchener MSS 
50/57/22.
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in size and strength. It is just possible that Kitchener was 
influenced by the publication early in 1904, of an English 
translation of the German history of the Boer War. In the 
preface of that work, the one principle which the German 
General Staff firmly advocated and stressed was that the 
Commander-In-Chief must have absolute executive control, and 
his decisions uncontested by Cabinets and Ministers for War. 
Kitchener planned to put into immediate effect the principles 
of continental practice, and accordingly resolved to reduce 
India!s internal garrisons to the barest possible minimum 
and thereby release enough troops to form nine field 
divisions instead of four. As no one was sure just how units 
would be brigaded in an emergency, Kitchener gave explicit 
orders that the nine divisions with their general officers 
(each division consisting of ten thousand bayonets) would be 
divided into two groups: a northern army composed of five 
divisions to guard the frontier along a line from Peshawar 
to Lucknow, while a southern army of four divisions was to 
debouch southwards, the leading division to be stationed at 
Quetta, facing Afghanistan. For the first time, the divi­
sional basis was effectively applied in India, an immense 
improvement which established the foundation for the modern 
Indian army. Roberts, to whom Kitchener submitted his pro­
posals, told him to proceed without delay in organising all
1. Waters, W.H.H. (translator), The German Official Account 
of the War in South Africa, vol•I (February"1904).
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available forces for tbe anticipated campaign with Russia:
"We are at present in a transition state in 
military affairs, and until our forces are 
adequately reorganized we should ... resort 
to ... improvisation/'1
Thus, in tbe course of bringing tbe new divisions 
up to a uniform standard of efficiency, Kitchener incurred 
criticism from those who desired to maintain former 
traditions and preserve old names that had won past dis­
tinction in the Indian army* His drastic re-naming and re­
numbering cut across lines of sentiment in his attempt to 
create a highly trained, consistently organised modern army, 
and his disregard for any obstacles made him unpopular with 
many British officers* In that way the Indian Commander-in- 
Chief soon established his authority, particularly in the 
*Kitchener test1 by which every battalion in India was 
subjected to severe examination under extreme conditions 
in an effort to simulate active service in time of war* 
Officers who were prejudiced against Kitchener frankly 
acknowledged his capacity for increasing the efficiency of 
the Army and, respected and feared by all, Kitchener*s 
vigorous tours to the frontier, along with his influence 
and personal courage soon became widely spread among the
1* Kitchener to Roberts, 31 March 1904, enc. scheme for re­
organising and redistributing Indian army, with a 
Memorandum on Indian preparedness; and Roberts to 
Kitchener, 17 dune 1904, Paper 54-D, Memorandum 
by Roberts on Preparedness etc*, Kitchener MBS 30/57/28* 
2* Praser, op*cit*, p*408.
tribes, and his reputation became legendary*
While Kitchener was working out the details of his 
scheme to mobilise nine divisions? - confident that Brodrick 
and Golonel Mullaly would convey his views effectively at 
meetings of the Defence Committee - Brodrick informed him of 
the progress of those schemes and reported on Britain*s 
diplomatic situation with Russia. Obsessed that the Home 
Government would be unable to send out the required men or 
provide sufficient funds to meet their cost, Brodrick 
intimated that this gave the Defence Committee "cause for 
very great anxiety as Russia*s communications improve every 
day. Even if we could improve ours, we may find ourselves 
hard pressed for men after we have sent 100,000 men from 
here." Nonetheless., he was able to reassure Kitchener that 
his views were given great weight in Committee:
"Your present conclusion is entirely in accord 
with that of the members of the Defence Com­
mittee, and I hope it is the view which will 
be adopted by all parties*"
Significantly Brodrick championed Kitchener*s views over
other matters notably Tibet, despite the fact that it had
been Curzon who had taken the initiative for the expedition
in the first place, forcefully guiding its policy. He told
Kitchener:
"I am sure you will realise that we are 
depending entirely on your judgment as to 
what is done. It would be impossible for 
us to take responsibility from here, and, 
little as we desire to incur further ex­
pense, the expedition has gone so far
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that we: must see it through at all hazards.1 
It was not, however, only the fact that the Secretary 
of State was engaged in corresponding privately with the 
Commander-in-chief on military subjects. In addition Brodrick 
had widened the discussion "beyond the purview of Kitchener's 
responsibility, on political matters affecting Imperial 
interests and Curzon1s Central Asia diplomacy.
2(6) Tibet and Afghanistan - The Great Game in Asia.
In 1901 Hamilton wrote that
**... the Tibetans are but the smallest of pawns 
on the political chessboard, but castles, knights 
and bishops may all be involved in trying to 
take that pawn.115
In 1909 Curzon suggested that India, no mere pawn among the 
other Asiatic powers was "a royal piece on the chessboard of 
international politics"^ and in the years intervening between 
1901 and 1905 Anglo-Russian rivalry in Central Asia, though 
long standing, became focused on Tibet and Afghanistan. The
ciimax of that struggle came to a head in the summer of 1904
and thereafter, and had an intimate bearing upon Curzon1 s 
relations with Kitchener as well as with the Home Government. 
Curzon*s policy in Central Asia had one essential object, 
the restoration of British influence and diplomatic credit 
in Tibet and Afghanistan; to that object all other consider­
ations were subordinated. In his view it was crucial to
1. Brodrick to Kitchener, 9 June 1904, Kitchener MSS 30/57/22
2. For details of the 1 Great Game* see Fleming, op.cit., 
pp.19-31a
3* Hamilton to Curzon, 22 August 1901.
4. Curzon, The Place of India in the Empire, p.13*
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achieve success (rightly or wrongly) on these two main
issues between Great Britain and Russia. If Curzon could
capture these two strategic positions, he would win the
’Great Game1 in Asia against Russia; if he failed, it would
take many years before British prestige could be restored.
In these circumstances Curzon maintained that far from the
charge that his was a dangerous ,!or impulsive policy on any
part of the Indian frontier”>he had no desire whatever for a
policy of aggression, but wished to pursue one of "consolida-
1tion and restraint*1 Accordingly he sought some brilliant 
and paralysing coup which would at once restore British 
prestige while at the same time re-establish her position 
in Central Asia and with consummate skill he managed to 
employ the tradition symbol of British power by playing his 
King.^
As we have seen Curzon defined India’s position as
"a fortress with the vast moat of the sea on 
two of her faces, and with mountains for her 
walls on the remainder* But beyond those 
walls ... extends a glacis of varying breadth 
end dimensions* We do not want to occupy it, 
but we also cannot afford to see it occupied 
by our foes ... if rival and unfriendly 
influences creep up to it, and lodge themselves 
right under our walls, we are compelled to 
intervene ... This is the secret of the whole 
position in Arabia, Persia, Afghanistan, Tibet,
1* Budget Speech, 30 March 1904, Speeches, III, p*403«
2. See Curzon to King Edward VII, 9 March' 1904; 11 January 
1905* In July 1905, to the chagrin of Brodrick, Curzon 
asserted to the Monarch that "The instruments of Your 
Majesty’s rule in India cannot be openly humiliated 
without weakening the foundations of that rule itself." 
Ibid.
226
and as far eastwards as Siam..* and the 
whole of our policy during the past five 
years has "been directed towards maintaining 
our predominant influence and to preventing 
the expansion of hostile agencies in this 
area .,. I would suffer any imputation 
sooner than ... allow the future peace of 
this country to he compromised hy encroach­
ment . *.1 1
Although Curzon*s foreign policy lies outside the
scope of this thesis, had matters been left where they were,
little excuse would have been found for the Home Government
to overrule the Viceroy, As it turned out these issues were
to count heavily (and, perhaps, unjustly) against him in his
subsequent misfortunes with the Commander-in-Chief. It was
Curzon's superb direction of India's external affairs during
his last years of office which not only attempted to restore
2
British prestige in Tibet and Afghanistan, but renders him 
one of the most interesting as well as complex of Indian 
Viceroys, His handling of Anglo-Ruasian rivalry in Asia will 
always remain among the classic examples of diplomacy under 
conditions of exasperating and peculiar difficulty; his 
attempt against formidable forces, to end Russian expansion 
in the 'roof of the World* became legendary.'
The impact of these developments had far reaching 
effects, revealing not only the motives behind Curzon*s
1* Budget Speech, 30 March 1904, Raleigh, Speeches, pp.402-3*
2. Lamb, A., Britain and Chinese Central Asxa, pp.334-5*
3. See Fleming, opTcIIT+V~pp719^31* ‘
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policy, 'but those of Ministers in London. The ability of the 
Indian Government to carry out its policy effectively was 
therefore to a very great extent determined by the deteriora­
tion of confidence in the relations of the two Governments
previously. The result subjected Curzon to suspicion and dis- 
1credit. Repeated friction and frustration with Kitchener 
in India over army administration only added to a situation 
which was to have unfortunate repercussions. But in spite of 
these drawbacks, the Viceroy had formidable assets: his own 
personality - a commanding presence, immense experience, 
unsurpassed knowledge and a complete mastery of debate. The 
lucidity of the correspondence in which he discussed India !s 
affairs with the Home Government bears witness to his indef­
atigable energy* Though the odds against him were tremendous, 
Curzon doggedly pitted his strength against his obstinate 
opponents in the Cabinet. He knew he would receive little 
support and suspected that at any moment he might have to 
face open hostility, recall or resignation. He had, however, 
consolation in the knowledge that, torn by internal dissen­
sion, the worn Conservative Cabinet was equally uncertain in 
its Parliamentary position; but they were entrenched behind 
a new and powerful instrument - the Defence Committee;
1. One example belonging to a later period will suffice to 
illustrate these suspicions: "in no case would the Cabinet 
assent to a fight with Afghanistan, [nor had they] the 
means of waging such a war with success, if the Russians 
joined in, as they assuredly would." Godley to Curzon,
5 March 1905.
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Curzon knew therefore that he would have to fight his battle
in spite of his allies, for even more disturbing to him was
the fact that he could rely on but small encouragement from 
1home.
In this connection the summer of 1904 marked the 
climax of Curzon*s Indian career. Matters concerning imperial 
strategy and defence reached an extreme state of urgency as 
his policy touched off strong emotions in London, Once again 
he was brought into open conflict with the Cabinet who above
p
all, desired to avoid rupture with Russia. Curzon1s external 
aims met with the implacable hostility of the Liberal opposi­
tion as well as of the members of the Cabinet and of the 
India Council, Even in 1903 9 Godley had written succinctly:
"I am afraid that you will find that the 
obstacles to an advance to Lhasa which exist 
in this country are much more formidable 
than those in Tibet*"3
Within a month of taking up his new duties as Secretary of
State for India, Brodrick had written:
"So far as I can see, there is a direct con­
flict between your opinion and that of your 
advisers and the view held here.,. I find 
the same view most strongly reflected in 
the Indian Council.., They all of them object 
to advancing; they would only now go to 
Gyantse to save our face ,., in short, they 
would be quit of the whole business, the 
more so as they think you will make a road
1. Curzon to Ampthill, 4 August 1904, Ampthill MSS 233/37-
2. Ronaldshay, Curzon, II, pp,206-7*
3# Godley to Curzon, 29 October 1903-
into India for an enemy on a frontier which, 
has heen hitherto a natural "barrier,"
The crucial passage in that letter, however, was related to
British foreign policy in Asia:
"The Prime Minister has also a strong opinion 
ahout the effect that an advance to Lhasa 
would have on our diplomatic relations in 
the Par East*"-*-
The Cabinet were unanimous against any avoidable advance in 
Tibet for two reasons; first because they foresaw political 
difficulties in occupying allegedly Chinese territory, there­
by giving Russia a handle for encroaching on other portions 
of Chinese territory, thus applying leverage on British 
policy elsewhere, and secondly, because of the weakness of 
the Government resulting from the Boer War and the Chamber-
p
lain schism in the Conservative Party, The Home Government 
were also fearful lest Curzon "landed us in a war", In which 
case the Government would be responsible and would, of 
necessity, have to defend Curzon^ policy in Parliament:
they are free either to support you ... 
or to censure or recall you. But in any case 
the point is that the House of Commons may and 
will rightly come down upon you - and, If they 
repudiate you, you must resign*"
Godley challenged, in good-humoured terms, Curzon1 s version
of the ideal that India and the Indian Government should be
largely independent: "if you mean that we are to send out a
1. Brodrick to Curzon, 6 November 1903* 
2* Ibid., 13 November 1903.
series of carefully selected autocrats, and then let them do
what they please,,*" there was no chance at all for success,
and he added: ‘'where are we to get our autocrats? , *. Curzons
1I assure you, don't grow on every gooseberry bush*"
But Curzonfs external policy particularly in Tibet,
Persia and Afghanistan, was the product of his conviction 
that the Cabinet must actively recognise the need to restore 
British prestige in Central Asia* The Viceroy claimed Indian 
public opinion in his support:
"To you in England it seems so clear that 
there is no difference between the end of 
Lord Bufferin's regime and the end of mine*
To me in India it is transparent that there 
is all the difference in the world* What is 
the great difference at this end? It is that 
public opinion has been growing all the while, 
is articulate, is daily becoming more power­
ful, cannot be ignored. What is the origin 
of the mistakes sometimes made at the other 
end? It is that men are standing still with 
their eyes shut and do not see the movement 
here."
Reserving for himself the right to decide when public opinion 
was an accurate expression of Indian feeling he recorded:
*'*•• to contend that it does not exist, that 
it has not advanced in the last fifteen 
years, or that it may be treated with general 
indifference is, in my view, to ignore the 
great change which is passing over this 
country, and which I believe history will 
recognise myself as having done much (whether
1. Godley to Curzon, 26 Bebruary 1904-* At this time many of 
Curzon*s letters were passed on by Godley to Brodrick 
and the Prime Minister, and copies are in the Balfour 
collection (Balfour MSS 4*9721).
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wisely or unwisely) to accelerate; viz. the 
lifting of India from the level of a Depen­
dency to the position which is hound one day 
to he hers, if it is not so already, namely,, 
that of the greatest partner in the Empire.”
Now it was Curzon whose actions were threatening to 
hring Balfour!s Government crashing down. Most Cabinet 
ministers feared the Tibetan mission would ultimately involve 
a clash with Russia, and they wished to avert that contingency
at all costs by applying diplomatic pressure at St. Peters-
2
burg. Brodrick moreover warned Curzon of the dangerous 
political liability which the Indian Government provided the 
opposition:
"Parliament is beginning to take more interest 
in Tibet, and the greatest suspicion is 
evinced on the other side of any further 
advance. "5
He pointed out:
"The Opposition had been seeking occasion 
against the Government, and have found a 
good many different outlets •.* The Tibetan 
business was just one."^
In March 1904-, Godley confessed that Brodrick was expecting 
a change of Government before the end of the summer, and 
that military affairs were high in the list of the differ­
ences of party politics:
"Never, I suppose, since the Reform Bill of 
1852, has there been a time when the division 
of opinion on the great questions of the day -
1. Curzon to Godley, 27 January 1904*
2. Brodrick to Curzon, 12 February 1904.
5. Ibid., 25 March 1904.
4. Ibid., 15 April 1904. Midleton MSS 50076.
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Fiscal Policy, Army Reform, Home Rule - was 
so much at variance with the recognised dis­
tribution of political parties * Prom what I 
hear there seems to he a fine row going on 
inside the Government about the Report of 
the Esher Committee,..
All these considerations tended to discredit Curzon
while enhancing Kitchener's position in India. Esher had in
fact blamed the Government for the failure of the Boer War
as 1 a deliberate political act, for which the Cabinet as a
2whole, and the Cabinet only, can be held responsible." In 
the Report of the Esher Committee, composed of 'the daunt­
less three' (Esher, Fisher and Clarke), military co-ordina­
tion was given a high priority:
"The British Empire is pre-eminently a great 
Naval, Indian and Colonial Power. There are, 
nevertheless, no means for co-ordinating 
defence problems, or for dealing with them 
as a whole, for defining the proper functions 
of the various elements, and for ensuring 
that, on the one hand, peace preparations are 
carried out upon a consistent plan, and, on 
the other hand that, in times of emergency, 
a definite war policy, based upon solid data, 
can be formulated"3
In view of the rupture between the Viceroy and the Cabinet
over the question of Tibet Balfour privately considered the
replacement of Curzon. The Cabinet found themselves in
unalterable disagreement over Curzon's conception of India's
external policy, and they were naturally anxious to avoid
1. Godley to Curzon, 11 March 1904-,
2. Esher, Journals, I, p.394*.
3. Johnson, F.A., Defence by Committee, p.68.
complications on any point of the glacis along the perimeter
of India's frontier. At the time Esher recorded Balfour's
comment "that Curzon was very ' difficult', and that he
quarrels with his old friend Brodrick and is at sixes and
sevens with K. Arthur hopes that he will not return to India,
and in that case (only this is a profound secret) he will
1send out Selborne..*"
But if in the spring of 1904- the Prime Minister 
entertained doubts as to Curzon's remaining in office, he 
refrained from acting upon them. By mid-June 1904-, Curzon*s 
health was in a state of collapse; his wife, Mary Curzon, 
had just given birth to a third daughter in March, and lost 
her father, Mr, Leiter, in June. By October she was suffer­
ing from a further miscarriage complicated by peritonitis. 
Walter Lawrence (1857-194-0), Curzon's ex-private secretary 
and confidante who supported his policy in a series of 
letters to The Times, confided to Ampthill:
"I ... am afraid that .., [Curzon] ... is
not having much of a holiday. His leg gives
him great pain and he is worried by the 
Defence Committee and by others. He frets too 
at the appalling ignorance of India which 
prevails in London ... the end will be that 
he will break down.
Throughout the latter part of June Curzon lay ill in bed,
unable to attend the frequent meetings of the Committee of
Imperial Defence. Brodrick nonetheless, lost no opportunity
1. Esher, Journals, II, pp.55-6, 20 June 1904-.
2. Lawrence to Ampthill, 13 June 1904-, Ampthill MSS 233/4-0.
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to hound the Viceroy, and on one occasion, mentioned that a 
Major Gough had neglected to consult the War Office in a 
mission he had embarked upon to enquire about horses for 
India from South Africa and explained that Balfour was 
furious ,Tthat such an obvious precaution for the joint work­
ing of the two Governments should have been neglected." He 
complained that as the incident was causing great indignation; 
the Prime Minister "took it seriously to heart", and that it 
had raised "a great deal of feeling . „ . at the Defence Com­
mittee."1 Such tactics did little to restore Curzonrs confi-
*
dence or the state of his health and he wearily replied:
"I am in bed and have not the spirit or strength to continue
2a controversy..."
In these trying circumstances Curzon as we shall 
see, became embittered. His efforts to regain what he con­
ceived to be Britain’s deteriorating position in Central 
Asia were consistently hampered by a Cabinet satiated with 
responsibilities for governing the fresh territories they 
had acquired at the close of the Boer War. His struggle with 
the Commander-in-Chief in India culminated in his own loss 
of authority in speaking for the Government of India on the 
management of its affairs; and that struggle was an added 
element of dispute undermining the relations between the two
1. Brodrick to Curzon, 7 April 1904, and ca. 3 June 1904; 
Midleton MBS 50076.
2. Curzon to Brodrick, 13 June 1904, Ibid.
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Governments# In July 1904, Curzon thus described his feelings 
to Ampthill about Brodrick, the India Office, and the problem 
Kitchener was creating in Indian army administration:
"As for the India Office, under a Secretary 
of State who knows little or nothing about 
India, and does not seem concerned to learn, 
things move more slowly than I have ever 
known* I write write and worry worry* But I 
cannot get things done .*. the object of the 
India Office seems to be to apply the drag 
everywhere* When you get telegrams asking 
you to consult Kitchener, you must not 
attribute them to any idea that you two dis­
agree. (They are merely the reflex of the 
chaotic conditions existing in military 
administration here, and still more to the 
existence of the Defence Committee# A dis­
cussion is, we will say, going on* Suddenly 
a fundamental disagreement presents Itself 
on the military aspect of the problem. The 
English soldiers state their view# What is 
the Indian? Send a telegram and ask Kitchener, 
says the Prime Minister# That is almost 
always the explanation.”1
Ampthill, in the meantime, on 4 June 1904, cabled 
the following message to Brodrick:
”... informant telegraphs through Meshed 
that Orenburg-TashkencL railway will be 
finished in three months and in full running 
order in six, Belief at Tashkend is that 
Anglo-Afghan war is imminent and Russians 
claim to have understanding with the Amir 
and Indian Princes * #, "2
1* Curzon to Ampthill, 19 July 1904, enclosed in 28 July 1904, 
Brodrick later reported Buller!s observation on the wide 
divergence of military opinion during the Boer War: 11'In 
Pretoria,f he said, 'I found Roberts sitting in one 
building with his Hindoo Staff; Kitchener in another with 
his Egyptian Staff; and Kelly Kenny in a third with an 
English Staff, all pulling against each other,1"
Midleton, op.cit#, p.120.
2* Ampthill to Brodrick, Telegram, 4 June 1904, Ampthill 
MSS 233/37•
In these circumstances, Ampthill*s position as Viceroy became 
severely strained* As locum tenens for Curzon, Ampthill 
attempted loyally to carry out Curzon*s policy while main­
taining strict neutrality in an effort to judge administra­
tive measures on their merit* Kitchener, on the other hand, 
found the excuse to take the opportunity of pressing his 
demand for a change in the system of organisation within the 
Army by consolidating the various departments of Supply and 
Transport under his personal executive authority# Accordingly 
he constantly bombarded Ampthill with proposals to achieve 
that aim* Unable to concur or agree with the Military Member, 
he hinted at resignation should his views not be upheld in 
Council, thus creating an extremely difficult situation for 
the acting Viceroy* Kitchener's efforts to bring the matter 
to the formal attention of the Indian Government, included 
the opinion of his Generals and the officers on his Head­
quarters Staff as well as the senior officials in the Supply 
and Transport services themselves0 He asserted:
"I look on the matter as one of such vital 
importance to the fighting efficiency of the 
Army that personally I feel with the present 
system I would not willingly accept the res­
ponsibility of command in a serious war. In 
these circumstances if the changes I advocate 
are not entertained I think you will agree 
with me that my position here becomes a false 
one *1,1
Ampthill tactfully conceded the point by allowing Kitchener's
1* Kitchener to Ampthill, 10 June 1904, Ampthill MSS 233/34/1.
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proposals to "be threshed out in Council, hut he warned 
Kitchener against importing "a personal element into the 
question. We must argue it out on its merits alone.” Ampthill 
was aware that his Council would decide against any change, 
and in addition he felt "pretty sure that the Secretary of
l
State would not assent to the change."
The great issue now confronting Ampthill was posed 
by Major-General Sir E.R. Elies, Military Member of the 
ViceroyTs Council, who found himself in the midst of the 
problem of Indian army administration. He questioned whether 
it was advisable for him to resign and thus allow Kitchener 
complete control, or wait for some final decision from the 
Home Government. In either case, he expressed his desire that 
some permanent rather than ad interim solution would be made, 
and he told Ampthill:
"The controversy is none of my seeking, but 
in view of the notes recorded ... I felt that 
I had no option but to deal with the whole 
question ... Personally it would make very 
little difference to me whether I gave up 
office in a few months1 time or completed my 
five years, but I am convinced that it would 
be a gigantic mistake to place the whole 
administrative as well as executive power in 
the hands of either a powerful Commander-in- 
Chief or a weak one. I would wish to add 
that there is no question of any personal 
difference between myself and the Commander- 
in~Chiefo We have also always recognized his 
great prestige and that he had a work to per­
form out here on behalf of His Majesty*s 
Government," ^
1. Ampthill to Kitchener, 11 June 1904-, Ampthill MSS 233/34-/1.
2. Elies to Ampthill, 9 June 1904*, Ibid.
But Ampthill, perceiving the difficulty of Elies1 position, 
refused to allow Kitchener's designs for the abolition of 
the Military Member to proceed, and thus forced the Commander 
in-Chief to seek support from other quarters.
Ampthill!s resolute integrity, however, became a 
source of embarrassment for the Home Government. Ampthill 
forthrightly presented his situation in a letter to Brodrick:
"I see in Lord Kitchener's present proposal 
another means of attaining the same end. It 
is in fact the thin end of the wedge. The 
transfer of the Supply and Transport to the 
Commander-in-Chief would merely be a first 
step in the direction of transferring all the 
remaining functions of the Military Member 
to the Executive head of the Army. If I were 
to acquiesce in the present proposal we should 
have no logical reason for refusing to make 
over to the Commander-in-Chief control of the 
whole administrative Department.”
Ampthill assumed that it was an axiomatic principle in army 
affairs that ’’the Executive and Administrative should be 
sharply divided. .♦”, and having no knowledge of Brodrick and 
Kitchener's secret communications, he stuck to that principle 
He further pointed out that Kitchener was so desperately 
keen on the subject, that he referred to it on every possible 
occasion, ’’and he even dragged it in the other day on some 
papers relating to the diseases of camels.” But the crisis 
which Ampthill sought most to avert, that of Kitchener's 
resignation, occurred four months later over a minor in­
fringement of discipline.
1. Ampthill to Brodrick, 9 June 1904, Ampthill MSS 233/37*
Kitchener had, for the moment, more serious problems. 
His immediate preoccupation was to obtain information regard­
ing Russian railroad building in Afghanistan* In 1905 he had 
predicted that it would take approximately three years for 
the Russians to construct a double line of railway, by which 
they would then "be rapping at our door . *. and if in the
meantime we have done nothing we shall deservedly go to the 
1wall*" Less than a year later he received reports that con­
struction had been considerably speeded up, and that the 
Russians were making provision to feed their troops along 
the way: "The Orenburg-Tashkent line will be open in June 
and they are constructing sidings and places reported to
p
give 2000 men a hot meal at certain intervals." Kitchener 
was convinced that an Anglo-Afghan war was imminent, and 
fearing an outbreak of hostilities at any moment, he accord­
ingly made frantic efforts to convince both the Indian Gov- 
ernment and the Home Government of the risks involved should 
the administration of the Indian army break down. Kitchener fs 
determination to see through his duty led to a desperate 
situation in England and in India, and Ampthill confided in 
Brodrick that he was wholly unable to keep the peace between 
Kitchener and Elies:
"I have failed completely ... I rather dread 
what may happen *.. Kitchener .., hints that 
the question is one on which he might have 
to make his resignation depend."5
1. Kitchener to Lady Salisbury, 29 July 1903? Balfour MSS
4-9757 •
2, Kitchener to Roberts, 30 March 1904, Kitchener MSS 30/57/29
3- Ampthill to Brodrick, 16 June 1904, Ampthill MSS 233/37/1•
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The extent of Kitchener rs obsession with the question of 
dual control is shewn by a letter to Roberts dated 30 June 
1904, in which he strongly hinted that if the Home Government 
did not act* and thereby intervene in the internal affairs 
of the Indian army, he would resign.'*" Roberts conveyed that 
message in a letter to the Prime Minister in which he urged 
Balfour at once to induce Curzon to accept the necessary 
changes in Indian army administration; else Curzon delay 
acting indefinitely, Roberts suggested that the Defence Com­
mittee should collectively apply pressure on the Viceroy In 
England•^
Ampthill in the meantime, In response to Brodrick*s 
repeated requests for an official estimate of Kitchener's 
situation, stoutly rejected the idea that Kitchener had just 
cause to resign. Ampthill characterised Kitchener as: 
"scheming at the great constitutional change which will 
abolish the Military Member and make the Commander-in-Chief 
supreme *., without the knowledge of the Secretary of State 
and the Government of India and behind the back of the 
Viceroy*" He too questioned Kitchener's motives: "I am 
afraid that from the first I distrusted his sincerity in 
this matter and It is clear ♦„, that he is bent on the design 
of abolishing the Military Member." In an effort to meet
1. Kitchener to Roberts, 30 June 1904. enc. in Roberts to 
Balfour, 19 July 1904, Balfour MSS 49725•
2. Roberts to Balfour, 19 July 1904, Ibid.
3* Ampthill to Brodrick, 7 July 1904, Ampthill MSS 233/37/1*
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Kitchener half way, Ampthill s\iggested two alternatives, 
short of dropping the matter altogether. He asked that 
either Kitchener would wait for a decision to be made by 
Curzon on his return to India, or alternately accept the 
compromise proposed by the Military Member that the depart­
ments of Supply and Transport should be transferred from the 
Military Member to the Commander-in-Chief. He informed 
Kitchener of the difficulty he faced:
11.,, It is sufficiently evident that our 
Colleagues are not prepared to accept the 
radical change which you propose although 
they have considered it with a good deal of 
sympathy with your views ,.. even if we were 
to recommend your proposal to the Home Gov­
ernment it would be seriously prejudiced by 
the fact that such a momentous question had 
been raised during my temporary tenure of 
office ...u
Ampthill pointedly gave consideration to the position of the 
Military Member, Elies:
"His long Indian experience and familiarity 
with the administrative side of the question 
oblige me to attach very great weight to his 
opinion *,. I am unable to tesist the con­
clusion that there is no justification for 
the great constitutional change which you 
propose.
On 26 July Kitchener spent two hours discussing the matter 
with Ampthill, At that meeting he told Ampthill that he was 
unable to modify his views and unwilling to agree to any 
postponement, with the result that both parties, Ampthill 
and Elies in seeking some sort of a compromise, were now
1. Ampthill to Kitchener, 24 July 1904, Ampthill MSS 233/37/1
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1disappointed.
Meanwhile fresh difficulties arose over the appoint­
ment of General J.R.L. Macdonald as escort to Younghusband1s 
Mission to Tibet and this situation served to illustrate one 
of the problems which plagued Britain1s Imperial administra­
tion throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries, Curzon 
had written:
1 On the one hand, the Mission is a political 
Mission, and Younghusband, not without reason, 
claims supreme control♦ On the other hand, 
the advance is in a sense a military operation, 
or, at any rate, may become so at any moment, 
if the Tibetans attack,"
Younghusband and Curzon were attached by strong bonds of
friendship, while Macdonald, Kitchener's appointee and
fellow-Sapper, had been personally selected by the Indian
Commander-in-Chief *
,fYounghusband is a little sensitive about his 
personal prerogative, and thinks that Mac­
donald imperfectly recognises the diplomatic 
character and object of the entire proceedings 
.., the situation is one that presents itself 
in almost every frontier war in India ..*"2
The fact that Macdonald lacked courage and was not fit to 
command the small force sent to Lhasa, "and had to be kicked 
along all the way", grievously embarrassed Kitchener, espec­
ially when Elies and Ampthill suggested that he be immediately 
recalled, to which Kitchener reluctantly agreed. In
1, Bee Ampthill to Elies, 2? July 1904, Ampthill MSS 253/34/1*
2. Curzon to Brodrick, 51 March 1904, Midleton MSS 50075*
3* Ampthill to Elies, 4 September 1904, Ampthill MSS 253/54/2.
describing bis dilemma in a letter to Brodrick, extracts of 
which were sent to Curzon, Ampthill wrote: "Kitchener ... 
[and] Elies rise up in arms and deliver a violent counter­
attack on Younghusband", and it fell to Ampthill to attempt 
to protect Younghusband and "resist their schemes for
i
'breaking1 him," These circumstances moreover produced 
friction, for "Kitchener ... strongly resents any aspersions 
cast on General Macdonald, who is the man of his own choice, 
and he has tried more than once to get the supreme command 
of the Mission for him*.."^
While Ampthill struggled to achieve some kind of 
compromise between Kitchener and Elies over the question of 
Supply and Transport, Kitchener had embarked upon a three 
weeks1 tour in August-September. He had received additional 
information regarding the Russian railroad build-up along 
the borders of Afghanistan and the Russian colossus, with 
its visions of inexhaustible hordes of Cossacks pouring in 
overwhelming numbers upon Afghanistan exercised the greatest 
dread in Kitchener’s mind. Before he went on tour, he had 
prepared his ’Redistribution Scheme’, and telegraphed in
1# Ampthill to Curzon, 23 August 1904.
2. Ibid., 6 September 1904, extract enc. Ampthill to Brod­
rick, 5 September 1904. See also Eleming, op.cit., for 
the best account of Macdonald's early career and the sub­
sequent problem which he created for Younghusband and the 
Indian Government, pp.105-112,
3* rRedistribution Scheme' subsequently emerging as "Scheme 
for the re-distribution of the Army in India, and prepara­
tion of the Army in India for war", n.d. December 1904. 
C.I.D. Records 6/2/58D.
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advance to the Government of India claiming that such an 
arrangement provided the only possible means to resist the 
gigantic resources of Russian armies soon to he set in 
motion, once the railways in Central Asia were completed. 
Kitchener cut short his holiday and returned to Simla on 6 
September where he learned that his proposals were being 
discussed. Because pressure from the local Governments 
in India was brought to bear upon Ampthill to reduce Kit­
chener1 s Reorganisation Scheme to 8 Divisions, the remaining 
5 extra battalions needed to form the ninth, had to be pro­
vided from Britain, causing delay. Ampthill did everything 
in his power to facilitate progress of Kitchenerfs scheme, 
but inevitably it was subject to some criticism and further 
delay on its way through India’s administrative machinery* 
Thanking Kitchener for his trouble in sending along a copy 
urging the immediate adoption of the Scheme, Ampthill in­
cautiously observed:
”1 must wait to hear what the Military Depart­
ment have to say..,
Kitchener thereupon composed a private letter to the Secre­
tary of State (which he despatched a week later) reiterating 
his discontent:
”*.. I fear you fail to realise that under the 
existing system of dual control ... we are 
both powerless .., though ... Ampthill is 
most anxious to push things forward, the
1. Ampthill to Kitchener, 15 September 1904.
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'baboo dept, ' will not and cannot be made 
to move .*, The dual control of the Army 
out here is fatal to efficiency or economy 
... life is hardly worth living with all 
the worries caused "by the M,D.nJ-
Meanwhile, Kitchener had given his agent in London, 
Colonel Mullaly (1860-1932), specific orders to apply 
pressure upon Roberts, Brodrick, Balfour and Lady Salisbury 
with regard to his position in India and what he termed the 
"xnt^rnational procrastination1' of the Military Department, 
Mullaly described Kitchener as "heartily disgusted with his 
powerlessness", and told Lady Salisbury that he would 
resign, "-unless some pressure can be brought from home to
p
settle the matter,,•" With Curzon off the scene, events in 
India which had been rapidly approaching a crisis, came to 
a head in September,
On 23 September Ampthill received a letter from 
Kitchener tendering his resignation. It was occasioned by 
an incident quite out of proportion to the other issues con­
fronting the Home and the Indian Governments 0 The Military 
Department had cancelled an order regarding a Volunteer 
Adjutant, Captain Swan of the Nilgiri Volunteers. Kitchener
1. Kitchener to Brodrick, 21 September 1904*, Kitchener MSS 
30/57/22,
2. Mullaly to Lady Salisbury, 25 August 1904-, Balfour MSS 
4*9757» Mullaly, later Major-General Sir Herbert Mullaly, 
was Secretary of Military Department (1902-3); Quarter­
master-General (1903-6); and a strong partisan of 
Kitchener1s cause.
considered that this seriously impaired his authority;
"In these circumstances feeling I can no 
longer he responsible for discipline in the 
Army I have the honour to place this my 
resignation of the post of Gommander-in- 
Ghief in Your Excellency’s hands. I am in­
forming the Secretary of State for War of 
my action in this matter,
That momentous decision, coupled with the announce­
ment of the postponement of Gurzon's return to India, con-
2stituted for Ampthill "a serious public crisis". He implored 
Kitchener to withdraw his resignation promising him a full 
hearing. Ampthill of course was fully aware that the real 
motive lay in the system of Indian military administration 
to which Kitchener was so implacably opposed. In begging 
Kitchener to reconsider his resignation, Ampthill telegraphed 
Brodrick that;
"He evidently wrote the letter tendering his 
resignation in a fit of childish temper 
because we did not accept his opinion in 
Gouncil on a point in the Re-Organisation 
Scheme, for in all matters which concern 
the Army he claims to be regarded as in- 
fallible."?
Ihe real difficulty lay, in Kitchener’s words, in the organ­
isation of the Army:
"Under the present system of dual control of 
the Army in India, the Military Department, 
and not the Gommander-in-Chief, is practically
1, Kitchener to Ampthill, 23 September 1904, Ampthill MSS 
233/3V2.
2. Ampthill to Kitchener, 23 September 1904, Ibid..
3* Ampthill to Brodrick, lelegram, 24 September”1904, 
Ampthill MSS 233/4-4
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the principal military advisor to the Vice­
roy as well as the authority that transmits 
the Viceroy4s personal orders or issues 
orders in his name to the Commander-in-Chief 
• *. Thus it is quite evident that the Military 
Department can themselves at any time render 
the position of any Gommander-in-Chief an 
impossible one *"I
Kitchener agreed however not to take any further 
!thasty action and will not allow my resignation to become
public in any way ,, * I want a short time to consider my
2position* * *" * He arranged to meet Ampthill on the afternoon 
of 26 September to discuss what he might reasonably expect 
in the way of a compromise from the Government at home* In 
the meantime Brodrick telegraphed a significant message to 
be conveyed to Kitchener:
".•• inform Lord Kitchener from me as Secre­
tary of State that the fullest consideration 
will be given to any cause of complaint he 
may have against any other Department; that 
this is the first official intimation I have 
had from him of his finding any difficulty 
in his position as Commander-in-Chief and 
that I appeal to him most earnestly not to 
allow his proposed action to become public 
before full time has been given for consid­
eration of the difficulty which has arisen 
and of his relations with the Military 
Department [particularly] in view of the 
reorganization of the Indian Army on which 
we are engaged on his initiative and the 
state of our relations with Russia."*
1. Kitchener to Ampthill, 24 September 1904, Ampthill MSS
233/34/2*
2* Ibid., 25 September 1904*
3* Brodrick to Ampthill, 25 September 1904, Telegram, 
Ampthill MSS 233/44
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These latter considerations were of crucial importance to 
the Home Government as we shall see, Ampthill promptly let 
Kitchener know his views;
"I know that you wished to urge the abolition 
of the office of Military Member when you 
first came out to India but I understood that 
you had since given up that idea and had 
resolved at least to complete your own term 
of office under the present system even if 
you decided to press for a change later on,"
He pointed out the discrepancy between Kitchener's original
reason for resigning, a disciplinary case in which his
authority was superseded by that of the Military Member, and
his later contention that the existing system of Indian
army administration rendered his position impossible;
T1., * you have not yet put your opinions as 
to the constitutional position of the Com- 
mander-in-Chief to the test. If, as it now 
appears, you intend to make your objections 
to that which you call the 'dual control1 of 
the Army the real reason for your resignation, 
surely you ought first of all to state your 
convictions and insist on their being fully 
discussed both here and at home. Then if 
your proposals were not likely to be accepted, 
but then only, would be the occasion for ^
making the issue depend upon your resignation.*."
At that meeting Ampthill e:xplained his dismay at the 
lack of consideration with which Kitchener had chosen his 
time to resign. As Lady Ourzon's illness forced the post­
ponement of Ourzon's return to India Ampthill felt that the 
Government of India should stick together and help one
1* Ampthill to Kitchener, 25 September 1904, Ampthill MSS
253/54/2,
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another: The Commander-in-Chief recognised that difficulty 
but insisted that the Military Department required a thorough 
overhaul and complete re-organisation* Ampthill cabled that 
Kitchener stated he regretted his inability to get along 
with Elies, and considered moreover "that General Elies is 
not a very suitable adviser to the Government of India on 
military matters and hopes that the dual control of the 
Army at present existing in India may be considered by a 
Commission from home or otherwise as Government may decide*" 
Kitchener then informed Ampthill that in deference to Brod­
rick fs wishes he had withdrawn his resignation, but that he 
hoped that if nothing could be done to improve the situation 
in India, he might be allowed to retire as soon as the Home 
Government could spare him* Ampthill shrank from the idea of 
Kitchenerfs resigning while he temporarily filled the post 
of Viceroy for Curzon, accordingly he surrendered uncondit­
ionally to Kitchener and agreed to make every effort to 
examine fully the question of the "dual control" of army 
administration as soon as possible, telegraphing Brodrick
p
in that sense on 27 September* Einally he wrote to Kitchener 
on 28 September:
"I have just received a private telegram from 
the Secretary of State in which he acknow­
ledges with very evident relief the receipt 
of the telegram which we agreed upon together
1. Ampthill to Brodrick, Telegram, 27 September 1904, 
Ampthill MSS 233/44.
2. Ibid*
in regard to the withdrawal of your resigna­
tion. He says - 1Assure Kitchener that I 
will carefully consider his communication 
with the Prime Minister without undue delay,1 "
In threatening resignation, Kitchener rightly guessed 
his cause would he advanced, for that act of "calculated 
impetuosity ... helped to convince Brodrick that the Oom-
p
mander-in-Ohief was indispensable •1 His peremptory action 
forced the issue of Indian army administration upon the 
Cabinet, triggering discontent within Balfour*s Government 
against what was considered Curzon*s arbitrary policy in 
Afghanistan and libet, Brodrick informed Balfour that "... 
if Kitchener resigns and tells his tale, the *if*s & but*s 
of even such a Viceroy as George will not satisfy the 
public.'* Brodrick now strongly questioned the advisability 
of Curzon* s returning to India, pointing out the fact that 
as the Viceroy's health was broken and Lady Curzon seriously 
ill, Curzon "had lost all keenness about returning to
tL
India*" He suggested that matters for the moment rest "in 
solution", for Elies, the Military Member, was soon to 
retire, at the end of his normal term of office.^ But one 
incident decisively changed the course of events precipitat­
ing close investigation on the part of the Home Government 
in matters connected with Indian army administration.
1. Ampthill to Kitchener, 28 September 1904-, Ampthill MSS 233/ 
34-/2*
2* Magnus, Kitchener, p,214-.
3. Brodrick -bo Balfour, 5 October 1904*, Balfour MSS 4-9721.
4-. Ibid *, 22 September 1904-,
5. Brodrick to Balfour, 5 October, Ibid.
On the night of 21 October 1904-, the Russian Baltic 
fleet steaming past the Dogger Bank on its way to the Far 
East mistook a Hull trawling fleet for Japanese torpedo 
boats. Using rapid-firing guns their Admiral, Rozhdestvensky 
sank a British trawler killing the captain and third hand 
and made no attempt to proffer assistance to the survivors. 
Feeling in England was greatly inflamed and the incident 
brought Britain and Russia periously close to war.1 In India 
Kitchener feared the worst. He fully expected that the 
Russians would throw an army of half-a-million men against
p
the Afghan frontier. Ampthill informed Curzon;
"There can be no doubt that the Russians mean 
to fight us as soon as they can get a conven­
ient opportunity, for the great military 
preparations in Trans-Caspia can have no 
other object."^
While the Government of India were told to make ready for
mobilisation, discussions were opened in the Cabinet and
Defence Committee in London, and the Home, Channel and
Mediterranean fleets were given orders to prepare for action
Admiral Fisher, the First Sea Lord, was dismayed to learn
that the Russians might invade India from Afghanistan, thus
cancelling out Britain1s naval superiority: "That N-W
Frontier of India is the bugbear which has possessed the
whole lot of our present rulers! and there is no 1 advocate
1. Dugdale, B., Arthur James Balfour, vol.I, pp.384— 5.
2. Minute by Kitchener, 7 October 1904-, enc. Ampthill to 
Curzon, 19 October 1904-.
5. Ampthill to Curzon, 3 November 1904-.
of the Devil1 to plead the other side*"**" Fisher told his 
wife (1 November 1904):
"I have been with the P.M. all day. It has 
nearly been war again. Very near indeed i^ 
but the Russians have climbed down...1'^
At a time when such large-scale military preparation 
was in progress it was virtually impossible for the Home 
Government to contemplate Kitchener's resignation. British 
public opinion remained greatly inflamed by the Russian 
outrage, and soldiers in England and in India never averted 
their eyes from Russian movements in Central Asia. It was 
obvious that the protection of the Indian frontier was pre­
dominantly a question of supply and transport; Victory could 
be achieved, it was felt, by whichever^the two armies was 
better able to mass troops at the decisive spot at the 
critical moment, and then keep them supplied; success more­
over turned on rapidity of transport. England was on the 
threshold of hostilities with her traditional enemy and 
even Curzon conceded:
"We are on the brink of war with Russia. We 
all hope it may be avoided, but the national 
honour is at stake."3
The Dogger Bank Incident acted on nerves already 
badly frayed in a Cabinet preoccupied with intestine strife
1. Fisher to Esher, 17 June 1904; Harder, A.J., Fear God and 
Dread Nought, vol.I, p.319*
2. Fisher to Lady Fisher, 1 November 1904; Marder, Ibid.,
II p.47« ----
3* Curzon to Ampthill, 28 October 1904.
and deep concern over the outcome of the Russo-Japanese con­
flict. Though the dispute was referred to arbitration and 
public indignation allayed, confidence in Curzon waned while 
the position of the Commander-In-Chief was enhanced. Brodrick 
now moved in active support for Kitchener's schemes in the 
influential quarters of the Cabinet and informed him:
"I will see that all which is possible is done 
to smoothe the working of the Departments at 
Simla",
promising that forthwith the matter would be fully discussed 
by the Cabinet and that they would rely solely upon Kitchen­
er's judgement in matters connected with Indian defence* That
1was to undermine the Viceroy's position*
'The Great Game* in Asia was now shattered by a
crisis which very nearly precipitated open hostilities.
2
Mention has been made in an earlier Chapter that in the 
aftermath of the Boer War though ministers might be blind 
in their choice of a policy for India they realised quite 
clearly their disinclinations. Moreover both Balfour and
Brodrick in their efforts to try and bring about greater 
cohesion and harmony in the conduct ot Imperial councils, 
did so with the Indian Government in singularly unorthodox 
ways.
1. Bee Brodrick to Kitchener, 23 October 1904, Kitchener 
MBS 30/57/22.
2, Chapter III* j^*
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Always Tainting and hedging at the formulation of 
Curzon’s policy in India, the Home Government could never 
bring itself to check it at its source* They were merely 
content to apply hampering tactics once events were set in 
motion* As the Viceroy had himself earlier remarked, in 
place of a policy of drift the man with forthright ideas was 
"regarded with much suspicion, not to say alarm; the hands 
of most men are against him and there is a general struggle
i
to reduce him to impotence*" The autumn of 1904 marked the
flood of Cabinet opposition and we find Brodrick excusing
himself by referring to a most distasteful subject, namely
"... what you consider is the growing tendency to dictate
India’s foreign policy from home. Is it not true that what
India does in Afghanistan, Persia, Tibet, or on the Chinese
Frontier, has become greatly more the concern of the Foreign
Office than it was 10 or 20 years ago? Russia’s railways,
Persia’s difficulties, China’s decrepitude, all seem to me
2
to have contributed to this," But Brodrick's anxiety was
of
fear, less of Russia than^the impact of Curzon’s policy in 
India on Balfour's parliamentary position. This anxiety 
was further deepened by Eitchener’s relations with the 
Government of India.
1, Curzon to G.J. Goschen, 11 October 1900.
2. Brodrick to Curzon, 24 October 1904.
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In forming his opinions Brodrick openly misapprehended 
the motives underlying Curzon*s conduct of India*s external 
relations, evident in the following letter to Ampthill:
"Bor your private eye, and not for transmission 
to Curzon ... the truth is that Curzon*s whole 
attitude about [the Tibetan Mission] and about 
Afghanistan frightened the Cabinet to death,..
I believe that Gurzon would have declared a 
protectorate.over Tibet without a moment's 
hesitation."
Anxious to assist Kitchener in his schemes for the defence 
of India Brodrick thus read the worst in the Viceroy*s 
political motives. Had Brodrick taken the trouble to examine 
more closely Curzon's correspondence with his predecessor 
he might have avoided that conclusion with its condemnation 
and censure. In 1901 Curzon had written:
"As a student of Russian aspirations and 
methods for fifteen years, I assert with 
confidence - what I do not think any of her 
statesmen would deny - that her ultimate 
ambition is the domination of Asia*1
In the absence of any intitiative from London in the inter­
vening years Curzon accordingly felt compelled to resist 
Russian ambitions by defending India from these "minor
2encroachments which are only a part of the larger plan."
1. Brodrick to Ampthill, 3 February 1905? Ampthill MBS 233/11t
2, Minute on Russian ambitions in East Persia, 28 October 
1901; see Lamb, op.cit,, po24-0.
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But lie remained emphatically opposed to the idea of annexa­
tion of Tibet, and he told Hamilton:
"It would be madness for us to cross the 
Himalayas and occupy it* But it is important 
that no one else should seize it; and that 
it should be turned into a sort of buffer 
between the Indian and Russian Empires. If 
Russia were to come down to the big mountains 
she would at once begin intriguing with Fepal; 
and we should have a second Afghanistan on the 
north."1
Brodrick's qualifications for pronouncing on Curzon1 s 
policy remain obscure; his previous experience was limited 
to the War Office and he merely dismissed Curzon as a 
bellicose autocrat, comparing his Viceroyalty "to that of 
Louis XIV - TL'etat c'est moi1."^ Yet Curzonfs diagnosis 
of the expansion of Imperial Russia is worthy of more careful 
consideration. He had in fact spent a third of his life 
"endeavouring to understand Russia and her policy • • * I have 
gone through the phase, through which everyone else has 
passed, of wondering why we could not make friends with 
Russia and ... I have come to the conclusion that It is 
impracticable for two reasons: (a) Russia has all the cards 
in her hand (geographical, strategical and political), and 
we have none: (b) the Russian Statesmen are such incurable 
liars. I have now followed the careers of at least four: 
Griers, Lobanoff, Mouravieff, Lamsdorff* They all lied, and
1* Curzon to Hamilton, 11 June 1901.
2. Brodrick to Ampthill, 8 December 1904, Ampthill HSS 233/11*
lied shamelessly. No bargain was sacred to them; they held 
by no compact. The Emperor is no check at all. He is a well- 
meaning figurehead in the background, sometimes brought in 
when really wanted, more frequently ignored. T*^  By 1904 the
Cabinet had successfully overthrown Curzon*s policy in their
censure of Younghusband1 s actions in Tibet. Brodrick was now 
on the brink of precipitating the final crisis with Curzon 
over a more personal and less Imperial question - interven­
tion in the question of Indian army administration. He told
Ampthill:
!,the trouble between him and Kitchener must 
now come to a head ... My Council here will 
go with Kitchener as against Curzons Lord 
Roberts on the other hand, supports Curzon: 
the Prime Minister is for Kitchener * My 
mind is still open,.."2
The latter part of that statement however must be qualified
by evidence belonging to a subsequent part of this thesis.
1, Curzon to Selborne, First Lord of the Admiralty, 29 May 
1901.
2, Brodrick to Ampthill, 17 March 1905? Ampthill MSS 235/11*
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CHAP1ER V
1HE STRUGGLE OYER ARMY ABMimSlRAlION, Part IX 
(1) The Arrangement with Balfour's Ministry
In early August, 1904, Curzon* s attention was drawn 
to the question of Kitchener!s position in India, which 
excited warm controversy in the coming months. On 4 August, 
at Balfour1 s room in the House of Commons, Curzon was chal­
lenged by Godley, Lee-Warner, Brodrick and the Prime Minister 
on the need for changes in India *s system of military admin­
istration; Roberts, who was also present, defended that 
system. Brodrick*s subsequent action, revived, in its 
acutest form, the controversy between the Viceroy and the 
Commander-in-Chief over the best method of achieving these 
changes *
Curzon*s tempei^ament was not, by nature, adaptable. 
His unbending pride, his rebelliousness, his impatience at 
checks and his uncompromising spirit merely imported personal 
distress into a difficult situation, Moreover the intrusion 
of such personal emotions created much tension, without 
facilitating agreement, for in fact It was impossible for 
Curzon to view the question with detachment. The whole human 
episode struck him as slightly disreputable. It would never 
have occurred to him to concede the point; on the contrary 
his view was that his friends had committed the unforgiv^able
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sin of going over to the other side. On the other hand 
Curzon's friends, especially Balfour and Brodrick and to 
some extent Godley, felt committed to the Viceroy "by affec­
tion and ties of a life-long intimacy and a mutual knowledge 
of his weaknesses and strength* In that connection they felt 
that a special part had to he performed* But in that capacity,
their role became increasingly distasteful and it was played
1
half-heartedly *
While appreciative of Gurzon's talents it was not 
unnatural for ministers to resent feeling that the Viceroy's 
policies were so decided as hardly to admit opposite opinion* 
But they were most reluctant to show that they meant what 
they said or to express what they felt. (That ambiance was 
born of distaste in interfering in matters of purely internal 
Indian administration and legitimate divergence arose over
whether the composition of the Viceroy's Council was an 
Indian or Imperial issue. Thus in the subsequent arrangement 
with Balfour’s ministry what was said was often the opposite 
of what was intended - the Home Government subordinating 
most issues to Kitchenex‘!s main purpose in India, dismissing 
the Viceroy's criticisms as irrelevant. That object had 
unforeseen consequences for ministers collectively responsi­
ble to the Indian Empire, though it was intended to stave 
off schism and internal dissentsdon in India. In the meantime
1. See Dugdale, op.cit., I, pp.392-3.
as part of its policy of placating the protagonists and in 
order to hasten some working compromise (though Brodrick 
had effected the transfer of the departments of supply and 
transport to the Commander-In-Chief to avoid further rupture 
between Ampthill and Kitchener) Curzon was asked to compose 
a statement explaining his position until such time as the 
Government could take action.
The stage was now set for the second act of an epic 
struggle. The Viceroy recorded his views in a memorandum 
submitted to the Home Government on 2 November. In that 
document, Curzon opposed making Kitchener the sole represen­
tative of Indian military administration for seven reasons: 
(1) no one man could possibly combine the executive and 
administrative functions of the Indian army; (2) the Viceroy 
needed immediate and experienced advice from the Commander- 
in-Chief at all times; (3) as there was no public outcry 
whatever demanding a change in India, any alteration would 
have to be imposed from without in default of local Indian 
opinion and authority; (4) past investigations had pronounced 
against the concentration of powers under the exclusive 
control of the Commander-in-Chief; (3) the Commander-in- 
Chlef was claiming immunity from criticism; (6) in a state 
of emergency such as during xtfar, the system would come to a 
standstill and break down, as the functioning of the Govern­
ment under a civilian head could not be constantly advised
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by the Commander-in-Chief; (7) finally, Curzon warned against
tampering with Indian military administration stating his
conviction that "any such change will he both uncalled for
and unwise *.. and 0 • * break down, and we should find that
we had thrown our Indian administration into the crucible
and re-constituted it, only to have to melt it down once
1more, and effect some fresh combination*1 In sum, Curzon 
unhesitatingly condemned experimentation with the Indian 
army*
Balfourl& response was immediate; he was determined 
to decide the issue once and for all* The next day, 3 
November, he informed Curzon:
"...if no step be taken; if no commission be 
appointed to reconsider the military organisa­
tion in relation to the changed circumstances 
of India; if Kitchener thereupon resigns; and 
if, to crown all, we became involved in the 
serious hostilities with Russia, I believe 
that both at home and in India an impossible 
situation would be created,"2
In those circumstances the Home Government now decided to
bring matters to a head and Curzon was asked to dine alone
with the Prime Minister on 9 November 1904, at which time
they "threshed out the various knotty problems lying before
us."5
1* Note on the Military Administration of the Government of 
India, 2 November 1904, Cabinet Records, 37/72/133, 1904* 
2, Balfour to Curzon, 3 November 1904*
3* Curzon to Ampthill, 10 November 1904.
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At this meeting, Curzon proposed two courses of 
action. The Government might enquire over the heads of his 
Council and send out a Commission of investigation, or 
Curzon could undertake that responsibility from India, In 
either case he was willing to give Kitchener's arguments a 
hearing, once Balfour decided which procedure was to he 
adopted, Balfour asked Curzon for his own opinion and on the 
next day informed Brodrick:
11... he suggested and I gladly accepted the 
suggestion - that the best course would be 
for us to send out, very shortly, a Despatch 
to the Indian Government, saying that we 
understood that Lord Kitchener was dissatis­
fied with the existing organisation of the 
Headquarters staff of the Indian Army, and 
especially with the position of the Commander- 
in-Chief, and begging the Indian Government 
to look into it ... They would then embody 
their views in a Despatch, which would then 
be sent home, and would be considered by the 
British Government; after which it would be 
proper, and constitutional, that the latter, 
if dissatisfied, should appoint a Commission 
of Investigation,
Curzon had promised to investigate Kitchener's 
position in India in a constitutional and official way, and 
he assumed that Kitchener would put his case to the Viceroy's 
Council and accordingly abide by the verdict of that body.
Bor their part, the Government were under the impression 
that the Viceroy would only remain in India for six months, 
(until the annual Indian Budget Debate in March 1905) and
1. Balfour to Brodrick, 10 November 1904, Balfour MBS 49721,
263
Balfour wrote:
"My hope now Is that he will give up his 
appointment in April , and that the new Vice­
roy will take Indian War Office Reform in 
hand *"l
There for the moment the matter rested,
Curzon sailed for India on 24- November, and arrived
in Bombay on 9 December, His decision to return was a mistake.
Before reaching Calcutta on 15 December, where he resumed
his Viceroyalty after an absence of seven months, he addressed
the Bombay Municipality: "The question may, perhaps, be
asked why in these circumstances I should have come back at
all?". He e:xplained: "India to me is ‘Duty1 All servants
of Government ,.. are also the servants of duty. The Viceroy
p
himself is the slave of duty as well as its captain," Never­
theless, his future very much depended on Mary Curzonfs 
health and before he left England he deposited two code words 
with her doctors: one word, which eventually was sent, meant 
that Lady Curzon could safely go back to India; the other 
indicated the inadvisability of doing so. Much hung on the 
choice between them, "Had the code word deprecating Lady 
Cursonrs journey been sent", he later told Sir George Arthur, 
"I should have come home at the earliest moment without 
fulfilling my term of office, Selborne would have succeeded
1. Balfour to Lady Salsibury, 4- October 1904-, Balfour MBS 
4-9757*
2, Raleigh, op«clt., pp.62-5.*
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me, I should have had no controversy with Kitchener . . • and
1above all my wife would, humanly speaking, he still alive.” 
Had Curzon relinquished office it is gust possible that his 
Government would have avoided the deeply resented partition 
of Bengal with its bitter aftermath of Swadeshi and resurgent 
nationalism. Furthermore, the struggle with Kitchener would 
have been averted, and Curzon1s reforms might well have
2ranked him as one of India *s most constructive statesmen.
On 25 January 1905, Curzon received information 
stating that the doctors not only permitted Lady Curzon to 
travel, but considered that the voyage to India would be 
beneficial for her. Prom that date Curzon determined to 
remain on in India. Accordingly, the next day he explained 
his reasons to the Prime Minister (in a letter which for 
some reason took nearly eight weeks to reach London), namely, 
that he no longer felt the necessity to resign owing to 
Mary's poor health.
The Despatch of 2 December from the Secretary of 
State to the Government of India reached India by the same 
mailship as the Viceroy* In it the Home Government requested 
the views of Curzon’s Government on the present system of 
control over the affairs of the Army in India, and stated
1. Arthur, G., A Septuagenarian’s Scrap Book, p*107*
2. See Reed, S„7^e~Ina:iVr"HewrTB9%lVj^, pp.91-2,
3« Curzon to Balfour,“ ‘26 Danuary Iyu3 •
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a number of facts in addition to raising several questions. 
Was the system capable of dealing with general mobilisation 
for war? Gould it supply the requirements of the army in the 
actual conduct of operations? Was it efficient? Brodrick 
laid particular emphasis on the danger of complications 
arising from the completion of Russia's strategic railways 
in Central Asia directed towards India's north-west frontier 
along the boundary of Afghanistan. If the Indian army were 
to be effectively mobilised, the business of providing equip­
ment and supplies, along with proper transport, was vital, 
"and any conditions which might hamper efficiency or cause 
duplication of work and delay, or create a conflict of 
authority as to whether expenditure deemed necessary by one 
Department and not equally necessary by another, should be
incurred or not, would react most prejudicially on the con-
1duct of the campaign..." Brodrick concluded his Despatch by 
asserting:
"These facts ,.. constitute a prima facie 
case for a review of the present system. It 
is desirable to ascertain whether the two 
Departments existing side by side are working 
harmoniously, and are fully in touch with 
each other..."
Before recording the official views on the Despatch, several 
incidents during Cursor's holiday must be mentioned which 
reveal that Kitchener had no intention of being deterred from
1. See Correspondence regarding the Administration of the 
Army''in Tnaia, Od, IToTir^rodrxcST’to*0 Curzon,
W H M w i h m k p iiH  . in -.  ,
5 Decemoer 1904.
prosecuting his plans by any adverse vote in Council* for
although he concurred in adopting the official procedure* he 
was covertly intriguing to forestall any verdict in India by 
action from London. Kitchener had solicited support and 
encouragement from home* especially through Sir Douglas Haig 
(1861-1928)* Inspector-General of Cavalry In India from 1905 
to 1906, Haig was as well a good friend of Esher, and the
latter fs advice was known to be favourably received in the
highest military circles in England. We are able to catch 
glimpses of the way in which the course of events at home 
regarding Indian army reform was moulded in the following 
letter to Haig from Esher:
TI... you need not suppose that I have slackened 
in the interest which I have always taken in 
the efforts which Lord K. and you are taking 
to get things into shape in India. I have seen 
many of Lord K.!s admirable memoranda, and I 
think I know fairly well the merits of the 
case, which I hope he will fight to the finish.
The 'dual* system has received a death blow in
London, and there is no reason why at Simla It
should not meet with a similar fate ... In India, 
you will have great changes, for I doubt George 
Curzon returning. He is such an uncertain sub­
ject for prophecy that one cannot be sure, but 
as in any case he would not have remained beyond 
April [1905] it seems hardly worth your while 
to return in December or January. Anyway, his 
successor has already been designated* One thing 
seems clear to everyone here, including the 
Prime Minister, which is that the days of the 
Government will not be prolonged beyond the 
General Election.!t
1. Esher to Haig, 7 October 1904*; Esher, Journals, II, 
pp.69-70.
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At that time Esher , knowing nothing of Curzon Ts arrangement 
with Balfour* actively enlisted support for Kitchener in 
London*
While Curzon was absent in England Ampthill had the 
greatest difficulty in persuading Kitchener to co-operate 
with him in India. In September Ampthill prepared to make 
over the executive control of Supply and Transport to 
Kitchener*s Army Department, but laboured under no misappre­
hensions as to Kitchenerrs real purpose. Eirmly believing 
that he was not in a position to make a lasting solution to
the problem Ampthill advised Kitchener to present his own
2case to Curzon when he returned* Ampthill told Curzon that 
in the future Kitchener would be much more difficult to deal 
with, knowing as he did that he had considerable support 
from influential circles at home, and that his views on army 
administration were thought to be reasonable and were there- 
fore received with wide sympathy. Ampthill1 s anxiety was 
further heightened by the crisis with Russia over the incident 
at the Dogger Bank in October and when he despatched a 
messenger with the news of the outrage to try and stop 
Kitchener1s train at Summer Hill Station, Kitchener merely 
disregarded the man while "the engine-driver would take no 
notice of his signals in spite of his red livery and
1. Ampthill to Curzon, 6 September 1904.
2* Ampthill to Kitchener, 12 November 1904, Ampthill MSS 
233/34/2.
3. Ampthill to Curzon, 6 September 1904.
1brandislied letter{" When he asked Kitchener to he on hand
to meet the Viceroy in Calcutta on 12 December, Kitchener 
demurred, and it was only with the greatest difficulty that 
he persuaded him to come, after pointing out "that people may 
attribute your absence to disagreement with Lord Curzon 
about the Reorganisation Scheme which would be very unfortun­
ate*"2
On 22 November acting on Brodrick's instructions, 
Ampthill informed Kitchener that the Indian Government would 
undertake an Investigation of army administration, Brodrickfs 
telegram stated:
"In pursuance of the promise conveyed in the 
telegram of 27 September, I am sending after 
consultation with the Prime Minister, a Des­
patch by this mail calling the attention of 
the Indian Government to the relations between 
the Commander-in-Chief and the Military Depart­
ment and to the dual control of the Army in­
volved and requesting the immediate considers-  ^
tion of the position by the Viceroy's Council."*^
Balfour had demanded complete surrender to Kitchener's
request for the transference of supply and transport, to be
carried out before Curzon's return, Though Brodrick kept
Curzon informed generally of these proceedings and the
situation Kitchener was creating in India, he did not
produce the details, owing to Lady Curzon's illness and the
1* Ampthill to Kitchener, 29 October 1904, Ampthill MSS 
233/34/2.
2. Ampthill to Kitchener, 12 November 1904, Ibid.
3. Ampthill to Kitchener, 22 November 1904, enc* copy of 
Telegram, Ibid.., Ampthill MSS 233/34/2.
4. See Balfour "To Brodrick, 3 October 1904, Balfour MSS 
49721.
1
sickening anxiety which, overshadowed the Viceroy. In short,
Brodrick deferred matters for Balfour to resolve, without 
actually showing Curzon the telegrams which had passed 
Between London and India on the question of Kitchener's 
resignation in September* That omission gave rise to confu­
sion. Brodrick telegraphed to Ampthill:
"To show Lord Curzon now private telegrams ..* 
would be an admission that he might have seen 
them while he was in England which he much 
desired, but which, for reasons connected 
with our correspondence, I refused. Unless 
necessary on public grounds, it is undesirable* 
Misunderstanding and friction would certainly 
arise ... I deprecate the proposed action*"2
Kitchener kept up the pressure on the Home Government 
from India. He chaffed constantly at delays and complained 
of the danger in continuing what he conceived to be a 
thoroughly defective system of military administration; he 
regretted that the Home Government were dragging their feet 
and complained to Brodrick:
"I had rather hoped that you would send out 
a Commission to inquire into the whole subject 
011 the spot, but I suppose ... that nothing 
will be done;"
he reiterated his wish to retire:
"If we go to war under the present system I 
can see nothing but disaster ahead ... My 
judgement in the matter may be entirely 
wrong; but if it is, all I ask is that you
1* See Brodrick to Curzon, 3 and 21 October 1904.
2. Brodrick to Ampthill, 6 December 1904, Telegram, Ampthill 
MSS 233/44
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should spare me and let me go; my health 
will not stand the strain much longer...”
In reply to Brodrickfs assurances, Kitchener informed Ampthill
that the matter of Indian army administration was far too
complex for the Viceroy1s Council to consider:
11. *. I feel the majority in the Viceroy and 
Governor-General1 s Council are most unlikely 
to advocate any change in the existing system 
of Army Administration. I therefore trust that 
the Despatch it is proposed to send in pur­
suance of the previous promise, may he with­
held* The question of Army Administration in 
India is one of such a technical nature that 
I had hoped it might have been investigated 
by a Commission. "2
Kitchener, in fact, had not the slightest intention of
allowing his proposals to be officially suppressed by a vote
in Council. While he was successful in completely stampeding
Brodrick and the Cabinet, Roberts remained the great obstacle
in his path and Kitchener now concentrated his fire to bring
Roberts into line; this was not’ easily accomplished.
Brodrick had tipped Kitchener off regarding Roberts 1 
opposition:
"The difficulty lies in the fact that officials 
of almost every degree .., adhere to ... the 
* dual control1 * They are fortified by what 
most people regard as the failure of successive 
attempts to improvise a better system ... Those 
who favour the present Indian system say: ^ave
1* Kitchener to Brodrick, 9 November 1904-, Kitchener MSS 
30/57/22.
2. Kitchener to Ampthill, Telegram, 22 November 1904-, 
Ampthill MBS 233/3V2.
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us from these changes* 1 I have shewn your 
letter in confidence to the Prime Minister,
"but said nothing to anyone else, and he 
wishes the whole situation discussed in the 
Cabinet..."*1
Q?he opposition of Roberts was extremely significant. Roberts 
was the greatest living authority on Indian military affairs. 
He had been Commander-in-Chief in India and in South Africa 
as well as in Britain itself. That experience was a fact 
which in itself exceeded in importance the views of other 
men and militated against tampering with army administration 
in India. He told Kitchener:
nMy reasons for not concurring in the abolition 
of the Military Member are that 1 do not think 
any one man could carry on both duties in a 
thoroughly satisfactory manner .,. Another 
very important point is the desirability of the 
Viceroy having on his Council a soldier on 
whom he could depend for advice on all Indian 
matters,"
Roberts proceeded to explain that most Viceroys sent out to 
India were invariably inexperienced with the Indian army. 
Similarly, should the case arise of a new Commander-in-Chief, 
equally unversed in army administration, a serious situation 
might be created, as any such combination would necessarily 
deprive the Council of a member with intimate knowledge both 
of India and of the army who could tender expert advice.
There was also grave political danger arising from race* When 
Kitchener suggested a scheme for establishing class brigades 
along exclusive lines of race Roberts asserted:
1» Brodrick to Kitchener, 13 October 1904, Kitchener MSS
50/57/22.
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" * ♦* it would "be a serious error* The two 
races are essential to each other, and each 
possesses qualities which the other lacks,*.
It must always he remembered that India is 
not our own country, and that the Natives 
only fight for us because they have faith 
in us and believe in our supremacy.”
Ultimately it would be folly to have inexperienced adminis­
trators meddling with matters which constituted a delicate 
religious balance, for "it would be most unwise to employ 
Brigades composed solely of Mahomedans especially Pathans, 
amongst a fanatical population of co-religionists like that 
of Afghanistan." ^
Though Roberts was under considerable pressure from 
both Brodrick and Kitchener, he reported to Balfour that he 
lamented the fact that Kitchener's attitude was so hostile 
to India's system of army administration:
"His acquaintance with India is very slight, 
he knows little or nothing at all about the 
feelings of the Natives, and does not appear 
to be very well up in the history of the 
Indian army ♦" ^
Roberts was against changing India's system to suit Kitchener, 
though he was more than willing that some kind of immediate 
investigation should be made in order to prevent Kitchener 
from leaving India, for at the bottom of the issue lay 
Kitchener's threat to resign.
Kitchener constantly admonished Roberts for not 
giving him more support:
1. Roberts to Kitchener, 28 December 1904, Kitchener MBS 
30/57/28.
2. Roberts to Balfour, 26 December 1904, Balfour MBS 49725*
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"Brodrick writes to me privately that you do 
not consider any change in the relations 
"between the Military Department and the 
Commander-in-Ghief should take place * *. I 
consider with the Military Department as it 
is, my time is "being wasted out here, 1 can 
practically do nothing*"
Thereupon he played on the Russian scare to emphasise that
point:
n * *. I must say I do not like to think of the 
number of soldier1s lives that would be need­
lessly thrown away if we went to war with 
Russia with our present organization at Head 
Quarters* r^ y opinion is that the dual control 
should be abolished and the Military Depart­
ment with a Chief of Staff should alone rule 
the Army.M
Kitchener then concluded with a strong
hint that the Home Government must act:
"I. feel that time is going on and as 1 do not 
intend to be one of the old officers about 
the clubs in London and as you know have no 
wish to go to the War Office, I shall have 
to start some other work outside the Army 
when I leave India*
Roberts remained unconvinced, He refused to be stampeded* He
admitted that India!s system was one of dual responsibility
and in earlier letters to Kitchener explained that in practice
he never found that he had been prevented from settling
matters pretty much as he desired:
"I found, [he wrote], I had plenty to do with­
out having control of what I called the 
1 spending departments1, and my fear is that 
future Commanders-in-Chief, who may not have 
had your unique experience, might be unable
1, Kitchener to Roberts, 27 November 1904, Kitchener MSS
30/57/29.
to cope with the amount of office worl-c they 
would have to deal with, and, at the same 
time, carry on their inspections in the 
thorough manner that is so essential for the 
efficiency of the Army in India.
Ihat view was subsequently confirmed by Kitchener1s colleague 
and friend, General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien who later main­
tained: "the personal inspection of troops by the Commander-
in-Chief diminished, and his magnetic influence grew small
o
by degrees, and dangerously less.1 Roberts predicted that 
it would be impossible for Kitchener to fill the two offices 
simultaneously, that he would fail and that his successor 
would have an extremely difficult task*^ Events proved that 
Roberts was tragically correct In his prophesy, and the 
Report of the Royal Commission investigating the ill-starred 
campaign in Mesopotamia asserted that "the combination of 
the duties of Commander-in-Chief in India and Military Member 
of Council cannot adequately be performed by any one man in 
time of war."^
Nevertheless Kitchener had successfully compelled 
the home authorities to take up the issue of Indian army 
administration from London and though reluctant to sanction 
change, Roberts agreed to use his position on the Defence 
Committee to ensure Kitchener a hearing. It now remained to
1* Roberts to Kitchener, 19 May 1904, Kitchener MBS 50/57/28.
2. Bmith-Dorrien, op0cit0, p*329*
3* Roberts to Balfour7~56 December 1904, Balfour MSS 49725*
4* Report of the Mesopotamia Commission, Cd. 8610 (July 1917)> 
^ y p 5 fc^ ^ ^ ;^ ^gj^fe^"TIauT:E5^0rganIsation of Indian 
Military Administration1 .
find some agreeable solution to the difficulty. The uncer­
tainty of Curzon's duration of office in India (owing to the 
delay of Curzon's letter mentioned on p.264*) was finally 
dispelled only when Balfour cabled Gurzon asking him (30 
January 1905) to state "whether you propose to return in 
April"; Curzon thereupon replied that to resign would be a 
"desertion of public duty." In those circumstances Brodrick 
proposed an ill-conceived plan which he claimed was a 
‘master-stroke* from Gurzon*s point of view. In point of 
fact the Gommission of enquiry which Brodrick espoused 
widened the gulfi* separating the Government of India and the 
Cabinet *
(3) Brodrick*s Gommission.
On 12 January 1905? to his intense surprise, Gurzon 
received the news that although Brodrick had previously 
agreed that Gurzon* s Council should take up the enquiry, he 
now proposed to send out a Gommission to investigate the 
differences between Kitchener and Elies, The motive of 
this change of front seemed to be Brodrick*s intense anxiety 
to avoid Kitchener*s resignation. Brodrick in seeking some 
more immediate solution to Kitchener's dilemma, had attempted 
to induce Roberts, Godley and Hamilton to go out to India 
and examine the question. Moreover, it was transparent that
1. Balfour to Gurzon, Telegram, 30 January 1905? und Curzon
to Brodrick, 31 January 1905*
it was not for India's sake but for Balfour's tottering 
government that Brodrick made his proposal and he told 
Curzon:
"Their report will carry great weight here, and 
also in Parliament, and, if Kitchener is un­
reasonable, it will be a great stand-by for us.
You have hardly mixed ..♦ enough with people, 
owing to your illness and mourning ... to 
realise that, while the public has chosen to 
entirely forget Lord Roberts' services and 
authority, and mostly ignore the fact that 
Wolseley is alive, ... they are ready to swear 
to almost anything Kitchener says,"l
Brodrick was extremely anxious about the effect that Kitchen­
er's resignation would have on his own reputation, though 
that burden was shared collectively by the whole Cabinet:
"I most urgently hope ,. * that you will see 
your way to accept the solution I suggest, 
and help us to find a way out of our difficulty 
without losing a man who is in many ways at 
this moment essential to the Indian army. "2
An animated telegraphic correspondence ensued.
Not a little of Curzon's increasingly bitter remarks 
derived from the fact that Brodrick was attempting to impose 
a hasty and great administrative change in the internal 
affairs of the Indian government. Satisfied with his agree­
ment with Balfour that the question of army administration 
would be examined by the Viceroy's Council, Curzon strongly 
objected to Brodrickrs new proposal, and to any exceptional 
haste. On 14 January Curzon cabled:
1* Brodrick to Curzon, Telegram, 12 January 1905*
2, Brodrick to Curzon, 12 January 1905*
"Kitchener only handed In his proposal to 
Military Department on 5th January. That 
Department, whose existence is at stake, 
must at least he allowed equal time to state 
its case,"
Curzon added that It was virtually impossible for his Council
to pronounce upon a proposal which would revolutionise the
Indian government without giving them an opportunity of
thoroughly examining the matter first and that he could not
expect a decision before the middle of February, at the
earliest. Brodrick pressed the Issue:
"Please understand that my only wish is to 
avoid question standing over till autumn.
Lord George Hamilton [who was sixty years 
old and unaccustomed to the Indian climate]
.., must be allowed to begin early in March, 
and I am of the opinion that political pros­
pects at home are not favourable to delay.
If we had two months more cold weather it 
would save us both trouble,"2
Curzon jibbed at the suggestion of the Commission:
"It was in order to avoid all such difficulties 
that I suggested to the Prime Minister the 
present procedure „,, if they now desire to 
appoint a Committee without awaiting our 
views, they should do so exclusively on 
their own responsibility. We will loyally 
obey whatever orders you may issue..."3;
Brodrick then explained to the Viceroy what he had 
not earlier revealed, namely that during Curzon1 s illness 
the Home authorities had pledged themselves to Kitchener, As 
Curzonls return to India had been postponed until November,
1, Curzon to Brodrick, Telegram, 14 January 1905*
2, Brodrick to Curzon, Telegram, 16 January 1905*
3, Curzon to Brodrick, Telegram, 1? January 1905*
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the question had remained untouched during the interim:
".. * [the] px*ocedure you propose will make 
it impossible for me to send out the Committee 
this spring ... The Prime Ministerfs pledges 
as to enquiry .* * were given to Lord Kitchener 
in September, but in order that you might be 
able to deal with the Despatch, it was delayed 
as you know., for two months."1
That delay was as unfortunate as it was unavoidable, but it
was clearly not Curzon*s fault* Brodrick resigned himself to
the failure of his proposal and now informed Curzon that
2Hamilton declined to go to India* He then sat down and 
composed a long explanation to Curzon attempting to explain 
(and justify) the position that the Government were in* He 
mentioned the meeting held in Balfour*s room in the House of 
Commons on 4 August 1904, at which Curzon and Roberts con­
tended with Godley, Lee-Warner, Brodrick and Balfour against 
any change in India!s administrative system* Brodrick 
asserted:
"Balfour spoke to me most seriously after that 
meeting #.• he spent a long time in trying to 
devise some means by which the Army might not 
be paralysed ... by the continuance of the 
divided administration at Simla ... It was 
agreed in consequence that the Supply and 
Transport changes should be made over *.."
Brodrick proceeded to expatiate on the merits of Kitchener*s
grievance, pointing out that he and Balfour were pledged to
the decision to hold an enquiry if they were to avoid
Kitchener*s resignation* But purely from a personal regard
1* Brodrick to Curzon, Telegram, 18 January 1905.
2* Brodrick to Gurzon, Telegram* 20 January 1905.
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for the Viceroy the Government had deferred the question 
until such time (9 November) as Cur son was in a position to 
discuss it. There the matter stood; hut it was the concluding
the Home Government had allowed the;
by the threat of Kitchener* s resignation:
"What I have been endeavouring to do in the 
last three days is to release myself from a 
position of great difficulty * The Prime 
Minister has declared more than once that he 
is not prepared to go to war with Eussia with 
the present divided system of control at Simla."
But Curzon legitimately repudiated the proposal for
a Commission on two grounds*. Birst, it was inconsistent with 
the agreement made between the Viceroy and Prime Minister on 
9 November 1904-, and secondly he was actively engaged in 
investigating the issue at the time, having duly undertaken 
that responsibility for the Government of India.
Pew agreements could have been more tactlessly dis­
regarded* Why, for instance, had the Viceroy been allowed to 
leave England if His Majesty*s Government were not fully 
prepared to accept the fact that he "disagreed wholly with 
proposals to change our military administration, and it was 
with that knowledge in their possession that I was permitted
p
to return?" What was meant by "pledges" to Kitchener? The
1* Brodrick to Curzon, 20 January 1905*
2. Curzon to Brodrick, Telegram, 18 August 1905.
portion of Brodrick*s letter which
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investigation was, at that date, (January 1905) heing under­
taken* What, again, was implied by Brodrick’s statement con­
cerning the position the Home Government were in? No declara­
tion had "been indicated to the Viceroy# Moreover advantage 
had been taken of his illness to justify keeping him in the 
dark# But Brodrick*s action was not merely open to criticism; 
its significance lay in its revelation of his lack of impar­
tiality in judging the issue. (Six months later we find him 
writing to Ampthill in June 1905? regarding Kitchener:
111 want to hack him in every way * *, and I 
hope the establishment of the new system will 
have an excellent effect*"!
We must now return to the events surrounding the progress 
of Brodrick*s despatch*
(4) Belations with the Oommander-in-Chief*
After Curzon* s return from England, Kitchener had 
several informal meetings with him. During a long conversation 
at Barrackpore at Christmas Kitchener? according to Curzon, 
did not once allude to the subject of army administration. 
Previously, Kitchener had informed the Viceroy that he was 
by no means confident of having formulated any viable scheme 
to replace the Military Department, but was turning over
p
several alternatives which he might soon suggest. On 3 
January Curzon took Kitchener for a drive and "asked him how
1* Brodrick to Ampthill? 9 June 1905? Ampthill MSS 233/1.
2* Curzon to Brodrick, 29 December 1904*
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lie was getting on with, liis constructive proposalst" Kitchener
played his hand extremely well; "He did not exhibit the
faintest symptoms either of being in a hurry or of being
annoyed at delay0" Ihe Viceroy reported that the Commander-
in-Chief had just completed his new scheme, the third he had
submitted in less than two years and entirely different from
any which had preceded it, Curzon described Kitchener as
saying it was "of merit so overpowering that he believed the
whole of his critics and opponents, including the Military
Department, would lay down their arms at once and not attempt
to argue the case* I said I thought this was somewhat
sanguine, but would wait to see this miracle-working produc- 
1tion0" On 1 January, in response to Brodrick*s despatch, 
Kitchener had completed his Note on Indian Army Administra-* 
tion. He considered that the moment had come to make himself 
felt:
"I feel that it is my imperative duty [he wrote], 
to state my conviction that the present system 
is faulty, inefficient and incapable of the 
expansion necessary for a great war in which 
the armed might of the Empire would be engaged 
in a life and death struggle."
The fate of the Empire rested on the abolition of the
Military Department.
"Can we then hesitate any longer to break the 
chains of custom and the tolerance of admitted 
defects which are so strong in India, and 
shall we not reform, while yet we have time 
and opportunity, our ancient and defective 
system of army administration?"2
1. Curzon to Brodrick, 5 January 1905#
2, Correspondence regarding the Administration of the Army 
in India, BncTosure 1 in Kitchener^ No be on Indian
Army A3ministration, 1 January 1905? Cd*2572*
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Gurzon was not in the least impressed.
"I do not know Che wrote], if you are aware ..* 
that the papers which emanate from Kitchener 
are not composed by himself ... he has a great 
gift for collecting round him the few smart 
writers that there are in the army and then 
making them do his work*”
He was at the time greatly annoyed at Kitchener’s methods of 
doing "business, particularly his ability to wheel his sub­
ordinates into line:
"The fact is, of course, that in the army and 
with the prodigious sense of discipline that 
there prevails, no officer of lower rank can 
stand up against the Indian Commander-in-Chief”;
Gurzon was dismayed to learn how Kitchener "drilled them all
into shape" when two general officers appeared at Galcutta,
"wearing a very docile and sheep-like manner, indicating the
final stage of the process by which this victory has been 
1
achieved."
In the meantime Brodrick pressed for a reply to his
Despatch of 2 December in order to .forestall Kitchener from
resigning: "I ask because it appears, from indications that
have reached me from various quarters, that Lord Kitchener
p
is becoming increasingly restless"; that his resignation 
"will certainly be tendered". He had received strong warn­
ings "that we were treading on most dangerous ground if we 
wanted to keep Kitchener. I know you think he flies these 
kites for the purpose of scaring us,.."; Indeed, that was
1. Curzon to Brodrick, 5 January 1905#
2. Brodrick to Gurzon, Telegram, 28 December 1904*
5. Brodrick to Curzon, Telegram, 12 January 1905#
283
precisely what Curzon was thinking* Brodrick confided:
"If 1 thought he would rest satisfied till 
November next, I should be only too glad to 
have an inquiry then* My impression is that, 
whether you stay at Simla through the summer 
... or whether a new Viceroy takes your place, 
Kitchener will not wait till 1906 to have 1 
affairs placed ... on a different footing*1
It was clear that the Home Government were frozen or at
least numbed by Kitchener!s threats, but Curzon, unmoved
merely disregarded them by asserting;
"I am not aware that Kitchener is fretting in 
the manner you describe * * „ You cannot hustle 
the Government of India more than a certain 
degree with a great question of this character; 
neither, if I may venture to say so, would any
undue haste be beneficial to the side to which
I understand you to incline*”2
Eight months later Curzon informed Lansdowne, the Foreign
Secretary:
’Would you, in my position, desire to stay in 
India if Home Government took sides so con­
sistently with your Commander-in-Chief against 
your Colleagues and yourself.*.?”*
The time had come for a showdown and on 12 January Kitchener
and Curzon met to discuss officially how to proceed*
Curzon deluded himself into thinking that Kitchener
was willing to abide the verdict of his Council: following
their meeting on 12 January he explained:
’’Lord Kitchener agrees that it would be unfair 
to expect any decision from our Government at 
the earliest before the middle of February.
We will telegraph its nature, but it is surely
1. Brodrick to Curzon, 20 January 1905.
2. Gurzon to Brodrick, 29 December 1904.
3. Curzon to Lansdowne, Telegram, 8 August 1905*
284
not contemplated that Government will send 
out a Commission “before it has even seen 
Lord Kitchener’s new proposal, which differs 
from any that has yet been put forward, or 
Sir E. Elies' reply, or the opinions of 
Viceroy and his Colleagues,.."
Pointedly refusing to pronounce upon Kitchener's scheme
until the members of his Council were in a position to study
it carefully, Curzon wrote;
"What I am standing up for the whole time are 
not my views as against Kitchener's, but the 
right of the Government of India to enjoy the 
prerogative of the most ordinary criminal by 
being fully heard in the constitutional way 
before sentence is passed*"
Pressure from Brodrick in London did not facilitate 
agreement in India and Curzon wrote:
"I really do not quite understand what the 
dispute is all about, nor can I make out why 
the Government, if they want to send out a 
Commission, will not do It off their own bat,,.
I told the Prime Minister plainly in England 
that there were two ways of doing the thing: 
one by consulting us, the other by enquiring 
over our heads♦ He decided to adopt the former 
but you now appear to desire to combine the 
features of both procedures, whereas they 
seem to me to be irreconcilable."2
This was the crux of the opposition to the Home Government's
proposal to send out a Commission* But the reasoning behind
the Government's decision Is tacitly clear from a letter
which Balfour sent to Brodrick;
"Lord Roberts backed by several letters I have 
seen from Kitchener says this last [delay]
1. Curzon to Brodrick, Telegram, 14 January 1905*
2, Curzon to Brodrick, 19 January 1905-
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will certainly "bring about his resignation, ”
Brodrick!s action then was a reaction on the part of Balfour1 
unstable Government, To them, Kitchener*s resignation in 
September overshadowed all other Ixidian issues0 It was a 
slow-fused time bomb likely to explode at any moment9 and 
produce disastrous consequences,
Tension in India mounted with the added uncertainty
of the Home Government's future * If the Government altered
India's administrative system, fell from power, and then if
Kitchener left India after the Indian Government had adopted
his proposals, a dangerous situation would be created. ”My
own belief” Curzon wrote, ”is that should the Government
fall and the other party take your place, and Kitchener be
offered the place of Secretary of State for War, he would,
2tinder certain conditions, most decidedly accept.” While 
Curzon was alarmed by these thoughts Kitchener, for his part 
was indeed flirting with the idea of becoming Minister for 
War under a Liberal Government, and that prospect excited 
the liveliest dread among Balfour's personal advisers in 
London* J.S. Sandars, his private secretary, on 17 January 
wrote t
”St. John [Brodrick] says, according to Godley, 
that Ko would not be satisfied with the Com­
mission coming next cold weather, and that he 
would not tolerate the delay.”
1. Balfour to Brodrick, 18 January 1905, Balfour MSS 4-9721.
2. Curzon to Brodrick, 19 January 1905.
5« See Kitchener to Marker, 15 kabruary 1905, Marker MSS 
52276.
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"However, as I think I told you, the popular 
opinion is that if we meet with a disaster in 
the next few months, K a would instantly find 
an opportunity of getting out of India, and 
would come home to realise his fond ambition 
of being Secretary of State *
In these circumstances Brodrick in desperation pressed Gurzon 
to act in order to forestall yet another 1blow-up1 with 
Kitchener* Unfortunately he did this tactlessly, intimating 
that the Conservative Party's Parliamentary crisis took pre­
cedence over Indian affairs, and that Kitchener's resignation
would thus have an intimate bearing on the Government's 
2
existence* Gurzon, in the third week of January, informed 
Kitchener that he would support the Military Department in 
India, whereupon Kitchener dutifully replied that in that 
case he would resign immediately* Kitchener wrote to his 
confidante Marker:
"•.. he [Curzon] accepted this as the natural 
consequence so I am preparing to pack up - he 
asked me if I would accept the position of 
Secretary of State under the Liberals* I said 
that unless they gave me some guarantee that 
Indian army administration was put on a sound % 
footing* P *M f,it was useless to prepare for war*"*^
Brodrick, by his intervention had now jabbed at a wound 
which was to slowly fester and thus poison communications
1. Sandars to Balfour, 17 January 1905? Balfour MSS 49705*
2. See Brodrick to Gurzon, 20 January 1905*
3* Kitchener to Marker, 19 January 1905? Marker MSS 52276; 
Col*R«J* Marker, (1867-1914-) a former A.D.C. to 
Curzon, 1899-1900, who 'went over to the other side1 be­
coming A PD.G, to Kitchener during the Boer War 1901-2 and 
in India 1902-4* As Private Secretary to H.O* Arnold- 
Forster at the War Office, he served a useful emissary 
for Kitchener's propaganda.
See also Kitchener to Lady Gurzon, 19 January 1905? 
Metcalfe MSS.
between the Indian and Home Governments for the next eight 
months. Kitchener, in the meantime, knowing he had the 
support of authorities at home was content to hold his hand 
in India, while Curzon, for his part, remained alarmed about 
the possibility of changes of Government, resolving to 
maintain his office as Viceroy# But the sequence of these 
events is revealing,
A month earlier in London, during the third week of 
December 1904-, Brodrick had persuaded Sir Arthur Godley to 
arrange a meeting with Balfour*s private secretary, J*S. 
Sandars, Sandars made a long memorandum of their conversation, 
in which Godley had also strongly pressed for a Commission 
of Inquiry#^ In reply Balfour recalled that the procedure 
had been already arranged and that ,fit was not until we had 
seen the despatch*1 of the Indian Government "and found it 
unsatisfactory, that we were to impose the Commission upon
p
them*" We have seen that Brodrick chose to ignore that pro­
cedure# Now, a month later on 20 January Hamilton was sum­
moned and came to the India Office, and In the course of a 
conversation with Lansdowne, (who happened to be there) was 
informed that if he went to India taking along his wife, 
the weather might prove inimical to his health, That fact, 
coupled with the certain delay of a despatch from the
1, Memo* of conversation witii Sir A. Godley, by J.S.Sandars,
21 December 1904, Balfour MSS 49762,
2, Balfour to Sandars, 50 December 1904, Balfour MSS 49762.
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Government of India, decided Hamilton against participation
1in Brodrick1s proposal. ' Nonetheless it had its effect on 
the issue, for Hamilton then wrote to Gurzon and explained 
his view of what the Government were contriving;
"When Brodrick asked me to go out [wrote Hamilton],
I asked two questions; 1st, How long would the 
proposed enquiry last? 2nd, Bid the Prime Minis­
ter and the Viceroy approve of my going out?"
Hamilton then saw the telegrams between Brodrick and Curzon
and declined the offer stating:
"I am glad to know now that I am in accord 
with you ... The Government are utterly dis­
credited in the constituencies, and a smash 
may come at any moment# Balfourfs success in 
keeping his majority together has been pur­
chased by the loss of character and reputation.
He is looked upon as a clever verbal conjuror 
without conviction or principle."
Hamilton predicted that the longer Balfourfs Government re-
2mained in office, the worse would be their defeat. That 
observation tended to diminish the confidence of Curzon in 
his colleagues at Whitehall. He was genuinely concerned 
about the possibility of finding himself at the tail of a 
kite whose string was in unfirm hands. And that prospect was 
even less attractive when he considered that any sudden 
change in Indian army administration would bring breakdown 
and disaster, for which he would be held responsible.
Two points must be made in respect to Curzon*s 
position. Administration was his applied religion. There is
1. Bandars to Balfour, ca„ 21 January 1905? Balfour MSS 4-9763*
2* Hamilton to Curzon, 10 February 1905.
3. See Curzon to Ampthill, 10 June 1904-*
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every reason to "believe that he was alive to the inherent 
dangers in British administration in India, firstly from 
political misrule hy an alien race and secondly, from any 
neglect on the part of India1 s rulers in discharging their 
duties and obligations* Curzon had intervened in the affairs 
of the army for reasons connected with social justice. He 
was only able to do so throtigh the man in whom he had confi­
dence; in other words he could exercise control of the army 
through the Military Member* ODhat interference was now 
threatened by the proposed amputation of the Military Depart­
ment and its Member* lhat Kitchener saw this only too clearly 
is evident from a letter which justified Curzon1s worst 
fears:
”1 can quite see Curzon*s views of the matter 
[he wrote], He could under the proposed system 
find it more difficult to interfere in small 
Army matters & get his way, as he did in the 
9th Lancers case & many others, & he thinks 
that the Viceregal prerogative would thus be 
touched - Perish the Empire sooner than allow 
such sacrilege
But the problem went deeper. Kitchener had already caused 
one mutiny at Omdurman; he now wanted unfettered control in 
India* In 1903 Curzon had informed Brodrick that the two 
great dangers which British rule in India had to face arose 
firstly from the problem of racial pride - "and the undiscip­
lined passions of the inferior class of Englishmen in this 
country1* - and, secondly, from the impression, should it ever
1* Kitchener to Marker, 19 January 1905* Marker MSB 52276.
290
gain substantial foothold in India* that injustice* neglect* 
or indifference, are shown to her cause hy those who are
governing her in London«1 Some consideration of these points
is essential if one is to understand Curzon1 s position* He 
declined to tolerate a military autocracy in India* He told 
this to Esher who wrote:
"Some day there will be a row* George [Curzon] 
will not allow K. to remodel the Army on his 
own lines. As he very truly says, K.’s idea 
of rule is K,, and you cannot rely on a suc­
cession of Ko's. Of course this was the prin­
ciple at the base of my original proposal for
the Army here. You must legislate for the
average man and not for the exception."^
In these circumstances it is just possible that 
Curzon deliberately chose to delay proceedings in the hope of 
not having to act at all* If this was so, he underestimated 
his by now political opponents who were more attuned to the 
traditional party politics of threat and bluff, thrust and 
counter-thrust. Moreover, in taking up what he conceived to 
be an unassailable constitutional position, he dismayed his 
critics even more by the manner than the matter of his high 
assertions. By January 1905? Brodrick informed Balfour of 
his failure to reconcile Curzon with Kitchener by the timely 
appointment of a commission of enquiry:
"Nothing will shake him *.. and therefore we 
should be put into the position of having 
ignored the Indian Government and intervened 
in the squabble before the time was ripe *"
I* Curzon to Brodrick, 2 October 1903.
2. Esher, Journals, II, p*49 (22 July 1904.)
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"Curzon. will not understand Kitchener *s position* 
and thinks it quite sufficient to say that •.. 
there can he no hurry
Meanwhile the Commander-In-Chief had recourse to means other.
than the official channels of the Government of India.
(5) Kitchenerfs Press Campaign*
Kitchener wanted to remove the controversy over the 
Military Member from the Government of India to the Cabinet; 
with this object in mind he utilised the press in addition 
to his secret contacts at home* On 26 January 1905 he wrote 
to Sir George Clarke* the secretary of the Committee of 
Imperial Defence* to explain how his position had been im­
paired by the fact that Curzon had persuaded Balfour to 
accept the verdict of the Government of India on the issue* 
Kitchener reported;
"This entailed certain delay. It placed the 
Military Department with their back to the 
wall and ranged the Government of India on 
one side of the question 0 .. Now* I agree 
with the Viceroy that* as the case has been 
referred* the Council will have to see and 
discuss it0 Their decision is of course a 
foregone conclusion as they cannot go against 
the Viceroy* and he has JoId me he is going 
to oppose my proposals."2
1* Brodrick to Balfour, 20 January 1905* Balfour MSS 49721.
2. Kitchener to Clarke* 26 January 1905* Clarke (1848-1933) 
later became Lord Sydenham; his autobiography, My Working 
Life, appeared In 1927 and contains an account of Kit- 
cEener's correspondence, cf. p.179* See also the Sydenham 
MSS 50835 at the British Museum for Kitchener's original 
letters to Clarke.
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We must consider, against the background of Kitchener's overt 
conduct with Curzon in India, his concealed efforts, and 
those of his agents in London, to undermine the Viceroy#
During the summer of 1904- Kitchener attempted through
his former A.D.C., Marker, to enlist the columns of Ihe limes
in support of his programme of reform In India# He was
largely unsuccessful with L.S. Amery (1873-1955)? but found
much support from Colonel Charles A Court Repington (1858-
1925)? then military correspondent of The limes. Repington
was in turn able to canvass support from Buckle (1854— 1935)?
editor of the paper, and to a lesser degree, Moberly Bell
o
(184*7-1911)? its manager. Curzon, however, had been stoutly 
defended in the columns of The limes by the director of its 
foreign department, Valentine Chirol (1852-1929)• Chirol 
asserts:
"Colonel Repington, who was then the military 
expert at Printing House Square, was, however, 
generally a week ahead of me with even fuller 
materials for pressing Kitchener's case, regu­
larly supplied to him from Indian army head­
quarters •"
Chirol reproached Kitchener for this:
"I told him so frankly when I was again not 
long afterwards in Calcutta and he began to 
reprove me for having backed Curzon against 
him. He replied equally frankly that when he 
was driven to fight he could not afford to be 
'too squeamish' as to the instruments he used,
1# L.S. Amery, My Political Life,_I, pp.207-8 and 
Repington, C.,' VeaHrgia, ppV2'53-4*•
2. Moberly Bell, E'.H.OTT^lhe Life and Letters of C.P. Moberly 
Bell, pp.231-2. ~
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and then went on to render a handsome tribute 
to Curzon, whom he had fought all the more
reluctantly *as it was he who, as Viceroy, *1
brought me to India as Commander-in-Chief'."
In response to Marker!s plea for support for Kitchener
(against Curzon), Repington promised to write " a fairly
warm article ... careful not to implicate anyone in the
p
criticism”; ”1 am only awaiting a favourable opportunity &
more evidence, to have a fling at this question*.*”^
Repington suggested he should go out to India to
write a series of articles on behalf of Kitchener for The
limes, asserting: ”1 don’t fancy we shall do much good until
ix.
the Mily* Dept* is knocked on the heado" Repington was con­
sidering the possibility of contacting members of the Liberal 
party (such as Campbell-Bannerman) as to Kitchener’s prospects 
of becoming Secretary of State for War, should Balfourfs Gov­
ernment collapse* Alternately he questioned whether Kitchener 
could afford to repudiate not only Curzon but also the Con­
servative Government, and he asked: ,TIf the GovJt. were over­
thrown would K, have gained or lost?” as Commander-in-Chief 
5in India.
In October 1904 Repington discussed Kitchener’s 
position with Buckle, a man of great newspaper experience;
1. Chirol, V*, Fifty Years in a Changing World, p.228.
2* Repington to"7!arker, 18 July 1904, Marker MSS 52278.
3. Ibid*, 19 August 1904.
4. Ib'id o, 25 August 1904.
5. Ibido, 8 November 1904.
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it was Buckle 1 s view that Curzon would only remain in India 
for six months and that Balfour would then appoint a suc­
cessor. He therefore suggested delay in order to avoid 
unnecessary criticism, and to this suggestion Bepington 
agreed.
In an extremely significant letter dated 11 October 
1904 in which Repington discussed the tactics of an attack 
on Curzon, he wrote;
"... we must he armed at all points to defeat 
the onset of the Indian warriors & their 
sisters, cousins & aunts. Again it will he 
improper to deal with this subject during 
Lady Curzon1s illness, so there is time for 
consideration. I presume that K* would in 
no case act while a mere locum tenens [Ampthill] 
is in power in India."
(Marker, in a marginal note commented: 'This is entirely
dependent on what action the Mily. Dept, may take’*)
Bepington continued,
1"If Clarke was right about Curzon and his six 
months, Buckle thinks that it implies that 
this Gov1to wish to have the appointment of 
his successor® If I were K« I would await 
this appointment before acting, as Curzon has 
rather a strong following & there is no 
object in arousing unnecessary opposition."
1. Clarke was closely in touch with Balfour. On 23 July 1904, 
Kitchener's agent, Colonel Mullaly informed Clarke that 
Kitchener was being hampered by India's system of adminis­
tration. Clarke immediately wrote Balfour as follows: 
"Clearly there is friction, and perfectly useless inter­
departmental correspondence ... completely fetters pro­
gress." Clarke to Balfour, 23 July 1904, Balfour MSS 
49700.
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But Marker was impatient« His marginal annotations reveal the
extent to which Kitchener1 s partisans were willing to go to
achieve their end: ’Time does not admit of any delay1 noted
Marker, fif Indian army is to he efficient when it may he
called upon •*• Curzon is the real obstacle to the removal
of present dual control, & I am for going for the key to the
T
position, as soon as may he,1
Repington however was in favour of waiting for Curzon 
to retire before attempting to bring matters to a head, thus 
avoiding a direct clash with the Viceroy who alone he felt, 
kept the Government in London straight:
"This moribund government have grown so feeble 
that they surrender at discretion to any strong 
man who comes along and says Hi! loud enough,
& until they go out they will always depend on 
Curzon whether he is at home or in India. He 
rules them* Cannot K* convince him?
,TIf we have to open fire in the press the 
thing must be done properly, All the Rajah’s 
are red-hot in favour of preserving the Mil*
Member whom they consider, no doubt rightly, 
the palladium of all their monopolies & 
interests*..
"The old guard die hard & we shall want 
a lot of ammunition to keep up the fire .,.
The great thing is to get a series of letters 
In the papers about the appearance of an 
article, supporting the views put forward. You 
can manufacture a public opinion if you go
1* Repington to Marker, 11 October 1904, with Marker*s 
annotations* Marker MSS 52278*
the right way to work.""^
Balfour's Government was indeed so weak that Kit­
chener seriously turned over in his mind the possibility of 
working in harness with a Liberal administration. But there 
was one major flaw in that plan. On 31 May 1901 Campbell-
Bannerman had denounced Kitchener's actions in South Africa,
2which he termed "methods of barbarism"; consequently 
Kitchener had no great belief in his chances of becoming 
Minister for War under a Liberal administration.
In his secret correspondence with Brodrick, Kitchener 
had been kept well informed of the Government's position; 
Brodrick moreover was careful to remind Kitchener how lucky 
he was to have in Balfour a leader so exonscious of the prob­
lems of Imperial defence, particularly the defence of India:
1. Ibid., 23 October 1904. The following illustrates the 
suspicion of the Rajahs for Kitchener's designs upon 
their armies, maintained with zealous pride but neverthe­
less subjected to various schemes for Imperial defence.
On one occasion at a small dinner party held by Minto 
Kitchener rashly remarked that he should have been 
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for bringing peace to the 
Sudan and to South Africa, A visiting Maharajah commented: 
'Nobel wanted the reconciliation of people through con­
tact and negotiation, not by conquest J t o  which Kit­
chener retorted 'Nobel was a dreamer. He was no realist, 
but a weaver of fantasies. How could such a man under­
stand what our Empire means for the future of the whole 
of mankind!" Magnus, Kitchener, pp.231-2, See also
Butt, IoA,, Lord Gurzon anH 'tHe Indian States, 1899-1905? 
Chap.. Ill, PhoP* Tliesis^ London, 1963,
2. Lee, S0, King Edward VII, II, p07S*
3. Kitchener to Marker,22 December 1904, Marker MSS 52276,
29?
"Your main experience of Governments in tlie 
last eighteen years has heen of Conservative 
Governments possessing a strong majority in 
hoth Houses, annually increasing estimates, 
and much assisted in doing it hy a rapidly 
growing revenue * The revenue is now halting, 
taxation is much higher, the political out­
look, although for the moment more quiet, is 
uncertain, and the radical party, which comes 
in pledged to retrenchment, will have a very 
strong backing with a people satiated by the 
fresh territory we have acquired and the wars 
which we have carried through in the last 
fifteen years.”
There was much weight in what Brodrick said. Out of a total 
revenue of £144,000,000 Brodrick estimated in 1905 that 
Great Britain would spend £29?800,000 on military prepara­
tions to provide for a field army of from 80,000 to 140,000 
men. As Kitchener had deemed necessary some 9 Divisions or 
120,000 men to defend the Indian frontier in the event of a
Russian invasion, Brodrick wrestled with these figures at the
1
meetings of the Defence Committee. In the event Brodrick's 
prophesy was confirmed, and in 1909 after three years' 
experience of Liberal Ministers Kitchener told Lady Salisbury 
that he ached to see them "kicked out - the harm they do is 
great", explaining that "with this Government, military or 
naval efficiency are looked on with disgust, and, whenever 
they can, they act accordingly, notwithstanding fine words
p
to the contrary e" ~
1. Brodrick to Kitchener, 29 April 1904, Kitchener MSS 
30/57/22.
2„ Kitchener to Lady Salisbury, 6 April 1909; Many of Kit­
chener's plans were scrapped by Morley, fa ruthless anti- 
militarist in the Gladstonian tradition* who succeeded 
Brodrick as Secretary of State. Magnus, Kitchener, p.232.
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Kitchener's agents therefore cast about for other
means to influence the Government to make a decision# On 25
1September 1904 Mullaly wrote directly to Balfour explaining 
that Kitchener's resignation was imminent; to Lady Salisbury 
he described the system of army administration in India in 
such terms as 'preposterous', 'a monstrous absurdity', 
entailing 'rivalry1, 'duplication of work', 'inefficiency', 
a 'waste of money', 'delay', and 'always preventing any 
settled military policy'# Mullaly enclosed in his letter an 
extract from Kitchener: "I think either Elies or myself will 
have to go; & if the latter I retire from the Army#" Mullaly, 
accompanied by General Sir Beauchamp Duff, (1855-1918), had 
made the rounds In London visiting Roberts, Brodrick, the 
Salisburys, Clarke of the Committee of Imperial Defence,
H#0. Arnold-Forster at the War Office, and his private secre­
tary Marker, in an effort to obtain further support for 
Kitchener. In so doing Kitchener's partisans accepted the 
fact that part of their working conditions was considerable 
manipulation of the truth# Propaganda was passed on from 
Lady Salisbury to Balfour and contained much misconstrued 
evidence* The transmission of information in that way 
amounted to lying for a good cause, and Gurzon rightly 
guessed its dishonesty, holding Brodrick personally, though 
perhaps unfairly, responsible.
1* Mullaly to Balfour, 25 September 1904, Balfour MSS 49726*
2. Mullaly to Lady Salisbury, 26 September 1904, Balfour 
MSS 49757.
3. See especially Curzon to Brodrick, 29 December 1904-; and 
19 January 1905.
299
But it was the Prime Minister who spoke out against 
these tactics in the autumn of 1904* He reported to Lady 
Salisbury his dismay over the issue of Indian army adminis­
tration: "K*s resignation, and all the circumstances con­
nected therewith, are extremely characteristic of the princi­
pal actors in the scene." Balfour explained the difficulty 
of deciding whether the supply and transport of the Indian 
army should reside with Elies or Kitchener, and whether 
or not Indian military administration should be unified under 
one head.
"Consider, first, George Curzon: ... [who] 
would not be responsible for the change, 
though under great pressure from me, he 
promised to look into it on his return. This 
is an excellent illustration of what George 
Hamilton used to say of George Curzon, - 
that he would never work any plan but one 
that he himself had originated*H
"Now, consider K: Ever since he arrived 
in India & found what the system was, he has 
been fighting against it by every means in 
his power, legitimate and illegitimate. On 
the main question I am entirely with him, 
and could I have foreseen the development 
of events and the attitude which George 
Curzon has taken up, I should have made it 
a condition of any renewal of the tenure of 
his office that he should make a genuine 
attempt to reform the system..."
"But though I am quite at one with K. as 
to his ends, I cannot express unqualified 
admiration of the means he employs to get them*
"His first plan was to tide quietly over the 
remainder of George Curzon's term of office by 
agreeing to some of his most preposterous 
strategic suggestions; and 1 do not think 
Mullaly denies that K* by no means holds some 
of the opinions to which he has solemnly put” 
his hand* His second plan is to try and force
everybody1 s hand by an absurd resignation:
And, again, Mulla.ly frankly admits that, 
while the alleged excuse for resigning was 
some trifling affair connected with discipline, 
the real motive was to compel us to adopt his 
policy at the point of the bayonet* There is 
an element of slimness in our only General 
which slightly diminishes my respect, though 
in no sense my liking, for that great man*"l
The weight of the press had also been brought to 
bear against Curzon's Tibetan policy as over army administra­
tion » It was only natural that Curzon had corresponded with
Younghusband during his Tibetan mission, and this Brodrick
2deeply resented, as he felt Curzo^s actions would embarrass 
the Government and reflect his management of its affairs* 
Knowing at the time that the editorial policy of The Times 
supported the Government of India - and hence Curzon - 
Brodrick had distributed a circular letter to several editors 
of the English press with a covering note explaining the 
viewpoint of the Home Government in regard to publication of 
the Tibetan bluebooks* Ghirol pointed out, however* (3 Feb­
ruary 1905) that no such note had been sent to The Times, 
but that Brodrick had, in his letters, referred to specific 
passages in despatches "to which attention might specially 
be called in order to show how gravely the Government of 
India and the British Commissioner [Younghusband] had ignored 
the deliberate instructions of the Imperial Government, and
h  Balfour to Lady Salisbury, 4 October 1904, Balfour MSS 
497570
2c Brodrick to Lord Salisbury, 15 September 1904, Balfour 
MSS 49757.
how necessary it therefore was for the Imperial Government
1to affirm Its control over insubordinate agents9U Because
Brodrick wanted the press on his side when it came to the
point of censuring Younghusband, he declined to recommend
that any honour should he bestowed on the courageous Young- 
2
husband, intending in fact, making him a scapegoat. He
asked Balfour to address the King's Private Secretary, Lord
Knollys, in that vein, and Balfour accordingly prefaced his
remarks by referring to Brodrickrs position "with regard to
whose affairs I am making the present communication^" Brod-
3rick, in Colonel Fleming's words, was taking no chances.
Ihe effect of these press disclosures, when Curzon 
indirectly learned of them, is significant; they completely 
destroyed his confidence in Brodrick1s motives and though 
the latter professed to strive mightily with his conscience 
to uphold and defend the Viceroy, the extremely sensitive 
Secretary of State was deeply wounded at the thought that 
once again he had failed miserably in his attempt to recon­
cile the protagonists, who now overshadowed almost all other 
Indian problems:
"I cannot tell you, my dear George, [wrote 
Brodrick], how hurt and distressed I am,
1* Chirol to Curzon, 3 February 1905# Bee also Younghusband 
to Curzon, 2 February 1905*
2. Brodrick to Lord Knollys, 5 October 1904; Lee, op.cit.,
II, Po371*
3. Balfour to Lord Knollys, 6 October 1904; Fleming, op«cit«,
ppe272-3.
that an office to which I had so much looked 
forward to bring us closer together has in­
volved me in trouble with you* and the with­
drawal of your friendship which you made 
clear in the summer is accentuated by the 
feeling that you think I am wanting even in 
official consideration*
But two weeks before he informed Kitchener that he would
press the Commander-in-Chief1 s case before the Cabinet
asserting: "Curzon is too anxious and too seedy to be
2
troubled with so serious a decision”* in view of the mis­
fortunes of Nary Curzon's health* Small wonder that relations 
between India and the Home Government now became stricken 
with uncertainty and confusion, while Kitchener and his 
partisans plunged ahead, in an atmosphere of conspiracy, to 
bring about the change they desired *
In these circumstances it is also not surprising 
that on 22 February, when Curzon read that The Standard had 
published an article stating that Kitchener's schemes were 
being confronted by obstruction "at every turn owing to the 
pernicious dual system” In India, he was enraged and immed­
iately called together his Council to issue an official 
contradiction* He telegraphed to the Secretary of State:
"There is not a vestige of foundation for this 
statement, and I am sure you will agree with 
me in deprecating these interested attempts to 
prejudice the discussion of a grave constitu­
tional question,”3
1* Brodrick to Curzon, 31 October 1904,
2, Brodrick to Kitchener, 13 October 1904, Kitchener NSS
30/57/22,
3* Curzon to Brodrick, Telegram, 24 February 1905*
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Kitchener in fact had sent a confidential copy of his paper 
on Indian military administration to H.A. Gwynne (1866-1950)5 
foreign director of Reuter*s Agency, and editor of The 
Standard, and Marker had followed it up to ensure its publi­
cation* On 12 January Kitchener informed Marker:
"Gwynne has written me a very nice letter 
promising the support of the Standard - I 
fancy he thinks I should like to go to the 
W.O* You can disabuse him of any such desire 
on my part - It is the last thing I should 
like though of course it might be necessary."
But though Brodrick agreed that article was "mischievous" he
was unwilling to do anything about it:
"Mo one here has any knowledge of the source 
whence the Standard got the inspiration and 
the articles have attracted no further atten­
tion up to now in Parliament and press« Hence 
I should deprecate official contradiction 
here, which would certainly arouse attention 
and force a premature discussion of the 
differences in your Council, which must before 
long become public...
But the damage had been done. Having carried his 
press campaign this far, Kitchener now decided upon a bold 
move* He would invest the fortress of the India Office itself 
and attempt to convert individual members of the India 
Council to his views, and thus set up a political lobby.
This plan met with much success* Kitchener had carefully 
prepared the ground, first by undertaking to obtain unoffic­
ially, through his military secretary, Colonel H.I.W.
1* Kitchener to Marker, 12 January 1905? Marker MSS 52276.
2. Brodrick to Curzon, Telegram, 24 February 1905*
Hamilton, the opinions of all high-ranking officers in India. 
He then secretly sent these opinions to Sir Edward Stedman, 
the Military Secretary at the India Office.*** Secondly,
Stedman enlisted the strong support of a number of the members 
of the India Council, including Sir James Mackay (1852-1952), 
Commercial Member of Council, Sir John Gordon (1852-1908), 
Military Secretary at the India Office, and Lt. General A.R. 
Badcock (1844-1907), Secretary of the Military Department 
and a member of the India Council from 1902-7* Kitchener 
knew that in addition he could count on support from Lee 
Warner (1846-1914), Political Member of the India Council, 
Godley and Brodrick as well as his many friends inside the 
Cabinet and Committee of Imperial Defence. He told Marker 
he was utterly fearless of Curzon in India as long as he had
p
this strong backing with the Government in England.
When Curzon learned in January 1905 that Kitchener 
had sent, en bloc, the letters of various Lt.-Generals 
agreeing with the Commander-in-Chief that the composition of 
Brigades In future should be of purely British and purely 
Indian origin, he became indignant. Some of those letters 
were abusive, and contained slurs upon the character of 
Indian soldiers which Curzon refused to countenance. For 
example Major-General Duff wrote (29 September 1904):
1. See Kitchener MSS 30/57/55*
2. Kitchener to Marker, 15 February 1905, Marker MSS 52276.
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that Sepoys must never he allowed to 
compete against British soldiers in any 
capacity in which the former could possibly 
prove themselves superior to the latter.*.
Native troops should never he allowed to 
fight an important action without the presence 
of British troops and this not with a view 
to any stiffening effect hut simply to make 
the Native soldier helieve himself incapable 
of winning victories on his own account.”!
Curzon sent Kitchener a strongly worded rebuke on 31 January 
1905 in which he referred to Kitchenerfs private correspon­
dence as "unconstitutional” and therefore irregular. He 
candidly explained that he would not tolerate such outside 
interference:
"The question of the future military administra­
tion in India has not been referred to you 
individually, but to the Government of India 
as a whole... and you and Elies have been 
asked for your opinions about it as Members 
of that Government... This is not a purely 
military question* It is a constitutional 
question, affecting the entire structure of 
the Government of India. ”2
Curzon, only imperfectly aware of the network of Kitchener*s
communications with the Home Government, thought Kitchener
lo (This letter is enclosed in Kitchener to Ampthill, 29
September 1904, Ampthill MSS 233/34/2. See also Brodrick 
to Curzon, 26 January 1905? regarding Kitchenerfs private 
correspondence to Stedman on the opinions of the Lt.- 
Generals and the abolition of mixed brigades. Three years 
later Kitchener wrote a 17-page memorandum (dated 9 
September 1908) which he enclosed in a letter to Morley, 
attesting the Army!s "dislike of change” and the existence 
of a "deep-seated racial repugnance to any step which 
brings nearer the day when Englishmen in the Army may have 
to take orders from Indians.” Kitchener to Morley,
10 September 1908, in Minto MSS 983.
2. Curzon to Kitchener, 31 January I905.
had only been corresponding with Roberts in order to obtain 
points of information regarding Indian army affairs. The 
next day he again explained to Kitchener why he objected:
"On the one side is the Government of India 
discussing an important constitutional question 
in the constitutional waye On the other side, 
and simultaneously, is the Commander-In-Chief, 
i^e*, one of ourselves, conducting an indepen­
dent and private correspondence on the same 
subject with the greatest military authority 
at home, and procuring for him confidentially 
the opinion of Indian Generals, who have 
nothing to do with Lord Roberts but are under 
the orders of the Government of India; the 
object of the correspondence being to influence 
the mind of Lord Roberts, and through him 
indirectly the Home Government»"!
Kitchener deftly attempted to persuade Curzon that he was
merely trying to induce Roberts to withdraw his opposition
to the abolition of the existing system, adding that the
Indian army had changed greatly since Roberts1 day* On 2
February he told Curzon;
"As you evidently do not wish me to write 
privately to Lord Roberts I will not do so 
until after this question is over;"2
that assertion misled Curzon and put him, as it were, on the
wrong track* When it came to Kitchener !s plea that it was
only to ask for Robertsf opinion as to the expressed and
unofficial views of the Generals, Curzon surrendered stating:
"I had no idea that the authority for whom 
you were procuring the opinions of the 
Generals was Lord Roberts."
1. Curzon to Kitchener, 1 February 1905*
2. Kitchener to Curzon, 2 February 1905*
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Nevertheless he asked his Commander-in-Chief to desist from 
corresponding behind his hack and mentioned he would suggest 
in the future that Roberts and Kitchener communicate offic­
ially through Brodrick,1 This was done and Roberts was asked 
to write to Curzon and apologise, which he did on 2 March 
1905 ? explaining:
"I wrote to Kitchener, as Brodrick will no 
doubt explain to you, by desire of the Prime 
Minister, and as a Member of the Defence 
Committee, Mr. Balfour has asked me to ex­
plain this to you, and to say he considers it 
very desirable that the correspondence 
should continue •,?
In that letter Roberts enclosed a copy of a previous letter
to Kitchener dated 2 December 1904- which revealed that far 
from supporting Kitchener’s plans to abolish the Military 
Department and establish the formation of Class Brigades in 
India, Roberts had in fact steadily opposed Kitchener’s 
views from the outset. Curzon had in Roberts a staunch
p
defender of the status quo.
Meanwhile in the first week of February Curzon pro­
ceeded to draw up a Minute in which he explained the position 
of the Government of India in relation to the question of 
army administration:
"This is the problem which we are now invited 
to discussP Lord Kitchener’s Minute is a sus­
tained indictment of the military administra­
tion of the Government of India during the
1. Curzon to Kitchener, 1 February 1905#
2. Roberts to Curzon, 2 March 1905, enc. Roberts to 
Kitchener, 2 December 1904*
last 40 years, and it culminates in a proposal 
to abolish that system, and to replace it by a 
new and wholly different organization,,f
He pointed out that under Kitchener’s scheme the Military 
Member and the Military Department would disappear, and the 
Commander-in-Chief would emerge as the sole adviser to the 
Indian government in military matters as well as the sole 
Military Member of Council and the single head of the execu­
tive and administrative offices* It was not the first time 
that similar proposals had been heard* In 1879 the Army 
Organization Commission had Investigated the best method of 
conducting Indian military administration, enquiring into the 
military and civilian relations involved in the system of 
Indian army administration, That review had produced a mass 
of evidence by "Viceroys such as Lord Lytton and Lord Dufferin, 
by Commanders-in-Chief such as Sir Donald Stewart and Lord 
Roberts, by Military Members such as Sir H. Brackenbury and
Sir E. Co lien * The result had been to confirm the existing 
1system. But there were far larger issues at stake. When 
Kitchener proposed to destroy the Military Member, that 
proposal was in reality one not so much to disestablish an 
individual or even a department, but "to subvert the military 
authority of the Government of India as a whole, and to sub­
stitute for it a military autocracy in the person of the 
Commander-in-Chief o1 The issue turned not so much on the
la Correspondence regarding the Administration of the Army 
xii Indxaa "M'nute by Curzon, 6 February l90$> Enclosure 3 
in No«2, Cd.2572.
system as on the men working it as Curzon rightly pointed
out in his conclusion:
"With a sufficiency of tact and conciliation 
I believe that the present system can be 
worked both efficaciously and harmoniously*"
Kitchener however was out to smash that system; and 
the one man who saw this most clearly was Ampthill who had 
described himself as "between the fires of Army Headquarters 
and of the Military Department for nearly eight months"* He 
understood Kitchener’s tactics:
"His is a mind which is not open to argument 
whether the discussion is based on abstract 
principles or practical matters of fact* The 
thing that rankles in his mind and which he 
will never get over is that Elies, a soldier 
junior in military rank and far lesser mili­
tary prestige, can get his schemes upset,"1
Magnus throws much light on this attitude:
"Kitchener, in fact, found it impossible any 
longer even to attempt to make the best of 
a system which required the military member 
to digest and criticize every plan which the 
Commander-in-Chief prepared and every sug­
gestion which he made before they could be 
given affect* Kitchener had based his case 
on the argument that the system was unwork­
able, and if he had succeeded in making it 
work that argument would have fallen to the 
ground. He therefore sulked like Achilles, 
and was constantly described by his staff, 
as well as by his friends, as a Hercules 
chained to the Himalayas, He dismayed the 
British Government, which was already torn 
by internal discussions about tariff reform, 
by announcing unequivocally that he would 
resign if he were overruled,
1* Ampthill to Curzon, 19 February 1905* See also Curzon to
Hamilton, 14 May 1903*
2* Magnus, Kitchener, p.211*
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Ampthill was not far from the truth when he stated:
"I have no doubt that the present system could 
he worked harmoniously and efficaciously with 
tact and conciliation on hoth sides , hut this 
is a thing which you rarely get when soldiers 
are concerned. They are brought up in a system 
in which the senior in rank commands, and 
everybody junior to him obeys without question* 
and they do not understand any other system."b
While the Government of India was in the process of 
preparing its papers and circulating the file on army admin­
istration to members of the Council, Kitchener felt content 
that Brodrick*s proposed Commission of enquiry had failed.
He feared that in any case Curzon would have induced them to 
secure some unsatisfactory compromise. In the meantime he 
was confident that his campaign in the English press would 
ultimately determine the issue in his favour observing:
"... as long as I am backed at home I have no 
fear of the ultimate result - I am very glad 
the Gov*t. is all right."2
During this interim period however, Kitchener grumbled:
"All this is Hanky Panky & very irritating and 
quite contrary to precedent, I think the Vice­
roy wants to put off the case .,. but I am 
going to protest very strongly and if necessary 
resign if he attempts this."*
When Kitchener at last saw the notes which Elies and Curzon
had written and circulated on his paper, he wrote:
"I do not think much of them - in fact I think 
I could have made a better case myself against 
myself...
1. Ampthill to Curzon, 19 February 1905* See also Curzon to 
Hamilton, 14- May 1903*
2. Kitchener to Marker, 15 February 1905, Marker MSB 52270*
3. Kitchener to Marker, 23 February 1905, Ibid*
4-. Ibid., 2 March 1905*
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In utilising the English press, Kitchener hoped to drive 
Gurzon to resign; hut these tactics involved the utmost 
secrecy and he had to play his hand carefully* He told 
Marker:
"Ourzon is very touchy about the press comments 
and I think a little doubtful as to whether 
his reputation may not suffer in consequence 
by the line he has taken. As far as I can 
gather he knows nothing of what is going on 
at home and rather hopes for a compromise *
Encouraging reports were sent to Kitchener during this period
from many quarters, on the progress of the question of army
administration in London. Although H.O* Arnold-Fors1ter told
(3 April 1905) Kitchener that he felt he was "not playing 
2the game", Kitchener heard encouraging reports from members 
of the staff of the India Office itself, who had been can­
vassed by Sir Edward Stedman, and reported: "all is still
%
going well - I get good news from S t e d m a n , I n  privately 
using Stedman for the dissemination of his viewsp Kitchener 
hoped to forestall the verdict of the Indian Government by 
that of the Home Government. Accordingly, on 8 March 1905 
he sent an extremely important and critical account of what 
was occurring in India during the course of the official
1. Kitchener to Marker, 1? May 1905* Marker MSS 52276.
2. H*0. Arnold-Eorster to Kitchener, 3 April 1905? 
Kitchener MSS 30/57/53.
3* Kitchener to Marker, 15 April 1905? Marker MSS 52276.
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1procedure of his schemes0
In that most highly confidential and secret document 
to Stedman (dated 8 March), the Commander-in-Chief made a 
sustained indictment of Elies and Ourzon* He claimed that he 
had responsibility without power and that the final authority 
for India's military affairs rested in practice with the 
Military Member who was then ultimately charged with respon­
sibility for the efficiency of the Army.
"What is really meant is that the system will 
not work unless the Oommander-in-Ghief admits 
himself to be the subordinate of the Military 
Member."
"Herein lies the fatal defect of the existing 
system. On the one side we have power without 
responsibility, and on the other responsibility 
without powero Herein lies the dualism of 
which I complain, the point of my whole indict­
ment of the system, and yet that point is 
simply ignored. There is not even an attempt 
to defend the system in this respect but merely 
an effort to obscure the real issue under a 
cloud of verbiage,"
1* Kitchener to Stedman, 8 March 1905» The original is not 
found in the Kitchener MSS at the P.P.O., but there are 
two copies in the Ourzon MSS at the 1.0., 111/400. Brodrick 
later, on 5 May 1905? printed and privately circulated 
three of Kitchener!s letters to Stedman (8,14,23 March 
1905) "for the confidential information of the Committee" 
he was secretly preparing* Oopies of these received wide 
distribution (though never of course seen by Curzon or the 
Government of India) and appear in the Minto Papers in 
Edinburgh, Minto MSS 895* - Brodrick had directed that 
Kitchener's correspondence with Stedman be "destroyed and 
not shown to our Council" except those letters he intended 
for use by his Committee. Por some strange reason however, 
Kitchener neglected to destroy the letters he received 
from Stedman, and six months later Stedman wrote; "these 
letters certainly had their full weight in bringing about 
the decision ... I hope Curzon when he returns full of 
wrath does not get hold of them." See Stedman to Kitchener, 
23 August 1905, Kitchener MSS 30/57/33•
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Kitchener took exception to the way in which his proposals 
were being considered in Council and submitted that the Vice­
roy, instead of adopting the usual role of judge by placing 
both sides of the case before the Council, had taken up the 
position of advocate for the defence of the Indian system;
’’With his views so forcibly put before them,
I am not surprised that they have unanimously 
agreed with him, which I always thought would 
be the case in Civil Members who have no ex­
perience of military technical matters,"^
Once again Kitchener justified his actions on the 
grounds that the issue of army administration was far too 
complex to be handled by the Government of India* In express­
ing that opinion he felt that if the Viceroy took a position 
of open hostility, it was most 'Unlikely that many, if any, 
members of Gouncil would take a substantially different one* 
The Standard of 22 February had further asserted:
"If there is any risk that Lord Kitchener’s 
urgent scheme of defence may be vetoed or 
even postponed . *. that danger must be
1, Kitchener to Stedman, 8 March 1905, Curzon MSS 111/400* 
The Kitchener Collection at the P.R*0, contains Stedman1 s 
letters, some 1/ in all, written to Kitchener from the 
India Office* These convey information regarding the 
circulation of Kitchener’s views, transmitted by Stedman 
in turn to Brodrick, Godley and Esher; Stedman then re­
ported the ’pulse1 of the India Office to Marker at the 
War Office, who thereupon communicated with Kitchener in 
India, See Kitchener MSS 50/57/55• The Marker papers at 
the British Museum help to complete the picture of how 
the Commander-in-Chief was able to subvert the Viceroy1 s 
position and lobby in England for the destruction of the 
Military Department,
removed by the intervention of the Home Gov­
ernment* As between Lord Kitchener and the 
Military Member of Council the nation will 
prefer the deliberate and considered views 
of the former, particularly as they are 
understood to be endorsed by the Imperial 
Cabinet* Mr* Brodrick has never lacked moral 
courage and we shall be surprised and dis­
appointed if he fails to enforce the approval 
he had already given to the scheme, and to 
make it known that the Imperial Government 
intend that Lord Kitchener shall be supported 
in carrying to a successful conclusion the 
supremely important task that was entrusted 
to him by something like a national mandate.”
Kitchener’s private letter to Stedman held up the 
Military Member and the Viceroy to ridicule as we shall see. 
His covert correspondence with the India Office was intended 
to make his arguments available for use by the Cabinet and 
influence the decision of the Home Government. The letter to 
Stedman, dated 8 March, reached England on 25 March, two 
weeks before Curzon *s Despatch embodying the opinion of the 
Government of India, which arrived on 8 April* It can hardly 
be doubted that the impact of that document prejudiced con­
sideration of the issue on its merits* Curzon, later, was 
able to verify these facts which he termed "low and corrupt"
and "inconsistent with the fundamental principles upon which
2the Government of India" should be conducted. His reaction 
to the disclosures in the press was painful; he knew if 
Kitchener resigned the British masses would interpret that 
act as striking proof of the Government’s inability to take
1. The Standard, 22 February 1905*
2. See Curzon to Morley, 28 December 1905? Morley MSS 555*
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the steps necessary to insure against deficiencies in the 
army - so glaringly exposed in the Boer War, Bitter at these 
misrepresentations, Curzon wrote to Balfour:
"Ihe impression has been conveyed to the public 
at home that our foremost soldier, after pro­
longed and patient experience, has found intol­
erable flaws in the system of our Military 
administration and has written a powerful 
indictment against it";
whereas the truth was that
"He has steadily laboured to render the system 
unworkable by his own attitude, and from time 
to time he had emphasised this by threats of 
resignation. By these means he forced the 
subject upon the attention of His Majestyls 
Government,"
"I asked you not to force the question forward 
in my time. Nevertheless you allowed me to 
come back to India, and you directed the 
question to be pursued."
He added that while the matter was being discussed in India,
deliberate efforts were made to capture public opinion in
England by showing that Kitchener was being "thwarted by his
colleagues and trammelled by red tape in his efforts to
raise the Army to proper efficiency and to provide for the
1defence of India." But intervention on the part of the Home 
Government could not, in any case, proceed until the receipt 
of the official views of the Governor-General!s Council.
However one reads Kitchener's correspondence with 
his friends in England, and however one assesses his political
I* Curzon to Balfour, 19 July 1905*
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lobbying and press campaign, the conclusion seems irresis­
tible : this was a calculated military intervention in the 
affairs of the state, deliberately timed and phrased to apply 
maximum pressure on ministers during the vital period when 
policy regarding India was being formulated0 Little attempt 
was made by Kitchener to clear his schemes with the Govern­
ment of India officially; he merely gave them advance warning 
of his intentions* That message was unmistakable: unless both 
the Indian and Home Governments adopted his plan for the 
abolition of the Military Member, and granted him unfettered 
control over Indian army administration, they could not 
expect him to remain in India* Alternatively, the Cabinet 
asked themselves whether they could at that time afford to 
repudiate not only a Viceroy who had hitherto achieved 
brilliant administrative success, but also abandon many of 
his specific proposals for internal reform in India* But if, 
by March 1905> Curzon no longer enjoyed the confidence of
Balfour1s Government, clearly they should have asked him to
1resign* This they did not do*
1* Dugdale, opacitc, I, pp.400-1*
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CHAPTER VI
■ u iWit i.t4rar M
CURZON!S RESIGNATION 
(1) The Verdict of the Council.
1Kitchener's Minute, dated 1 January, was submitted 
to the Military Member who replied in detail on 24 January 
to the charges brought against the system by the Commander- 
in-Chief* Elies denied that the system was one of dual con­
trol* The army had but one head, namely the Governor-General 
in Council, as established by statute under the Charter Act 
of 1855* That act provided that the Government of India was 
to be supreme over all military affairs in India, and main­
tained that such supremacy must remain intact; hence Elies 
argued that the Viceroy's constitutional position as head of 
Indian army administration was now threatened* Elies further 
pointed out that the function of the Commander-in-Chief was 
to command the army according to the rules of conduct and 
practice, while the Military Member represented the Governor- 
General in Council in respect of all business not of suffic­
ient importance to be brought before the Council collectively* 
In concluding, he asserted his conviction that no one man,
2
however able, could properly run Indian army administration*
1* Correspondence regarding the Administration of the Army 
in India, Enclosure 1 in No.2 Minute by Kitchener,
1 January 1905? Cd* 2572.
2. Ibid*, Enclosure 2 In No*2 Minute by Elies, 24 January
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Curzon next proceeded to draw up his own Minute 
(dated 6 February 1905) recording his views on the two sides 
of the question before him* He based his argument on the fact 
that India!s system had worked well in the past; that re­
peated examination had resulted in the confirmation of the 
existing system* Nevertheless, those conclusions were now 
disputed by ,Tone of the foremost living masters of the 
science of military government as well as of the art of war*’1 
In these circumstances the civilian members of Oouncil were 
called upon to decide between two sets of opinions irrecon­
cilable with each other and involving the fundamental princi­
ples which governed Indian administration* Basing himself on 
six years1 experience of the actual working of the system, 
he was unable to concede to Kitchener's case for change, 
declaring that such a proposal for altering the system would 
subvert the military authority of the Indian Government, and 
substitute for it a military autocracy in the person of the 
Commander-in-Chief:
"The Commander-in-Chief will not only be the 
source of all initiative, but the sole instru­
ment of execution* No curb of any sort will 
exist upon his authority* *. "
In concluding, he asserted that he was more than willing to
consider any reasonable reform or readjustment of the system:
"But no such proposals are before us; and the 
Commander-in-Chief in designing his new
1. Correspondence regarding the Administration of the Army 
in'indla^ Enclosure 3 in Minute by Curzon,
£> February 1905*
edifice is not satisfied until he has com­
pletely demolished the old. I cannot recommend 
that it should he swept away on this single 
and unsupported indictment, or that there 
should he substituted for it an organisation 
which vd-11, in my opinion, be injurious to 
military continuity, efficiency and control 
in time of peace, and will expose us to even 
greater risks in time of war.,,J-
2Brodrick's Despatch and the three Minutes were then 
circulated to the Members of the "Viceroy's Council. One after 
another they gave their reasons for dissenting from Kitchen­
er's proposals. Curzon in the meantime commented to Ampthill 
that "The Kitchener-Elles row is in full swing and makes 
life a burden" and that Elies, on the merits of the case, 
had come out on top. He explained to Brodrick that he ex­
pected his support as constitutional defender of India's 
rights in the matter: "You are bound to see that, if our 
constitution is impugned or subverted, it is only done in 
the proper way"; even though he was fully aware of the desire 
of the Prime Minister and the Home Government not to have a 
row with Kitchener, or to be forced to contemplate his 
resignation: "No one recognises more clearly than myself the 
sort of artificial prestige that attaches to a great soldier, 
or the degree of the pressure that he is in a position to
1. Correspondence regarding the Administration of the Army 
in India Enclosure '5 in "'No.2• Minute by Curz o n ,
6 February 1905? Cd.2572-
2. Ibid., No.l. Despatch by Brodrick, 2 December 1904*
3. tJurzon to Ampthill, 25 January 1905.
apply." He begged Brodrick not to view the matter so much 
as hearing upon one Individual, hut to consider "the future 
military administration of this country long after the 
present Gommander-in-Chief has disappeared, and when other 
figures dominate the scene
The question came up in Council for dehate on 10 
March. In describing the scene in the Council Chamber,
Curzon wrote that "Kitchener read a brief statement express­
ing his regret that his colleagues unanimously disagreed 
2with him." The evening before however, Curzon and Kitchener 
had held a long conversation (lasting one and a half hours), 
on the probable outcome of the Commander-in-Chief * s proposals, 
Curzon making it clear that Kitchener would have no support 
from the Viceroy's Council, He then informed the Home Gov­
ernment that should they "attempt to overrule us in a matter 
affecting the daily discharge of the business of Government, 
and to force upon us a change which the Viceroy and everyone 
of his colleagues pronounce to be disastrous..0", it would 
not be impossible that the Home Government might suddenly
"find themselves with no Government of India at all, and
x
only a Commander-in-Chief.,.
Contrary to expectation, Kitchener made no effort to
1. Curzon to Brodrick, 2 February 1905*
2. Ibid., 16 March 1905.
5. TB33.
refute the arguments and criticisms of his colleagues. He 
sat brooding and silent, unwilling to discuss the matter and 
regretting that he was in a minority of one. He concluded his 
brief statement amidst bewilderment. That scene was dramatic, 
for a painful silence fell upon the assembly. The one man 
present at the Council table who was taken aback by this 
abrupt dismissal of the matter was Elies. Serious charges 
had been made against his conduct as Head of the Military 
Department* He now rose and "made a most effective and 
dignified appeal to his colleagues to tell him whether he 
had their support" in reply to the charges against him, and 
desired to know how each Member felt. Thereupon every Member 
of Council in turn asserted that the charges against the 
Military Department had wholly broken down, that Elies 1 
vindication was complete, and that the Council ought to 
associate with him unhesitatingly.
"It must have been a painful moment for 
Kitchener, who was practically told to his 
face that he had hurled a number of reckless 
and unsupported charges against a colleague, 
which he had wholly failed to sustain.
The Council had then pronounced their verdict, overwhelmingly
siding with the Viceroy.
In a letter to the Prime Minister Curzon summed up 
Kitchener's position as he saw it:
"He came out to destroy the Military Department: 
he has been compelled, from time to time, to
1. Curzon to Brodrick, 16 March 1905
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hold his hand; hut he has never abandoned his 
purpose , and whoever the Military Member had 
been, and whatever the Military Department 
had done, he would not have spared them# You 
would find difficulty in believing the persis­
tency and even pettiness with which he has 
conducted his campaign# He has scarcely treated 
Elies (who has shown a quite remarkable temper 
and self-control) with common courtesy. He has 
constantly written notes on the file that re­
vealed the temper almost of a school-boy. He 
has brought absurd charges of obstruction 
against the Military Department when it was 
merely doing its duty (as the Government of 
India in its military capacity), and, whenever 
he has been especially angry, he has sent in 
his resignation."^
Following the decision of 10 March, and before draft­
ing the Despatch embodying the almost unanimous opinion of 
the Government of India, Curzon made a final attempt to 
arrange some kind of truce - by way of a private understand­
ing - with Kitchener, in the hope that " y o u  may see your way
to modify the expression of opinion" in the draft Minute of
2Dissent which he was writing. During the course of their 
conversation of 9 March, Curzon suggested making over a 
number of additional functions of the Military Department to 
Kitchener, and, as Elies was soon to retire, appointing a 
new Military Member more amenable to him. To these informal 
suggestions Kitchener turned a deaf ear. Kitchener felt 
that unless some radical change were made nothing could 
succeed and
1# Curzon to Balfour, JO March 1905*
2. Curzon to Kitchener, 17 March 1905, enclosing corrected 
draft of Minute by the Commander-in-Chief, 14 March 1905*
3. Kitchener to Curzon, 19 March 1905*
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"„*0 we should have the same duplication of 
work going on in the offices, and you would 
have a system of Army administration being 
carried out by two men neither of whom be­
lieved in it* That I should personally have 
a happier time goes without saying; but that 
would not give us a satisfactory office*"
Kitchener thereupon declared that he would await the decision
of the Home Government until Nay, and that "if the decision
is against my proposals, I will not resign without the
1most careful consideration of all the circumstances." That, 
it must be pointed out, was precisely the situation which 
His Majesty*s Government desired most to avoid*
By intimidation the Commander-in-Chief sought what 
he could not gain by negotiation* At his best in action, 
Kitchener was at his worst in discussion as was shown ten 
years later, when he was Minister for War. Strikingly unable 
to play a rational or coherent part in the Gouncils charged 
with the conduct of World War I, Kitchenerls presence among 
Ministers eager and fluent in discussion had a nugatory 
effect, and Lord Esher wrote:
"His form of speech was Cromwellian in its 
obscurity and incoherence. He would seem to 
be thinking aloud, his mind tossing in a 
flood of difficulties. The dialecticians and 
lawyers who sat round him could make nothing 
of it or him."2
'Following the failure of his attempt to work out 
some kind of modus operandi in India, Curzon drafted and
1* Kitchener to Curzon, 19 March 1905.
2. Esher, The Tragedy of Lord Kitchener, p*l50.
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issued on 25 March, a Despatch embodying the decision of the 
Indian Governmente Two main points were stressed - the danger, 
implicit in Kitchener*s scheme, that civil control in India 
over the army and military policy would be undermined by the 
control of a single individual; and secondly, the practical 
impossibility of one individual taking upon himself the tasks 
of an office, which would in time prove to be too great a 
burden for one man to bear.^ A week later Curzon described 
to Balfour his efforts to retain Kitchener^ services in 
India, and indicated his suggested solution. In view of the 
expiration of Elies1 term of office, he outlined the possi­
bility of a subsequent selection of a successor with whom 
Kitchener could work and who would be imbued with his own 
ideas: "Could you work with him?" he asked, to which, accord­
ing to Curzon, Kitchener had replied "Oh certainly". The 
Viceroy then realised that in so saying Kitchener had given 
away his entire case against India *s system by reducing it
p
to a question against one individual * Curzon therefore 
suggested he might work out some solution with Balfour where­
by Kitchener would be persuaded to remain in India:
"I think that he is less keen about resigning 
than he was, because he does not like the idea 
of the papers coming out, ,e. and still more 
because 0 •. [he] has very much become chilled 
[in] his desire to go home and serve as War 
Minister under a Radical Ministry, should such 
come into power«"
1. Correspondence regarding the Administration of the Army 
In^nSxa, RoTST" '2? War oh 1905V GdV2$?2.
2. Curzon to Balfour, 50 March 1905.
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Moreover "both Balfour and Curzon were aware that no military 
post was left for Kitchener outside India (save that of War 
Minister in England* at that time not vacant). Curzon there­
fore conjectured that Kitchener would probably be willing to 
stay on in India, and remarked that he was indeed planning 
large alterations to his house and had made arrangements for 
the coming winter.
Meanwhile Kitchener had appended a brief Minute of 
Dissent to the Despatch of 23 March0 Some attempt, he wrote, 
had been made to dispute his facts, but in his opinion, 
without success.
"My assertions have been contradicted, but not,
I think, disproved. My arguments remain uncon­
troverted, and are, I believe, incontrovertible«
I adhere, therefore, to everything that is 
contained in my Memorandum and it follows that p
I entirely dissent from the accompanying Despatch."
But Kitcheners refusal to attempt any rebuttal of 
the arguments of his opponents, became the subject of debate 
in the House of Lords on 1 August. His declaration was 
criticised by Ripon, an ex-Viceroy, who had closely followed 
the controversy. Ripon became excited at Kitchener* s pontifi­
cal manner, expressing astonishment at Kitchener*s assertions 
after reading Elies 1 defence:
1. Curzon to Balfcur, 30 March 1905•
2. See Correspondence regarding the Administration of the 
Army^nTnaiar^nclosSe^d in Nq020 Mlnube of Dissent 
by Kitchener, 18 March 1905* Cd. 2572*
"When I turned to Lord Kitchener’s Minute 1 
found no reply at all. I found nothing hut a 
lofty declaration that he would not x*eply 
and that he knew he was quite rightsM
Ripon thought Elies 1 Minute had dealt fairly with the
Commander-in-Chief1 s original criticisms, and that Kitchener,
in his peremptory dismissal of those arguments, weakened his
case*
"In a controversy of this description I am 
always a little inclined to think that a 
person who takes that line and refuses to 
reply in that tone does so because he cannot 
reply, because he has no answer to what his 
opponent has said*"1
Ripon, however, as well as Curzon and his Council, was wholly
unaware of Kitchener’s secret correspondence with Stedman,
for the Commander-in-chief's refusal to reply either in
Council or in any other public document was the result of
his confidence that he had already secured the support of
the Home Government through his secret contacts at home*
These circumstances consequently seriously confused issues
publicly debated In the House of Lords, although Kitchener's
case was thoroughly known to Members of the Home Government
and press.
The confusion of these proceedings led increasingly
p
to vindictive and provocative expressions in Curzon1 s
1* Parliamentary Debates, 4th series, Lords, vol,150,
Ripon's Speech, 1 August 1905? cols. 1090-1*
2* See especially Curzon to Brodrick, 21 Pebruary 1905? and
2 March 1905*
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correspondence with Brodrick. Brodrick, for his part, became
sorely pained by these "heated remonstrances" and reproaches,
and was dismayed that he should have to bear more injury from
Curzon*s words "than from all those with whom I have been
1associated in office during 18 years." But Curzon denounced 
his friend as having a parti pris in his share of these 
negotiations as the two Governments reached a climax in the 
spring of 1905*
(2) The Committee of Seven and the Amputation of the
The Despatch of the Government of India containing 
the four Minutes arrived in England on 8 April# Upon its 
receipt Brodrick convened a secret Committee at the India 
Office to advise him on the issues which it raised. It was 
upon the recommendations of that Committee that the scheme
devised by the India Office and subsequently communicated to
2
the Government of India in a Despatch dated 31 Nay 1905 was 
based.
The terms of reference of the Committee on Indian 
army administration were: to consider the 23 March Despatch 
and four Minutes of the Government of India and to report
1. Brodrick to Curzon, 13 March 1905, Midleton MSS 50077*
2. Correspondence regarding the Administration of the Army
;" m T 2 5 7 T.----  -------------
328
(i) whether it was advisable for Indian army administration 
to he conducted under two separate Military heads of depart­
ment; (2) whether it was advisable to have more than one 
member to provide expert military advice on the Viceroyfs 
Council; (3) what modifications of the system should be 
adopted, and particularly (4) if a single Member of Council 
be henceforward made responsible for army administration, 
whether that Member should be the Commander-in-Chief; 
finally (5) whether it was advisable to provide that proposals 
for army administration should be subject to independent 
criticism for the benefit of the Viceroy in Council, and, if 
so, how this could best be accomplished.
The Committee appointed by Brodrick contained, in 
addition to himself, six men. Originally he intended that 
it should include a Member of the Cabinet (Lord Salisbury), 
two ex-Commanders-in-Chief (Sir George White and Lord Roberts), 
two Members of the India Office Council (Sir John Gordon and 
Sir James Mackay), and a representative of the Opposition 
front-bench, either Lord Elgin or Sir Henry Fowler. Fowler 
was however persuaded by Campbell-Bannerman to decline to 
participate as the latter feared he might in some way be made 
responsible for whatever decision was arrived at and thus 
compromise the position of the Opposition in regard to the
1* See Further Papers regarding the Administration of the 
Army"Iii' lhdiapTIerms of"reference to a Committee on 
Indian Army administration appointed In May, 19051,
No.l, Cd. 2718.
Committee!s re commendation 0 Instead Sir Edward Law, ivho had
just returned from India as Finance Member of the Viceroy1s
Council, agreed to supply information of bow the system was
at that time being worked* Sir Arthur Godley, Permanent Head
of the India Office, was appointed Secretary as well as
Chairman of a small sub-committee and act as "honest broker"
on points of difficulty, though his prejudices were in
favour of Kitchener^ scheme;'*' General Stedman was to act as
Secretary with him* In effect, Brodrickfs Committee was
2packed1 with a number of Kitchener's partisans*
The Committee of Seven had great difficulty in 
resolving one issue; whether or not the Viceroy should have 
a second expert opinion on his Council for consultation in 
military affairs* In the Report of Godley*s sub-committee, 
appointed on 8 May, it was stressed that "The Member of 
Council in charge of the Military Department should be the 
adviser of the Governor-General in Council on questions of 
general policy, as distinct from purely military questions*"*'
One former Military Member, General Sir Henry Brack- 
enbury, was consulted but did not sit on Brodrick1 s Committee 
owing to a weak heart* In his testimony he considered that
1. See Godley to Curzon, 26 May 1905o
2. Barrow to Curzon, 5 August 1905*
3* Further Papers regarding the Administration of the Army 
rnlhcila, EncXo sure ‘ to' HoT20' Report o'f the sub-committee 
appointed 8 May 1905• Cd.2718*
India's best interests lay in retaining the Military Depart­
ment, not under the Commander-in-Claief, but under the control 
of an ordinary Member of Council» He added:
"I am satisfied from my own experience that 
it is not within the power of any ordinary 
man to carry on all the duties which are now 
performed by the Commander-in-Chief and 
Military Member respectively*
That view, in one way or another, was corroborated in the 
testimony obtained from other experts familiar with Indian 
army administration, who were consulted by Brodrick1 s Com­
mittee, These included, in addition to Brackenbury, Lord 
Elgin, Lord Cromer, Sir E. Collen (Elies* predecessor), and 
Sir D* Barbour, Though their opinions were quoted in the 
subsequent report laid before Parliament, their evidence, 
significantly, was witheld* That action had the effect of
eliminating all opposition in Parliament and these facts did
2not become publicly known until 1909*
The Report of the Committee was issued on 26 May 1905* 
and recommended that the Commander-in-Chief should have exclu­
sive control over all strictly military portions of army 
administration; that he should be the only expert on military 
problems, and that junior officers should not criticise pro­
posals emanating from him, though the Viceroy could consult
1, Memorandum by Brackenbury, 10 May 1905*
2, Parliamentary Debates, Lords, Voldl, 4th session,
Curzon*s Speech, 29 June 1909; Godley later admitted as 
much in a letter to Minto, 9 March 1906, Minto MSS 1005*
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1
whom he wished for criticism on military proposals *
Brodrick, basing himself on these recommendations 
composed, within five days, the Despatch embracing their 
views. He sought a compromise that would reconcile Curzon 
with Kitchener, and not excite too much opposition in Par­
liament. Under its provisions the future Military Member 
would confine his work to the quasi-civil and administrative 
side of army administration - contracts, stores, ordnance, 
remounts and military works - in short, all matters related 
to supply. His office was to be termed the Department of 
Military Supply, and he was to wear civilian clothes to 
emphasise the civilian character of his post. All matters of 
a strictly executive military character - appointments, pro­
motion, discipline, training, organisation, preparation and 
defence - were to be the direct responsibility of the 
Commander-in-Chief, who was to be furnished with a secretar­
iat for the purpose* He was empowered to submit his schemes 
direct to the Viceroy!s Council without having to go through 
the channels of the Member for Supply0
That Despatch, along with a second Despatch (Ho.67 
recommending that in order to carry out the proposed chafc^ ges, 
Elies should be relieved of his duties as soon as this could 
be done without financial loss on his part) was communicated
1. Further Papers regarding the Administration of the Army
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to the Government of India as the decision of His Majesty1s 
Government, arriving in India on 18 June. At the same time 
the Government of India were requested to submit any modifi­
cations for the approval of the Secretary of State before 
its implementation on 1 October.
Brodrick*s scheme, and the spirit in which it was 
conveyed, also came under criticism in the House of Lords.
It fell to Lord Lansdowne, the most respected and able 
Minister in Balfour’s Cabinet, to defend it by explaining 
that the Government had had to choose whether or not the 
Viceroy should have on his Council a second military expert 
to render advice:
"We found ourselves in the position of having 
to decide between the demand of Lord Kitchener 
that the Office of Military Member should be 
absolutely put an end to, and the view of the 
Government of India that it should be pre­
served and that he should remain very much in 
the position which he had always occupied, and 
we decided against Lord Kitchener•1
The great question at issue now became whether the Government
intended that the Viceroy's Council should have a second
opinion to act as a check upon the proposals of a Commander-
in-Chief o Lord Roberts, who served on Brodrick*s Committee,
asserted:
"I have no hesitation In saying that, in my 
opinion, it is essential to the security of
1. Parliamentary Debates, 4th series, Lords, vol*150, 
Lansdownefs Speech, 1 August 1905? Col.1117.
There is no evidence to suggest if in fact the Cabinet 
ever saw the actual despatch before it was sent.
3** Q
India that the Viceroy should not he dependent 
on the advice of a single soldier, however 
eminent and distinguished he may be.”!
It was particularly important to have a second adviser in
case the Commander-in-Chief was, as in the present case, a
complete stranger to India* But the day before the Lords
dehate, Roberts had been sent a strongly-worded letter by
Brodrick, attempting to dissuade him from mentioning the
subject.^
Apart from confusion about the precise role of the 
second Military Adviser, doubts were raised about the tone 
of Brodrickfs Despatch, for Brodrick had alluded to the 
”startling discrepancy” between Kitchener and the Viceroy*s 
Council, and his opening remarks were couched in the language 
of reproach, at the lack of co-ordination between the Depart­
ments of the Indian Government. Because of their unwilling­
ness to admit to any fault in that system, the Government 
of India was ordered to put an end to the conflict of 
authority and give the Commander-in-Chief greater freedom. 
That represented a stinging rebuke to the Viceroy and Lord 
Ripon now came to his defence:
”.*♦ if there is one point on which the 
Secretary of State ought to be very cautious 
about interfering with the Viceroy it is in 
the management of the business of the
1. Parliamentary Debates, 4th series, Lords, vol.150, 
Roberts1 Speech, 1 August 1905? cols. 1096-7*
2. Brodrick to Roberts, 31 July 1905; James, D.R., Life of 
Lord Roberts, p.421,
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Viceroy's own Council* The final despatch 
of Mr* Brodrick says - 'This has "been decided, 
and that has teen decided, and your arrange­
ments made by October 1st*' I venture respect­
fully to say that that is not the tone in 
which the Viceroy of India ought to be addressed* 
I do not believe, my Lords, that since the days 
of Lord Ellenborough's famous despatch to Lord 
Canning about the affairs of Oudh, any Government 
of India has received such a rebuff in the face 
of India and in the face of the world* Recollect 
this, that the order issued to Lord Curzon in 
regard to the distribution of business in his 
Council deprives him of a discretion which has 
been given to him by Act of Parliament; and I 
think that even if that can be justified, which 
I greatly doubt, it ought at least to have been 
indicated in gentler terms and in more civil 
phrases, and that the document in which it was 
sent to the Viceroy ought not to have been 
published* Many a Viceroy would have given a 
very short shrift to a proceeding of that 
description* "3*
Brodrick's Despatch would indeed have benefitted had 
it been drawn up by the more tactful Godley* On its receipt, 
according to Godley, Curzon completely severed his friend- 
ship with Brodrick and 'declared war1 on the India Office* 
Curzon, who took no part in the compromise, soon realised 
that on the fundamental question of principle he had been 
overruled and found he was left with a mutilated Supply 
Member, which he dubbed the 'Director of the Indian Army and 
Navy Stores (Limited)'* He was prepared to resign at once 
after he had studied the Despatch (which reached Simla on
1* Parliamentary Debates, 4th series, Lords, vol.150,
Ripon1 s Speech, 1 August 1905, Co'ls *1091 ff.
2. Kilbracken, Reminiscences, p.181.
18 June and was published in a special Gazette of India on 
23 June). He refrained from so doing on being implored by 
his colleagues not to desert them and ,Tto stay and mould the 
new organisation into something workable: so that the control 
of the Government of India may not go altogether by the 
board, and the whole Military Administration pass, when I 
go, into Kitchener's hands."
Lord Roberts had been asked by Brodrick!s Committee 
to inform Kitchener of the nature of the new proposals, and 
he explained that Elies was to be retired and that the new 
Supply Member would be powerless to interfere with the 
Commander-in-Chief and would only advise the Viceroy's 
Council on the financial and political aspects of military 
questions. Roberts mentioned that everyone in London had
agreed that it would be unwise to deprive the Council of the
2advice of a second military expert. But Kitchener had been 
privately informed of this news before Roberts1 letter 
arrived. Lord Esher who had previously sxiggested to Balfour 
that the new Supply member should be merely a consultative 
Member of Council and that he should have no administrative 
function whatever, indicated that "this, coupled with a 
change in personnel, might possibly be accepted by Lord
1. Curzon to Clinton Dawkins, 21 June 1905 •
2. Roberts to Kitchener, 1 June 1905, Kitchener MSS 30/57/28. 
3o See Kitchener to Marker, 1 June 1905, Marker MSS 52276.
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1Kitchener*M Por his part Kitchener was rather surprised at
the outcomes
"I suppose a compromise can never "be quite 
satisfactory*, I shall try my very best to 
make the system work so that when I hand it 
over to my successor it may be thoroughly 
established and have given confidence to 2 
those who doubt all Military administration.1’
The Government, however, was considerably disturbed 
during this period by the turn of events. Balfour confided 
to Esher that the ’Kitchener business in India” was one of 
”three rocks ahead of the Government” and that in the event 
of failure at compromise ”1 think the P*M# will let the 
Government go# George Curzon writes that if he is overruled, 
both he and his Council resign, but that he is sure K 0 does 
not mean resignation. K. writes that if he is overruled he 
resigns, but that there is no fear of George Curzon quitting 
India under any circumstances#”^
The Cabinet, according to Curzon1 s friend Clinton 
Dawkins, was "in a state of great perplexity and no little 
trepidation” at the possibility of Kitchener’s resignation# 
In any case, Balfour’s Parliamentary existence was at stake 
and the Cabinet felt that if it had to break with either the 
Viceroy or with the Commander-in-Chief, that action would be 
misrepresented and attacked, not only by the Opposition but
1# Esher to Balfour, 19 May 1905? Balfour MSS 49718#
2, Kitchener to George Clarke, 22 June 1905? Sydenham MSS
50855.
3# Esher, Journals, II (18 April 1905)? pp#83~4„
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by discontented Members of its own party. According to 
Dawkins, if the Cabinet broke with Curzon,
nthe Opposition will say 'Here is the Govern­
ment allowing a Military Dictatorship1• If 
it breaks with Kitchener, then the cry will 
be fHere is the Government breaking with our 
one military expert - here is more civilian 
interference with military questions which 
has resulted in such a chaos at the War Office 
and in the Army'."1
Furthermore, although Esher told Sandars (on 4 May) 
that Mthere again there is room for compromise" he also 
contended that the fact which stood out "with absolute 
clearness amid all this controversy" was that the Cabinet 
could not possibly "allow Lord Ka to leave India at this 
moment when great military changes are in progress, only 
half-completedo" It was a question of choosing the lesser 
evil. "Even if Kitchener were wrong, which I don!t think he
is, to allow him now to throw up his task would be to choose
2the greater evil*" The broad fact remained that military
reform in India was long overdue and that Kitchener, "whose
talents are generally admitted to be primarily administrative,
condemns as thoroughly unsound the present system of army
3administration.
1. Clinton Dawkins to Curzon, 18 April 1905* Balfour may 
have been additionally deterred from recalling Curzon 
because he could not afford to antagonise the.’ Imperialist 
wing of the Tory party at the time.
2. Esher to Sandars, 4 May 1905* Esher, Journals, II, pp.84-5*
3. Ibid*, p087„
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Kitchener, in tlie meantime, had "been privately 
disturbed hy the crushing defeat he had suffered at the 
hands of Curzon1s Council, who he described as the slaves of 
the Viceroy and fully expected their opposition: 111 do not 
blame them” he wrote to Marker, ”They would never be Lt. 
Governors or anything else if they did not come in to the 
whip and that is all they think and care for,” He e:Kplained 
that if he won the principle for which he contended, ”1 
shall not be difficult in coming to an arrangement so that 
he may save his face - of course I am supposing it goes my
way ... Curzon and his pocket Council will be the difficulty
2
to get over for the Government at home*" But Kitchener was 
not unduly sanguine as to the result, and grumbled at the 
composition of Brodrick*s Committee, that there were ”too 
many on it” and that it was "very unfair to put such a 
partisan as Ld* Bobs [Roberts] on it* He has already written 
his views officially against my proposals and is not likely 
to change * They might almost as well have put Curzon on* I 
do not think this is treating me quite fairly*
Curzon, however, was under no illusion about the 
effect produced by the Committee of Seven: Kitchener had 
triumphed* He predicted that, unless it was found possible 
to remodel the scheme by modification, two possible results
1* Kitchener to Marker, 9 March 1905i Marker MSS 52276*
2* Ibid., 17 May 1905.
5. Ibid•, 25 May 1905.
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would occur.
"Either the new Military Member will be found 
to be so useless ^ such, a fifth wheel in the 
coach (while still acting as a Military drag 
in the Council) that there will be before 
long (very likely from Kitchener himself if he 
stays long enough) a demand that he should be 
replaced by a civilian: or the independence 
and autocracy of the Commander-in-Chief, 
particularly with a new Viceroy? will be so 
soon established that the new organisation 
will break down irretrievably, like most of 
Brodrick1 s creations. *. " ^
Furthermore? Cur son was convinced that the civil authority
of the Government of India was being subordinated to military
control and accordingly? he drew up his forces to wage a
monumental battle for the sound principles of administration
to which he had consistently adhered.
(3) Curzon's Resignation.
"I resigned for . two great principles, 
firstly? the hitherto uncontested, the ess­
ential, and in the long run indestructible 
subordination of military to civil authority 
in the administration of all well-conducted 
states, and secondly, the payment of due and 
becoming regard to Indian authority in deter­
mining India’s needs
It is difficult? even with the documents before us, 
and taking full account of the Government's dilemma at the 
time, to be certain how far the Commander-in-Chief was 
responsible for what proved to be a most humiliating episode,
1, Curzon to Clinton Dawkins, 21 June 1905«
2o Curzon!s Byculla Speech, 16 November 1905? in I.Raleigh, 
opocit,, p.587*
On the one hand, Brodrick had long decided to render unto 
Kitchener the things that Kitchener claimed; on the other, 
he attempted to reconcile Curzon and Kitchener and thus 
prevent a resignation which would only damage the already 
internally torn Government, as well as India®
Brodrick claimed that his scheme provided a "genuine 
solution1 to the problem of Indian army administration, one 
which would 1 stand any amount of hammering1 * He further 
explained that his real intention lay in 1Tmaking it clear 
that we really desired to do what we could to smooth matters 
down1* between Kitchener and Elies * Xet because he had fore­
seen the difficulty 1 about; conveying to you a decision with 
which you might not agree1 he had proposed a Commission of 
Enquiry, as we have shown in Chapter V (3)? and when this 
had proved abortive, he professed that now the Government 
had sought a system for India "which would work for all time" 
and not one "which is a sort of patched-up truce between
Kitchener and yourself, and which does not even satisfy
2either of you®"
In that letter he emphasised "Ho one here wishes you 
to resign", and conceded that when he came to judge the case 
on its merits he was irresistibly forced by his experience of
1* Correspondence Regarding the Administration of the Army 
in In&xa, SNFoIB 3 JT’Ilay 19®? OcU ^3?^*
2* Brodrick to Curzon, 30 June 1905*
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military administration to agree that some change was nec­
essary "though I supported you as vigorously as a man could 
. ♦ ♦ as to the inadvisability of entirely merging the Military 
Department in the Gommander-in-Ghief *" He also said: "I am 
very sanguine that we shall get through this crisis, as we 
have many others*That confession revealed the inherent 
weakness of BrodrickS compromise* Though persuasive, it 
lacked conviction; it encouraged the belief that a genuine 
solution had been found between conflicting parties* It did 
not take Curzon long to discover the fallacy underlying the 
Governments compromise; it lay in the question of the Vice­
roys access to a second military adviser* BrodrickS real 
intentions on that issue were obscure* Both Roberts and
Lansdowne had stressed the unwisdom of depriving the Vice-
2royS Council of expert military advice; and the confusion 
may well have emanated from the fact that though Brodrick 
had circulated the Report of his Committee of Seven, dated 
26 May, to the Cabinet, the Despatch of 31 May, which was 
sent to Curzon and subsequently published in mid-June, was 
not seen or approved by them* BrodrickS Despatch brushed 
aside Elies' and CurzonS objections and that of the Viceroy's 
Council; and it was perhaps inevitable that it should lack 
impartialityo Brodrick in fact had no scruples in exploiting
1* Brodrick to Curzon, 30 June 1905.
2. See Parliamentary Debates, 4th series, Lords, 1 August 
1905® c0f0 supra, pp. 332-3.
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the evidence in favour of abolition, while suppressing that 
which was unfavourable0 Finally, although unable to mention 
that Kitchener had made his resignation a potent weapon to 
promote his objective, Brodrick urged that in the face of 
Kitchener's statement that his schemes were subject to 
"enormous delay and endless discussion" and of "vexatious" 
and "unnecessary criticism", in future "The Commander-in- 
Chief will wield powers and possess machinery adequate for 
the furtherance of his schemes." Furthermore, it was asserted 
that the new Military Supply Member was specifically to 
advise the Viceroy's Council "on questions of general policy 
as distinct from purely military questions." The impact of 
that document on the Government of India was significant*
The success of Brodrick's Despatch and its compromise 
was no real criterion of the failure of Curzon to convince 
Ministers in London; for that is to be judged rather by the 
evidence of Kitchener's press campaign, as we have seen in 
Chapter V (5)* Moreover the official records of these pro­
ceedings are notable for what they do not tell us - and 
consequently we must fill in the circumstances as best we 
can* Curzon's discomfiture was extreme. It was thus, in a 
mood of mortification that he now dealt the Home Government 
a bold blow* On 26 June Curzon cabled that unless certain
1* Correspondence Regarding the Administration of the Army 
InTSaia';"lb» 3 -----------------
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modifications were made to Brodrick!s scheme, "both he and
1Kitchener would resign*. It will he convenient to retrace 
and examine the causes which led to that action, and it is 
essential to explain that Curzon and his Council had heen 
kept in the dark during Brodrick1s secret proceedings, 
prejudicing them against the Despatch from the start* On 24 
June, Curzon had consulted his colleagues in the preparation 
of papers and in the course they should follow; at their 
request he agreed to meet Kitchener on the next day to con­
sider modifying Brodrick*s schemeQ
The discussion was held on the afternoon of Sunday,
25 June, and lasted one-and-a-half hours. Curzon informed 
Kitchener that he could not understand how the new Supply 
Member was to advise on ‘general policy' as distinct from 
•purely military questions*. Moreover, he threatened to 
resign unless Kitchener signified assent to the modifications 
which he now suggested0 There were five in number and 
included that the designation of the name 'Military Member* 
be retained and that he should be available for consultation 
by the Viceroy's Council® Thereupon Kitchener, realising the 
gravity of the situation which would thereby be created, 
impulsively offered to place his resignation in Curzon*s 
hands and agreed to associate himself with whatever action 
the Viceroy might take. These modifications, according to
1* Curzon to Balfour, Telegram, 26 June 1905*
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Curzon, were embodied in a draft-telegram and submitted for
inspection to E13.es, Duff and Kitchener. On the next day,
Monday 26 June, Kitchener replied accepting them:
"Duff has explained to me the points about 
which you intend to telegraph to the Secretary 
of State. Though I cannot say that I consider 
some of them to be improvements on the pro­
posals in the Despatch, there are none which 
I am not willing to accept in deference to 
your wishes."1
Curzon then cabled those modifications to the Prime Minister.
His proposals were intended to safeguard "the practical
efficiency1' of the new Member of Council, "who will thus be
available for consultations by the Government, with full
2[knowledge of all that is passing."
This news stunned the Government and produced a
sensation in the Cabinet. Balfour was so astonished at this
concurrence that he immediately sent a cable requesting a
full statement of Kitchener!s "reasons for apparent change
of view" as this new version appeared "quite inconsistent
x
with his Minute already laid before Parliament*"^ Thereupon,
zl
with Kitchener's approval, Curzon cabled: "Lord Kitchener 
and I are in absolute agreement, and this telegram is sent
and signed by both of us" and that if His Majesty's Govern­
ment refused to accept these joint proposals, "Lord Kitchener
1. Kitchener to Curzon, 26 June 1905*
2. Curzon to Balfour, Telegram, 26 June 1905*
3* Balfour to Gurzon, Telegram, 29 June 1905*
4. See Curzon to Kitchener, 29 June 1905.
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desires to associate himself with any action that I may take
1in the matterc"
Fully conscious of the obstructions against which
he would have to contend, Curzon nevertheless took that
calculated risk in order to make it clear to the Government
that he would refuse to enter into any agreement unless a
formal and explicit understanding were reached in advance as
to the position of the new Member* However much Curzon*s
formalist proposition may have been resented at the time,
his insistence on guarantees for the sound principles which
he advocated reveals that in his dealings with Kitchener he
was no amateur diplomatist* Brodrick buffeted the Viceroy's
position by refusing to tolerate the status quo and what he
termed Curzon*s 'splendid isolation* 5 he was reluctant to
recede from his own position on the grounds that "anyone who
holds the limited power which is incidental to public
2service" must be "willing to accept advice." Curzon
however was merely unwilling to accept Brodrick *s advice 
given to meet Kitchener's requirements*
Meanwhile in London, Balfour expressed his satisfac­
tion that Curzon and Kitchener agreed: "I am delighted that 
what seems to Brodrick and myself a satisfactory arrangement 
can now be come too" He happily concluded that the modifica­
tions met with general approval and all parties were, after
1. Curzon to Balfour, Telegram, 30 June 1905*
2. Brodrick to Curzon, 30 June 1905-
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all, in harmony with the intention of the original Despatch***"
That view was reinforced by Brodrick two weeks later, who
also deemed "it a matter of satisfaction" that, although
Curzon was adverse to change, the points which he raised
appeared to leave the scheme’s "general principles untouched",
and that Kitchener, "whose decided preference for more
drastic changes had great weight with His Majesty’s Govern-
2
ment, is now in accord with the rest of your Government*" 
Finally, following a painful exchange of strongly worded 
telegrams, Brodrick professed his desire to settle the 
question once and for all upon the lines to which Curzon and 
Kitchener had agreed:
"His Majesty’s Government desire to avoid a 
prolongation of the controversy, and they 
are content to regard it as closed by your 
declaration of the utmost desire to carry 
out loyally a policy decided upon by His 
Majesty’s Government, which they accept 
unreservedly*
But Balfour complained to the King that the accounts given 
by the Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief were at wide variance 
with one another:
"Neither of these eminent men can be said to 
emerge from the controversy with any credit 
whatever * But as they have come to a working 
agreement and as this agreement leaves un­
touched the essence of the proposals which, 
largely in consequence of Lord Kitchener’s 
views, the Government have pressed on the 
Viceroy, it seemed to the Cabinet that ’least 
said soonest mended1 and they therefore
1. Balfour to Curzon, Telegram, 1 July 1905*
2. Brodrick to Curzon, Telegram, 14 July 1905. 
3* Ibid*, 25 July 1905•
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resolved not to make more bad blood even by 
the most legitimate condemnation of the tone 
which the Viceroy has thought fit to adopt in 
his recent utterances."!
There for the moment the matter rested. However Brodrick1s
Despatch could hardly have been calculated to pour oil on
2troubled waters in India. The Times had pointedly commented 
that its tone was "unnecessarily harsh" and that the Secretary 
of State had displayed tactlessness and lack of consideration 
in his treatment of the Indian Government. Nevertheless 
Brodrick had described its tone as "excellent".4
It was now Curzon1s misfortune to feel surprise at 
the turn of events. Apparently, considerable misunderstanding 
had arisen regarding the underlying principle of the modifi­
cations he sought, and the alterations for which he had 
asked* On 3 July he telegraphed:
"Kitchener and I distinctly contemplate that 
Military Member shall be available for con­
sultation by Viceroy at his discretion upon 
all questions."5
In order that these proposals would not be valueless, a week
later he reiterated his desire to secure an effective working
1. Balfour to Edward VII, 25 July 1905, Balfour MSS 49685.
2. Minto later reported to Morley that "I do not think that 
I have ever met anyone who approved of the Despatch of 
the 31st May. Kitchener himself says that it was disas­
trous, that it put everybody*s back up, and that if it had 
not been written he believes the new organisation could 
have been introduced without much difficulty, and that 
indeed Curzon himself had once proposed to him something 
very similar to it." Minto to Morley, 10 January 1906, 
Minto MSS 1006.
3. The Times, 29 June 1905.
4. BrodrrcE*to Curzon, 30 June 1905.
5* Curzon to Balfour, Telegram, 3 July 1905.
348
scheme "by attempting "to provide Viceroy and Council with
1
alternative military advice*"
That, however, was not the intention of the Home
Government, and Brodrick replied that Curzon appeared "to
show that you have misapprehended the intention and the
practical effect" of his orders and that he therefore could
not allow the new Member to "have any special claim to be
consulted" or to note on the proposals of the Commander-in- 
2Chief. The receipt of that telegram shattered any illusions
as to the real purpose of Brodrick1s decision* He desired to
make Kitchenerxs voice supreme in the affairs of Indian army 
administration. On 16 July Curzon learned*' of Brodrick's 
intention to nominate an officer from England to the newly 
formed Department of Military Supply. He immediately tele­
graphed back that he was about to recommend Major-General Sir 
Edmund Barrow (1852-1934) £°r post of Military Supply 
Member, as one of the ablest soldiers in India and acceptable
Zl
to both Kitchener and himself. Barrow, moreover, was an 
officer well qualified to undertake the difficult task of 
introducing the new military organisation. Curzon asked only 
for the support of the Home Government in his selection of 
the Military Supply Member;
1. Curzon to Brodrick, Telegram, 10 July 1905*
2. Brodrick to Curzon, Telegram, 14 July 1905*
3. See Brodrick to Curzon, Telegram, 16 July 1905*
4. Curzon to Brodrick, Telegram, 17 July 1905*
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,rIt must "be evident tliat I can only satisfac­
torily inaugurate new system with aid of 
Military Colleague in whose experience, judg- 
ment, and ability I have fullest confidence♦,."
He reasonably expected first that Barrow would be empowered
to give general military advice to his Council, and second
that his suggestion as to the person best qualified for this
purpose should be favourably entertained.
On 1 August Brodrick telegraphed that Barrow was not
2acceptable to the Cabinet* Curzon was greatly disappointed 
by that refusal: "You refuse to grant me the assistance of 
the officer whom I hold to be preeminently suited for the 
task, and whom I selected with the knowledge that he could 
and would loyally co-operate in carrying out" the wishes of 
of the Home Government* Curzon appealed for re-consideration 
of his views; he protested that Barrow was the most competent 
person to advise on military affairs and that Kitchener had 
himself agreed to Barrowfs name, Finally, he was dismayed to 
learn he was to have no say whatever in the nomination of 
the new officer to be selected by Brodrick. Simultaneously 
he asked that Brodrick modify his attitude, and thus enable 
him to accept a responsibility which he inferred the Home 
Government still desired him to assume.
Brodrick replied on 4 August refusing to appoint
1. Curzon to Brodrick, 2 August 1905*
2* Brodrick to Curzon, Telegram, 1 August 1905.
5. Curzon to Brodrick, Telegram, 2 August 1905*
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Barrow, as lie "can hardly he expected to inaugurate the new
system with, an open mind." He then directed Curzon to "con­
sult Kitchener as to who in his opinion is the hest qualified
1man for the post, and let me have his views." That request
merely added insult to injury, and Ourzon retorted that
Kitchener "did not and does not consider it any part of the
duty of Commander-in-Chief to recommend to Secretary of
State .,. a Member of Viceroy!s Council - an appointment for
2making which you have asserted sole responsibility." Curzon 
informed Brodrick that he realised that the Home Government 
differed fundamentally in their interpretation of the meaning 
they attached to the modifications of their scheme, and 
which they had accepted and on which alone he had consented 
to remain in office.^ His position was undermined and there­
fore, in principle, "almost exactly where it was when I 
telegraphed my resignation on 26 June; and the main conditions 
which caused me to resign on that occasion have again been 
called into being.Since he felt unable to discharge his 
public duty conscientiously, and was not prepared to assist 
in the introduction of a system of military administration 
which he regarded as unworkable and calculated to imperil 
the control of the Government of India over military affairs, 
he requested that a new Viceroy should be asked to attempt 
it; and he begged that Balfour "place my resignation at once
1. Brodrick to Ourzon, Telegram, 4 August 1905*
2. Ourzon to Brodrick, Telegram, 5 August 1905*
5* Ibido
4. Ibid*5 Telegram, 12 August 1905*
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I
in the hands of His Majesty the King.”
Having thus committed himself to the principle of a
second military adviser, it remained for the India Office,
in order to restore the peace between Curzon and Kitchener,
to bring forward a nominee mutually acceptable to both, or
to accept Curzon*s resignation© The Home Government did
neither, and an intricate situation, in this connection,
arose, Curzon was incensed by what he considered a new
affront when the India Office informed him they would appoint
the new ’Supply Member1 without consulting the Viceroy, to
which he replied:
”1 have failed to receive either the information 
or the assurance which I sought, and I am reluc­
tantly driven to the conclusion that the policy 
of His Majesty’s Government differs fundament­
ally from what I thought had been agreed upon 
with the Government of India, and is basnd on 
principles which I could not conscientiously 
carry into execution.”
In these circumstances it might perhaps be asked, 
why did Curzon not resign outright at the announcement 
imposing the decision? Dominating Curzon1 s conscience was 
his sense of ’responsibility’ with its associated virtues or 
defects of duty, sacrifice and justice* Curzon had told 
Balfour that his colleagues "pressed upon me most emphatically 
that it was a higher duty on my part to stay, in order to
1. Curzon to Brodrick, Telegram, 12 August 1905.
2. Ibid©
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give the new organisation a chance of vitality, and that to 
desert the helm at such a moment would merely involve the 
ship in worse disaster*” Ourzon yielded to their advice on 
condition that Brodrick*s scheme would he modified* His 
action at first sight might appear unedifying, hut on closer 
inspection this sequence is less cynical than one would 
imagine, for the central core of Curzon1 s philosophy was the 
ideal of integrity in the conduct of all public administra-
p
tion* Moreover, Curzon1 s insistence that he he given his 
own man to work the scheme rohhed him of what must have 
otherwise proved to he unqualified success, for Kitchener 
had verbally assented to the selection of Barrow.^ Curzon*s 
position had in fact been sabotaged*
In urging Barrow*s appointment, Curzon argued that 
it was not a question of persons hut of principle, "to 
assist me in carrying out their policy with the greatest
Zl
chance of success©1 As Kitchener had agreed to Barrow, he
could not understand the Cabinet's reluctance to appoint him.
The Government however were only awaiting an opportunity of 
striking the Viceroy down* Curzon then claimed that the 
Government had destroyed "a system which worked to the 
general satisfaction until Kitchener appeared upon the scene,” 
and then had thrown "our military constitution into a crucible
1* Curzon to Balfour, 27 July 1905o
2. Nicolson, Curzon; The Last Phase, p 016.
3* See infra, p*
4. Curzon to Brodrick, Telegram* 12 August 1905*
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from which., if English precedents are followed, it will not
p
emerge until after years of controversy and chaos0" Kitchen­
er had come to India in order to destroy the Military Depart­
ment and had virtually set himself up as Military Dictator - 
in fact had triumphed - and the Viceroy resigned on that 
issue aloneo
The bitterness of these proceedings was further 
heightened by two incidents which dramatised the complete 
breach between the Government of India and the Cabinet over 
the question of army reform. On 18 July Curzon explained to 
the Legislative Council the nature of the modifications which 
he and Kitchener had agreed to demand before accepting the 
Governments scheme* Extracts of that speech, which contained 
several passages to which Brodrick took exception, were 
cabled to London by Reuters and created a false impression. 
Curzon stated that the Government of India "learned to their 
regret" that their advice was refused and claimed that "They 
may be pardoned if they were somewhat surprised at the 
manner in which it was thought necessary to convey these 
orders." He justified this public statement on the grounds 
that the Indian public had a right to be kept informed of
p
the nature of the settlement. " Curzon then received a curt
1. Curzon to Balfour, 19 July 1905.
2. Curzon to Brodrick, Telegram, 20 July 1905; see also 
The Times, 19 July 1905*
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telegram from Brodrick,’*' and learned that the Opposition 
front bench had made an attack on the Government1 s policy 
and were planning to move a vote of censure on the Viceroy !s 
conduct.. Ourzon1 s indignation was boundless when he heard 
that Sir Henry Fowler referred to his speech as a "severe and
p
offensive criticism" of the Government, and that Fowler 
wanted to force a debate on the issue. (But Lord George 
Hamilton was prepared to defend Ourzonrs position against 
Opposition attack and hoped that "the subject will die a 
natural death..." and that he would not resign).^ nonethe­
less, Curzon told Ampthill that Fowler's attack was "outrag­
eous" and asserted that "It is commonly believed here that 
Brodrick must have put Fowler up to ask the question - in 
order to get the Opposition committed to his side." He termed 
Brodrick*s treatment "spiteful"1 and that he was a man "who 
has failed in every office that he has filled" and would 
"never have had the chance of being a failure as Secretary 
for India if he had not already been a failure as Secretary
for War." The full text of his speech appeared in The limes 
5on 21 July, but the damage was done. It is just possible 
that Brodrick delayed giving any notice of the settlement in 
Parliament for the express purpose of giving Kitchener
1. Brodrick to Ourzon, Telegram, 19 July 1905; The Times,
19 July 1905o See also Balfour to Edward VII, 19 July 1905, 
Balfour MSS 49685®
2. See The Times, 20 July 1905*
5® Hamiiton*T;o Curzon, 26 July 1905.
4. Curzon to Ampthill, 23 July 1905*
The Times, 21 July 1905®
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sufficient time to reply, secretly, as to what was transpir­
ing in India, and by thus keeping the India Office informed
of his plans, enabling the Government to prepare their case
1against Curzon, as we shall see.
(The Viceroy now became the victim of further mis-
p
understanding* On 19 August Kitchener repudiated the des­
cription of his proposals as contained in the summary which
*
Curzon had earlier sent home on 10 August. In that telegram 
the Viceroy estimated that the new Supply Member would not 
have 1 two hours1 work a day" and that the creation of the
K
post would "involve an unpardonable waste of public money."
Kitchener, to whom Curzon showed this telegram, promptly
claimed that the Viceroy had misrepresented his intentions
and produced a memorandum criticising in detail Curzon fs
view of the facts, in the meantime communicating, on 14
August, a statement intended to correct misunderstanding of
c
his views to (The Dimes.^  Curzon replied in turn by
1. It is important to bear in mind that during this period
of acute crisis Curzon*s irritability was enhanced by
much compounded illness and suffering. Confined to his bed, 
experiencing "diarrohea and dysentry" and constantly 
wracked by spinal paralysis, the Viceroy had a waning 
capacity to cope with the many worries confronting him and 
he wrote of the Secretary of State; "My official existence 
has long ceased, under Brodrick’s treatment, to be any­
thing but a source of pain and distress." This helps to 
explain the bitterness which surrounded his resignation.
See Curzon to Ampthill, 23 July 1905.
2. Kitchener to Curzon, 19 August 1905*
3. See Curzon to Brodrick, (Telegram, 10 August 1905*
4. Ibid.
5* (The (Times, 14 August 1905*
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substantiating in every particular bis previous summary main­
taining bis original view tbat Kitchener at tbat time bad 
made no objection to them. Since the telegram of 10 August 
was about to be published in connection with Ourzon1s resig­
nation, Kitchener demanded the publication of bis memorandum,
thereupon Curzon warned tbat be would be compelled to issue
2
with it bis own rejoinder*
Tbat sequence of events rapidly converted a public 
controversy into a personal quarrel, hopelessly confusing 
matters in London as reflected in the following note by 
Balfour to bis private secretary:
"It is a wretched world and I really cannot get 
to the bottom of the Kitchener-Curzon squabble*
K* distinctly declares tbat G*C* is a liar: G.C. 
with very little circumlocution indicates tbat 
bis opinion of K. may be similarly expressed. 
Barrow!s evidence [see Barrow to Curzon, 19 
September 1905]* certainly goes to show tbat K. 
did not behave straightforwardly about the 
appointment of the new Military Member, and G.C. 
writes to me in the most positive manner tbat 
in no single particular has be misrepresented K *I 
I do not easily think ill of mankind but, upon 
my word, these two old friends of mine are 
gradually compelling me to take a very dark 
view of our poor fallen nature*"^*
1. See Curzon to Brodrick, Telegram, 18 August 1905*
2„ Ibid.
3. Barrow maintained tbat Kitchener "did virtually acquiesce 
in my appointment" and "tbat there was an intrigue against 
you going on ... in the hopes of bringing on a crisis" 
by which Curzon would be driven to resign. See Barrow to 
Curzon, 19 September 1905•
4-. Balfour to Sandars, 20 October 1905, Balfour MSS 4-9764-.
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Unfortunately for the Viceroy the conduct of Ihe 
limes had heen carefully managed hy the India Office owing 
to their fear of his retaliation and Curzon did not dis­
appoint them* Sandars in mid-August informed Balfour that he 
had forfeited nyour half-crown" for Curzon had, at last, 
resigned. Because Sandars expected "that G.C. [Curzon] will
pull all the wires at his end" he had proposed seeing Buckle
1of Ihe limes about preparing the Governments case* Ihe 
next day Sandars, in consultation with Godley at the India 
Office, suggested that Curzon should not be left in India 
any longer than necessary as he would cause much "mischief", 
and^that Godley suggested having .Ampthill act temporarily
p
until such time as Minto could take over* Accordingly, on 
17 August, with Brodrick’s permission, all Curzon1 s telegrams 
were shown by Godley to Buckle^ with the result that, on the 
merits of the military administration issue, the Government 
were placed in the right and Curzon in the wrong. Ihese 
events, in conjunction with Curzon1 s resignation, caused 
Godley to comment that the whole thing had gone off "better 
than might have been expected*"^
Godley passed the gravest censure on Curzon’s pro­
ceedings which he attributed to physical "paralysis"* He
1. Sandars to Balfour, 14 August 1905? Balfour MSS 49763*
2* Ibid,, 15 August 1905*
3* rbicL ■> 17 August 1905*
4. Godley to Sandars, 22 August 1905? Balfour MSS 49857*
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believed however that the English press were generally
inclined to view the Viceroy as a * coming man1 ♦ Godley asked:
"But is he? As a subordinate, he is hence­
forward impossible; as Prime Minister, can 
he ever form a Gov't? As I have said more 
than once, I think his mission now is to 
form and lead the Grand Ducal Party in this 
country 0 M ■*-
By the end of August the Government had thoroughly
prepared its case, and Lansdowne, who heartily approved of
the appointment of Minto, told Balfour: "Curzon and Kitchener
are making things warm for one another, whereas our tempera-
2ture need not rise*" Curzon protested against the way in
which he was being treated by his colleagues in London.
Against him official standards of conduct were waived in
favour of Kitchener!s schemes, and that action, he believed,
was incompatible either with sound public administration or
3the principles of constitutional Government.
A month later Curzon turned to face his critics. The 
press attack in The Times of 28 August deeply wounded his 
pride as it virtually accused him of misrepresenting the 
facts of the controversy. He vehemently replied by asking 
Buckle to "relieve me from a particularly unjust and undes­
erved reproach" in the charges brought against him. He 
assured him that Brodrick!s compromise "by no means solved
1. Godley to Sandars, 22 August 1905? Balfour MSS 49857*
2. Lansdowne to Balfour, 28 August 1905, Balfour MSS 49729*
3. See Curzon to Haldane,. 11 October 1905*
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the question, and I look forward at no distant date to a 
great awakening of public opinion at home* Ho Government can 
dictate an unwelcome and unworkable constitution to India,
T
and expect success,” In the event the truth of Curzon!s 
prophesy proved to be only partially correct* Within two 
years Brodrick!s scheme was abandoned, within four abolished; 
while within a decade the new system of Indian army adminis­
tration tragically collapsed in Mesopotamia,
Inasmuch as a public attack on the Government 
involved the prestige of the Monarch's representative in 
India, King Edward intervened to prevent further publicity.. 
In the meantime, Brodrick had lost no opportunity to try and 
prevent public recognition for Curzon*s services and this 
necessitated persuading the King of the rectitude of the 
Governments position in upholding Kitchener and cancelling 
any mark of royal approval on Curzonrs Viceroyalty. On 25 
July, Brodrick had informed King Edward that Curzon and 
Kitchener were "irreconcilable”, carefully pointing out that 
as he was really Curzon1 s best friend he hoped that he might 
yet bring about some working agreement, When Curzon1 s resig­
nation had been laid before the King, who was at Marienbad, 
on 13 August, and the announcement made on 21 August, King 
Edward at once sent, on 22 August, a handsome tribute
1. Curzon to G*E. Buckle, editor of (The limes, 21 September i g o 5  ^
acknowledging Curzon's services while consoling him upon his
1enforced resignation0 In the meantime Curzon wrote to 
Knollys, the King's private secretary, that the Home Govern­
ment had completely "plumped" for Kitchener and that he had
obtained "the complete military supremacy which he has all
2
along desired*"
Prom the tangle of those events several facts 
emerge: Curzon had pressed for the publication of his tele­
graphic correspondence only in so far as it related to the 
circumstances surrounding his resignation. On public grounds 
however, he deprecated the publication of anything in the 
nature of papers which must give rise to the appearance of 
an acrimonious and personal wrangle between himself and
Zl
Kitchener* Kitchener however persisted in the matter, 
pressing for publication and Brodrick did not see how this 
was to be avoided "if Kitchener thinks that his proposals 
have been misrepresented" and that the "sooner it takes place 
the better.
The immediate result of these incidents was to bring 
down a storm of abuse attacking the Viceroy for the publica­
tion of papers, from personal motives of revenge in the dis­
pute with Kitchener. That incorrect version of the facts was 
reflected in The Times which commented that "this lamentable
S © © also
1. See Edward VII to Ourzon, 22 August 1905;/bee, Edward VII, 
II, p.378*
2. Curzon to Knollys, 16 August 1905*
3* Ourzon to Brodrick, Telegram, 21 August 1905*
4. Ibid*
5. Brodrick to Curzon, Telegram, 22 August 1905.
spectacle ought to have heen impossible1' and that it consti­
tuted "an offence against the public interest."*^ While 
Curzon strove to correct what he believed to be an unmerited 
public condemnation, he was -sdaafoasmed by Brodrick to desist 
from further reference to past incidents lest such cause 
renewed recriminations and the re-opening of an "acute con-
p
troversy." Nonetheless once again the handling of the con­
troversy in the press was criticised by Ripon who complained: 
"Bid Brodrick sanction that publication? [referring to the 
minutes of Curzon and Kitchener]• If he did, he is quite 
unfit to be Secretary for India .•* it is all very sad and 
discreditable and will do serious mischief in I n d i a . I n  
order to complete the picture surrounding Curzon1s resigna­
tion however it is necessary to return to the point (Chap. V, 
(5)) where Kitchener's tactics were last examined, and to 
the events prior to the Viceroy's
resignation.
(4) Kitchener's (Triumph*
It is perhaps inevitable that in examining Kitchener's 
proceedings some repetition of previous events is necessary.
Kitchener had carefully concealed his hand and well 
knew how to play a waiting game0 Having spent ten laborious
yie limes, 28 August 1905®
2. Brodrick to Curzon, Telegram, 31 August 1905*
3. Ripon to Sandhurst, 30 August 1905? Ripon MSS 43639*
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years in preparing for Gordon’s revenge, endured the recur­
ring disappointments of the Boer War, the obstacles which 
so hampered and protracted his campaigns had only stiffened 
his determination for victory* Now his three years* hammering 
at the Government of India and the Home Government was to 
bear fruit<, Pledged to reform, he knew his fame and reputa­
tion had preceded him - he was temperamentally unsuited to 
the task of working in harmony with Elies and the Viceroy, 
and he conceived it to be his duty to place the Indian army 
'on sound business principles of efficiency*, by abolishing 
a separate Military Department (on the tacit assumption that 
an efficient army was ample insurance against national dis­
aster) „ In fact his intense dislike of institutions and 
departments amounted to hatred; he smashed organisations:
"I find I have hardly a moment here in this 
awful system of doing nothing but write Minutes, 
which apparently makes up the Government of 
IndiaJ lo get anything done, however small, 
under the present system is the work of a life­
time; and, as soldiers only hold their billets 
for five years, the result is evident, and is 
apparently exactly what the Government of India 
like* Borne of my Minutes are, I fear, getting 
me disliked, as I cannot help pointing out how 
absurd the system is0"
As the Viceroy once ruefully reflected, Kitchener
"thought to be a ruler of India straight away: and as he has
said 'When Ourzon has gone, and we have a weak Viceroy in
2
his place, I shall be dictator®." But Ourzon neglected to
1* Kitchener to Lady Salisbury, 3 March 19035 Balfour MBS
49757.
2. See Ourzon to Hamilton, 28 May 1903#
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weigh the prestige and confidence which Kitchener inspired 
in Government circles at home* and because he had no know­
ledge of Balfour !s secret correspondence with Kitchener he 
could not know of the Prime Minister's grave concern "that 
we have got you, in this critical and in some respects
transitional period as our Military Adviser and guide on the
1problems of Indian Defence." Correspondingly, Curzon did 
not realise that his presence in India constituted a boulder 
which once dislodged set everything in motion, as Godley 
told Sandars: "I am sure that, with the new Governor General
p
[Minto] we shall be on a bed of roses." Kitchener had suc­
cessfully campaigned for Curzon1s dismissal.
In the spring of 1905, while the Home Government in 
Whitehall had debated the merits of whether or not the 
Commander-in-Chief should be the sole military adviser to 
the Government of India, Kitchener remained extremely im­
patient, He constantly chaffed over the repeated delays, and 
grumbled at his treatment by Curzon*s Council. Moreover he 
knew that to be decisive in any conflict, he must apply 
pressure at the correct psychological moment and at a definite 
goal; thus he was uncompromising in his efforts to destroy 
Elies and the Military Department, using his Cabinet friends 
as a restraining influence on Curzon*s policy, Curzon did
1, See Balfour to Kitchener, 3 December 1903, Balfour MSS 
49726.
2, Godley to Sandars, 22 August 1905, Balfour MSS 49857#
364
not perceive this, and thought only that Kitchener should
he a lion in action and a dog in obedience a As Kitchener
emphatically stated: "It is quite impossible for Elies and
I to remain - so one must go, I don*t care very much which -
it is a dog!s life as it is." Nevertheless with the passage
of time Kitchener sensed that the Cabinet strongly desired
to avoid Curzon1s resignation, and he accordingly regulated
his conduct in the light of that inference. But he had "very
2grave doubts" that the case would go in his favour, though 
in the meantime, work in the Military Departments had come 
to a "standstill".^
News of the Cabinet decision however was secretly 
telegraphed by R.J. Marker who had left India after being 
jilted by Mary Curzon*s sister. Marker had been appointed 
Private Secretary to H.O. Arnold-Porster, and Kitchener 
described that appointment as "very lucky - as through him 
anything can be safely transmitted to me* I pay for all 
telegrams, so they are private and absolutely safe." He did 
not know that Curzon was empowered through his security 
regulations to have inspection copies produced of all private
Ul
or secret telegrams and that he was therefore roughly aware 
of Kitchener*s intrigues. When, in March, Kitchener had
1. Kitchener to Marker, 9 March 1905, Marker MSS 52276.
2. Ibid., 17 May 1905.
5. TEIcC., 25 May 1905,
4. Magnus, Kitchener, p«215.
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facetiously reported to Lady Salisbury (14 March. 1905) the 
course of action Brodrick should adopt, he suggested, sig­
nificantly, that Elies should disappear with a G.C.I.E*; and 
Brodrick acted accordingly in his secret Despatch (no*67 of 
51 May) proposing Elies1 premature retirement, and recom­
mending that he would get a G-0C.I.Ef in acknowledgement of
1
his services* Both Elies and Curzon termed that Despatch
an "unmerited indignity" especially as it proffered a "money
2compensation for premature retirement." But at that point 
both Curzon and Elies were helpless«
On 29 June Elies took the trouble to write to 
Brodrick^ saying that he was prepared to resign at any time 
in the public interest, but protesting that he thought he 
might well have been spared Despatch no*67* Brodrick replied 
that although it was impossible to cancel that Despatch, he 
had no intention "to give you pain"; and that the pecuniary 
provisions were necessary, as his resignation was to be 
submitted to the King on 30 September, and the King had 
already sanctioned the G-oCoIoE, on his retirement from 
office 0 Ordinarily, this information, apart from its personal 
content, would not be importantP In this case, however, it 
was disclosed to the press, emphasising the fact that 
Brodrick had required Elies to resign by a certain date.
1. Brodrick to Curzon, Telegram, 19 June and 16 July 1905*
2* Curzon to Brodrick, Telegram, 17 July 1905*
3* Enclosed in Elies to Curzon, 13 August 1905*
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(That information was alluded to and commented on in precise 
terms by the Times of India (30 June 1905) and the Pioneer 
Hail (2 July 1905) and was noticed in telegrams to England 
by Eeuter on 22 June and 27 July0) These disclosures became 
an additional topic for the heated exchange of telegrams 
between Brodrick and Ourzon, and produced unfortunate sub­
sequent effects on the controversy, for they served to 
deepen the affront to Elies’ services,
Kitchener had next suggested that Ourzon* s face would
be saved and his mind eased if the Commander-in-Ghief were
given a deputy whose principal duty would be to stay out of
harm’s way on the outbreak of war, and to hold and stroke
Ourzon*s hand, adding that the post could be abolished when
1Ourzon relinquished his Viceroyalty, When Brodrick had 
supplied Curzon with General Scott, whom Curzon termed "a 
disembowelled Military Member” given him ”to prevent me from
p
resigning”, Ourzon predicted that the new Member ”will be 
found to be so useless”, ”a fifth wheel in the coach” that
the new organisation would break down irretrievably ”like
- x
most of Brodrick*s creations.”^
Following the receipt of Brodrick's Despatch in India 
on 18 June, Kitchener was relieved to find that Ourzon
1* Kitchener to Lady Salisbury, 14 March 1905$ Magnus, 
Kitchener, pf217<>
2* Ourzon to Clinton Dawkins, 21 June 1905*
3* Ibid,
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regarded the Cabinet*s decision as a resounding defeat. But 
Lady Salisbury chided Hubert Hamilton, Kitchener*s Military 
Secretary, that Kitchener should be well satisfied in having 
obtained all the he required: ’’They all say, *K, is so sensi­
ble? he will see he has get what he wanted, and will go 
ahead in c o m f o r t * a n d  that his friends at home were, in 
consequence, well pleased. But after digesting Brodrick*s
Despatch, Kitchener told Lady Salisbury (22 June 1905) that
2
the decision was less favourable than he had anticipated. 
Moreover, he was at great pains to obtain copies of what had 
transpired in the proceedings of Brodrick*s secret Committee, 
though he was willing to look for the best in the 31 May 
decision, and "make it a success in spite of all Curzon can 
do to wreck it*1'^
Kitchener*s interpretation of events led him as we 
have seen to believe that though willing to throw over Elies, 
the Cabinet were reluctant to disrupt things further and to 
recall the Viceroy* According to Kitchener, Curzon opened 
the interview on 25 June (see supra, p.375 ) by threatening 
to resign at once unless Kitchener would recommend that 
Brodrick accept certain modifications in the new arrangement 
As Curzon enumerated his points, Kitchener saw that they 
were matters of trivial detail and realised r,the puerile and
1* Lady Salisbury to Hubert Hamilton, 1 June 1905,
Magnus, Kitchener, p.219*
2. Ibid., 22"June l‘905, Magnus, Kitchener, p*219*
3. Kitchener to Marker, 22 June 1505, Marker MSS 52276.
1quite unimportant nature of the Viceroy1 s demands..."
Kitchener thereupon agreed to associate himself with Ourzon*
The discussion then grew warm and, finally, heated on the
subject of the title of the new Member* Curzon contended
that the Military Supply Member should revert to his former
title of Military Member and he threatened to resign within
the hour unless Kitchener promised to ash BrodrickFs assent
to this* He then flopped into a sofa and appeared to burst 
2into tears*
"I was rather upset .. * after over an hour of 
very straight talking ••• he suddenly gave in 
& collapsed & in the excitement of the moment 
I said I would associate myself with him ..* 
afterwards I regretted what I had said but I 
could not get back in it without another row 
& he would certainly have gone back on the title 
question had I done so, so I left it alone. I 
hope it was not mi sunder stood at home but it 
made me anxious."3
Kitchener had in fact given way: "I hope," he wrote 
to Sir Edward Stedman (26 June 1905) "Mr. Brodrick will 
approve of my attitude in this matter. I have done everything 
possible (perhaps too much) to conciliate the Viceroy and 
prevent a crisis. I have had a pistol held to my head which 
I really believe was loaded, as he is very much upset at the
1L
terms of the despatch and his loss of prestige." He con­
fessed to Marker:
1. Kitchener to Marker, 6 July 1905, Marker MSS 52276.
2. Magnus, Kitchener, p.219*
5* Kitchener to Marker, 6 July 1905, Marker MSS 52276.
4-. Kitchener to Stedman, 26 June 1905, India Office Records, 
Private Office Pile, MSS 374.
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"I think I have been right in keeping Curzon 
from resigning on this question at the present 
stage | it would have done the Government a good 
deal of harm & however much a change of Viceroy 
would he advantageous, I do not think that it 
was advisable in the papers as they stand ..."
To Lady Salisbury, Kitchener wrote (6 July 1905):
"I wonder whether I have done what Mr* Balfour 
would have wished in keeping Curzon from re­
signing? *.. I can well understand that there 
are several matters in connection with Afghan­
istan which would have made a change of Viceroy 
advantageous; but looking at the whole position 
of affairs, I could not help coming to the con­
clusion that Curzonfs resignation at this 
juncture would do the Government harm*.. I 
made one slip of the tongue in these negotia­
tions, which I much regretted afterwards, as 
I was afraid it might be misunderstood by my 
friends at home* After an hour and a half 
storming at Curzon about the title of Military 
D e p t w h i c h  he insisted on and I strongly 
objected to, he suddenly gave way and collapsed.
I was so surprised that I said in that case I 
would associate myself with him in obtaining 
his puerile requests ... I could not go back 
on what I had said without upsetting everything 
again *.. and I therefore left it alone, trust­
ing my friends would not dream for a moment 
that I had been disloyal to them in any way .,.
I could have bitten my tongue out for making 
such a stupid remark* I suppose I was rather 
excited by the discussion* I was prancing up 
and down his room, talking to him very straight 
on the subject. I told him if he insisted on 
the title, everyone would know what he meant by 
it, and that he did not intend to loyally carry 
out the decision of the Govt*; and when he 
collapsed I rather lost my head. Mea culpa{
I hope, however, I am forgiven* Please let me 
know if I am. It has been a trying time.#,"2
1* Kitchener to Marker, 6 July 1905, Marker MBS 52276*
2* Kitchener to Lady Salisbury, 6 July 1905.
Magnus, Kitchener, pp.220-21.
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Kitchener was much troubled about that incident; he wrote to 
Lord Stanley (1865-194-8) 3 Financial Secretary to the War 
Office:
"The only tip I had was yours, to let him down 
easy *. * Even before I got downstairs I felt 
I had made a mistake, but has no one ever 
said more than he intended? .*. Had he gone , 
on the dispatch, he would have had much 
sympathy, both here and at home, and might 
have done a good deal of harm. No retort about 
his conduct in Tibet and Afghanistan would 
have been possible, as these had been condoned, 
and it would have widened the discussion to a 
considerable extent. He would have appeared as 
a martyr to the cause of constitutional 
government.
Following that meeting, at which Kitchener’s tactical
mistake encouraged Curzon in the belief that he had won
significant concessions, Curzon consulted Elies and General
Duff informing them as we have seen that Kitchener had
signified his assent to all the modifications of the scheme
which the Viceroy placed before him* These were embodied in
a draft and re-submitted to Kitchener on the following day,
and he replied that though he could not say he considered
them improvements on Brodrick1s original despatch "there are
none which I am not willing to accept in deference to your 
2wishes," But the evidence in the Curzon papers clearly
reveals that Kitchener openly deluded the Viceroy whilst
3privately enlisting support at home* That concealment had
1. Kitchener to Lord Stanley, undated, ca. July 1905,
Kitchener MSS 30/57/32,
Magnus, Kitchener, p.220.
2. Kitchener to Curzon, 26 June 1905.
5. See Curzon's letters to Ampthill, especially 12 August 1905.
its effect, for in masking his real intention, Kitchener 
placed Curzon in a false position. Skilfully adapting him­
self to the circumstances Kitchener secretly waited for 
Curzon to fput his foot in it1: "it will be all the worse 
for him when it all comes out - as it must."
Curzon however made no attempt to conceal that he
would insist upon a second Military Adviser to the Government
2Of India, or resign. It was upon that point that Kitchener’s 
subterfuge, promising the Viceroy one thing whilst privately 
telegraphing another, undermined the Viceroy's position.
That however was only to be expected.
On 1 July Balfour announced his Government’s decision 
accepting the joint modifications; this was confirmed by 
Brodrick on 5 July, subject only to an official announcement 
'in the press whereby the Government would comment on the 
precise terms of the modifications. But Brodrick delayed that 
announcement and the whole settlement of the question lingered, 
causing acute anxiety. As head of the Indian Government,
Curzon felt his "public position" was left "in suspense" and 
that he was under some obligation to explain the situation 
and what was happening at a meeting of the Legislative Council 
to be held in Simla on 13 July. That meeting, owing to
1. Kitchener to Marker, 24- August 1905, Marker MSS 52276.
2. Curzon to Balfour, Telegram, 26 June 1905c
3c Curzon to Brodrick, Telegram, 13 July 1905*
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Brodrick!s delay in announcing the settlement in Parliament,
was postponed until 18 July. Curzon at that time restated
the situation "to inform the Indian public of that which they
1had a right and were equally anxious to know." In his speech 
on the 18th Curzon deliberately announced that he had suc­
ceeded in obtaining a number of important modifications;
"We have converted the position of the Military 
Supply Member into one of greater efficacy and 
utility. We have very considerably strengthened 2 
the guarantees for civil supervision and control."
The astonished India Office promptly cabled a 
request for Curzon to telegraph, en clair, the full text of 
that speech homep Kitchener, who was extremely sensitive to 
the charge of military autocracy wrote to Lady Salisbury;
"CurJon has, I think, given himself away by his 
very improper speech. I wonder what action the 
Government will take - he is evidently at their 
mercy.
But Curzon*s speech was, in fact, regarded in India as a 
simple explanation of what had taken place and of the nature 
of the modifications of Brodrickfs scheme. The Times of India 
the following day characterised it as "a restrained and 
almost colourless statement" setting forth the proposals 
which the Cabinet had accepted. It added that Curzon was 
"studiously moderate" In handling the exceedingly thoriDy
1. Curzon to Brodrick, Telegram, 20 July 1905*
2. Speech at Legislative Council, Simla, 18 July 1905* 
Speeches, op.cit., IV, pp.129-136.
3. Brodrick to Curzon, Telegram, 19 July 1905*
4-. Kitchener to Lady Salisbury, 20 July 1905*
Magnus, Kitchener, p *221•
373
question, and rejoiced that the controversy had been so far
satisfactorily settled and that there were to be no resig- 
1nations* Curzon then claimed the right to nominate, accord­
ing to custom, the new Military Member of Council in succes­
sion to Elies. Because strong representations had been made 
by Kitchener *s partisans that Curzon was trying to wreck
p
Brodrick*s scheme and revive the old system, Brodrick 
refused to admit Curzon*s claim, or to accept his interpreta­
tion of the so-called modifications. The Secretary of State 
in fact refused to appoint Major-General Sir Edmund Barrow 
because he knew that Kitchener would object. But he informed 
the King that there were three grounds for Barrow*s rejection? 
first that he was holding an important military command at 
that moment? second that his services might thereafter be 
required in a still more important one? and finally that as 
he had served for eight years in the Military Department, 
the natural result of his appointment would be to re-estab­
lish the old system. Moreover on 12 July he told the King 
that Curzon had made the appointment of Barrow a personal 
matter in forcing his views on the Cabinet.
1. The Times of India, 19 July 1905*
2* See fealfour MSS 49857 for extracts of two unsigned letters 
marked * strictly private * dated Simla, 13 and 20 July 1905* 
In all probability these letters were written by Kitchen­
er's private secretary, Col* Hubert Hamilton, to Major
H.J. Marker at the War Office - see Kitchener to Marker,
24 August 1905* Marker MSS 52276.
3* Brodrick to Edward VII, 12 July 1905; Lee, Edward VII,
II, p«378. "
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On 14 July Brodrick reversed his ground and called 
that Curzon had "misapprehended" the Cabinet1s orders and 
intention, and meanwhile insisted that the term Supply*, 
which Kitchener had agreed to drop, should be restored to 
the title of Elies1 successor* Curzon, in the light of these 
proceedings and now in a state of health bordering on col­
lapse, was goaded to desperation* He was told by Brodrick 
that the sole responsibility of making the appointment rested 
with the India Office; that Barrow was unacceptable to the 
Cabinet as he could "hardly be expected to inaugurate the 
new system with an open mind"; and that he must now "consult 
Kitchener as to who in his opinion" was the man best quali­
fied for the post and to "let me have his views". Finally, 
Brodrick imparted his extreme reluctance in "having greatly 
against our will been forced to deal with this vexed question
p
of Army Administration*"
Kitchener, in the meantime, well aware of Curzon!s 
desire for Barrow to fill the new post, had told Marker: "I
think highly of Barrow but ..." his appointment as Supply 
Member would be "unwise".^ He reported (on 10 August 1905) 
to Lady Salisbury a second painful, interview which he had 
had with Curzon five days earlier:
1. Brodrick to Curzon, Telegram, 14 July 1905*
2* Ibid*, 4 August 1905*
3* Kitchener to Marker, 13 July 1905> Marker MSS 52276.
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"He said lie would resign, and I said lie must 
do what he thought right, and so I left him. 
Next day I got a letter from Eddy Stanley 
telling me what misrepresentations the Vice­
roy has heen making in secret telegrams about 
my views o I was angry. I always thought his 
misrepresentations were about the so-called 
modifications, and it never occurred to me 
that he could have told such unwarrantable 
lies about my views of the whole scheme...
I do not now believe a word he says, and I 
hope neither you nor any of my friends will 
do so in the future; and to think that, out 
of pity for the man when he was down, I could 
be fool enough to make such a gross mistake - 
it makes me wild.
"I am so glad it is understood at home 
that I have not been disloyal to my friends. 
If I only had not made that one mistake I 
should feel quite happy. **1
Curzon did not in fact misrepresent Kitchener*s
views when the Commander-in-Chief said that Barrow was
2acceptable to him* This is proved by independent evidence, 
for although Kitchener desired to nominate General Duff,
"he could not object" to Barrow and 1 twigged* the Viceroy 
into believing he accepted Barrow. Kitchener, in deceiving 
Curzon, saw this advantage: it prevented any new appointment 
being actually made in a hurry, and thus "would give time to 
our friends at home to realise what is going on, and if 
needs be step in and defeat Curzon*s schemes."*' But Kitchener 
compounded the bitterness of the Viceroy*s defeat by being 
caught out by Curzon at his own game. In their second
1* Kitchener to Lady Salisbury, 10 August 1905, in 
Magnus, Kitchener, p*222o 
2* See Curzon to ffaTfour, 21 September 1905.
5* See Balfour MSS 49857* for extract of letter dated 
15 July 1905? and above, p.575 n.2.
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interview, on 5 August, Kitchener abused Barrow and threat­
ened resignation Mif the Military Supply Member ever ventured 
to criticise him*1 Then, according to Curzon, Kitchener 
"lost all command of himself, raged and blustered, and 
eventually stalked out of the room, not however before he 
had mentioned as his ideal Military Supply Member a dear,
placid old dummy named General Scott, Director-General of 
n
Ordnance *.*"
At the same time the dispute with Kitchener was made 
bitterly personal when Kitchener represented that Curzon 
deliberately misconstrued his views about the new role of 
the Military Supply Member* Curzon maintained that, if His 
Majesty1 s Government wished him to remain in India in order 
to undertake the difficult task of introducing a new military 
system, he was entitled to inaugurate that system with the 
aid of a satisfactory colleague "in whose experience, judge­
ment, and ability I have fullest confidence"* Furthermore, 
Brodrickfs refusal to grant Curzon the assistance of "the 
officer whom I hold to be preeminently suited for the task" 
denied him the support from the Home Government which "in
p
these circumstances I may reasonably expects" His expecta­
tions were sadly disappointed when Kitchener repudiated the 
fact that he had Initially agreed to Barrow1s selection.
1* Curzon to Ampthill, 12 August 1905*
2. Curzon to Brodrick, Telegram, 2 August 1905; see also
Ibid., 10 August 1905*
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An angry correspondence ensued in the course of which 
Curzon alleged that the Commander-In-Chief had seen and 
accepted a Minute signed hy the head of the Ordnance Depart­
ment ? regarding the numbers of men who would, in future, he
<
directly under the Commander-in-chiefTs office* On 26 August, 
for the second time, Kitchener denied ever seeing that 
Minute:
"I beg to reiterate my assertion that I never 
saw these numbers, and I have carefully 
inquired from my staff who state they have
never had any knowledge of them* In these
circumstances I must leave it to you to say
whether you adhere to your statement that I 
did see these figures*..r,J*
To Kitchenerfs intense surprise, Curzon refused to accept 
that denial, and wrote that he had found that the note con­
taining the figures 1 was included in the file sent to you,
and was marked with a green strip, to which your attention
was specially drawn * * * in the margin of the same page on
2
which you noted in ink*1'
That assertion virtually accused the Commander-in 
Chief of lying and Kitchener told Lady Salisbury:
"Curzon has rather surpassed himself, I think, 
by writing me the last letter of the enclosed 
correspondence* In old days I suppose I should 
have called him out on it and shot him like a 
dog for his grossly insulting letter* All I 
can do now is to have nothing more to do with
1* Kitchener to Curzon, 26 August 1905*
2. Curzon to Kitchener, 26 August 1905* There appears to be 
a slight error as to the date of Curzon1s letter to 
Kitchener5 Magnus tells us 28 August$ see Kitchener, 
p* 225•
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him .. * Everyone knows I never saw the paper 
in question - not through any carelessness of 
mine, hut because it was hid away in a big 
file which was referred to me on a different 
question (which I answered), without any 
reference to this paper having been placed at 
the bottom of the file. I am going away on 
tour, to be clear of the whole thing0 It all 
seems to be so low and disgusting*"l
In the same letter he asked that Balfour should be informed
of this insult to him. Magnus writes: "Never at home among
files", Kitchener "had been let down on that occasion by
his staff*"2
Though Kitchener superficially signified that he was 
"deeply grieved at the news of Curzon1 s resignation",^ he 
insisted against Curzon*s protest, that their correspondence 
be published in the press, in association with a White Paper 
containing the telegrams which had passed between Curzon and
Zl
Brodrick.
The India Office, as we have seen, had carefully 
gone over the papers it wished to publish with Buckle of 
The Times and on Monday, 21 August that paper published (for 
the first time) the complete contents of a Parliamentary 
bluebook,^ portions of which the Government of India had
1, Kitchener to Lady Salisbury, 30 August 1905, in Magnus, 
Kitchener9 p^223*
2. 7STT. “
3* Kitchener to Curzon, 21 August 1905.
4. Magnus, Kitchener, pfc223- See Parliamentary Papers 
Cd. 26151 (published in July 1905)*
5* The Times, 21 August 1905# published the further 
poncfence“contained in Cd. 27iS (published in Augu 
- a skilful feat of journalism^
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never before seen, viz* (1) The terms of reference of Brod-
rickfs Secret Committee of Seven; (2) The Report of 26 May;
(3) The Report of Godleyfs Sub-Committee of 8 May, as well
as sixteen of the crucial telegrams which Brodrick and
1Curzon exchanged on the question of modifications* The India 
Office acted with a notable promptitude that was not the 
least tragic touch in this most controversial question, 
injustly blaming Curzon for the publication of the official 
papers•
Thereupon The Times fell upon Curzon for his share 
in the deplorable and "unedifying spectacle of two of our 
most distinguished public servants *,* openly engaged in 
heated personal altercationn asserting that the "paramount 
consideration of the welfare of India ought to have dictated 
a cessation of public controversy and repressed the prompt­
ings of personal indignation* *• necessarily injurious to the 
interests of I n d i a * B u t  as Chirol remarked, (24 August 1903) 
the India Office firmly supported by The Times, had "already 
committed itself so deeply on the question of Army Administra­
tion that *.. they were able to secure the tactical advan­
tages of position*" "How galling it must be to you that such 
scurvy treatment has been dealt out to you by men who claim 
to be your own personal and political friends."^
The Times, 21 August 1905, published the further corres­
pondence contained in Cd* 2718 (published in August 1905)
- a skilful feat of journalism.
2* The Times, 28 August 1905o 
3* Cfhirol to* Curzon, 24 August 1905.
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The announcement of Curzon* s resignation and the 
appointment of Lord Minto as Viceroy were both made on 21 
August 1905o1
Curzon has been mistakenly accused of sacrificing
principle to expediency and then '’characteristically,
2
resigning on a personal issue*” The question may be asked 
'did Curzon compromise over the question of principle and 
then resign on a purely personal issue?' He did not* We have 
seen that when the change was forced on his Government in 
the 31 May Despatch he agreed to it on condition that a 
second military adviser would be appointed* On 5 August 
Kitchener verbally assented to the appointment of Barrow. At 
the same time however, Kitchener privately cabled (6 August) 
to the War Office saying that Barrow was quite unfit* That 
information was confidentially circulated by Brodrick to the 
Cabinet on 7 August behind Curzon*s back. A month later 
Curzon asserted that Kitchener "did accept Barrow, absolutely 
frankly, and without demur* Ask Barrow, whom he sent for and 
talked to for an hour about the new billet . *. Kitchener 
subsequently lied about this as he did about the other 
points „,. one of my difficulties has been that I have been 
dealing with a man who has not a regard for truth, and who
1. The Times, 21 August 1905*
2. See Magnus, Kitchener, pc222; Chirol, V., Fifty Years in 
a Changing Wo rid, p*228 and Nicolson, Curzon: The La'st 
Phase, p018a
3* See Cabinet Records 37/79/144•
has been pursuing in the background a campaign of which I am
1
only gradually beginning to learn the ramifications •"
Clearly a plot against Curzon was going on and lARRfe 
Army Headquarters in India hoped he would be driven to resign. 
Rather than resign immediately, in which case he would have 
had strong support in India and at home, Curzon merely played 
his cards badly, as Winston Churchill later explained to 
W.S.Blunt:
"Curzon ought then to have called on Kitchener 
to explain himself, accused him of being the 
liar and intriguer he was, and reported the 
whole thing to the India Office, when it 
would have been Kitchener who would have had
to resign*"2
Curzon then, had played the game straight - that was always 
his greatest strength - and had lost. But these circumstances 
explain why in 1952 Harold Nicolson wrote;
"To the end of his life he remained convinced 
that the Cabinet, and especially his old 
friend ... had treated him shamefully. After 
seven years as Viceroy he retipned to England 
an angry and embittered man* "5
(5) The Bitterness of Defeat*
Curzon1s administration, and his desperate struggle 
with Kitchener, left the public in England and India a little 
breathless; the press of both countries wisely recognised
1. Curzon to Chirol, 14 September 1905*
2. Churchill to W.SeBlunt, 2 October 1909; Blunt, W.S.,
Hy Diaries, Part II, pp*286-7*
3. Nicolson, Ho, King George the Fifth: His Life and Reign, 
p.84, n„l.
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that further discussion would only prolong a hitter and 
unprofitable controversy# This is not to say that, following 
Curzon*s resignation, the trouble between the Viceroy and the 
Cabinet on the one hand, and the educated Bengali community 
on the other was without its after-effects# Curzon1 s person­
ality and political attitude were such that he became a
i
natural target for repeated criticism# As Dr* McLane suggests, 
grievances in India against the Viceroy had been brewing for 
many months# Probably the fact was that the Nationalists set 
themselves impossible goals, and when they failed to achieve 
them they had to blame someone* It was not unlike Curzon in 
these circumstances to indulge in some self-pity and his 
correspondence bears witness to his sensitivity - his 
troubles, trials and sacrifices# He spoke as though having 
to work with the Home Government was the worst burden that 
could ever be imposed on a man and referred to the India 
Council as "*.# that body, who for years have truly strewn
p
my path with thorns*,!
Nevertheless, apart from these circumstances the 
immediate source of Curzon*s bitterness stemmed from Kit­
chener's tactics# Indeed following the Viceroy's resignation, 
Kitchener became extremely anxious lest his secret telegrams 
to the Cabinet, via Marker at the War Office, be published.
1# J.R.McLane, The Development of Nationalist Ideas and 
Tactics and tKe^T’oJXc 1 es of the' Government of India, 
1 5 ^ 1 9 0 $ ,~hID* thesis, T9ST, LondonTpp* " 3 4 5 - 5 1 ♦
2# Curzon to Sir David Barr, 7 September 1905* See also 
Edwardes, M0, High Noon of Empire: India Under Curzon,
pp#165-6$ 205-15* ~ ™
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He informed Lady Salisbury his
"position was that I had told the Viceroy, if 
no change in army administration was allowed, 
that I wished to resign my command. Under 
these circumstances I think it was only natural 
that I should keep my friends informed of how 
things went on, and of my views; and I looked 
upon these telegrams exactly the same as 
private letters.
Kitchener feared that Curzon might use those telegrams 
against him and urged Lady Salisbury to curry Royal inter­
vention as:
"this would be very unpleasant and should be 
stopped:... The only person I know of who 
would be likely to influence him would be the 
King, and if Curzon is desperate it might be 
as well to invoke his aid; as if I have to 
justify my action in public it will do no 
possible good, but will, I fear, only tend to 
lower our public life at home and abroad*"2
Lowering the tone of English public life was not an action
for which Kitchener had just cause to reproach Curzon for.
Moreover the King, under strong pressure from Brodrick and
Balfour, was forced to withold an honour for the Viceroy*s
services, awaiting Curzon*s attack; but in the absence of
papers, and while misfortunes were heaped upon Curzon1 s head,
the public were kept in the dark as to what had happened*
fhe telegrams were never published.
At the same; time, Kitchener!s employment of the press 
and his political lobbying at home paid off in rich dividends,
IT I | I— WIWM I II  .......................... ■ ■■■Ill r I I II ■! > HI*.
1. Kitchener to Lady Salisbury, 2 November 1905, in*
Magnus, Kit chener, p * 224 *
2. Ibid. “ “
3. Ibid.
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securing for him the object he sought in his struggle over 
Indian army administration* In congratulating his conspira- 
tors in England "for all you have done so well", he laid 
particular stress that his secret correspondence with Stedman 
be destroyed, telling Marker to "see that anything I have
told him privately is not left on record - Curzon is
2excited**." He characterised Curzon as an "unscrupulous" 
person and further asked Marker to "explain to the press 
that I hope they will not believe any statements he [Curzon] 
may make about me and my views or intentions for he is quite 
sure to misrepresent them* I shall certainly not answer any­
thing he says - If he takes this line I hope you will arrange 
for a douche of cold water coming on him from all round,,. 
(Kitchener despatched, among others, letters to L.*S. Amery 
in an attempt to prepare against what he believed would be 
Curzon *s public onslaught, and asserted that it would "take 
some time" before the Viceroy would "find his level after 
ruling out here as a potentate*")
Curzon was not content however, to allow the matter 
to rest* His spirit was deeply wounded by the blows it had 
received, He, like Kitchener, was temperamentally unsuited
5
to brook any limitation of his powers or authority. Was the
1* Kitchener to Marker, 22 June 1905* Marker MBS 52276*
2* Ibid*, 1 June 1905*
3. !Tbxd*, 21 September 1905; see also LoS.Amery, op*cit,,
pp7208~9 .
4* Ibid*
5* Bee Edwardes, M„, op; cit., pp* 223~5«
assumption of this attitude one of vanity or the result of 
circumstances? Perhaps it would he well to examine the 
irritants which contributed their share to the malaise which 
followed the bitterness of his defeat* The weakness of the 
Viceroy*s case was that he attached too great an importance 
on autonomy for the Government of India - on the ‘functional* 
composition of his Council, and too little to the ‘structural* 
anomalies of India*s system and thus the Commander-in-Chief’s 
position in it. Functional diseases have subjective, patho­
logical causes while structural disease is often character­
ised by objective, material causes* The etiology or deriva­
tion of the irritants which caused this state are not hard 
to discover, and include the paralysis of the Home Government 
created by the Russian scare; the threat of military dicta­
torship in India; the quest for some recognition of Curzon*s 
services and, significantly the potent epidemic of unrest 
occasioned by the partition of Bengal.
The first factor was the Russian bogey, the cause 
of British imperialism in Central Asia. By the early spring 
of 1905 it was evident that Russian defeats in the Par East 
had greatly allayed the threat of invasion to India. Inas­
much as the Viceroy and his Council objected to altering 
India1s administration, the broad fact remains that the 
Commander-In-Chief1s scheme for redistributing the Indian 
army was dealt with by the Government of India, and passed 
within a matter of a few months, refuting per se the
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suggestion of deliberate obstruction on the part of the 
Military Department* Why then had the Secretary of State 
forced this change on an unwilling Viceroy and his Council? 
The answer lies in the way in which Kitchener's threats 
shaped events* The primary aim of the Home Government in 
these circumstances should have been diagnosis rather than 
therapy. Obviously diagnosis must precede therapy* But since 
the diagnosticians who approached the problem differed in 
their background and experience it was only to be expected 
that they would also disagree in their evaluation of the 
symptoms. Part of the evidence suppressed by Brodrick con­
tains two significant documents which he chose to ignore, but 
which throw some light on these proceedings* On 11 May 1905? 
Roberts had written: "If friction exists the remedy seems 
to me to lie In a clear definition and apportionment" of the 
respective duties of Commander-in-Chief and Military Member,
"rather than in the amputation of the Military Membership of 
1Gouncil." But by far the most trenchant document was put 
forward by Sir George White, Commander-in-Chief in India from 
1893-1898. He argued that Indian army administration had been 
altered by Kitchener with a view to the likelihood of a 
serious Russian menace. But in consequence this was not the 
case:
"Russia, in her present condition, will scarcely 
court ,.. war with England by sea and land. I
1. Roberts, Note on Indian Army Administration, 11 May 1905? 
copy in Minto MSS 895*
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“bring forward these considerations to show 
that the advance of Russia is not of increased 
imminence, and that, therefore, an argument 
based on it does not, at the present time, 
seem to justify a hasty rush into violent and 
untried remedies* Indeed, I go so far as to 
state that the immediate crisis has been 
created by a servant of the State, though, I 
am confident, he believes his action to be in 
the interests of that State
So upset was Ripon by the surrender to Kitchener
over the 'Russian scare* that he told Campbell-Bannerman
Brodrick*s handling of India's affairs "shows once more his
unfitness to be Secretary of State .*. he has got the whole
thing into such a muddle that it will be very difficult to
get it right again", with the result that "the military
element is triumphant; the civil element discredited* This
is a great misfortune", for no doubt the Viceroy had made
mistakes, and the two masterful men were thinking only of
themselves, "Brodrick was totally unfitted to deal with such
2people and India will suffer,*" A fierce feud now took place 
between what the India Office termed the 'Curzonians* and 
what Horley called the 'Kitchenerites' ; The Curzonians
lo Sir George White, 17 May 1905s Ibid* It is interesting 
to note that a week later, on 25 May, White's former 
Military Secretary from 1895-9? Sir B„ Buff (1855-1918)s 
then Adjutant General in India (1903-6), implored White 
to help abolish the Military Department and thus support 
Kitchener in his struggle against Curzon. Ironically, 
when Duff later became Commander-in-Chief of India (1913- 
6), the system he advocated in 1905 collapsed in 1915-8 
under his commando See Duff to White, White MSS 108/109/68.
2. Ripon to Campbell-Bannerman, 3 September 1905* Ripon MSS 
43518.
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■believed that the position of the Commander-in-Chief would 
he over-centralised and thus over-burdened with work, while 
the Kitchenerites felt that the Gommander-in-Chief alone must 
he the absolute adviser and military head of the Government 
of India. Divergence over cure soon became crystallised 
along party lines.
The new Liberal Prime Minister, Sir Henry Campbell- 
Bannerman, addressed a large meeting in the Albert Hall on 
the evening of 21 December 1905* There he declared that 
though it was wise not to violate the rule of keeping ques­
tions of the internal administration of India outside the 
arena of party politics, it was the late Viceroy himself who 
was the most unsparing critic of the late Government’s decis­
ion l,so tactlessly handled, so recklessly published", and 
that the country "may be assured that we shall make ourselves 
party to no steps that involve any invasion of the sacred 
principle - foV* it is a principle recognised by each party 
throughout the realm of the King - the sacred principle of 
the subordination of the military to the civil authority*"^ 
Campbell-Bannerman’s views were shared by many of the rank 
and file of the Liberal Party, particularly by Ripon, the
1. Reported in The Times on 22 December 1905, speech by 
Campbell-Bannerman in the Albert Hall, 21 December 1905*
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distinguished ex-Viceroy.'*" That view reflected a classic 
statement made by John Mcrley in a speech at Arbroath on 23 
October 1905, he asserted that the Viceroy had been "chased 
out of power" by a military conspiracy, and hastened to add:
"If there is one principle more than another 
which has been accepted in this country since 
the day when Oharles I lost his head, it is 
this ~ that the civil power shall be supreme 
over the military power» That is what you will 
find in the India Office - they have been 
guilty of this great dereliction, this great 
departure from these standard maxims of public 
administration which have been practically 
sacred in this island ever since the days of 
the Civil War*"2
Curzon now had found support for his constitutional 
claim, provided by statute - namely, the Charter Act of 1835 
- that the Government of India shall keep intact control 
over all military affairs in India; Kitchener*s triumph had 
established a military autocracy in the person of the
1* Curzon had taken the trouble to acquaint Ripon with his 
views; see Curzon to Ripon, 30 August 1905* Ripon 
assured him that his own views were "entertained generally 
by the Liberal Party", Ripon to Curzon, 20 September 1905 o 
In addition Curzon wrote to R.B. Haldane on 12 July and
11 October 1905 and Lord Sandhurst, 24 August in whom 
he found some support, though only temporary# Ripon 
always remained Kitchener’s most hostile critic; see 
Ripon to Morley, 17 & 25 October 1907? Ripon MSS 43541.
2. See The Times, 24 October 1905, and Morley, Jc,
Reco11ectTons, II, p#138«
Commander-in-Chief*^ Balfour's Government dismissed those 
charges and condemned Curzon1 s actions as arising from 
personal pique* They rightly saw that after seven years of
1*. Possibly it is worth while to recall the problem of civil- 
military relations in India, for the subordination of 
civil authority to military control has been somewhat 
neglected by historians* Once the boulder of civil control 
has been overthrown, and military authority established, 
many other events are set in motion* Traditionally Great 
Britain is an example where civil power controls military: 
considered sound and right* While, theoretically, Imperial 
Germany became the tragic example where military policy 
ran away with civil control: considered wrong* Why are 
these traditional views significant? Three suggestions 
present themselves: (1) Civil authority alone must be 
responsible to the state for the conduct of its affairs 
(i*e0 in India, the Viceroy as the King Emperor's repre­
sentative, and his Council, supported by the Secretary of 
State in Council and by Parliament, must face Indian and 
British public opinion, not their Generals)* (2) Propor­
tion and perspective in handling defence (frontier and 
external) policies must weigh more heavily on statesmen 
concerned with reconciling national interests than on 
soldiers exclusively concerned with preparing for the 
threat of aggression* (Kitchener subsequently created a 
momentous precedent by attempting to revolutionise Indian 
policy by his allegation that the Government of India was 
neither qualified to handle questions of India's external 
policy, nor Parliament knowledgeable enough to manage 
military affairs,) Conceding such questions solely to a 
Commander-in-Chief could precipitate national disaster*
(3) Only a civil authority can direct and integrate all 
the moral and economic resources of a nation where 
possibly a military authority might prove helpless* 
(Moreover it was only later, when he filled the supreme 
post, that Kitchener's unsuitability for it became appar­
ent when on 5 August 1914, he became Minister for War*
See 'The Kitchener Legend1, Times Literary Supplement,
31 October 1958? also Jenkins, K „, Asquith, p 6583) »
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constant toil, his strength and health were in a state of 
collapse*. Nevertheless they witnessed, 'because of his willing 
sacrifice of what he conceived his public duty, his free 
abuse in the English press; finally they markedly added to 
his sense of isolation and despair by witholding any official 
recognition of his services*
Curzon was well aware that it was the usual practice 
for the Sovereign to honour a returning Viceroy for his 
services, either by a step in the Peerage, or by the Knight­
hood of the Garter or otherwise* Notable exceptions to this 
custom had occurred, and several Governors-General and Vice­
roys had become the victims of Parliamentary Enquiry; Clive 
consequently taking his own life, while Warren Hastings 
returned after 13 years in India to endure impeachment pro­
ceedings* In fact King Edward made strong representations to 
his ministers on Curzon ls retirement, and on 1 September 
Knollys cabled to Balfour that
"The King desires me to inform you that he 
thinks Viceroy of India should be offered an 
Earldom at once* He hopes that considering 
Viceroy of India !s character such an offer 
made immediately might soothe his feelings*"
Nevertheless, Curzon did not receive his Earldom until 1911?
and he was to wait another five years before being offered a
Knighthood of the Garter in the New Xear!s Honours List of 
o
1916* In that way the bitterness of Curzon1s defeat was
1. Knollys to Balfour, Telegram, 1 September 1905? Balfour 
MSS 49685.
2. Ronaldshay, Curzon, III, p*137*
augmented by the Government's pointed neglect of his services 
in India*
At the same time Brodrick was exceedingly active in 
countering opposition from Curzon* This was indirectly re­
lated to the question of the Partition of Bengal, as we shall 
see* In August he laid before his Cabinet colleagues several 
of Kitchener's secret communications which had "reached a 
Member of the Cabinet from a private source*" In these, 
Kitchener repudiated the statements he had openly made to 
Curzon and pleaded "In meantime please ask friends not to
p
believe anything Viceroy says regarding me or my views*" 
Brodrick followed up this information by asking Curzon to 
"please say at what date you would like Ampthill to replace 
you pending Lord Minto*s arrival?"^ In conference with Minto 
and Balfour in London, Brodrick decided on the infeasibility 
of attempting to introduce the proposed changes in military 
organisation while Curzon remained in India, and to adjourn 
their introduction pending Minto!s arrival.^
In view of the impending visit of the Prince of Wales 
to India, however, the King desired that Minto and Curzon
1* It is quite probable that these telegrams were sent by ^  
Kitchener to Marker who in turn gave them to Lord Stanly 
(17th Earl of Derby, 1865~194-8, the Financial Secretary of 
the War Office 1900 - October 1903, Post-Master General 
with a seat in the Cabinet October 1903 - November 1905)t 
and then given to Brodrick*
2# Cabinet Records, 7 August 1905, 37/79/144-*
3* Brodrick to Curzon, Telegram, 19 August 1905*
4. Ibid*, 11 September 1905-
would confer in person regarding tliose changes, and Sir W.R.
Lawrence, Curzon1s ex-private secretary and friend, helped
facilitate that end at Balmoral *^  Though Brodrick did his
best to prevent these arrangements, the King pushed them
through, and Curzon wrote to Minto that "conversations
between an incoming and an outgoing Viceroy is absolutely
indispensible to continuity of administration ... Brodrick*s
one desire seems to have been to prevent us from meeting and
2to hustle me out." He told Lawrence:
"That splendid King intervened and pulled 
everything out of the fire. Brodrick fought 
as he has done all through to humiliate me.
He did not want me to receive their Royal 
Highnesses as Viceroy. He did not want me to 
receive Minto «.. This was his last spiteful 
kick*
The action of the Home Government led to some un­
pleasantness between the King and his Ministers, or so one 
gathers from Esher's letters to Knollys concerning the Gov­
ernment's publication of the Curzon correspondence printed 
in The Times on 21 August. In trying to defend their position, 
the authority of the King was not obtained before action was 
taken, and Esher wrote:
"I cannot Imagine how the Government permitted 
this correspondence, and also the Curzon- 
Brodrick correspondence to be printed. Espec­
ially without the leave of the Sovereign. *.
1* See Brodrick to Curzon, Telegrams, 11,14,19,22,25>26,29?
and 50 September 1905)*
2. Curzon to Minto, 5 October 1905*
5* Curzon to Lawrence, 5 October 1905*
4. See Esher to Knollys, 28 August 1905? Esher, Journals, II, 
p*105* * “
The King Indeed opposed prolongation of controversy and 
wrote to Brodrick:
"I am most anxious to avoid doing anything 
which might tend to further hurt Lord Curzon1 s 
feelings, and would welcome any means which 
would gratify him and soften the circumstances 
under which he is leaving India.
Brodrick's hostility to Curzon was by now indefatigable and 
he told Balfour that Indian affairs were falling into help­
less arrear whilst the Viceroy conducted the "show business"
p
of the Royal Tour. Accordingly Balfour replied to Knollys 
(7 October 1905) that it was not a question of cancelling 
Curzon*s claim for an honour so much as its political exped­
iency and timing:
"It would never do so to time this public 
recognition of his services as to suggest 
that it was in the remotest degree connected 
with his action in the Curzon-Kitchener dispute,"
Balfour felt that it would be unfair both to Brodrick and
Kitchener, "whose feelings I am bound to consider as well as
Curzon's or my own", suggesting a postponement of any
decision until the following year, in order to forestall the
possibility of a public attack by Curzon on his return
from India. Curzon had in fact prepared a statement of his
case, but, taking the King's advice, declined to publish
it; Brodrick a year later informed Kitchener
"our best assistant has been Curzon who ... 
came back home thinking he would ride down
1. Copy, Edward VII to Brodrick,n*d.September 1905?
Balfour MSS 49721.
2, Brodrick to Balfour, 21 September 1905, Balfour MSS 49721.
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everyone . . . and the main result of nearly 12 
months fighting was that he has not got a seat 
in the House of Commons and has been refused 
promotion into the House of Lords „ The pamphlet 
he wrote against you and me, has been suppressed 
and the type broken up I ”3-
In 1907 he told Hinto:
”G.C. sees that England is getting on without 
him; he Is unnerved by incessant illness, and 
the doctors think badly of his nervous col­
lapses. The Government absolutely decline to 
give him the Earldom”
but it was desirable to give him some kind of recognition in
order to satisfy ”many who are inclined to listen to Curzon
because they think an effort is being made to keep him out
p
of political life ,.. He has enemies everywhere.”
The Monarch, however, was not so easily put off by 
his Ministers1 appeal to the question of political expediency 
as is reflected in a letter from the King's Secretary to 
Sandars, regarding Gurzon!s 'dismissal1; he commented:
”the Government condoned Curzon's shortcomings 
respecting Tibet and Afghanistan by sending 
him back to India, and on the other points by 
declining to accept his resignation in June 
(I think) and that they knew before he returned 
that they and he disagreed on the question of 
the Military Member of the Council ... I con­
fess I cannot admit that he was, as you say, 
'practically dismissed1# Surely if there has 
been any question of that, Brodrick would not 
have telegraphed to him on August 16, that he 
had received his telegram of resignation with 
the 'deepest regret'...”*
1. Brodrick to Kitchener, 30 August 1906, Kitchener MSS 
30/57/32.
2. Brodrick to Minto, 22 December 1907, Minto MSS 995*
3. See Knollys to Sandars, 9 September 1905, Balfour MSS 
49685*
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In the meantime the King had given his royal assent 
(on 28 August) to the issue of the Proclamation regarding 
the reconstitution of Bengal and Assam, and the so-called 
Partition of Bengal now became an additional element of dis­
pute between Curzon and the Home Government * In Bengal it
was generally believed that Brodrick had conceded Curzon*s
1partition scheme in order to propitiate the Viceroy, and
that it was ”a sop to Cerberus over the project of military
2administration” in which he was overruled. It appears that 
were it not for the dispute with Kitchener partition would 
have been examined more closely if not postponed altogether. 
On the same day (26 May 1905) that Brodrick circulated the 
Report of the Committee of Seven, he also circulated a 
Telegram from Curzon, dated 24 May, asking that the Govern­
ment of India*s recommendations be adopted on the partition 
%
question* Several members of the India Council however 
opposed the scheme, and while the Committee of Seven examined 
the question of military administration, a second special 
India Office Committee, composed of Lee-Warner, Lyall, 
Pitzpatrick, Hutchins and Bayley - a sizeable remainder of 
Brodrick*s Council - studied the proposed plan for partition 
received from the Government of India. On 11 May they had
-**• ^ee ^he Bengalee, 29 June 1905; The Charu Mihir, 11 July 
1905l~TT^^Tnd£an Nation, 28 AugusB’X^O^. *
2. The BengaXee^ 29" August 1905* See Zaidi, The Partition of 
B'engaX' and its Annulments: A Survey of the Schemes of 
TernXoroaX Re dl s t r ib iition of "Bengal V 1902-1911 ? Ph ♦ D.
Ihe”sI^^XConXon T9S4^~pp * 161-2.
3. See Curzon to Brodrick, Telegram, 24 May 1905#
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prepared a draft opposing some of the details of that scheme, 
hut on receipt of Curzon1 s 24- May cahle, Brodrick persuaded 
them to accept Curzon1 s view and made "a personal appeal" to 
them to drop their opposition; the partition scheme was
i
officially approved on 9 June 1905• However, seven years 
later Godley excoriated Curzon*s partition scheme as "a 
complete blunder" and reported the unusual circumstances in 
which it took place, The experts in the India Council, he 
wrote, were rather weak and though they did not like the 
plan, "they were not the men to stand up against it and make 
their voices heard," Moreover Brodrick "who had no strong 
opinion one way or another on the merits, made no secret of 
the fact that he was very anxious not to veto the proposal 
or refer it hack, for the simple reason that he was already 
having a deadly struggle with Curzon over the Military Member 
question, and intended to overrule him on that, When the time 
came, he was therefore all the more desirous of avoiding 
another great row, and I remember his giving me definite 
instructions to do all I could to get the Council to accept
p
Curzon*s scheme," Godley*s view is supported by a marginal 
annotation pencilled in at the time in a letter from Curzon, 
dated 19 July 1905, to Balfour. Curzon alleged the "despatch 
about the Partition of Bengal, which he [Brodrick] has since
1, See Brodrick to Ampthill, 9 June 1905? Ampthill MSS 233/11*
2, Kilbracken to Hardinge, 10 February 1912; see Zaidi,
toCito, pe162, for this letter and an explanation ofese proceedings.
5, See Curzon to Balfour, 19 July 1905> Balfour MSS 4-9733 
(page 5? f.35)*
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proposed to publish *.. similarly contains remarks calculated 
to depreciate the Government of India and to injure their 
credit in this countryc *.M The comment, probably made by 
Godley, reads: "Modified proposal to meet Go's views by S.J." 
[St* John Brodrick]* This evidence tends to suggest that some­
thing in the nature of a quid pro quo was engineered by Brod­
rick and the India Office in dealing with two issues intim­
ately related in their timing during the spring of 1905#
Furthermore Brodrick asserted that it was only 
because of Curzon's vigorous insistence on pushing the scheme 
ahead that the Government avoided making some concession to 
the agitation, and informed Balfour accordingly on 27 Sep­
tember: "So long as Curzon is there he must and will press 
on the change whatever the agitation..." "Under these circum­
stances which I mentioned to the King and to Minto the suc­
cessive postponement of the new Viceroy's arrival ... are 
1serious." Brodrick, however, appears actuated by more 
personal motives; he wanted to justify his position and avoid 
further concealment by the publication of papers, in order 
to forestall an Opposition attack in Parliament. It was this 
desire for avoiding issues threatening the Government's 
Parliamentary existence which forms so striking a factor in 
these events, as in the Curzon-Kitchener controversy. Brod­
rick seemed unwilling to brook censure over his management
1* Brodrick to Balfour, 27 September 1905? Balfour MSS 49721*
2* Ibid*, 4 October 1905.
of Indian affairs* In July he prepared a dossier against
X
Curzon!s external administration, challenging it in toto* 
Though Curzon may be rightly condemned for his efforts to 
dictate his policies in the teeth of the Home Governments 
opposition, it was not upon these issues which Brodrick 
focussed, so much as on their connection with the Conserva­
tive Ministry's political future* His extreme sensitivity 
to criticism of his conduct led him to overlook no possibil­
ity of protecting himself and the Home Government* Irritated 
by Fowler's motion of censure in the House of Commons, he 
alleged that "Lord Curzon has been counting for months on the 
fall of H.M*G. and the' advent of a Government who may recall
p
Lord Kitchener for work at home*"
But what finally must have goaded Curzon to despera­
tion were Brodrick's continued assertions, in such patronis­
ing phrases as "with every desire to meet your wishes" and 
"The Gov't are most desirous of working cordially with you 
and we see no obstacle in the way***", and, the ultimate 
indignity, when he cabled on 16 August; "Throughout your 
administration * * * I have endeavoured to give you constant 
support ... including the partition of Bengal" and that he 
was always "anxious to defer to your judgment" in matters 
connected with India's internal administration* Curzon1s
1* Brodrick's Note to Cabinet, 24 July 1905? Cabinet Records 
57/79/152.
2* Ibid*
5* $ee“Brodrick to Curzon, Telegram, 16 August 1905*
laconic reply was: ,f**. looking back upon more recent events
I reflect with sorrow how little justification there has
been for the claim which you make of having rendered me con-
1stant supports'1
As both Brodrick and Godley were vigorously opposed 
to granting Curzon a peerage, they represented to Balfour the 
inexpediency of allowing the Viceroy any official recognition
p
if he continued to struggle against the Home Government*
Brodrick wrote: "if George is elevated before all this has
blown over, it will be regarded as a pretty severe snub to
the Ministry apart from myself,,*#" "1 he whole official world
would", he continued, "I think, condemn us, if you do not
prevail as to deferring the h o n o u r # I n  order to confound
possible detractors, code words were employed between the
Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for the principal
4actors in the drama, and Brodrick confessed that "he whom 
his Sovereign delights to honour, will be the aggrieved 
party, and that I on behalf of the Government, or you, will 
have to open a number of rather dark doors as to his conduct 
during the last twelve months*"^ Balfour somewhat calmly 
stepped forward and with Olympian detachment wrote a defini­
tive memorandum on the termination of Curzonls Viceroyalty,
1* Curzon to Brodrick, Telegram, 18 August 1905*
2* See Godley to Brodrick, 14 August 1905 & 12 September 1905 
Midleton MSS 50072*
5. Brodrick to Balfour, 12 September 1905? Balfour MSS 49721* 
4* See Balfour to Brodrick, 19 September 1905, Ibid*
5» Brodrick to Balfour, 15 October 1905? Ibid*
1entitled r,A Peerage for Lord Ourzon” • In that able document
he argued that misconception would arise were the Government 
to honour Curzon*s services in any way. Thereupon followed 
a brilliant analysis of the outstanding conflicts which 
Curzon's administration and his relations with the Home 
Government had produced» Perhaps it is significant that 
Balfour placed the struggle with Kitchener first in his 
catalogue of the differences under discussion. It will be 
profitable to quote what Balfour wrote in some detail:
tr... the train of circumstances which have led 
to his resignation has produced a situation 
far more complicated than need have resulted 
from a mere difference of opinion. He has 
really been engaged for many months past in 
fighting inch by inch against the effective 
execution of a policy which he has never 
pretended to approve , but which he declared 
himself ready to accept. The various incidents, 
both public and private, of this long contest 
have been painful in the extreme. It has 
brought much bitterness between old friends.
It has involved a dispute, not merely on 
questions of principle, but on matters of 
fact, between the Commander-in-Chief in India 
and the Indian Viceroy. The Indian public 
have been made parties to the quarrel; the 
Indian press has somehow or another, learned 
the contents of documents which ought never 
to have been made public; and a situation 
generally has been created which more than 
once made me regret that the Viceroy ever 
returned to India last November, or, having 
returned, did not give up the post as he 
originally proposed in November.”
1. See !A Peerage for Lord Cur^on1, 6 September 1905? 
Cabinet Records, 37/79/154-•
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Balfour struck out against the idea of autonomy for
the Indian Government and what he believed to be the danger­
ous conviction that India was free to direct her own external 
policy, regardless of ,rthe control of Parliament and of the 
Cabinet, and that the Viceroy, if only he possesses suffic­
ient resolution and capacity, may fearlessly pursue a policy 
of his own, sure that success and failure, co-operation and 
obstruction, will, at the termination of his office, be 
equally rewarded." He continued:
"There are, however, three great subjects 
outside purely Indian administration in the 
narrow sense, all of which the Home Govern­
ment have had most carefully to consider, on 
all of which they have had to overrule Lord 
Curzon. The three subjects are; (1) the posi­
tion of the Commander-in-Chief, which has 
been the occasion of Lord Curzon!s resignation; 
(2) the Tibetan policy and (3) the Afghan 
policy* With regard to the first and third of 
these, the public know much, but not all, 
that has passed; and it may certainly be said 
that, irrespective of party, public opinion 
In this country has sided with the Home Govern­
ment and the Indian Council against the Viceroy* 
Of the differences between the Indian and 
Imperial Governments in connection with the 
recent negotiations with the Amir much less 
has been published. But I am certain that here 
again the Home Government would be thought to 
be right by the majority of impartial critics*
It must be recollected that the foreign policy 
of India is now an inseparable and integral 
part of the foreign policy of the Empire to 
a degree which has not been the case in times 
gone by**1* Tibet is under the suzerainty of 
China, and China is the storm-centre of 
international politics. Afghanistan touches 
Russia and Persia, and is the weak spot in 
Imperial defence0 To allow a Viceroy to run
1. See Chapter III, p p * ^
his own foreign policy in those regions, 
irrespective of the foreign policy of the Home 
Government, would he to copy the blunder which 
has brought Russia to disaster and humiliation 
the blunder, namely, of having one Foreign 
Minister in the Far East and another at home, 
not necessarily acting in accord."
In concluding his reasons for the postponement of 
an honour, Balfour sought to avoid further misunderstanding;
"It only means that so long as the Kitchener- 
Curzon controversy is the incident of Lord 
Curzon1s Viceroyalty uppermost in the people’s 
mind, it would be wise that no steps should be 
taken which would give an entirely erroneous 
impression as to the view taken of it by His 
Majesty’s Government’s adviser.
The King had, in the meantime, stoutly defended 
Curzon1 s right to a peerage and called in his Ministers for 
consultation. His intervention was intended to heal the 
breach and to prevent further controversy. He dwelt, moreover, 
on the injury inflicted on the Crown if the position of the 
Viceroy was lowered in the eyes of the ’native mind* in his 
public struggle with the Commander-In-Chief* He considered 
the Commander-in-Chief’s position of much inferior dignity 
to the Viceroy’s, and deprecated the fact that Curzon had to 
return to England without having any mark of royal approval 
for his long years of service* Finally, he quoted from Sir 
Dighton Probyn, Keeper of the Privy Purse, that the Viceroy 
was "regarded by the natives as a demi-god" and that their
1. Memorandum by Balfour, 6 September 19055 1A Peerage for 
Lord Curzon’, Cabinet Records 37/79/132.
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faith would he shaken in the Monarchy if Curzon departed 
from India under a cloud* In a pathetic hut sincere appeal? 
King Edward suggested that he personally should deal with 
the case and thus avoid continued animosity and political 
resentment* He summoned Brodrick for an audience on 11 Sep­
tember and after discussing his own views, lamented the fact
that Brodrick "was the particular Minister who had heen con-
1earned with the crisis*"
Once again Brodrick had heen caught out mismanaging 
British Imperial affairs, and once again his colleagues were 
forced to defend their hapless Minister* Sandars felt, how­
ever, that though the King was pro-Curzon, his mind could he
influenced and "his attitude can, I think, he easily modified
2
under adroit management *" That was accomplished through 
Knollys, the King's private secretary who now became increas­
ingly hostile to Curzon, and who held up the decision on the 
question of a Peerage* Balfour, in thanking Knollys for his 
support asserted: "it would never do so to time the public 
recognition of his services as to suggest that it was in the 
remotest degree connected with his action in the Curzon- 
Kitchener dispute." The question of Curzon's honour now 
became the subject of a ludicrous controversy, and while the
1. See Sandars to Balfour, 11 September 1905? for King 
Edward's attitude towards the Curzon-Kitchener dispute* 
Balfour MSS 49763,
2* Sandars to Balfour, Ibid,
3* Knollys to Sandars, 12 September 1905? Balfour MSS 49763*
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Government deliberated, Curzon was in effect swindled out of 
an honour. Balfour wrote:
"I am however disposed to think that this 
particular difficulty would he adequately- 
met if any overt action were deferred till 
January or February* By that time the 
country will probably be thinking of other 
things than India, and in so far as they 
are thinking of India it will be the parti­
tion of Bengal rather than the status of the 
Military Member which will be occupying 
their attention. ”1
Balfour then shrank from the distasteful task of 
dipping into a personal squabble* He was content to avoid 
taking any step which might further aggrevate an already 
precarious political position or take any action which would 
further alienate his colleagues* He particularly sought to 
avoid giving the Opposition an opportunity to take up the 
question from a party standpoint, and concluded:
"I cannot resolve on the proper course to 
pursue till I know what lines George means 
to take when he returns, and I cannot find 
out his intentions without putting both him­
self and me in a false position* This is very 
unlucky* I am convinced that any further 
washing of dirty linen in public would do 
much harm and no good...”2
1* Balfour to Knollys, 7 October 1905, Balfour MBS 49685*
That prediction was correct, for as Brodrick reported: 
"Curzon1 s anathemas will have to compete with a political 
crisis here for public interest and a man with a grievance 
never scores very heavily in the long run*”
Brodrick to Ampthill, 1 December 1905, Ampthill MSS 233/12*
2. Balfour to Knollys, Ibid* The question was to drag on 
for many years, and BalTour met Curzon on 22 March 1906 
to try and persuade Campbell-Bannerman to grant Curzon 
some reward - but this was refused on political grounds.
Curzon was consigned to a position of political exile*
Why is the question of Curzon1s peerage significant? 
First, the Government abstained from granting him recogni­
tion fearing his public attack on their policy; secondly, 
they shrank from the suggestion of anything in the nature of 
a bargain with Curzon, which would give him a peerage at the 
price of silence, a proposition they felt he would decline*
In sum, they would "wait and see what happens*" The fact 
that Curzon did not then receive a peerage, marked the dis­
approval with which the Home Government viewed his administra* 
tion* Brodrick*s efforts to justify that position appeared 
as recently as 1939 with the publication of his memoirs: 
Balfour had "emphatically" informed his Minister stating:
"I will not go down to posterity as having 
removed a Viceroy whom I had just re­
appointed merely because he quarrelled with 
a soldier."^
The pro-Kitchener faction among Balfour*s colleagues
presently hoped that Curzon would be driven to publish the
x
"squalid details" in the columns of The Times, and Lord
Salisbury termed his conduct "impossible", stating that he
Zl
was "guilty of gross misbehaviour"* Uncharitably Salisbury
1. Balfour to Brodrick, 15 October 19055 Balfour MSS 49721.
2* Midleton, op.cit*, pp. ix-x* Memoirs are notorious for
their tendency £0 bias, inaccuracy and self-justification; 
and Brodrick*s were based upon a secret pamphlet, now to 
be found in the India Office Library, entitled ’Relations 
of Lord Curzon as Viceroy of India with the British Gov­
ernment,, 1902-05*; see Fleming, op.cit*, p.289.
3. Lord Salisbury to Balfour, 19 September 1906, Balfour MSS 
49721.
4. Lord Salisbury to Sandars, 5 October 1905? Balfour MSS 
49758.
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suggested to Sandars that the Government should T! * . * offer
1him something - something small perhaps0"
Gurzon then was openly 'snubbed1, (as Younghusband 
over Tibet), by the Home Government, and that action was 
calculated to lower the political temperature over his resig­
nation* Moreover, Brodrick1s attitude - apart from Kitchener 
- was perhaps the decisive factor in bringing that about, 
Nevertheless, Gurzon1 s friend, W.R. Lawrence characterised 
the Secretary of State's conduct of Indian affairs as largely 
ineffectual, adding;
"He is a poor creature and not worth your powder 
and shot. No one has a good word for him, and 
he goes about bleating out his sorrow and his 
friendship for you ... I do not trust him,"2
Some months earlier Gurzon confessed to Ampthill:
"My time in India since I returned has been 
rendered a painful one, by the outrageous 
publication of the Tibetan Blue Book which 
was certainly intended by the Home Government 
as a snub to myself ,. . by the Afghan mission 
* •, and by the Kitchener dispute,"
Overruled in each case, Gurzon felt "the work of the past six 
months has been entirely thrown away," "I should have resigned 
over this" had it not been "for a not less momentous affray, 
namely that raised by the Commander-in-Ghief. ,,, It seems to 
me inconceivable that even the present Government should 
decide to trample on the Government of India in a matter
1, Lord Salisbury to Sandars, 5 October 1905* Balfour MSS 
49758.
2, W.R. Lawrence to Gurzon, 12 September 1905#
affecting their own constitution •.• For in the hands of a
military autocracy [the] one main sphere of the Government's
1responsibility would have been ... destroyed,!t
Brodrick*s conduct appears symptomatic of the inherent 
instability of Balfour's Government; hyper-sensitive to 
criticism he lashed out at Curzon in self-justification 
defending his actions, particularly over Curzon1s Tibetan 
policy. Four months after Kitchener had threatened to resign, 
Balfour pointedly commented how astonished he was at Brod­
rick1 s b ehaviour:
"St. John is really very odd just now* I cannot 
imagine why he has washed all our and Young- 
husband's dirty linen in public by giving the 
whole correspondence to the world in the new 
Blue B o o k . 2 The view we took of Younghusband*s 
behaviour was sufficiently emphasised to the 
Indian Government and the Indian official world 
by the character of the decoration which Young­
husband received. Why we should go further I 
am quite unable to under stand." 5
Brodrick* s malignity found its final manifestation 
when he implored Balfour not to receive the returning Viceroy 
at Charing Cross railway station on his arrival in England. 
Brodrick thought at the time that Curzon would attempt to 
overthrow "the new military administration in India" if the 
Government fell and the Liberals took office: "After all we 
have gone through about this, to have it suspended at the
1. Curzon to Ampthill, 2 April 1905.
2. Parliamentary Papers, Cd, 1920: 2054-; 2570; see 
Fleming, op°cit,, pp.265-293.
3. Balfour to TUyncCham, 31 January 1905, Balfour MSS 4-9805#
1
last ... would be a heavy blo^ ^^ ." But Balfour, driven to 
his decision, had admitted his mistakes, and he told Gurzon:
"Having failed lamentably in my hope that we 
could work together until either the Govern­
ment or your term of office came to an end,
I have now no desire but to save from the 
political wreck all that is possible of 
private friendship and mutual esteem. "2
For the moment the Kitchenerites had won the day.
1. Brodrick to Balfour, 21 November 1905? Balfour MSS 4-9721*
2, Balfour to Gurzon, 23 August 1905.
CHAPTER VII 
INDIAN ARMY REFORM 1906-1909
(1) Minto and the New System.
The change of Viceroys in India synchronised very 
nearly with the change of Government in England. Minto 
arrived in India in November 1905 and in December the 
Balfour administration tottered to its fall. Campbell- 
Bannerman, the new Prime Minister, offered the portfolios 
for India and War to Morley and Haldane. The association of 
Morley with India, and of Kitchener with Minto, marked a new 
phase in Indian Army Reform. Political alignments strikingly 
changed. Instead of a hostile Viceroy, Kitchener now found 
in Minto, himself a former professional soldier, a staunch 
supporter, while the new Secretary of State, Morley, was 
antipathetic to militarism of any kind. The incoming Liberal 
Government was deeply pledged to the traditional policy of 
Peace, Retrenchment and Reform, They considered Indian army 
administration a stale legacy of the late Ministry and re­
solved to consider that problem in the light of sound
1Radical philosophy,
Minto, the new Viceroy, was a soldier-administrator 
who had seen active service under Roberts in India during 
the Afghan War of 1878-9 and served successfully as Governor- 
General of Canada, A shrewd politician, endowed with a
1. See Morley, Recollections» II, pp. 14-9-150.
soldier!s practical good sense, his philosophy was sympathy
tempered by rule hy the strong arm0 Minto found that he quite
1liked Kitchener and was soon convinced that it was useless
for him to he Commander-in-Chief unless he could do what he
wanted with the Indian army.
But following the change of Government in England,
the "battle raging between the Kitchenerites and the Curzon-
ians threatened Kitchener!s ambitions, and infused much
bitterness into the conduct of Indian administration.
Kitchener greatly feared that Brodrick1s compromise decision
would be altered against his favour, and reported to Sir
George Clark that Minto "has taken the necessary steps to
put the new machinery in motion1' but that with the change
of Government the "whole question is hung up and will again,
2I suppose, be put in the melting pot." Kitchener was well 
aware that pressure would be exerted on Morley by the 
Curzonians to reverse Brodrick1s decision and he told Minto 
to inform Morley that he would resign within the horn? if 
such action were taken.
Kitchener hoped that his friends, particularly 
Marker, Esher, and Clarke, might persuade Morley and other 
Liberal Ministers to come round to his views and additionally 
that they would put in a good word for him with the new
1. See Minto to Morley, 1 February 1906, Minto MSS 1005*
2* Kitchener to Clarke, 21 December 1905, Sydenham MSS 
50835„
3. See Minto to Morley, 13 December 1905, Minto MSS 1005*
1Viceroy. But Kitchener was strongly urged by Esher to pro­
ceed with great caution. Esher wrote:
"The battle rages ..* All the patriotic and 
decent-minded people will endeavour to limit 
the controversy to the political issue ,..
Luckily you have a strong supporter in 
Godley*
Esher made two shrewd suggestions: (1) "Keep profound 
silence yourself, whatever be the nature of the attack" and 
(2) "keep on intimate and friendly terms with Minto";
"the main point in the whole controversy ... 
is that the late Viceroy and you agreed upon 
a compromise and upon an amendment of the 
Brodrick Despatch. This is the crucial point, 
because the worst of all compromise is, that 
the compromiser cannot go back upon his 
action, and Lord Gurzon and his school will 
find it Impossible to contend that your pro­
posals are essentially fatal to good govern­
ment in India, since he himself agreed - upon 
certain conditions - to try them. The moment 
that - in a great controversy - a politician 
finds himself struggling, not for a principle, 
but for an expedient, his battle is lost."3
That wise advice was not lost on Kitchener and he
reported to Lady Salisbury that "the Viceroy and I get on
first rate" and that it was of much greater importance for
n
hxm to keep in well with Minto than with Morley. On 11 
January 1906 he wrote to Clarke: "Lord Minto and I are 
working thoroughly well together. He took a little time to
1. Kitchener to Marker, 27 September 1905, Marker MSS 52276.
2. Esher to Kitchener, 21 December 1905, Kitchener MSS 
30/57/33.
3* Ibid.
4. Magnus, Kitchener, p.231.
investigate the whole case, and is now convinced I was 
right11, and two months later asserted; ,!At last! I really 
think that next Monday we shall make a start with the new 
system •,T
Kitchener went to considerable trouble to cultivate
Minto*s respect and sent him letters which he hoped would
be transmitted, through him, to Morley, Acutely sensitive
to criticism of his actions by Liberal Ministers in the
Cabinet, particularly Bipon, he found their views "and the
opinions of other deluded ex-Indian officials, •*1 intoler- 
2able. His intransigence, after all he had done to defeat 
Curzon and to bring about his resignation, was surprising;
"I fully realise that a large proportion of the Cabinet 
would have viewed with composure my overthrow *twixt cup 
and lip", Moreover, Kitchener felt that he was being "com­
pletely misrepresented" at home by Curzon and that in con­
sequence his "case has been entirely lost sight of or become 
hidden under the mass of lies that now surround and envelope 
my personality," Proud of his staunch friends at home, he 
explained to Esher that "the end has justified my action*"^ 
Kitchener quickly discovered that in persuading the indolent 
Minto, then in his sixty-first year, and his Council of the
1, Kitchener to Clarke, 11 January & 15 March 1906, Sydenham 
MSS 50835.
2, Kitchener to Esher, 11 January 1906$ Esher, Journals II, 
p *134-0
3, Kitchener to Esher, 1 March 1906, Ibid,, pp*14-5-6*
validity of his views on Indian army administration, he had
only won the first round', he would now have to convince the
new Liberal Home Government* With Gurzon removed from the
scene, Kitchener*s dynamic energy and force soon dominated
in India. On that point, the Kingfs private secretary, Lord
Knollys (1837-1924), had confided to Curzon (with some
indiscretion):
"I certainly have no wish to disparage Minto, 
but there is no doubt that during Lord 
Kitchener's tenure of office in India he [Lord 
Kitchener] will be the real Viceroy*"!
By March 1907 Kitchener had won the confidence of
his colleagues and obtained from Minto rs Council a unanimous
vote in favour of the new organisation. He described his
latest triumph by asserting that the "new system was a
complete success and an immense improvement upon the old ,*.
I think I must have the three despatches bound up - Curzon1 s
original, signed by all the Council, except myself; then
the despatch establishing the new system; and this last one,
2signed by everyone. Poor Curzoni How angry he would be J"
In June 1907 he assured Lady Salisbury that the new system 
had "more than justified my wildest hopes*" A few months
1* Knollys to Curzon, 21 September 1905# Knollys told
Sandars, 9 September 1905: "As regards" Minto and Curzon 
"one cannot really put the 2 men in any way on the same 
level* It would be like coupling Pitt with Percival." 
Balfour MSS 497630
2. Kitchener to Lady Salisbury, 24 April 19079 Magnus, 
Kitchener, p0225«
3, Tbid,
earlier he had confided in Minto: "Gurzon will, I am sure, 
greatly dislike this proof that his estimate of me was not 
quite correct",1 and confidently informed the Viceroy that 
his work was happily less than it used to he and that he was
p
able to occupy his time by shooting "tiger and bear".
Nevertheless throughout the remainder of his term as 
Commander-in-Chief in India Kitchener was troubled with the 
repercussions of his struggle with Gurzon* That psychological 
battle indeed often obscured, particularly in the English 
press, the more fundamental issues underlying Indian admin­
istration* Following Kitchener*s militant press campaign 
Curzon recruited a strong fraternity of supporters, including 
Sir A*C. Lyall, J* St. Loe Strachey, and Valentine Chirol* 
Deploring the circumstances in which Gurzon had been forced 
to leave India, these men pointed to Gurzon*s administration 
as representing the epitome of Imperial rule until hindered 
by active interference from the Home Government. No one was 
more influential than Ghirol and his appearance in the 
columns of The Times gave rise to the comment from Morley, 
about to push ahead with his reforms, "This is bad news for 
me, for active unfriendliness and opposition from The Times 
will make a vast deal of difference."-' Gurzon never lost an 
opportunity of pointing to the Gommander-in-Ohief as the
1. Kitchener to Minto, 4 April 1907? Minto MSS 980.
2. Ibid.
5* Horley to Minto, 13 January 1909? Morley MSS 573/4*
cause of political unrest in India. lie assailed both. Kit­
chener and Minto for attempting to introduce a policy of 
reform while at the same time carrying out one of repres- 
sion, and it was only natxiral that this attitude brought 
with it much resentment in India* In 1906 Kitchener had
written: "I see the pen of Chirol and the hand of Curzon" in
2
the columns of The Times and Minto, who blamed his misfor­
tunes on his predecessor wrote: "If a true history of 
Gurzon!s rule is ever written. It will make the world wonder. 
Few people at home know the legacy of bitter discontent he 
left for his successor ... a knowledge of his life as seen 
from behind the scenes here would make people‘s hair stand 
on end. His promotion to the House of Fords would in my 
opinion only give him further opportunities for mischief."^ 
During Minto1s administration, Gurzon viewed all Indian 
isaues from a subjective point of view and, systematically 
frustrated by both parties in his struggle for some recogni­
tion of his services, progressively attempted to embarrass 
Conservative and Kadical Ministers alike in their handling 
of Indian affairs. It is just possible that had either 
BalfourTs Government or the Liberal Administration conferred 
an honour on the ex-Froconsul as a mark of distinction for 
his administrative work, his public opposition might have
1. See The Times, 15 June 1907*
2. KitcheneiTTo~lvlinto, 8 September 1906, Minto MSS 97i*
3. Minto to Morley, 12 September 1907? Minto MSS 1007*
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been mollified. As it happened those attacks in the press
usually generated heat rather than spread light and Curzon
1appeared in the guise of a foiled reformer in exile, None­
theless Kitchener remained extremely touchy about the press
p
comments and sent Minto frequent letters discounting them*
In the meantime, strenuous efforts were being made
to reform Britain1s military organisation, and Esher had
written (26 July 1905) suggesting Kitchener return to London
in order to serve as Chief of the General Staff at the War
Office.^ In his reply (14 August 1905) Kitchener derided
that idea, stating:
"Patriotic convictions, my dear Lord Esher, 
have led many men to commit great follies, 
and will, I presume, continue to do so in 
the future,"4
In his letter Kitchener enclosed an extremely important 
document entitled *A Note on the Military Policy of India1, 
dated 19 July 1905* In that paper Kitchener advocated a 
vigorous policy of absorption of the border tribes along 
India!s frontiers. In order to prevent Russian encroachment 
and guarantee the integrity of the Government of India*s 
control over them, he urged the Cabinet to "show that you 
intend to be masters in your own house."^ Further, he argued
1* Bee The limes, 15 June 1907.
2. See especially Kitchener to Minto, 29 April 1906, re the 
Soudanese Mutiny at Khartoum following Kitchener's 
departure from Egypt*
3* Esher to Kitchener, 26 July 1905? Kitchener MSS 30/57/20* 
4* Kitchener to Esher, 14 August 1905; Esher, Journals, II, 
p*98*
5* !A Note on the Military Policy of India* (19 July 1905);
see Kitchener MSB 30/57/30.
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that no consistent policy had hitherto heen followed, and 
that policy had heen apt to change according to the convic­
tion and personality of every succeeding Viceroy or Secretary 
of State« Finally he asserted that in future India*s military 
policy should he controlled hy the Commander-in-Chief,
(acting through the Committee of Imperial Defence) instead
1of the Viceroy and Government of India, At the time Balfour
and the Cabinet were greatly impressed hy that document -
2which had heen privately circulated hy Lord Esher. Esher 
informed Balfour:
"Could anything he more clear, as is shown hy 
his [Kitchener1s] historical survey of the 
past and his synopsis of recent events, than 
that the Government of India is not qualified 
to deal with questions of external policy?"3
Esher was convinced that Indian frontier policy could he
settled more satisfactorily hy the Defence Committee than
hy the Government of India; and with the change from Curzon
to Minto he sensed that Kitchener would he given unfettered
control adding:
"Lord Ko [Kitchener] .„, will he enchanted* It 
is a victory for him all along the line, and 
he can do pretty well what he likes. Luckily 
he has shown himself to he a canny sort of 
customer, otherwise there might he fears for 
the future. A Liberal Government will accept 
Minto, and take him on*»
1* *A Note on the Military Policy of India* (19 July 1905);
see Kitchener MSS 30/57/30*
2* See Esher to Balfour, 10 September 1905, Balfour MSS 
49719.
3* Xbido
4. Esher, Journals, II, 21 August 1905, pp.99-100.
419
Kitchener had won his case, hut Esher later cautiously
observed that there were political dangers involved, were
Kitchener - acting through the Defence Committee - to tamper
with the external policy of India* He speculated whether it
their
was wise for Sepoys to fight against/tribal co-religionists, 
especially during a possible outbreak of hostilities else­
where: ”Do you think it would be prudent” he asked Balfour 
”■«*. in view of the uncertainty of the circumstances in 
Europe or elsewhere, which might co-exist with a war on the
i
N.W* Frontier, or an Indian rising?”
Curzon had implacably opposed any military meddling
in India *s external policy, and he informed Morley:
”**. one of the main reasons for which 
Kitchener desired my departure & for which 
his predominance in India may be such an 
onus and danger, is that he desires to sub­
stitute for my cautious frontier policy, a 
policy of vigorous and aggressive initiative 
against the tribes,”2
Though Morley largely attributed Curzon's warning to a desire
to sow discord between himself and Kitchener, he nevertheless
became deeply suspicious of Kitchenerfs motives^
When, in 1906, Kitchener attempted to translate his
lL
views into action, Morley responded with the question: ”Is
1. Esher to Balfour, 3 October 1906, Balfour MSB 49719«
2. Curzon to Morley, 24 December 1905? Morley MSS 555#
3. See especially Morley to Haldane, 9 June 1906, Haldane 
MSS 5907.
4. See Kitchener to Minto, 1 May 1906, Minto MSS 978* 
Kitchener had sent Duff to England in October 1906 in the 
hope of persuading Morley to accept his views on frontier 
policy\ see Duff to Kitchener, 14 December 1906, Minto 
’MSS 9*79? and also Minto to Kitchener, 28 October 1906, 
Ibid,
it more than the old story - hammer the tribes & bully the
i
Amir?" In 1907 both Kitchener and Minto proposed that in 
view of the Government of India1s inaction and loss of pres­
tige during the period of unrest, a frontier campaign might 
offset what appeared as weakness on the part of the Govern­
ment of India, and "the chance of active service may have a 
good effect in drawing away the attention of the Native Army 
from the mischievous attractions that surround them*" Minto 
discussed the possibility of occupying various tribal terri­
tories and mentioned the fact that Kitchener must keep an 
eye on the loyalty of his troops were they to become engaged 
against Mahsuds, Waziries and Afridi sympathies. He proposed 
to furnish evidence to Morley to suggest that such action 
would "save money" as well as have a beneficial effect on 
"the safety of British subjects and the peace of the frontier"
and in that way the Liberal Secretary of State "may see his
2way to support us," By February 1908 noth Minto and Kitchen­
er had been able to justify a punitive expedition against 
the Zakka Khels in the Bazar Valley* But Minto chaffed that 
Morley "keeps on pressing upon us that there is to be no 
occupation on any grounds whatever" of their territories, 
to which Kitchener retorted: "post Morley with some of
lL
Ourzon!s own statements on the subject*" Accordingly, on
1. Morley to Minto, 5 October 1906, Morley MSS 573/1.
2. Minto to Kitchener, 14 October 1907, Minto MSS 980*
3. See Minto to Kitchener, 7 February 1908, Minto MSS 982*
4. Kitchener to Minto, 14 February 1908, Ibid*
421
19 February, Minto informed Morley "Gurzon himself, very 
shortly before he left India, noted that 'the present system 
is a scandal and strong measures are required to remedy 
it'." The campaign was a success and Lady Minto reported 
from London (13 March) that Morley was "chuckling with joy 
over the Zakka Khel Expedition having terminated" and that 
he had exclaimed: '"I am daily appearing in a new light: 
to-day I am a great War Minister, and to-morrow I have to 
make a Bishop!"1 (the news of the death of the Bishop of
. p
Bombay having just arrived*)
Kitchener would have liked to have seen "that extra-
ordinary man the Secretary of State"-' and his unpalatable
* 4-obstructrons "hampering all progress", relegated to the
limbo of oblivion: "Morley*s evident determination to stop 
everything [military] shows that it would be futile to sub­
mit proposals" to him on matters of military policy, in 
particular schemes on redistributing the army.^ He knew how­
ever that any such action on his part would arouse great
suspicion at home and he therefore urged "careful wording" 
in replying to Morley1s efforts to reduce India's military 
establishment. Nevertheless the King found it a "comfort
1. Minto to Morley, 19 February 1908, Minto MSS 1008.
2. Lady Minto to her husband, 13 March 1908, Mary Minto, 
India» Minto and Morley 1905-19103 p#200.
3. fcit'chener to Mint0, 5 February T908, Minto MSS 982.
4. Ibido, 7 May 1908o
5* iBl'd., 17 March 1908.
6. IbTS., 18 April 1908.
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to learn that the Indian Army is in a far more satisfactory
state than it was" and that "the employment of the troops
on active service has proved most beneficial." As for
sedition: "If we are to retain onr hold on the country, we
must endeavour to crush the present disloyalty with a high
hand - or else we may have similar troubles as we had 50 
1years ago!"
Early in 1906 Kitchener had called Minto1s attention 
to the possibility of disaffection among his troops by 
political agents. He was unwilling however to believe that 
a state of unrest, unknown since the days of the Mutiny, 
prevailed in the Indian army and characterised the statements 
regarding the possibility of sedition (such as occurred in
0
Spectator on 10 December 1905) as merely "another of 
the many baseless fabrications that are now being concocted 
at home to influence the Government" against him* He argued 
that "there was no -unrest in the Indian Army", although he 
became increasingly disturbed as secret reports revealed 
that the "shoe pinches in the Native Army" owing to a rise 
in the cost of living which left the Sepoy in an unsatisfac~
ZL
tory financial position. By 1907 the situation had been 
radically altered*
1. Edward VII to Minto, 1? July 1907, Minto MSS 997.
2. Ihe Spectator, 10 December 1905*
5. Kitchener to Minto, 10 January 1906, Minto MSS 978*
4. See Sir B.Blood to Kitchener, 17 January 1906, Ibid*
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A more sinister form of political agitation broke 
out in the spring of 1907 and political unrest gave rise to 
serious fears of sedition in the army. So anxious was Minto 
about the attempts made to corrupt the loyalty of "Native 
officers and soldiers" that he told Morley "we were entirely 
taken hy surprise, and the more we got to know, the worse 
things seemed*"'1' The Viceroy was so alarmed that he informed 
his wife (15 May) "The whole place is like a powder magazine" 
and he called upon Kitchener to provide vigorous measures to 
crush potential rebellion in the army.^ A stream of outrages 
had occurred, including bomb-throwing, terrorist propaganda 
and assassination* On 6 December 1907 an attempt was made to 
blow up the train of Sir Andrew Braser, the Lieutenant- 
Governor of Bengal, at Midnapur, On 23 December, B.C. Allen, 
a former Magistrate of Dacca, was unsuccessfully shot at.
On 30 April 1908 the murder of Mrs. and Miss Kennedy at 
Muzzafarpur ultimately resulted in the discovery of hidden
ZLbombs, dynamite and inflammable literature* Rumours became
current that the Government used flesh and bones in the
manufacture of salt; that wells were being poisoned so as to
spread plague and destroy unborn children*^ According to
1* Minto to Morley, 29 August 1907? Minto MBS 1007.
2. Minto to his wife, 15 May 1907? Mary, Oountess of Minto, 
Ibid., p*136*
3* See”"Minto to Kitchener, 55 24,30 May; 8,22 June 1907?
Minto KISS 980 *
4P See Report of the Indian Sedition Committee, (1918), 
pp*22-50.
5. See Zaidi, opacito, pp*194ff. These slanders appear to 
have been propagated exclusively to embarrass the Govern­
ment over Partition in the aftermath of Swadeshi.
Kitchener, agitators had made persistent attempts to tamper 
with the loyalty of his forces and thus undermine the alleg­
iance of the "Native Army ..* and persuade the Sepoys to 
throw In their lot" with the disaffected agitators. He 
asserted that "every possible attempt was being made to 
corrupt the Army which must sooner or later be influenced 
by prevailing ideas" and that grievances were permeating the 
"Native regiments" to the extent that a "well known sedition- 
monger" had remarked "that it was recognised by the leaders 
that nothing could be done until the Native troops had been
i
won over." Kitchener was determined to take strong action 
in dealing with agencies fostering sedition, including stern 
measures of repression. As protection against the 
seduction of the allegiance of his troops, he advocated a 
stringent press law. He pointed to the Arya Samaj as the dis­
loyal party which sponsored agitation in order to gain "some­
thing for their personal advantage ... Remember - Indians,
like all Orientals, are extremely excitable and led away by 
2lies." On 5 June 1907? Kitchener urged Immediate and 
uncompromising action against the growing audacity of the 
agitators. Treason, he argued, could go no further before 
shaking "to its very foundation the confidence of the Native 
soldier in the efficiency of our power and the stability of
1* Minute entitled ’The Harmful Influences of the Native 
Press1 (5 June 1907), enc. Kitchener to Minto, 6 June 
1907, Minto MSS 980.
2. Ibid.
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our rule"; he looked upon the Indian press as a tTcanker 
which is slowly but surely eating into the loyalty and good
i
Reeling of our Native troops." The Commander-in-Chief 
confided:
"We shall have to walk warily for some time 
to get things right* The prestige of the 
Sahib has stiffered and the result is a want 
of'discipline. People who never thought of 
criticising the British Raj do so now more 
freely. The native Press is responsible for 
a great deal; they recommend bombs and a 
combination to turn us out* openly and with 
impunity. We must stop all this*"^
Constrained to take firm action against the 
supposed chief agitators* the Government of India deported 
Laj-Pat Rai and Ajit Singh*^ On 1 November 1907? the 
Prevention of Seditions Meeting Act Was passed and 
between June 1906 and July 1907, prosecutions instituted 
against nine newspapers or journals.^ The liberty of the
1. Minute entitled *The Harmful Influences of the Native 
Press1 (5 June 1907)? enc* Kitchener to Minto, 6 June 
1907? Minto MSS 930*
2. Arthur, op*citQ , II, p025^* Kitchener discounted the idea 
that the discontent of his troops was in any way con­
nected with his rash and unsympathetic rule, attributing 
such accusations to Curzon. Indeed, Lawrence had written 
to Gurzon on 5 June 1905? "I feel that it would be a 
calamity if you left India to the mercies of Lord Kitch­
ener and a new Viceroy," contrasting Ourzon with Dalhousie 
who "suffered for the Mutiny"*
5* See Minto to Morley, 8 May 1907? Minto MSS 1007* D:r* S.R. 
Wasti gives us an insight into the confusion between 
Minto*s and Ibbetson's views as to whether Lajpat Rai 
was guilty of tampering "with the loyalty of the army" 
in Lord Minto and the Indian Nationalist Movement 1905 to 
1910, ppa104-5, 1X0.
4* See"Minto to Morley, 7 August 1907, Minto MSS 1007#
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press was curtailed on 8 June 1908 with, the passing of the
Indian Press Act and, under strong pressure from Kitchener,
on 11 December 1908 the Government passed the Criminal Law
Amendment Act to expedite the trial of anarchical offences
1and the suppression of conspiratorial societies*
Kitchener's demand for repressive retribution did
nothing to increase confidence in his ability in London,
though he held the respect of the European community in 
2India* When he hit upon the expedient of sending a trusted 
Mohammedan officer to enquire into regimental feelings as 
to the loyalty of the army to British rule, his action was 
reported in England and Lansdowne commented;
".. * all over the country the natives have 
'got their beards up1 as they never had them 
before* As to the army I heard an ugly
story the other day . *. to the effect that K*
had introduced spies into the native's regi­
ments & that they had been at once detected - 
a dreadful gaucheriel"5
Nevertheless Kitchener played upon the worst fears of the
Government of India by telling Minto who reminded Morley
that "the regimental officers of the old Indian Army believed
implicitly in the loyalty of their regiments till they rose
in arms against them" in the night and cut them to pieces.^
1* Home Proceedings, Public/Political, July-December 1908,
10L Records 7592.
2* See Morley to Minto, 8 August 1907, Morley MSS 575/3.
5. Lansdowne to Balfour, 24 December 1908, Balfour MSS 49729.
4. Minto to Morley, 10 July 1907, Minto MSS 1007.
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Marker even went so far as to tell George Arthur, later 
Kitchener’s "biographer, that perhaps it was a good idea to 
show the Liberal Government in power the dangers that lay 
ahead by providing stories of sedition and unrest in the 
army*
Kitchener informed Lady Salisbury (6 June 1907) that
sedition was "pretty strong underneath the surface. The
principal agitators are the more or less educated lawyer
class. They ... are doing all they can to get at the loyalty
of the Army. They preach another mutiny, to drive us out of
the country. It will require careful handling...1' Though
the question at issue, the loyalty of his soldiers, was never
at any period in serious doubt, he told Minto that it was
"unrealistic" to worry about outrages committed in Bengal,
as he drew no soldiers from that unwarlike country where he
could easily suppress rebellion. He was much more concerned
with unrest in the Punjab as he felt Sikhs "have a grievance
in connection with the Punjab Golonisation Act, and the
agitators seem to have succeeded in producing a certain
*
amount of unrest among them*""^ Unrest in the Punjab was
1. Marker to Arthur, 25 June 1907? Kitchener MSS 30/57/31*
2c Magnus, Kitchener, p0234-.
5. See KitcEener“€o*^Minto, 5?7?8? 12 May 1907? enc.Kitchener1 s 
Note ’The Effects of the Present Unrest in the Native 
Army1 (12 May 1907) Minto MSS 980, The American Consular 
Records also reveal that the danger of a ’rising’ was ex­
aggerated owing to Kitcheners fear of unrest in the Pun­
jab. Here, Kitchener may well have been observing his cus­
tomary practice of when in doubt magnifying the possibil­
ity of serious unrest in order to keep as many reserves as 
possible in the country. United States Department of State, 
Consular Records, Calcutta, reports by Consul-General W.H. 
Michael, Diplomatic Despatches MSS 6971/1-22 (May-June 
1907)? Archives of the U.S.A., Washington, D.C,
somewhat over-exaggerated owing to Kitchener’s fear of out­
rages committed by Punjabis because "they are the fighting 
classes from which we draw our Army"; he feared sedition 
gaining a foothold amongst his troops and more especially, 
the tampering of their loyalty by propaganda, speeches or 
attacks in the press by Swadeshi lecturers such as Gokhale.
In pressing for a vigorous prohibition of obnoxious public 
meetings and seditious pamphlets as well as advocating the 
death penalty for anyone attempting to meddle with the army, 
he pointed with stubborn pride to the fact that his troops 
"laughed on finding copies of the ’American’ seditious leaf­
let in their lines, whilst the Mohammedan community through­
out the Punjab appear to view the whole agitation with dis-
1approbation and disgust."
Making no effort to conceal his view that Britain 
held India by the sword, Kitchener drew up comprehensive 
plans to suppress rebellion in three ways. First by utilising 
railroads in making arrangements for Regular British troops 
to be despatched immediately to trouble spots; secondly by 
establishing mobile columns and garrisons at 18 key strategic 
’Defence Areas’, or 25 if Burma, Aden and Kohat were added. 
These areas corresponded roughly with the Brigading of troops 
with their garrisons throughout India. Finally, Kitchener,
1. See Kitchener to Minto, 12 May 1907, enc. Kitchener’s 
Note ’The Effects of the Present Unrest in the Native 
Army* (12 May 1907), Minto MSS 980.
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planned to act according to a pre-arranged scheme, in con­
cert with civil authorities whose European populations could 
he collected and armed for their own security, in districts 
of safety. They were expected to defend themselves and pro­
vision was made to store arms and ammunition at the security 
depots where refugees collected. In addition, a force of 
8,500 sabres, 41,000 rifles and 72 guns had been specially 
allotted for internal defence. These troops were charged 
with responsibility for holding magazines and stores whilst 
keeping an eye upon the Native army (roughly 400,000 sepoys), 
the Police, and the armed forces of the Native States. Thus 
Kitchener planned down to the last gun, sabre and bayonet to
maintain rail and road communications, repress acts of
the
rebellion and provide for the security of/European civil
population. He laid out his scheme in an Army Order, No.512
1
dated 8 October 1907# That plan was to act as a counterpoise 
to the formidable number of Indian troops under arms, and 
Kitchener argued that, far from excessive, his European 
contingent (roughly 71,000 men) was only adequate to meet 
any internal threat. Kitchener was careful to distinguish 
European enemies as opposed to 'Asiatics’, and in the event 
of a war with Russia was prepared to throw 9 Pield Divisions 
against any invasion of India’s frontiers* With the tacit 
approval of the Committee of Imperial Defence under Balfour’s
1. See 'Record of Kitchener's Indian Army Administration’, 
1902-9, Minto MSS 856.
Government, and that of Campbell-Bannerman, Kitchener assumed
that he would alone defend India using his own resources
until after naval warfare on a global scale achieved victory
for British seapower. After nine months, naval supremacy
restored, the despatch of reinforcements and supplies from
1England would assist operations in India.
But in fact being preoccupied with organising his
forces to prepare for a great external conflict, Kitchener
was caught off balance by the possibility of having to face
internal disaffection. His great weakness in this respect
lay in his scant regard for the effects which his reforms
of Indian army administration would have on India. Though
one Sikh soldier was actually tried under the Indian Articles
of War for sedition, Kitchener wrote:
"Notwithstanding the agitation which has recently 
been going on in the Punjab, and attempts made 
to Influence the Army, I am glad to say the p 
loyalty of the Sepoys has not been affected."
Kitchener,concerned only with relating India's forces with
those of Great Britain in preparation for a general European
war, in those circumstances almost had to tell Morley that
the loyalty of his sepoys was not affected, though he used
10 See especially Balfour's Speech (published in 1905) on 
the Defence of India (11 May 1905), also 'Record of 
Kitchener's Indian Army Administration', 1902-9, Minto 
MSS 856.
2. Kitchener to Morley, 25 May 1907, enc. Minto to Morley 
25 May 1907, Minto MSS 1007* Kitchener tried to maintain 
an outward calm, but caught off balance both he and Minto 
were extremely fearful; see Minto to Kitchener, 5 May 
1907, Ibid.
argument later as an excuse for preserving intact his
1large military establishment*
Kitchener*s massing of troops along India's frontiers 
provoked serious criticism, for it laid him open to the 
charge that in deploying his forces in great cantonments he 
disregarded (1) the requirements of internal defence as well 
as (2) the health and comfort of his soldiers, who were 
locked up in camps far away from their homes and thereby 
subjected to agencies of unrest within their ranks. It must 
be admitted that Kitchener never averted his eyes from what 
he conceived to be the primary enemy, Russia* He maintained 
his belief in her indomitable determination to move against 
India's buffer state, Afghanistan, a contingency always 
closely considered by the Defence Committee. Shortly before 
the signing of the Anglo-Russian Convention (31 August 1907) 
Kitchener had requested up to 100,000 reinforcements in the 
event of a Russian Invasion of Afghanistan, even though he 
reported that he did "not regard a direct attempt by Russia
p
to xnvade India as at all likely."
Kitchener divided and grouped his Divisions according 
to the dictates of his strategic concept of a war on the 
North-West Frontier. In the event of hostilities and in order
1* See especially article in The Observer, 24- April 1910*
2. Report of the Sub-Committee Thquiring into the Military 
Requirements of India, 1 May 1907* Cabinet Records 6/3/98*
to support the Amir of Afghanistan, his Divisions were to 
advance along two principal routes: first from Peshawar to 
Kabul, and second from Quetta to Kandahar# Operating as two 
main hut independent bodies with Kabul and Kandahar as their 
strategic pivots his forces were conveniently distributed 
along main lines of railways, whereby Kitchener planned 
rapidly to concentrate and transport troops to the two main 
objectives# The Northern army, constituting the five Divi­
sions lying at the foot of the Himalayas and pointing towards 
Kabul, were the Peshawar, Rawalpindi, Lahore, Meerut, and 
Lucknow Divisions; these were in charge of a Lieutenant- 
General, while each Division had its own Divisional and 
Brigade Commanders responsible for settling details respect­
ive to their commands «> On a lower line were the four Divi­
sions pointing towards Kandahar - the Quetta, Mhow, Poona 
and Secunderabad Divisions - which, with the garrisons of 
Burma and Aden, made up the Southern Army* In the result, 
Kitchener's 'Redistribution and Reorganisation Scheme' 
enabled him to concentrate his troops all along the North- 
West frontier and await without alarm any difficulties 
arising beyond the frontier# Because, Kitchener argued, 
each Division was lodged in a strategic plan of campaign 
near its own line of railway, it was available to meet any 
contingency, external or internal; and each Divisional 
Commander could make his own arrangements to meet either 
emergency within his own area or in response to an alarm
from the North* In any case troops could be despatched at
short notice to vital points and thus make contact with the
enemy, or stand ready for at least a twelvemonth, until
1Imperial reinforcements from overseas arrived* Fully 
equipped, these nine Divisions, each consisting of three 
Brigades, were estimated to provide approximately 120,000 
men in all, as compared with the former four-division system 
which had furnished only 70?000 troops* Kitchener!s system, 
along with a number of other useful but unspectacular re­
forms, must be accounted greatly superior to the one which 
it displaced*
"It was better adapted to needs and conditions 
which, together with the highly personal 
machine which Kitchener devised to meet them, 
have passed, like a dissolving view, into
history*"2
(2) Morley and Kitchener and the Abolition of the
The association of Morley and Kitchener marked the 
culminating phase in the struggle over Indian army reform0 
No two men were more diverse in character, temperament,
1* See Kitchener!s Memorandum 'The Preparation of the Army 
in India for War* (30 January 1904), as amended in 1906, 
emerging in mature form in 1907? marking a great stride 
in the decentralisation of the Indian army, Minto MSS 836. 
Haldane was greatly impressed by Kitchener's achievement, 
as tested in the field by operations in the Bazar Valley - 
in 1907-8, and congratulated him on his success. Haldane 
to Kitchener, 3 June 1908, Kitchener MSS 30/57/31$ also 
Haldane MSS 5708.
2. Magnus, Kitchener, p#226.
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social background or political outlook, Morley was a polished 
intellectual who once told Esher that he found Kitchener !,a
i
most uninteresting type1’, Nicknamed ’Priscilla1 “by Campbell- 
Bannerman because he seemed over-imbued with his own self- 
importance, Morley found militarism and the business of war 
so abhorrent that in 1914 he resigned office rather than be 
party to it. Kitchener lived by the sword and always held 
himself ready for arbitrament by it and his career bore wit­
ness to his ability to adopt measures of repression and sub­
jugation when the situation called for them* Although both 
Morley and Kitchener strove hard to break down the intellec­
tual barriers between them (their correspondence reveals 
their efforts to achieve sympathetic understanding where 
agreement was unattainable) and though Kitchener tried hard 
to work loyally with Morley and thus rally Liberal support 
for his schemes (he found common cause with Morley in an 
overriding preoccupation with cheese-paring economy), he 
nevertheless described Morley as ’’pig-headed and dangerous”, 
”sand-paperish” and a man who ”positively hates military 
efficiency^
Morley soon discovered the difficulties he would face 
at the India Office as the result of the Curzon-Kitchener 
question, which he termed a "delicate” imperial problem. He 
wrote:
1* Esher, Journals, II, p*275»
2. See Magnus, Krtchener  ^ p*232.
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"discussion had followed resignation and the 
publication of minutes and correspondence 
and scandal over a scene where heat and some­
thing like political scandal were most sedu­
lously to be avoided, These stormy transactions 
left a heavy surge behind them, and India watched*"
At the same time these proceedings coincided with the 
ascendency of the Liberal Party, least inclined to quarrel 
with the political aspirations of a people who claimed an 
increased share of authority in their own government* Cor­
respondingly, deeper currents of political unrest, some 
moderate, some revolutionary, constituted a fundamental stir
in the Indian atmosphere and all parties came to agree in
2
the general need for reform* But the main issue confronting 
Morley was how to deal with the problem of Indian army 
administration and its intimate relationship on the demands 
of the military resources of the Empire, for the requirements
' X
of India were the "master key" of Imperial policy.
Morley found that circumstances in India had changed 
rapidly, for Minto had taken office with a Conservative 
mandate accepting Brodrick!s scheme and was actively engaged 
to give it effect with a minimum of fuss* Accordingly, Minto 
had drawn up the necessary rules for the new Supply Depart-
Zl
ment, and his draft of them had actually reached Morley in
1* Morley, Recollections, II, p*149*
2* Ibid*, ppTIA9-lJS* Within two years following Curzon's 
departure Minto witnessed the emergence of the most 
formidable nationalist sentiment since the Mutiny, cul­
minating in the open split of the Congress at Surat 
In 1907*
3* Ibid*, p^lJO*
4. See Morley to Minto, 28 December 1905* Morley MSS 575/1*
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the midst of his election campaign when he was too occupied 
to give much thought to it. The new Secretary of State for 
India referred the matter to a Committee at the India Office 
pending his return to London, and during this interim matters 
had a chance to cool down to some extent0 Although Morley 
had openly professed his strong adherence to the principle 
of civil supremacy in India, he found on taking charge of 
the India Office that it was one thing to make such utter­
ances, and quite another to reverse the policy of his pre­
decessor, and so translate words into action. But he was 
more than willing, Before taking up the question, to give
Both Minto and Kitchener a fair hearing on the question of
T
dual control and the merits of Brodrick!s Despatch*
Once settled down at the India Office, Morley found 
himself confronted By a formidaBle comBination of authorities: 
in India Minto and Kitchener were in accord, along with his 
own Council in Whitehall, on the question at issue. Could 
he, as a new Minister of a few days* standing, overrule this 
array of unified opinion? Morley mastered the papers which 
he discussed individually with Balfour, G-odley, Roberts, 
Brodrick and Curzon, he also held long conversations with 
Ian Hamilton and H.Smith-Dorrien, all except Curzon, took 
Kitchener !s view* Morley then rightly claimed that the 
importance of the issue had Been enormously exaggerated on
1. Bee Morley to Minto, 9 February 1906, Morley MBS 573/1*
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both sides, and deliberately avoiding past controversy,
1echoed Esher's advice to Kitchener arguing that Curzon had 
accepted change in principle when he accepted Brodrick's 
scheme subject to modifications: "fhis was to come a long 
way forward," On the other hand Kitchener had loyally agreed 
to make the best of the new system, and Morley wrote:
"It ought to be possible with care and good­
will, and oblivion of a fierce quarrel that 
need never have taken place, to build a 
golden bridge*"^
However, Morley did not altogether believe that he 
could satisfy his own party as well as the "Curzonians"; 
but he was able to avoid further harm to imperial interests: 
"We must, in any case, get temper down before anything else,1^ 
Reluctantly acknowledging Brodrickrs Despatch, Morley quickly 
came to the conclusion that he could not overrule the power­
ful combination of authorities in India and in Whitehall, 
Shrewdly he picked his way between the two factions 0 On the 
question of the position and powers of the Secretary in the 
new Army Department, the Government of India were themselves 
divided; Morley sided with the dissentients, Curzon *s ex­
counsellors, against Minto and Kitchener, who were supported 
by Major-General Scott, the new Supply Member, and Baker, 
the Finance Member, Morley, as well as Minto*s civilian
1, See stxxDra, p* 412,
2, See Morley to Minto, 28 December 1905? Morley MSS 573/1*
5. Ibid», 1 February 1905*
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colleagues, recoiled from the prospect of losing any safe­
guard for the constitutional control of the army by the 
Government of India« Bent on strengthening the constitutional 
check on the Commander-in-Chief which only the position of 
Army Secretary could provide, Morley accordingly placed the 
new Secretary in as independent a position as possible on 
the tacit assumption that this measure once adopted - even
though tentative - was infinitely better than indefinite
1prolongation of controversy* In that way Morley hoped all 
parties would see the firmness of his position as final 
arbiter.
Curzon, who feared Morley!s hand was being forced 
by circumstances, informed him on 24 January that he had
pprepared a manifesto stating the entire case, which he felt 
it his duty to publish, and reveal, if necessary, the imprac­
ticability of Brodrick!s scheme, especially if Morley toler­
ated any inferior status for the Army Secretary under the 
new Department* He concentrated on two issues: (1) that 
Kitchener fs case against dual control as such had no founda­
tion but was personal to one individual, Elies, and (2) that 
"Scott is, as we all know him to be, an absolute cipher." 
Curzon characterised these proceedings as "being a veritable
1. Morley to Curzon, 7 February 1906.
2. ’Private and Confidential Pamphlet on Indian Military 
Administration1, 2nd version, 1906, Curzon MSB 111/416.
The substance of which appeared in The Times on 1 March 
1906.
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scandal - viz* that this docile nonentity [Scott] after a
life devoted to the manufacture of shot and shell,
should by Brodrick’s action, taken upon Kitchener’s advice,
he sitting and voting upon the foreign policy, frontier
policy and internal achninistration of every branch of the
1Government of India.” The position of the new Army Secretary 
to the Government of India was, for all purposes, an academic 
one* Conscious of this hut debarred from calling attention 
to the matter in Parliament, Curzon had little hope of draw­
ing public interest to his arid crusade, and was indeed
forced to set forth his case in a series of letters in the
2columns of Ihe Times. Strong though Morley*s position was, 
Curzon*s anathemas weighed heavily on his conscience, and 
the memory of them had a salutory effect on his subsequent 
outlook on the question of Indian army reform*
In his correspondence to India, Morley was careful
to draw particular attention to the prevailing mood of
Parliament and the Cabinet towards imperial affairs. He
informed Minto that
,fIhe new Parliament and the new Cabinet will 
be, in the highest degree, jealous both of 
anything that looks like expansion, extended 
protectorates, spheres of influence, and so 
forth: and of anything with the savour of
1* Curzon to Morley, 24 January 1906, Morley MSS 555*
2. See Ihe limes, 1 March 1906. Morley later abolished Scott 
(and~his department) who unnecessarily duplicated the 
military vote in Council| see Morley to Minto, 22 February 
& 7 March 1907, Morley MSS 573/2*
1
militarism about itB"
Morley professed himself "incurably suspicious1 of a policy 
dictated in the face of the House of Commons; moreover he 
emphatically rejected Kitchener*s tactics in threatening to 
resign should his cause not win favour with the authorities 
at home. He adamantly told Minto:
"Tou say that Lord K. told you he would resign, 
if what he calls dual control were restored. I 
have also seen a letter to one in this Office, 
in which he uses the 3ame language about 
resigning."
111 do not want Lord K. to resign; if he 
resigns, I should look on my efforts as to 
the controversy as a failure* At the same 
time, if I have done my best to master the 
arguments and to grasp the points, with my 
utmost diligence and impartiality, I am not 
at all afraid of facing the House of Commons 
or the public, even if he does resign. Nor 
shall I be moved by a hairsbreadth from what 
may seem the best course, by any threats of 
this sort* They are exactly the attempt of 
the military authority to over-rule the civil 
which public opinion here is least inclined to 
tolerate. It is a pity that he should be so 
undiplomatic as to begin by using language, 
which may or may not be needed to influence 2 
and affect me at the end of the discussions.M
In the meantime Kitchener relied upon Esher to bring 
Morley to a favourable decision over the changes he desired 
to introduce in the Indian army. Kitchener told Esher (1 
March 1906) that he had been "so completely misrepresented 
at home" that his case had been "entirely fost sight of
1. Morley to Minto, 2 January 1906, Morley MBS 573/1#
2. Ibid.
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or "become hidden wider the mass of lies that now surround
and envelop my personality*,lIt has been a trying time, but
thank God it is now overe It is a lesson to me to have
1nothing further to do with Army reforms Kitchener had 
good reason to believe that the Liberals would be disinclined 
to take up his schemes favourably in Parliament. His reputa­
tion and such incidents as the desecration of the Madhi's 
tomb and the production of his skull, and his unpopular 
methods of rounding up Boer prisoners in South Africa into 
concentration camps, caused serious criticism in Radical 
circles. One example will illustrate the misgivings aroused 
by Kitchener1 s autocratic personality.
In 1898 Winston Churchill (1874-1965) ka<l been 
personally snubbed by Kitchener at Omdurman and subsequently 
criticised his actions, particularly in his book, ffhe River
p
War. As a warm admirer of Curzonfs administration in India
(he had in 1898 proposed himself as an aide-de-camp to the
Viceroy), Churchill wrote on hearing of Curzon1s resignation:
"Unless the civil power is possessed of expert 
military information drawn from an independent 
and authoritative source, I do not see how a 
Viceroy can control finance or frontier policy...
I am quite certain that no Liberal Government .*. 
could possibly acquiesce in the position de­
manded by Lord Kitchener*"
Churchill asserted that he had in fact been an "unrelenting"
opponent of the Conservative party ever since 1898, and
1. Kitchener to Esher, 1 March 1906, in Esher, Journals, II, 
pp. 145-6. ~ ~
2. Churchill, W.8 ., (The River War, II, p.577# See also Lady 
Violet Bonham Carter T s Winston Churchill As I Knew Him,
pp.41-2.
rejoiced "over the melancholy and miserable aspect of the
Government today*," In reply Curzon welcomed the idea that
"the opinions which you entertain and for which I have
fought *.. are shared by an almost unanimous public opinion
in India* and not least strongly in the Army itself where
the coming dictatorship is viewed not only with apprehension
but with hearty disgust*" Gurzon considered it "inconceivable
that so great and disastrous a change should be thrust upon
India against her will* and behind the back of the House of
Commons"; and found "The silence of that House one of
2the most inexplicable phenomena of recent history*" Churchill 
had then informed Campbell-Bannerman;
"I am convinced that the new arrangement of 
duties in India gives excessive and Improper 
powers to the Commander-in-Chief: considering 
what has happened it seems to me that Kitchener 
is something very like a military dictator in 
India ,. ♦ I should propose to move an amendment 
to the address condemning the new arrangement* 
and asserting the paramount importance of the 
civil power in India*"
Churchill went on to tell the Prime Minister elect that he 
planned to have dinner with Morley on the night of 28 
October 1905* concluding: "I abhor military tyrants
Morley clearly had no illusions about the Commander^ 
in*-Chief1 s ambitions in India and Kitchener in consequence
1* Churchill to Curzon* 22 August 1905.
2* Curzon to Churchill* 5 October 1905.




was prepared to "expect the worst" from the Secretary of
State, But in the meantime Morley came under considerable
pressure from Esher, whom he respected and liked, and he was
persuaded to hold his hand before coming to any decision
connected with Indian army administration, Esher pointed to
Curzon*s limitations;
"There has been hitherto far too much paroch­
ialism in dealing with these matters, tempered 
by the temporary whim of the proconsular 
autocrat,Tf£^
Esher bombarded Morley with a constant stream of visitors 
including military experts, and such partisans as Hubert 
Hamilton and Douglas Haig and, later, Duff, each individually 
suggesting strategic points on India for Morleyfs considera-
Z
tion. Esher moreover forwarded copies of Kitchener!s 
letters directly to the King, expressing his private satis­
faction "that Mr* Morley will show the same spirit of con­
ciliation and fairness to these proposals as to those with 
which he has already dealt" and that Morley "has consented 
to write privately to both Lord Kitchener and Lord Minto,
Zl
before he arrives at any decision," Esher secured Kitchener 
access to Morley on two conditions: (1) "That you are always 
ready to discuss frankly any scheme of yours, provided that 
you know that a serious attempt is being made to arrive at
1, Kitchener to Esher, 1 March 19065 Esher, Journals, II, 
pp0145-6, ‘
2, Esher to Morley, 15 March 1906$ Ibid,, pp,150-1,
5, Bee Esher to Morley, 23 January 1906; Ibid,, p,139*
4, Esher to Edward VII, 22 March 1906$ IbIH77 pp.151-2*
a just and fair decision1* and (2) "That he will always find
you amenable to reason and open to conviction, provided
that discussion is above board, and that there is no attempt
1at intrigue«"
Despite EsherJs flair for mediation, he held power 
without responsibility and his intervention often produced 
unfortunate consequences. Part of the friction between Minto 
and Morley in 1907 occurred when Minto learned that Morley
p
had asked Kitchener to correspond regularly with him, which 
he resented as another instance of MorleyTs autocratic 
meddling in Indian affairs. What Minto probably did not know 
was that it was Esher, not Morley who originally and indepen­
dently proposed the correspondence - first to Kitchener (21 
December 1905) and then to Morley (15 March 1906).^ In 1910 
Minto incorreo.tly reported that Morley fs dislike of Kitchener 
,Twas largely due to Kitchener !s refusal to correspond with 
him behind my back*1 and that Morley resented this: *'how
ZL
biassed he [Morley] is o’*
In the meantime Morley came to grips with the Govern­
ment of India by explaining his firm intention to make the 
position and function of the new Army Secretary sufficiently 
independent to guarantee constitutional control of the army
1. Esher to Kitchener, 6 April 1906, Esher, Journals, II, 
pp0157“Sfl
2. See Minto to Morley, 14- March 1907 j Minto MSS 1007.
5. See Esher, Journals, II, pp*131-2, 150-1*
4. Minto to Arthur Bigge, 5 July 1910, Minto MSS 998.
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"by a civilian colleague* Accordingly, on 9 February 1906,
Morley drew up a powerful despatch ordering an end to any
alleged conflict 'between civil and military authorities and
any further "prolongation of fruitless and injurious con- 
1
troversy." Nevertheless Mintofs Council were themselves 
divided, four to three, over Morley1s proposed alterations 
to the Army and Supply Departmentsf whiSh Arundel, Ibbetson, 
Hewett and Richards opposed Kitchener, Scott and Baker 
support^flh Minto* [The proceedings were then published in a 
special Gazette of India on 17 March 1906.]
After a yearfs trial however, Morley was convinced 
that the practical working of the new scheme sufficiently 
justified raising the question of whether the Supply Depart­
ment, which did little work and contributed nothing whatever 
to the Government of India, could safely be abolished. Morley 
argued that if this were possible, and the Supply Office
were transferred to the Army Department and disposed of,
2
great financial savings would accrue. Within eighteen months 
the Department of Military Supply had proved otiose; and 
within three years, Brodrick*s rickety compromise which had 
annually cost Indian taxpayers 1,150,000 rupees, came to its 
peaceful demisee Kitchener, least willing to disturb or
1. See f urther Papers Regarding the Administration of the 
Army in”ln3-Ta1 No039 Qd. 2842'' (published February 1906)»
2. India Office to Government of India, 28 June 1907*
Despatch No <>105? Minto MSS 836.
cause a recrudescence of heated controversy, had mixed 
feelings* He advised Hinto to make no change, unequivocally 
asserting:
"I never advocated its creation and cannot 
oppose its abolition; but I greatly fear  ^
raking up the ashes of the old controversy*"
Because the system wan working so well, and because
personal relations with the docile Supply Member, Scott,
were so cordial, Minto and Kitchener opposed making any
2alterations whatever* But Morley saw no reason to continue
to pay a salary to an official who, though regarded by Minto
Government as popular and efficient, was in reality - accord
ing to Morley - "K.Ts mumbling shadow'1 who merely duplicated
the military vote in Council: "Scott and his Dept* must
vanish* No time should be lost in putting this expensive
35
abuse right*Accordingly, the post of Military Supply
ZL
Member was abolished on 22 January 1909, and thereafter 
Kitchener assumed personal control over Indian army adminis­
tration*
1* Kitchener to Minto, 14- March 1907, Minto MSS 980.
2o Minto to Morley, 14 March 1907, Minto MSS 1007*
3* Morley to Minto, 28 March 1907, Morley MSS 573/2*
4* India Office to Government of India, 22 January 1909, 
Despatch No.10* Minto MSS 836* kor a reason unknown to
me, Magnus gives the date as 1 April 1909; see Kitchener,
pP225® See also Morley to Minto, (Telegram, 23 January
1909, Minto MSS 984 0 Minto had tried to suggest that it 
was Curzon who was after all responsible for the Depart­
ment of Military Supply and even went so far as to blame 
him for its existence; see Minto to Morley, 9 October 
1907, Minto MSS 1007.
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As a measure of economy, Morley*s abolition of the
post of Military Supply met with, little opposition except
from Curzon, who asserted in a lords* Debate on 28-29 June
1909, "The fear I have is that if you leave things as they
are now, at some date which we cannot anticipate, and which
may be a date most inconvenient and most dangerous for us**
1disaster would overtake Indian army administration. Brod- 
rick*s compromise had proved expensive as well as ineffective, 
and the abolition of the Supply Member in January 1909 
created problems which Curzon foresaw in 1905; for the 
Coinmander-in-Chief, in his additional capacity as Military 
Member, now performed administrative as well as executive 
military duties. This chain of dual functions and responsi­
bilities became chaotic in the hands of his successors, and
confusion inevitably resulted* In the report of Sir William
2Nicholson*s Committee the procedures resulting from the new 
arrangement were described as "complicated and perplexing" 
with the result that cases were "not unknown of the Comman- 
der-in-Chief disagreeing with himself as Army Member*"^
The task of organising Army Headquarters in India 
and working that system in 1909 fell to Douglas Haig (Chief
1* Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 4th Session, Vol*II (Speech 
by Curzon 29 June 1909), col*106*
2. See Nicholson to Haldane, 11 July 1912, Haldane MSS 5909* 
Nicholson (1845-1918) was C*I.GoS. from 1908-1912*
3. See Charteris, ojgocit*, pp«48-50.Charteris was Haig*s 
Assistant Military"Secretary at the time.
of Staff from 1909-12). He characterised Indian army
administration on his arrival by recalling the comment
once made by Curzon: 111 rise from the perusal of
these papers filled with the sense of the ineptitude of my
1military advisers 0” (The pendulum had swung as Curzon had 
predictedo But it was a greater blow to the Government of 
India when in 1915-10 more than 30% of its force was des­
troyed in Mesopotamia, casting, in Lloyd George’s words 1!a 
baleful light upon the mismanagement, stupidity, criminal 
neglect and amazing incompetence of the military authorities 
who were responsible for the organisation of the expedition, 
and on the horrible and unnecessary suffering of the gallant
men who were sent to failure and defeat through the blunders
2
of those in charge,1* The Report of Royal Commission stated 
unequivocally that ’’This astounding system has only to be 
described to be condemned*”
Morley in the meantime loolced with a penetrating eye 
upon Kitchener’s projects for strategic railways, barracks 
and increased pay for the troops under his command. He 
explained his intention of cutting down military expenditure
ZL
and running the army along lines of strict economy. When
1. Bee Charteris, opoClt0, p®57*
2. Lloyd George, DT“Uar Memories, I (2 volume ed.) p.483.
3. The Report of RoyaT*13omirs^Ton, July 1917? Cd* 8610# 
Mesopotamia Commission, Part XI, ’Faulty Organisation of 
Indian Military Administration’, p.99-
4# Morley to Kitchener, 6 April 1906, Minto MSS 1006.
Kitchener arbitrarily demanded an increase of the forces at
his disposal in India, Morley suggested that, in view of what
he termed the 1Russian lull’ Indiafs military establishment
was ample to secure her from the threat of a Russian invasion®
He deprecated the idea that military efficiency depended upon
increased military expenditure and recorded:
"It is my place, as the honest broker, to help 
to reconcile the general necessities of His 
Majesty’s Government with the legitimate 
requirements of the Indian department of that 
Government."
Morley, like Curzon before him, had become the stern champion
of Indian revenues; "The War Office wants more money from
India, I want India to pay, not more, but less, in military
1expenditure»"
Kitchener attempted to parry that argument by point­
ing to the effects of Japanese success on Asiatic opinion 
which, he believed engendered the confidence "that they are 
capable of obtaining similar results ♦,* In India itself, 
the victory of Asiatics over Europeans has proved a stimulus 
and encouragement to those who, for various reasons, are 
discontented and disloyal® The lesson which they believe that 
victory to hold for them, is now the ordinary text of the 
speeches made by the party of sedition* That party, however, 
is noisy rather than important, and its strength, such that 
it is, lies at present among the less warlike races, and not
1* Morley to Kitchener, 6 April 1906, Minto MSS 1006*
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among those from which we draw our Native soldiers*1 None­
theless, Kitchener pointed to the disparity between armed 
white soldiers in India and the civilian Indian population, 
presenting the following ratios: Russian Central Asia, 1:92; 
Caucasus, 1:101; India, l:3>800a He concluded that to reduce 
his internal forces was to run the risk of internal disorder 
and though conceding that the destruction of the Russian 
fleet had materially weakened her at sea, pointed out that
her railway communications remained intact and thus her
n
strength in Central Asia was materially unchanged0 Morley 
was not wholly convinced by these arguments, as we shall see 
moreover, it is probable that during the period 1906-9 there 
was no danger whatever of a war between Oreat Britain and 
Russia along India’s frontiers.
At the same time it appears highly likely that 
Kitchener had other reasons for wishing to maintain (at 
India’s expense) a numerically large force* Here Kitchener 
merely pursued his customary practice, namely to keep as 
many troops as possible in India as reserves.. His assessment 
of the increased danger of internal revolt was a patent 
fraud* He told Morley: "India should bear her due share of 
the burden..*1 of the costs of Imperial defence. "The more, 
therefore, that you should reduce the forces out here, the 
greater will be the possible demand which England may have
1. Minute by Kitchener on the Anglo-Japanese Treaty (9 May 
1906), Minto MBS 836 (Probably written by Buff and signed
by Kitchener).
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to meet in case of emergency, and the less help will India 
he able to give to the Empire in case of need , elsewhere,"*" 
Kitchener persistently argued that the Indian army was not 
just concerned with the affairs of the sub-continent but 
must be systematically prepared for utilisation outside the 
frontiers of India, in conjunction with Great Britain!s other 
forces in the event of a world war, Morley declined to admit 
either the validity or the justice of that argument:
"I know you may say that India has a right to 
frame military schemes for which India pays.
Yes - but the India that frames the schemes 
is not the India that pays: just the contrary* .
Ihe India that frames is not India at all, but 
a body of Englishmen at Simla, And it is the 
business of us Englishmen at Whitehall to 
criticise and control e;xpenditure on behalf 
of the India on whom the other Englishmen lay 
the burden0n^
Yet Kitchener had one more card to play: Douglas 
Haig, upon leaving India in 1906, was determined to prepare 
for war. He had been appointed director of military training 
in England (1906-7) &n& subsequently transferred as Haldanefs 
Director of Staff at Army Headquarters (1907-9) with the 
task of co-ordinating military strategy in order to place 
British axmies on a war organisation. Duff Cooper wrote that 
"Haig*s mind was busy during these years" working out in 
detail schemes for military operations utilising the Indian
1, Kitchener to Morley, 30 April 1906, enc. Kitchener to 
Minto, Minto MSS 1005 o
2, Morley to Kitchener, 25 May 1906, enc, Morley to Minto, 
Minto MSS 1005,
army "outside the frontiers of India in the emergency of a 
world war" and that when these were discovered by Morley, 
"orders were peremptorily sent out from home that not only 
were all studies of this nature to be abandoned forthwith, 
but that also, incredible as it may seem, any plans of this 
nature that had been drawn up were to be destroyed," These 
orders were tacitly disobeyed and the plans carefully pre­
served so that, with the advent of World War I, troops were 
conveyed from India to Europe according to Haig's scheme,
including the details for the subsequent disastrous military
1operations directed from India in Mesopotamia, Kitchener 
was at his old game again. Moreover his desire for a strong 
political lobby at home may well have arisen from the uncer­
tainty of the financial support he could expect from the 
Liberal party in London, deeply pledged as it was to 
Retrenchment,
Indeed, following the fall of Balfour !s Government
at the close of 1905, a crisis sprang up concerning the
future of the Defence Committee, for Campbell-Bannerman -
as well as Morley and others of his colleagues - distrusted
that organisation. But as the result of the subsequent
efforts of Esher and Haldane, the Committee was "granted a
2probationary period," In the meantime several important
1. Cooper, D,, Haig, pp,29-30; see also Terraine, op,cit,, 
pp,48-49; alsoCharteris, J., op,cit,, pp,56-58*
2, Lord Hankey, The Supreme C o m m a n d ' I? p*51*
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developments occurred? affecting Britain and India equally. 
Two of these 5 the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance on 
12 August 1905 and the results of the Anglo-Erench Entente 
of 8 April 1904, had greatly modified the strategic and 
political concepts upon which Kitchener originally framed 
his reorganisation of the Indian army. Additionally? Russia*s 
defeat hy Japan checked the power of her possible offensive 
against India? and paved the way for the Anglo-Russian Con­
vention (31 August 1907)? obliging Kitchener to e:xpound a 
new doctrine regarding the defence of India. Besides elabora­
ting the cardinal principle of safe-guarding India from 
external attack whilst ensuring security against internal 
rebellion (in addition to preserving peace amongst the 
border tribes of the frontier and discharging the obligation 
of defending Afghanistan) Kitchener in a Memorandum on 21 
October 1907 held that the Indian army was now liable for 
service overseas for the purpose of Imperial defence. But 
he had to manage Morley carefully. He proceeded to discuss 
the possibility of complications arising from a Russian 
attack upon Afghanistan (with repercussions on tribal fanat­
icism? and on the bonds of religion which might well threaten 
the internal stability of India.) Kitchener observed that 
the consolidation of a Mohammedan Pan-Islamic movement 
coupled with the rise of Asian Nationalism would produce 
serious consequences? and stated that "Any reduction in our 
forces in India" would? amongst other things? "induce the
1Amir to pay less attention to our adviceo" He committed his 
authority to exploiting every pretext of military discontent 
amongst his army, the police and the forces of the Native 
States, in order as we have seen, to keep his military 
estimates and army reserves intact0 He reported to Lord 
Salisbury that
"Japan's {jump has fired the imagination of 
the Indians, and opened up to their minds 
possibilities previously unheard of* They 
cannot see how different they are in every 
way to the Japanese, and feel convinced that, 
if given the chance, they would do as well 
or better,"2
Nonetheless Kitchener in a crisis wanted the Government of 
India to act in order to crush discontent by methods of sub­
jugation and repression; Morley wanted not coercion, but a 
policy of co-operation and conciliation in India, with the 
army playing a minimum role.
Much has been made of the agitation and unrest 
following Curzon's partition of Bengal with its aftermath of 
sustained boycott and Swadeshi movements, culminating In the 
outbreak of sedition* After 1907, Kitchener never wearied in 
reporting and, as the Minto Papers now show, in exaggerating 
unrest in India* Yet like so many people, the Government of 
India often failed to appreciate the very great loyalty of 
the Indian masses and particularly the army who at the time
1. Memorandum of 21 October 1907, Minto MSS 978*
2* Arthur, G*, op*cit*, II, p*238.
were still uneducated, largely illiterate and wholly 
inexperienced in political activity, despite the glowing 
optimism of the Indian National Congress * However, in order 
to prevent undue attention being paid to unrest, Morley 
reported (3 May 1907): "If there be a scintilla of real 
evidence that seditious rags are infecting the Native Army, 
nobody would refuse their suppression1 but he ascribed the 
danger more to "your law and order people, who are responsible 
for at least as many of the fooleries of history as revolu­
tionists are" adding, "You won!t forget that in moments of 
excitement . *. people are uncommonly liable to confuse
p
suspicions and possibilities with uncertainty and realitye"
x
As Dr* Mehrotra has suggested, Morley felt that it 
was India*s cast-iron bureaucracy which constituted the 
greatest menace to the Empire; and that the British Demos 
must maintain a strict vigil over the !Ichinovniks *, his 
term for civil servants in India whose methods and outmoded 
ideas of rule by the sword must be diluted and tempered by 
wider liberal sympathies. But he also was unwilling to commit 
the grand folly of acting wholly on principle, without 
regard to practicalities or circumstances - hence his asser­
tion that it was neither "desirable or even conceivable, to
1* See especially Report of the (Twentieth Indian National 
Congress, 1904, pT37I “
2. MorleyTo Minto, 3 May 1907, Morley MSS 573/2.
3« Mehrotra, S„R&, India and the Commonwealth 1885-1929? P#47*
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adopt English political institutions to the nations who
inhabit India0 Assuredly not in your day or mine. But the
1spirit of English institutions Is a different thing.*." In 
these circumstances, acting through Esher, Kitchener employed 
the techniques he had so successfully applied against 
Curzon; for he had learned that it was essential to manipu­
late the Home Government in order to carry forward his 
schemes in India. Hitherto, Kitchener had referred those 
schemes direct to the Defence Committee, either through 
Clark, Haig or Esher himself. By converting that body and 
thus ranging behind him an important segment of expert 
military opinion, including strong support from Haldane in 
the Cabinet, he would be placed in a powerful position with 
Morley. In the meantime Esher would effectively prepare the
ground by writing directly to Morley espousing Cabinet and
2
Defence Committee strategic doctrine. Esher rightly guessed 
that the public in India and in Britain neither knew nor 
cared about the details of army administration in India so 
long as a definite policy was laid down; and he considered 
that Parliament was rather inclined to favour Kitchener!s 
schemes once they had been adopted by the Committee of 
Imperial Defence and the Cabinet.^ In the meantime Kitchener
1. Morley to Minto, 6 June 1906, Morley MSS 573/1.
2. See Esher to Morley, 3 October 1906 & 9 Pebruary 1907? 
Journals9 II, pp.187-8, 220-1; also Esher to Edward VII,
21 January 1907? pp*217-8.
3. Ibid.
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got Duff to suggest to Morley that sedition had spread, 
how perilous it would he to yield to it, and that if there 
was going to he any extension of native rights, it would he
■l
necessary to increase India’s military forces• Though Duff
2reported ’’Morley is, as ycu know, very suspicious. • , " , 
Kitchener informed Lady Salisbury that ’’Duff has done a lot 
of good at home with Mr* Morley”. Nevertheless he explained 
’’Curzon’s agents do all they can to poison the S* of S.’s 
mind with most unwarrantable and baseless reports. I wonder 
he listens to them.”^  Here again such tactics repeated those 
employed in Kitchener's triumphant struggle against Curzon 
over Elies; and his demand that Indian army reserves he 
enlarged not only to cope with sedition, hut to take part in
ZL
a Continental conflict, formed part of a familiar pattern.
These proceedings taxed Morley and it was inevitable 
that the Secretary of State was extremely reluctant to 
consent to any part of their execution, even though the 
Defence Committee formally approved of the military policy 
of the Commander-in-Chief, supported as always by Minto *s 
Council. At the time, however, both Kitchener and Minto were 
furious with Morley for proposing the reduction of 'British
1. See Minto to Morley, 3 July 1907? Minto MSS 1007* See 
also Kitchener to Minto, 14 May 1907? Minto MSS 980 and 
18 May 1908, Minto MSS 982.
2. Duff to Kitchener, 22 February 1907? Minto MSS 980.
3. Magnus, Kitchener, p.231.
4*. See Minto MSS 97^, and supra, p. 4-50.
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troops in India, despite efforts at keeping the Home
Government well supplied with rumours of "unrest1' should
1further attempts he made at reduction* Such tactics, 
suppressio veri and suggestio falsi, coupled with Kitchen­
er1 s desire for the suppression of sedition once more 
reveals the divergence of outlook between the Government of 
India and Morley over Indian administration; and Morley lost 
no time in asserting his view that when Kitchener demanded 
more stringent powers he would in future "have to give us
facts *.* people will want chapter and verse for further
2
measures of repression" He characterised Kitchener's des­
cription of the perils of sedition (and of the necessity for 
a Press Act and increased subsidiary military garrisons)^ 
as a piece of "vague" and "solemn trumpery": "What more is
it than the sort of thing that is talked in any service club
n
any day of the year?" According to Morley Kitchener was 
becoming an alarmist by threatening general disaster should 
the army not receive more men and money; he expostulated: 
"Considering the difficulties and even dangers that surround 
us, it would be monstrous if there were the least departure 
from absolute straightness on his part."^ He pronounced: "if
1* See Minto to Morley, 31 July 1907, Minto MSS 100?; also 
8 April 1908, Minto MSS 1008«
2. Morley to Minto, 11 July 1907, Morley MSS 573/2.
3. See Minto to Morley, 10 July 1907, Minto MSS 1007*
4* Morley to Minto, 2 August 1907? Morley MSS 575/2.
5« Ibido, 4 September 1907*
half the attention had "been given during the last four years 
by certain military authorities to the Native Army that has 
been given to fear of Russia" the G-overnment of India might
well have escaped its present difficulties. Returning to a
predominant theme, distrust of Kitchener’s intrigues, Morley 
wrote;
,fI am rather struck by the immense quantity
of underhand, crafty, and slightly disloyal
correspondence constantly going on. Certainly 
the embers of the old [Curzon] quarrels are 
still smouldering.,. "1
When these suspicions appeared confirmed he pointed out
bluntly;
TtWe have to work with a man whom we now know 
to be working against us behind our backs.
Morley feared that Kitchener was translating the Government
of India into a "military autocracy with a vengeance" and
seemed at one point prepared to maintain Kitchener in India
only for "preventing European panic.
When in 1908 Minto professed that Kitchener "is the
lL
very essence of caution as regards the frontier", Morley 
reminded him that it was Curzon who had "planted" the 
Commander-in-Chief in India and that there was never a 
"whisper of frontier trouble in his peace-making days*"^
1. Morley to Minto, 5 July 1907* Morley MBS 573/2*
2. IbidQ, 5 October 1907*
5. Ibid., 29 Kovembex^ 1907.
4*. Minto to Morley, 25 March 1908, Minto MSS 1008.
5« Morley to Minto, 15 April 1908, Morley MSS 573/5*
Morley felt, in fact, that reforms In India were in much
t
greater demand than increase in men and military expenditure;
in any case, a reduction of India’s military forces would
he "worth a hundred press laws" which the Commander-in-Chief
1advocated to curb sedition. These differences of political
outlook came to a head following a two years’ extension of
Kitchener's term, and to a climax when the Commander-in-
Chief pressed his ambition to achieve the coveted Viceregal
gaddi. On 15 March 1907 Morley had offered to prolong
Kitchener’s post as Commander-in-Chief as his period of
office was to expire In November 1907 and this Kitchener
then
accepted on 7 April. He/ followed up his letter by intimating
his desire for a holiday and he wrote to Morley on 24- Sep­
tember 1907 to ask permission to leave India early in 1908 as 
after "years of incessant work" his health was failing and 
he needed a rest. He had "ascertained that there will be 
no objection on the Viceroy’s part". Thereupon he outlined 
a holiday in the form of a long sea voyage to Singapore,
China and Japan, knowing he was debarred by law from re­
visiting Europe during his tenure of command* He represented 
that his visit was for the purpose of gaining the opportunity 
of "making myself acquainted with the conditions under which 
those regiments of native infantry serve which India lends
p
to the War Office for garrison duty." But his real reason,
1. Morley to Minto, 15 May 1908, Morley MBS 573/3*
2. Kitchener to Morley, 24 September 1907, Minto MBS 1007*
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as Tae informed Lady Salisbury (29 August 1907) was 'because
lie felt himself "a prisoner in India" and longed "to *be out
of it all", because Morley was being so "nasty", and allowing
1
him "no consideration*"
Only six months prior to that request Kitchener had 
told Morley of his tours of shooting along the frontier
2lamenting that he had "only got three tigers and three bears"o 
More concerned with the state of unrest than with bags of 
game the Liberal Minister curtly informed Minto on 31 October
1907:
"If the state of things warrants exceptional 
repressive laws, people might reasonably 
think that the Commander-in-Chief should be 
on the ground."3
To Kitchener, Morley wrote:
"It is only, I think, three or four months 
ago since I received, as the foundation of 
the case for sundry measures of repressive 
legislation, a strong memorandum of yours 
depicting the dangers of disaffection in the 
Indian Army as real and of imminent, if not 
even actual, urgency. In the state of things 
so emphatically pressed on my close attention, 
you won!t think it unnatural that I should 
feel uneasy at the idea of your being off the 
scene even for a week. Then there is another 
difficulty* You represent military things 
upon the Executive Council of the Governor- 
General. What is to become of them in your 
absence? You will not, I think, refer me to 
the head of the Military Supply Department?
Even if you did, I cherish the hope that this
1. Magnus, Kitchener, p.235®
2. Kitchener T^HKorley, 7 April 1907, enc. Minto to Morley, 
10 April 1907, Minto MSS 1007.
3. Morley to Minto, 31 October 1907, Morley MSS 573/2.
department may vanish, into limbo almost 
before you could start
Moreover, Morley added that "Indian military policy, in all 
its aspects" was to be a major topic of interest and import­
ance for some months to come* "Are we to hang it all up?", 
and thus leave military questions in the Council of the 
Governor-General "in a state of suspended animation" during 
his absence* "Again, is it safe to leave the Army Department 
in an experimental stage * *. how would the coach travel
p
without you?"
Magnus comments that in Morley
"Kitchener appreciated that he had met his 
match, and he withdrew his application for 
leave; the prompt award of a G.G.I.E. may 
have been intended as a kind of consolation. 
Nevertheless, for the first time in his life, 
Kitchener reacted by relapsing into idleness*., 
shooting tigers, exhibiting his orchids, 
arranging his porcelain, caring for his poodle, 
raising the ceilings of his suites of reception 
rooms and playing with his investments helped 
to solace Kitchener !s leisure during his last 
two years in India."5
But this period of inanition came to a close as the 
time drew near for decision on a successor to Minto and 
Kitchener had carefully to establish his claims* The Liberal 
Government were trying hard to place Kitchener In the 
relatively minor post of Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterr­
anean at Malta, which Kitchener accepted provisionally on
1. Morley to Kitchener, 7 November 1907, Minto MSS 981*
2. Ibid.
3. Magnus, Kitchener, pp.236-7*
the tacit assumption that it would lead to the Indian Vice- 
royalty* In the meantime his friends, abetted by King Edward 
pressed those claims from Londone Kitchener wanted Sir Beau­
champ Buff to succeed him in India but the India Office 
selected instead General 01Moore Creagh and his appointment 
was announced, along with the news that Kitchener was to 
become a Field Marshal on 10 September 1909 when he relin­
quished his post as Commander-in-Ghief in India and took up 
the holiday he had proposed earlier. In effect he timed his
trip to coincide roughly with the time when Minto would 
1
leave India*
In the meantime Kitchener was extremely confident
that he could freely advise Minto on Indian affairs and
amiably suggested that Scott might replace Creagh on Morley fs 
2Council. He told Minto that it was a "pity Lord Morley is
so entirely in the hands of those who surround him and so
entirely ignores the man on the spot"^ and that Morley* s
"predatory attitude" towards military administration in India
zl
were causing great harm. When, in 1908 Curzon was elevated 
to the House of Lords where he intended to attack Morley*s 
proposal to abolish the Department of Military Supply, 
Kitchener wrote that he would provide the necessary "notes 
on Curzon*s projected attack .** but that Duff would write
1* Magnus, Kitchener9 p<»242*
2. Kitchener 'to~lEn^o, 26 February 1909, Minto MSS 984-*
3. Ibido, 19 October 1908, 983*
4. IBicU, lelegram, 19 February 1909, 984*
the ammunition for the Secretary of State" for consumption 
1in London0 Kitchener had consulted Minto as to how he 
should proceed to obtain his final ambition, the Indian Vice­
royalty But those preparations were shattered when, on 20 
August 1909 Kitchener attended a farewell banquet at Simla 
in the course of which he -unwittingly read out, almost 
verbatim, phrases which Gurzon had delivered at the Byculla 
Club on 16 November 1905* That speech was symptomatic of the 
way in which Kitchener conducted his affairs for in composing 
his notes he had directed that Luff draft it for him,never 
for a moment thinking that Duff would crib it wholesale from 
Curzon himself* Minto was lamely forced to make excuses for 
a very unpleasant dilemma and when Lady Duff confessed that
it was one of her husband !s choicest pieces of work he con­
fided: "she of course is a raving mad ,„c lunatic” and that 
he was sorry, "it is such an intensely stupid thing to
happen at the end of his time” for in his period of "indo­
lence” he did little of his own work and "scarcely ever 
wrote his own notes on files", with the consequence that at 
times he [Minto] was forced to withdraw "a lot of nonsense
p
that had been written for him over his name*" Prior to this 
Morley!s confidence in Kitchener waned as he acidly commented 
that if Kitchener was idle what was to become of British rule
1* Kitchener to Minto, 28 January 1909, 984-; Duff did this in 
a long memorandum dated 5 February 1909* See Kitchener 
MBS 30/57/32*
2. Minto to Sir Arthur Bigge, 14 October 1909, Minto MSS 996•
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in India?: "Kitchener has "been indolent in these days - 
indolent both in mind and body, and cares more for cultiva­
ting his garden than for tending the prickly cactus, Homo,
1especially Homo Indicusu.
Minto moreover had naively confessed to Brodrick, now 
Lord Midleton, regarding the demise of his ill-conceived 
system:
1 None of us wanted the abolition of the Supply 
Department, but we couldn’t deny that, on 
public grounds, there was no excuse for con­
tinuing its existence# Being human, we only 
wanted to be spared the revival of old bitter­
ness and Morley was on perfectly sound ground 
when he said that, in the public interest, he 
could not accept such reasoning* As regards 
carrying out of military work, there was no 
reason for General Scott’s continuance in 
office# His presence on Council simply dup­
licated the military vote. Kitchener has 
supported me most loyally in all our disemis­
sions here, and as Scott has always followed 
Kitchener the position was most welcome to mei 
But one could not support it conscientiously.
The increase in work thrown on the Commander- 
in-Chief is mere imagination. It would be most 
unfair to say that Kitchener is idle, but yet 
it is a fact that he has had extremely little 
to do for a long time# I believe he never 
works after 2 P.M. - some people say never 
after noon! But T can vouch for his work 
being most easy*,,£^
Nonetheless Kitchener now took up the line that Indian army 
administration was in a state of critical transition, requir­
ing a strong hand to put down sedition whilst preparing India 
for its role within the systematic organization of the
1. Morley to Minto, 22 September 1909, Minto MSS 1009*
2* Minto to Brodrick, 29 July 1909? Minto MSS 996*
defences of the Empire„ He intimated, through Minto that a 
dangerous conspiracy within India was being directed at the 
British Government; Minto had in fact told Grey, the Foreign 
Secretary that "India is in such an inflammable condition 
that the agitators never lose an opportunity of jumping at 
anything which may set the place in a blaze again" and that 
at any moment someone might set "another spark to the powder 
magazine."’*' So frightened was Minto by rumours of revolution 
that in desperation he wrote in 1908 to Kitchener stating 
that there was "undoubtedly a murderous conspiracy in exist­
ence" and suggested that he arrange a military display of 
force in Calcutta by "a march through the bazaars", attribut-
p
ing the evil influence to "a Curzonian combination."
As the question of Minto’s successor began to grow 
warm the legacy of the Curzon-Kitchener controversy played 
an important part as key factions became aligned behind one 
or the other of the candidates proposed for the gaddi: Col® 
Arthur Bigge, the private secretary of the Prince of Wales 
wrote:
"A large party headed by the King and Prince 
of Wales want Kitchener: Morley seems to be 
undecided, but I imagine the Cabinet will 
never agree to Kitchener unless things get 
worse in India [especially] if there is to 
B e a  roWo"3
Kitchener intrigued constantly to prey on the fears of the
1. Minto to Grey, 3 February 1908, Minto MSS 995*
2. Minto to Kitchener, 6 December 1908. Minto MSS 983.
3. Bigge to Minto, 8 February 1910, Minto MSS 996*
467
and
Home Government/to provide sufficient alarm to suit his
cause* He calculated that these fears would support his 
1candidature, following several important meetings after his 
arrival in England on 26 April 1910, Kitchener discovered 
that Morley was actively against him and that Sir Charles 
Hardinge, the Permanent Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office 
was strongly favoured* Hardinge later wrote that during the 
discussions (which lasted over three months) Kitchener had 
openly campaigned in his own favour and that it was., only when 
the King died une:xpectedly on 6 May 1910, that the way was 
cleared for Hardinge !s own appointment: "Most people consid­
ered Kitchenerfs appointment to he almost a certainty"
Hardinge recorded, adding that Sir Walter Lawrence had 
visited him at the Foreign Office to report the fact that he 
"had met Kitchener in Belgrave Square, who stopped him . •. 
and ashed him to tell me that it was impossible for anybody 
to fill properly the post of Viceroy unless he had private 
means of at least £8000 a year"o So sure was Kitchener that
he would get the appointment "that he had actually appointed
2his personal staff, whose names I knew*"
It fell to Morley to uphold the work of the Indian 
Councils Act of 1909 and to point out that Kitchener!s 
appointment would destroy the goodwill created by that reform*
1* See Kitchener to Haldane, 26 February 1910, Haldane MSS 
5909.
2* Hardinge, Old Diplomacy, pp0 187-9. See also Hardinge to 
Minto, 8 July l9'i0? liinto MSS 990*
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He asked Haldane, "would his name strike the people in India
favourably and hopefully; or would it be the symbol of rule
by the sword; of reaction from the policy of the last few 
1years?" Four years earlier Morley had felt impelled to re­
iterate his stern adherence to the sacred maxim that military 
power must be subordinated to civil control. That philosophy 
was reflected in a delightful passage written while visiting 
Windsor Castle when he cautioned against further intrigues 
on KitchenerTs part; he told Haldane:
"I warn you that I write this under the very 
roof where Charles I was carried awayjlo^have*"^^/'/. 
his head cut off for trying the..,sam^ '^ tricks in 
army affairs and that LMml spirit ... lives, 
so long as there is breath in the body of John p 
Morley - Let tyrants and their minions tremble]"
Morley told Minto that if Kitchener were appointed 
he would feel inclined to resign, "for such an appointment 
would be to plant an Indian system on a military basis.
Even Minto reported hearing from Gokhale that his appointment 
"would look like punishing a naughty school-boyi" and that 
there certainly would be much of this feeling in India.
Minto in fact was not privately certain of the advisability 
(on public grounds) of sending Kitchener although It "would 
satisfy the people at home who think that in him they would 
secure a !blood and thunder1 soldier, who would stand no
1* Morley to Haldane <, 5 May 1910, Haldane MBS 5909.
2. Ibido, 9 June 1906, 5907.
5. Morley to Minto, 17 March 1910, Morley MBS 573/5.
4. Minto to Dunlop-Smith, 29 March 1910, Minto MSS 996.
damned nonsenseFinally as opinion hardened, Minto
reported:
T,Haldane wants him to succeed me to get him 
away from the War Office* Morley says nothing 
will induce him to send him to India and 
Curzon says he wonrt serve in a Conservative 
Cabinet if he does go to IndiaI and the 
Royalties insist on his coming here.”2
It was clear that a military dictatorship in India would set
the clock of reform back* The dregs of the old Curzon-Kitch-
ener quarrel had been stirred and Morley moved to resolve the
issue once and for all.
Morley informed the Cabinet that if they insisted on 
sending Kitchener to India they must expect his resignation^ 
and Asquith, who strongly pressed Kitchener1 s claims, was 
unwilling to permit Morley to resign on that issue alone 
In these circumstances It was decided that Hardinge should 
be appointed to succeed Minto and on 9 June 1910 Morley sent 
Kitchener this message:
nAt last, after some delay, for which I am not 
responsible, a decision has been reached about 
the Indian Viceroyalty 0.* We are not going to 
invite you to go back in a new capacity * * *
The sole difficulty arises from misgivings as 
to the impressions which would be likely to c- 
arise In India from a military appointment*
That letter conveyed to Kitchener nthe most bitter
1* Minto to Dunlop“Smith, 6 April 1910, Minto MSS 996.
2. Minto to Arthur Elliot, 17 May 1910, Minto MSS 996.
3. See Morley to Asquith, 5 June 1910, Asquith MSS 23*
Ao See Roberts to Minto, 16 June 1910, Minto MSS 996.
5* Morley to Kitchener, 9 June 1910, Kitchener MSS 30/57/31*
1disappointment" of his life* But the meanest historian 
owes something to truth5 Morley had watched the downfall of 
one Viceroy and refused to witness his own demise as Secre­
tary of State under pressure from Kitchener* His decision 
was eminently sound and, together with Curzon1 s prophecy, 
was vindicated by the process of historical events*
(3) Retrospect
Any adverse judgement passed on Curzonfs Viceroyalty 
after 1902, because it appeared unpopular and wrong-headed, 
must be tempered in the light of his struggle with Kitchener 
over Indian army administration* His crusade against racial­
ism and for the principle of social justice led the master­
ful Viceroy to incur the wrath of the army as well as his 
own European community; moreover the feud with the Indian 
army in the last resort was symptomatic of our judgement of 
his conduct - he did the right thing in the wrong way* As an 
enemy of military pretensions he appeared to have fallen 
victim to them in his own defeat *
His dispute with the Commander-in-Chief merely exac­
erbated friction in India Ts relations with the Home Govern­
ment and the Cabinet, preoccupied with responsibilities 
acquired in the aftermath of the Boer War, were determined
1* Magnus, Kitchener, p«251«
to avoid fresh, committments especially in Central Asia. That 
relationship and the fact that the Home Government had more 
confidence in Kitchener's ability than in Curzon1s policy, 
produced unfortunate consequences in India's external rela-
i
tions with Tibet and Afghanistan, and had its bearing on the 
problem of Indian army administration.
Curzon resigned when Kitchener insisted on doing away j  
with the Military Member in August 1905? and one of the most 
disfiguring after-effects of their quarrel was its legacy of
bitterness which obscxn?ed more fundamental issues in Indian i
!
i
administration, notably the Partition of Bengal. Yet the 
verdict which Curzon passed on the conduct of the Home Gov- j 
ernment in these proceedings was neither as harsh nor unjust i 
as the one they passed on him. Inspired by a profound sense 
of duty, Curzon was a proud, self-willed man of outstanding 
ability who pursued high ambition by none but worthy means; 
his quarrel involved therefore not only a clash of tempera­
ment, but a genuine divergence of opinion about the best 
method of advancing the interests of India and of an Empire 
to whose service his life was dedicated* Indeed the contro­
versy over Indian army administration reveals wider differ­
ences in the political outlook of British statesmen generally, i
|
in their control of India's destinies. |
j
It is perhaps worth noting that though British 
statesmen professed to agree to the abstract idea that India
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should "be independent of the shifts of politics in England, 
Indian army administration was in many respects an exception. 
(The army (at least theoretically) was the servant of the 
Indian nation rather than its master, as Golthale rashly 
remarked to Kitchener at a debate during the Legislative 
Council at Calcutta (28 March 1906).^ The debate of these 
questions during Curzon*s administration and in the after- 
math of his resignation inevitably pulled India and the army 
into the arena of English party politics. Kitchener*s secret 
contacts played here a key role, for they had no scruples 
whatever in plunging into the world of journalism and poli­
tics to put across his schemes, and the view that disaster 
would follow if they did not prevail. At the time, the hap­
less Minister for War, H.O. Arnold-Porster, remarked (in 
another context) in Parliament:
"I find I am dealing with at least six armies*
I am dealing with the Army in India, the 
Indian Army, the Army at Home, the Militia, 
the Volunteers, and the great army of those
who have left the colours and are now en­
trenched in the clubs of this city."
Curzon retired from public life for ten years, while 
Kitchener with Minto*s help made the role of the army much 
too important in Indiafs internal affairs, to the dismay of
Indian taxpayers. With the outbreak of war in 1914, the
subsequent campaign in Mesopotamia raised a series of
1. Parliamentary Papers, Session 1906, vol.81, Proceedings 
of the Viceroy*s Legislative Council, Calcutta, 28 March 
1906, p.165.
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critical problems concerning Kitchener!s administrative 
arrangements; and, as Curzon had predicted, (as late as 
1913),^ they ended in disaster0
Personality and not administration was one of the 
central themes in the dispute between Curzon and Kitchener * 
Curzon occupied an extremely precarious position after the 
renewal of his Viceroyalty - for he depended for his support 
upon two factors: opinion in India (including the army) and 
that of the Conservative party in power. In addition, although 
Curzon may be likened to Haldane at the War Office, pledged 
to his policy of administrative reforms, he was forced to 
resign not because he lacked vigour, but because he was 
deemed to have pushed his policies too vigorously* Profoundly 
distrusting the motives of his official superiors in White­
hall and their designs on India, his solution was no solution 
at all; he placed too much emphasis on the dignity of his 
office, spending too much time stating his case, and too 
little facilitating agreement, as his letter to Ihe limes 
of 1 March 1906 so well illustrates;
le Speech at the Eelventh Annual Calcutta Dinner, 11 June 
1913? Curzon of Kedleston, Subjects of the Day, p<»73* 
uWhen I left India I prophesied th^^the^^system of mili­
tary administration which had been set up by the Govern­
ment at home against the advice of the Government of 
India, and over which I resigned, must result in confusion, 
if not in chaos, and that the attempt to combine in one 
person the positions of Commander-in-Chief and War Member 
in one office&the functions of Headquarters Staff and War 
Office must inevitably break downe"
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"To me it seems a most serious and ominous 
tiling that a home Government should lightly 
assume the responsibility of overruling, and 
contemptuously overruling, a united Government 
of India on matters not of external Imperial 
policy, but of its own internal Constitution; 
and still more ominous that the decision should 
have been so against the civil and in favour 
of the military power*"1
Morley was more perceptive. He was determined to 
alter the machinery of the Indian Government to suit changed 
circumstances in India and the growing democratic opinion at 
home. In his vieitf, sympathy was more important than effic­
iency, and reform as opposed to repression, must be imple­
mented, "Reforms1' he wrote to Minto in 1908, "may not save
p
the but if they don't, nothing else will," Nowhere
was there a more marked divergence of political outlook than 
in the soldier-administrator1 s reply to the Liberal states­
man; "You say" Minto wrote back, "that reforms may not fsave 
the Raj1; they certainly will not, though if they are thought­
fully introduced they may help to render its administration 
happy* But when you say that 1 if reforms do not save the Raj 
nothing else will1 I am afraid I must utterly disagree, The 
Raj will not disappear in India as long as the British race
remains what it is, because we shall fight for the Raj as
hard as we have ever fought, if it comes to fighting, and 
we shall win as we have always won*"-' That was also Kitchenerfs
Ike Times, 1 March 1906,
2, MorleyHJo Minto, 7 May 1908, Morley MSS 573/5*
3* Minto to Morley, 28 May 1908, Minto MBS 1008.
philosophy* In the fundamental difference "between ends and 
means, lies the friction created hy Kitchener in his manoeuv­
ring to place Indian administration under ?rule hy the strong 
hand1.
Morley!s conduct of Indian army affairs marked hut
a stage of the larger struggle foreshadowed hy the election
of 1906 which hegan in earnest in India with the Reforms of
1909: "the main objective of our proposals was to give
Indians "a new and widened share" in the administration of
their affairs: "these changes entitled us to claim that they
would place the representatives of various classes in more
effective positions hoth in policy and administration, and
so would in effective principle go some way to a new chapter
in Indian government . •« the port to which tide, winds 3 and
1
seamanship destined us*"
MorleyTs philosophy gives us the key to the struggle 
over Indian army administration from 1899 to 1909? for 
during that time three patterns of thought emerge: the 
Imperial Ihesis propounded hy Curson; the Military Antithesis 
advocated hy Kitchener, and the Liberal Synthesis of Morley. 
Ihe result of that struggle reveals that Indian interests 
often became secondary to an exaggerated emphasis on the role 
of the army* As hoth soldiers and statesmen became sedu­
lously involved in the dubious warfare of press and political
lo Morley, Recollections, II, pp*160-1*
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propaganda, secret correspondence and "backstairs intrigue 
in order to gain their ends, and as each indulged in new 
techniques of mass media and political lobbying - threatening 
imminent resignation unless their views prevailed - India 
watched* When Gokhale learned that Kitchener's reorganisation 
scheme was to cost the Indian taxpayer over 10 mi Ilia® 
sterling, he blurted out:
"I fear that a protest in this country against 
the military policy of the Government and the 
ceaseless and alarming growth of our military 
burdens is almost like a cry in the wilderness...M
Kitchener's defeat of Curzon over the question of 
the Military Member could scarcely^a more blatant example 
of military interference in the internal politics of India* 
Conservative Ministers in London were not adverse to exploit­
ing that situation to the full; and the India Office 
justified its procedure in overruling Curzon, on the grounds 
that there were times perhaps when it was right to act 
unconstitutionally0 Yet it is the only instance in modern 
times when an acting Commander-in-Chief has been, in con­
junction with the Cabinet, brought in to defeat a Viceroy 
on what was essentially a non-military Issue, concerning the 
composition of his own Government. With the exception of 
Morley, no one wished to risk Interfering with the new 
arrangement, all the more delicate because of the prestige
1. Parliamentary Papers, Session 1906, vol*81, Proceedings 
of the Viceroy's Legislative Council, Calcutta, 20 March 
1906, p.157*
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attached to Kitchener1 s reputation* That situation - and the 
one it created - was indefensible,,
In the meantime, circumstances in India were changing 
rapidly. Japan emerged victorious from her combat with 
Russia and as Gokhale noted, a new spirit hammered away at 
British rule "the whole East is today throbbing with a new 
impulse - vibrating with a new passion and it is not to be 
expected that India alone should continue unaffected by 
changes that are in the very air around us ... What this 
country needs at this moment above everything else is a 
Government national in spirit, even though it may be foreign 
in personnel, - a Government that will enable us to feel 
that our interests are the first consideration with it and
0VJ} wishes and opinions are to it a matter of some 
1
account*u
In the struggle for Indian army reform these impulses 
were disregarded* Improvisation came about as the result of 
differences in British political outlook; in Curzon, Kitch­
ener and ^orley we see outlined the principles of Imperial­
ism, absolutism and Liberalism, and their ramifications had 
a powerful Impact in India afterwards. Though we are not yet 
ready to assess the levelling or far-reaching effects of
1. Parliamentary Papers, Session 1906, vol.81, Proceedings 
of the Viceroy’s Legislative Council, Calcutta, 28 March 
1906, p*225o
these patterns of thought, all three helped mould events.
There was Curzon:
"If our Empire were to end tomorrow, I do not 
think that we need he ashamed of its epitaph, 
it would have done its duty to India, and 
justified its mission to mankind ... I am not 
one of those who think that we have huilt a 
mere fragile plank between East and West which 
the roaring tides of Asia will presently sweep 
away* That is not the true reading of history 
... To me the message is carved in granite, it 
is hewn out of the rock of doom - that our  ^
work is righteous and that it shall endure."
There was Kitchener telling Gokhale;
"Owing to recent events, we have a breathing 
space in which to complete the precautionary 
measures which have been recognised to be 
indispensible" for the Indian army. Military 
eixpenditure "is a simple, rudimentary obliga­
tion in the relations between master and 
servant" "to secure efficiency and economy In 
all matters - particularly military*
There was Morley:
"... how intensely artificial and unnatural 
is our mighty Raj» And it sets one wondering 
whether it can possibly last* It surely can­
not, and our only business Is to do what we
can to make the next transition, whatever it ^
may turn out to be, something of an improvement."^
1, Speech at Guildhall, 20 July 1904, Raleigh, opoCit*, p*47*
2. Parliamentary Papers, Session 1906, vol*81, Proceedings 
of the Viceroy9s Legislative Council, Calcutta, 28 March 
1906, p.X65ff*
3® Morley to Minto, 15 August 1907? Morley MSS 573/2.
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Vol.403 - MSS notes to Lhe limes etc.
Vol.404 - Secret minutes by-Curzon, Kitchener, Lansdowne; 
army administration 1904-1916
Mi s ce 1 lane ous Co rr e spond.ence ( cent *)
Vol.405 - Letters, inc. Kitchener, etc. 1899-1920 
Vol.406 - Correspondence on the Curzon-Kitchener controversy, 
C.1905
Vo1.407 - Correspondence re Indian military administration 
October 1905-April 1906 
Vo1.408 - Further correspondence re Indian military adminis­
tration April 1906-May 1920 
Vol.409 - Curzon to Balfour etc. re political situation in 
India 1908-9
Vol.410 - Lovat Fraser on military administration etc*
January 1908
Vol.411 - Lovat Fraser on military administration etc. 
February 1908
Vol.412 - 7 copies of fPrivate Correspondence relating to
military administration in India, 1902-1905* inc. 
Curzonfs annotated copy 1905 
Vol.413 - Summary of Lord Curzonfs administration re Military 
Dept. 1906
Vol*414 - Summary of Lord Curzon1s administration re Military 
Dept, (marked copy) 1906 
Vol.415 - Summary of Lord Curzon1s administration re Military 
Dept. (2nd edition) 1907 
Vol.416 - 16 copies of pamphlet on military administration 
by Curzon 1906 
Vo1.417 - Proof sheets of Parliamentary Debates, Lords 
June 1909
Vol.418 - Newscuttings on controversy c. 1905
Vol.419 - Album of press cuttings etc. 1905-1916
Vol.420 - Letters & telegrams on Curzon*s resignation 1905
Vols. 421-425 - Duplicates of 420
Vols. 426-433 - Papers relating to India, after Lord Curzon’s
Viceroyalty 1906-1925 (in folders alphabet­
ically arranged).
Vol.468 - Scrapbook containing press cuttings;
vol.6 1898: 1904-6
vol.7 Dec. 1905-8 
Vol.469 - Scrapbook containing press cuttings 5 vol.10 1908-10 
Vols.506-508 - Summary of Curzon’s administration In
Military Dept. Parts I, II & III (2 vols.) 
Vol.509 - Summary of Despatches - appendix 
Vol.510 - Summary of Despatches - appendix 
Vols. 511-517 - Legislative, Finance, Commercial, etc.
Vols. 518-522 - Home Department 
Vols. 523-543 - Foreign Department
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B. OTHER ERIVATE PARERS
Amp thill Papers: (Papers of the 2nd Baron Ampthill 
"(1869-193577'"Vrceroy of India 1904) at the India Office 
Library, MSS Eur. E.233
2, Asquith Papers; (Papers of Asquith, Herbert Henry, 1st
Earl of Oxford and Asquith (1852-1928), Prime Minister
1908-1916) at the Bodleian Library, Oxford by kind 
permission of Mr. Mark Bonham Carter, MSS 10/149
3. Balfour Papers: (Papers of the 1st Earl of Balfour
'(1848-1930)V Prime Minister 1902-1905) at the British 
Museum, ALL MSS 496 98ff.
Campbell-Bannerman Papers; (Papers of Sir Henry Campbell- 
Bannerman (1836-1908), Prime Minister 1905-1908) at the 
British Museum, ALL MSS 41223 ff*
5* Haldane Papers: (Papers of Viscount Haldane of Cloan,
(1856-1928), Secretary of State for War 1905-1912) at 
the National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh, MSS 5906 ff.
6* Kilbracken Papers; (Papers of Sir Arthur Godley, 1st
Bliron'Kiibracken of Killegar (1847-1932), Permanent- 
Under Secretary of State for India from 1883-1909) at 
the India Office Library, MSS Eur* P.102
7. Kitchener Papers; (Papers of Herbert Horatio, 1st Earl
Kitchener of Khartoum (1850-1916), Commander-in-Chief 
of the Indian Army 1902-1909) at the Public Records 
Office, MSS 30/57/ff.
8* Marker Papers: (Papers of Major, afterwards Lt. Colonel,
Raymond’ VFohn'Marker (1867-1914), A.L*C. to Lord Kitchener
1902-1904, Private Secretary to H.O. Arnold-Porster at 
the War Office 1905) at the British Museum, ALL MSS 
52276-8
9* MetcalfePapers; (Papers belonging to Lady Alexandra
Nardera ITetcaTfe, b. 1904, youngest daughter of Lord 
Curzon) relating to the personal correspondence of
Lord Kitchener with the 1st Lady Curzon 1902-1905
10. Midleton Papers: (Correspondence of William St. John
BTO^rTcFr^Ts-TEarl of Midleton (1856-1942), Secretary 
of State for India 1903-1905) at the British Museum,
ALL.MSS 50072-7*
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11, Minto Papers: (Papers of the 4th Earl of Minto (1845- 
I9I41) , Vxceroy of India 1905-1910) at the National 
Library of Scotland, Edinburgh} MSS M.
12, Morley Papers: (Papers of Viscount Morley of Blackburn,
('1S58-T923'J? "Seeretary of State for India 1905-1910)
at the India Office Library, MSS Eur* D.573
15* Ripon Papers: (Papers of the 1st Marquis of Ripon (1827-
1909), iord Privy Seal 1905-1908) at the British Museum, 
ADD. MSS 4551S ff»
14, Sydenham Papers: (Papers of George Sydenham Clarke, 1st 
Baron Sydenham of Combe (1848-1933)? Secretary of 
Committee of Imperial Defence 1904-1907) at the British 
Museum ADD, MSS 50851-50841
15* Salisbury Papers: (Papers of the 4th Marquis of Salisbury
'(I8nSr-T94?)7 W r d  Privy Seal 1903-1905? President of the
Board of Irade 1905* Ihough the Salisbury (or Hatfield) 
MSS are as yet unavailable, excellent use has been made 
of the material by Philip Magnus in Kitchener» Copies 
of many of Kitchenerfs letters to Salisbury^s wife,
Lady Cecily Alice Gore (1867-1955) appear in the Balfour 
MSS at the British Museum).
16, White Fg-pggs? (Papers of Pield-Marshal Sir George Stuart 
White (1835-1912) Commander-in-Chief of the Indian army 
1893-1898, Member of the India Office Committee of the 
Administration of the Army in India 1905) at the India 
Office Library, MSS Eur. F„ 108
C. OFFICIAL RECORDS
1. At the India Office Library:
Military Department Records, Misc. List, vol.43 (1905) 
Judicial and Political Index, vols, 705-74-0 (1905) 
Military Series (a) Home Correspondence - military etc. 
Minutes of the Council of India, vols. 94— 95 (January- 
December 1905)
Private Office File, MSS 374
List of Military Despatches 1898-1910 (4 vols.) MSS 111/ 
509/510 (see also summary of Curzon’s administration 
in the Military Department)
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2. Archives of the United States of America, Washington,
D.C*, State Department Decords:
India, Consular Records, Diplomatic Despatches, Calcutta, 
Letters, 1905-1910 (espo W aH0 Michael, B* 1845, Consul- 
General, Calcutta)
3# Papers of the Committee of Imperial Defence 1901-1909 
(C.I*D. Records 6/1/1D - etc*) Papers of the Defence of 
India, Series 1901-1909
4„ Cabinet Records - Bound Vols* Main Series 
Cabw 1 Cabinet Memoranda 1901-1909
Cab* 6 C*I*D* Papers on the Defence of India, Series
fD T, 1901-1909, 1905, vols* 76-80 (Cab^37/70 etc.)
D, REPORTS AND PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS
East India : Report of the Peel Commission 1859
East India : Report of the Indian Army Commission 1879
Elgin Report, Royal Commission on the War in South 
Africa, 1903*
Esher Report ; on the Committee of Imperial Defence,
(4 May 1904)
Correspondence and Further Papers on the Administration 
of the Army in India 1905-6
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Mesopotamia Commission Report 1917 
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Report of the Committee on the Administration and 
Organisation of the Army in India 1919-1920 (Chairman 
Lord Esher)
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The Times of India, Bombay
Young India, Ahmedabad
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